[eDebate] Fwd: RE: Pedagogy-- Workers/Citizens/Advocates (REvisiting the Greene/Hicks debate)

Jean-Paul Lacy lacyjp
Fri Apr 21 02:22:50 CDT 2006

Interesting stuff begins when I start to argue about Hicks & Greene.

The "Worker Rule" stuff seems to be the current consensus (Of voters, I'm 
not sure.)


>From: Jean-Paul Lacy [mailto:lacyjp at wfu.edu]
>Sent: Fri 4/21/2006 2:26 AM
>To: Kuswa, Kevin
>Subject: Re: [eDebate] Pedagogy-- Workers/Citizens/Advocates (REvisiting 
>the Greene/Hicks debate)
>1. I agree that the rule ought to be: 'every person a school brings to the
>ndt should either be debating, judging a minimum of four rounds, or
>scouting a minimum of four rounds.  Observers can be given exemptions on a
>2. Even if you were "wrong" about your interpretation of the rule, my bad
>PMN still applies: the rule doesn't prohibit "work" by unregistered workers.
>3. I've got serious equity concerns about the rule: I've been thinking
>about how we would comply, & figure it would be easy for us:
>a. Move almost every important research assignment to a debater (basically
>b. Upgrade the squad's research skill. We've got a deep squad but haven't
>done as much as possible to maximize everyone's research skills. (Mostly
>because of existing rules) Engage in collaborative research with an
>emphasis on teaching for most of the season (That means coaches with
>primary roles updating time sensitive stuff step down...keep track of
>everyone's search terms & databases, etc so they can hand it off durng the
>NDT...Politics & other time sensitive updates (depending on the topic,) are
>too irrelevant to spend half our NDT card-cutting on them. *We should
>probably do all of the above no matter the rule.*
>c. Open Research: Ross & Pannetta's branchild. Still in the incubation
>stage. Basic idea: We share all our stuff with you with the understanding
>that you do the same. New programs are free to join without charge.
>Established programs need to contribute their share of the resources to
>keep the thing running. Uploads of "broken" files (in their entirety--you
>read a shell, the whole file goes up) happen on Tuesday or Wednesday. We're
>still working on the details. I hope it will happen next year, but there
>are political obstacles at Information Systems to overcome.
>4. Given all that, (if our undergraduate research education pans out, if
>the "Open reseach" thing works) I'm not sure if this is better than the
>status quo. Some people just don't have the undergrad resources to keep up.
>Responses to "mumbo" below...
> >8. Full circle to Greene and Hicks.  JP already posted the conclusion
> >pages.  A few moments in the piece deserve another read here.  The
> >distinction between Day and Muir is worth considering in terms of debate
> >today.  For Day, switch-side debate operates through a norm of free speech
> >that produces moral minds and souls.  This is why Jackie is so on-point
> >with his argument that the resolution (and the topic writing process)
> >produces ossification because its agent-lock tries to constitute a frozen
> >margin.
> >It has gotten so extreme that it is no longer about affirmative
> >flexibility (affs broke the chains years ago), but about the imposition of
> >a "debate proposition" that is partially closed for debate--a free speech
> >morality masking a Statecentric Free Speech norm.
>I wasn't explicit about this (and definitely didn't quote the passages you
>did, although I did think of responding to them) but I did (try to) write
>that Day's norm of requiring suspension of our own convictions when
>under-heard viewpoints are not present in public debate runs counter to
>normal free speech norms, which has significant implacations for how we
>write and debate topics. This also speaks to the current predicament about
>researcher participation in the NDT: The "marketplace" or "Statecentric"
>norm does not account for unequal access to the market.
> >When Muir defends debate, it is based on the gap between debater and
> >temporary conviction allowing pluralism but not relativism.  Ron Greene
> >shared an angle on this with me recently about the framing of Day's positi!
> >on.  Depending on the importance of the Cold War and McCarthyism, Day may
> >be more or less guilty of inscribing free speech through debate as a "safe
> >space for critique and advocacy" or as a "procedural apparatus designed to
> >capture the radical tendencies of the free speech movement."  More on this
> >insight as it is mulled over.
>Hmmm "Free speech zones" is the most recent eDebate referent. I do think
>the ideal of radical deliberative democracy is more attractive.
>In the meantime, more evidence:
> >
> >Greene and Hicks (2005 _Cultural Studies_ v19n1, pp100-126).  p118:
> >
> >" '...the central tendencies of switch-side debating are in line with
> >convictions built on emphatic appreciation for alternative points of
> >view...in a framework of equal access to ideas and equal opportunities for
> >expression, the truth that emerges is more defensible and more
> >justifiable' (Muir, p292).  For Muir, debate retains its epistemic value
> >while also taking on a new role in the moral development of students.  At
> >the same time, like Day, debating both sides performs internally on the
> >mind and soul of the student.  In the language of moral development, Day's
> >defense of free and full expression circulates as a universal norm to
> >guide the interaction between interlocutors.  For Muir, Day's defense is
> >curiously absent, but it is important to note how Muir reassigns
> >conviction to the process of generating morally sounds
> >judgments.  According to Muir, the game of debate is redeemed on the
> >terrain of moral development because it gives students the distance from
> >acting on the!
> >ir arguments, helping to secure the possibility of respecting pluralism
> >without risking moral relativism."
> >
> >A few paragraphs later, after going through the concept of "technologies
> >of communication" as it relates to cultural studies and answering the
> >"debate is speaking from a platform" argument by reconceiving of debate as
> >a research-based and research-driven critical pedagogy, Greene and Hicks 
> write:
> >
> >"Bordieu and Frow demonstrate how a class interest finds its constitution
> >in the ability to distance one's self from the world {can any of us really
> >say our research does not "distance" ourselves in some way?}; a class
> >interest that authorizes a class' judgment as worthy of recognition and
> >authority.  From this perspective, debating both sides is part of the
> >history of educational efforts to provide a specific class with the
> >cultural legitimacy necessary to valorize their judgments about the
> >world.  The link between moral development and the game of debate to train
> >students into their class roles as expert judges makes room for the
> >re-assignment of debating both sides to the globalization of liberalism as
> >deliberative democracy."
>I do think that Hicks & Greene have ignored the "ideal" of deliberative
>democracy here: [And avoid the point you made about *judging*] The point of
>*listening* to both sides is not to create expert judges, but, with hope,
>to help us understand each others standpoints (and yes, I mean that word
>with all its baggage.)
> >
> >Re-assigning "debating both sides to the globalization of liberalism" may
> >be enabling and constraining, but a topic addicted to the usfg is
> >certainly not empowering in the face of normalization--both in debates
> >centered on the usfg and in global politics centered on the us.  More on
> >this soon.
>More food for though: The USFG is not "two sided." I don't think these
>arguments are unavailable to an aff if the topic reads "USFG," I do think
>that given 'community consensus' (A term I hate) they'll be more viable
>absent a USFG agent: [A Whitman debater scanned this, so I don't have the
>page number] (Plus, this is proof that positioning ourselves vis-vis the
>government is an vital rhetorical move, one that has been employed for at
>*least* three decades)
>Jean Paul Sartre, Inaugural Statement to the Tribunal Against the Crime of
>Silence, ed. By John Duffett, 1968
>There are, in fact, two sources of power. The first is the state with its
>institutions. Well, in this time of violence, most governments would be
>afraid, if they took such an initiative, that it might one day turn against
>them, and that they might find themselves in the dock. Furthermore, for
>many of them the United States is a powerful ally: which of them would dare
>ask for the resurrection of a tribunal whose first action would obviously
>be to order an enquiry into the Vietnamese conflict? The other source of
>power is the people, during revolutionary periods in which it changes its
>institutions. But, although the struggle remains an implacable one, by what
>means could the masses, compartmentalized by frontiers as they are, succeed
>in uniting and in imposing on the various governments an institution which
>would be a genuine Court of the People? The Russell tribunal was born of
>the recognition of these two, contradictory facts: the Nuremberg verdict
>has made necessary the existence of an institution for the investigation
>and, where appropriate, the condemnation of war crimes: but neither
>governments nor people are, at the present time, capable of creating such
>an institution. We are entirely conscious of the fact that we have received
>no mandate from anyone. But if we have taken the initiative of coming
>together, it is because we knew that nobody could give us a mandate.
>Certainly our tribunal is not an institution. But it does not claim to
>replace any established body; on the contrary, it emerged from a void, and
>in response to an appeal. We have not been recruited and invested with real
>powers by governments. But then we have just seen that such powers, at
>Nuremberg, did not suffice to endow the judges with an uncontested
>legitimacy.  Quite the contrary: the fact that the verdicts could be
>carried out permitted those who had been conquered to challenge their
>validity; backed up by force, those verdicts appeared as the simple
>expression of the adage "Might is Right." The Russell tribunal considers,
>on the contrary, that its legitimacy derives equally from its total
>powerlessness, and from its universality. We are powerless: it is the
>guarantee of our independence. We receive no aid ? except from our
>supporting committees which are, like ourselves, associations of private
>individuals.  Representing no government and no party, nobody can give us
>orders: we will examine the facts "in our hearts and consciences" one might
>say or, if you prefer, openly and independently. No one of us can say,
>today, how the proceedings will go, or if we will reply by a yes or a no to
>the accusations, or if we will not reply ? considering them perhaps
>well-founded but not conclusively proved. What is certain, in any case, is
>that our powerlessness, even if we are convinced by the evidence presented,
>makes it impossible for us to pass a sentence. What could a condemnation
>mean, even the mildest of condemnations, if we do not possess the means to
>see it carried out? We will limit ourselves therefore, if that is what
>turns out to be necessary, to stating that such and such an act falls under
>the jurisdiction of Nuremberg. It is therefore, according to that
>jurisdiction, a war crime, and if the law was applied it would be subject
>to such and such a penalty. In such a case, we will, if that is possible,
>decide who are the authors of the crime. Thus the Russell tribunal will
>have no other concern, in its investigations as in its conclusions, than to
>bring about a general recognition of the need for an international
>institution for which it has neither the means nor the ambition to be a
>substitute, whose essential role would be the resuscitation of the jus
>contra helium which was still-born at Nuremberg ? the substitution of
>ethical and juridical rules for the law of the jungle.  Precisely because
>we are simple citizens we have been able, by recruiting our members on a
>wide international basis, to give our tribunal a more universal structure
>than that of Nuremberg. I do not mean merely that a larger number: of
>countries are represented; from that point of view there would be many gaps
>to fill. But above all, whereas in 1945 the Germans were only present in
>the dock, or at best on the stand as witnesses for the prosecution, several
>of the judges here are citizens of the United States. This means that they
>come from that country whose own policies are under investigation, and that
>they have, therefore, their own understanding of it and, whatever their
>opinions, an intimate relationship with it, with its institutions and its
>traditions ? a relationship which will inevitably mark the tribunal's
>conclusions. However, whatever our desire for impartiality and for
>universality, we are entirely conscious that this desire does not suffice
>to legitimize our enterprise. What we want, in fact, is that its
>legitirnization should be retrospective or, if you prefer, a posteriori.
>For we are not working for ourselves and our own edification, neither do we
>have any pretensions to imposing our conclusions from on high. What we wish
>is to maintain, thanks to the collaboration of the press, a constant
>contact between ourselves and the masses who in all parts of the world are
>living and suffering the tragedy of Vietnam. We hope that they will learn
>as we learn, that they will discover together with us the reports, the
>documents, the testimony, that they will evaluate them and make up their
>minds about them day by day, together with us. We want the conclusions,
>whatever they may be, to be drawn by each individual in his own mind at the
>same time as we draw them ourselves; even beforehand perhaps. This session
>is a common enterprise whose final term must be, in the phrase of a
>philosopher, une verite devenue [developed into truth]. Yes, if the masses
>ratify our judgment, then it will become truth, and we, at the very moment
>when we efface ourselves before those masses who will make themselves the
>guardians and the mighty support for that truth, we will know that we have
>been legitimized and that the people, by showing us its agreement, is
>revealing a deeper need: the need for a real "War Crimes Tribunal" to be
>brought into being as a permanent body ? that is to say, the need that it
>should be possible to denounce and punish such crimes wherever and whenever
>they may be committed. "What a strange tribunal: a jury and no judge"! It
>is true: we are only a jury, we have neither the power to condemn nor the
>power to acquit anybody. Therefore, no prosecution. There will not even be
>strictly speaking a prosecution case. Maitre Matarasso, president of the
>legal commission is going to read you a list of charges which will take the
>place of a prosecution case. We, the jury, at the end of the session, will
>have to pronounce on these charges: are they well-founded or not? But the
>judges are everywhere: they are the peoples of the world, and in particular
>the American people. It is for them that we are working.
> >
> >thanks for reading all this mumbo, my current feeling on the worker rule
> >is that every person a school brings to the ndt should either be debating,
> >judging a minimum of four rounds, or scouting a minimum of four
> >rounds.  Observers can be given exemptions on a case-by-case.  This, of
> >course, is NOT the current rule :)
> >
> >kevin
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> >eDebate mailing list
> >eDebate at ndtceda.com
> >http://www.ndtceda.com/mailman/listinfo/edebate

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