BMD op-ed

[Gordon Mitchell]

Hi friends.

If you have a spare moment I would appreciate backchannel feedback and 
suggestions on a draft of the op-ed pasted below (under review by the 
Boston Globe). I am always buoyed by the quality of constructive (and 
deconstructive!) criticism on works in progress that I float to this list.

Thanks,

Gordon

* * *

SECOND THOUGHTS ON SCARECROW DEFENSE
by Gordon R. Mitchell

So far the Bush administration?s missile defense plan has been short on 
specifics and heavy on hype, but signs of change are on the horizon. During 
NATO meetings earlier this month in Brussels, U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld started to get down to brass tacks, previewing for European 
allies details of some missile-busting systems currently on the Pentagon?s 
drawing board.

One plan calls for a crash effort to deploy a bare-bones battery of 
ground-based interceptors in Alaska by 2004.

The early deployment date for this rush job seems odd given that the most 
credible assessments do not forecast emergence of a real ballistic missile 
threat from "states of concern" until 2007 at the earliest. One explanation 
for the hurry-up could be that Bush?s missile shield is really a Democrat 
shield in disguise, designed to protect the GOP White House from political 
attack during the 2004 presidential campaign.

But apparently, missile defense?s true believers really think that throwing 
together a jury-rigged system as fast as possible is militarily sound. 
Rumsfeld put it this way to U.S. allies in Brussels: "As this program 
progresses we will likely deploy test assets to provide rudimentary 
defenses to deal with emerging threats."

Translation: The Bush administration wants to deploy missile defenses 
before showing they work!

What is the military logic behind such a peculiar strategy? Rumsfeld 
explains that when it comes to missile defense systems, "they need not be 
100 percent perfect" to have a deterrent effect on future adversaries.

Here, leaky shields are thought to work like scarecrows, frightening away 
enemies hell-bent on destroying the United States. This makes about as much 
sense as expecting a burglar to be deterred from theft by a sign reading: 
"Beware: house protected by untested and unreliable alarm system."

When confronted with such conundrums, Bush?s missile defense pitchmasters 
are wont to issue the fallback rejoinder: "Any defense is better than 
nothing."

However, recent disclosures from the office of Rep. John Tierney (D-MA) 
provide compelling reasons to question even this apparently straightforward 
pitch.

In a June 12 letter to top congressional leaders, Tierney reveals that for 
months, the Pentagon has squelched an internal report that "highlights 
severe deficiencies" in the National Missile Defense (NMD) testing program.

Phillip Coyle, former Director of Operational Test and Evaluation at the 
Pentagon, wrote the "National Missile Defense (NMD) Deployment Readiness 
Review" last August. Tierney, a member of the House Government Reform 
Committee, had to request this report six times from the Pentagon before he 
finally received a copy on May 31, 2001.

It is not hard to imagine why defense officials were reluctant to hand over 
Coyle?s report, which found serious problems with the NMD command and 
control system. In simulated tests the system mistakenly identified a radar 
signal as an incoming missile. The system then launched interceptors at the 
illusory missile after manual override attempts failed.

According to Tierney, Coyle?s report provides a sober warning to missile 
defense advocates seeking to rush deployment of immature systems: "One can 
imagine the potential hazards that could arise in future deployment 
scenarios if the United States launches multiple interceptors against 
missile that do not exist. One immediate danger in these types of 
situations is that adversaries may interpret these launches as a hostile 
first strike and respond accordingly."

President Bush is fond of touting missile defense?s potential to transcend 
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the nuclear doctrine that enshrines 
deterrence as the cornerstone of strategic stability. But in his haste to 
erect a scarecrow defense, Bush may usher in a new and even more dangerous 
kind of MAD ? Mutual Accidental Destruction.

Gordon R. Mitchell (gordonm at pitt.edu) is an Associate Professor of 
Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh. He is 
author of Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile 
Defense Advocacy (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2000).