[eDebate] arnold crushes fishy erlich on twitter revolution

Old Strega oldstrega
Wed Jul 22 22:01:09 CDT 2009


In his diplomatic career of nearly 30 years, Terrell E. Arnold served  as an analyst in the State Office of Intelligence and Research, in five diplomatic postings including Consul General, Sao Paulo, Brazil, as a Senior Inspector who evaluated the operations of 24 US diplomatic missions, as Principal Deputy Director of the State Office of Counterterrorism and as Chairman of the Department of International Studies of the National War College.


that's the source on the evidence below.


it's not the foolish left making the argument caricatured by walter cronkite's close friend.  it's scott ritter, former UN chief weapons inspector, who has been established the line of continuity between the bush administration and the obama administration regarding regime change in iran.   fishy gerbil, no more confusion.   you're stuck in a bad game where all you can do is react in defeat.   the name of the state dep't conduit is "the alliance of youth movements".   i wonder how your boss is going to tell you how to smear ritter.   "crush, crush, crush 5-0," the words of david huggin.   you've been a miserable opponent.


http://www.rense.com/general86/irn.htm



For Iranian leadership, the principal lessons learned from these elections may have been mostly about the players, the extent and nature of outside meddling, and the order of discontent within Iranian society. The diverse new tools of communications technologies-especially cell phones and videocams and the Internet's FaceBook, YouTube and Twitter-manifested themselves in this election more than in any other of record. What emerged in the situation were novel opportunities and maybe some novel cyber applications of electoral interference. Certainly FaceBook and Twitter were in constant use. An estimated third of Iranians had Internet access, so all one (Iranian or not) needed to get involved in the runup, the demonstrations and the post election protests was access to the Net and a laptop or other digital communication device. Chinese leadership has been sensitive for some time about this type of external communication and political interference or networking. It has not closed down the Internet, but restrictions on it are abundant, spying is constant, certain sites are or may be blocked, and China has a growing cadre of Internet police. In dealing with the June 12 elections and subsequent experiences, Iran officials are reported to have monitored emails, and they probably authorized broader cyber surveillance. There are practical reasons why that would commend itself to the hierarchy and to the serving government. In effect, the Internet proved to be a major vehicle for external meddling in Iranian affairs. Former UN Chief Weapons Inspector Scott Ritter notes ( see: "The Iranian Elections and Energy Security" in Energy Intelligence, June 19, 2009) that the US State Department runs a program known as the "Alliance of Youth Movements" which uses FaceBook and other Internet avenues for "planning and implementing covert action against Iran" The Zionists, who view Iran as the next significant Middle Eastern challenge to exclusive Israeli regional power, have joined the US in conducting cyber warfare against Iran. The tools are tailor made for interfering in elections, but Ritter suggests the goal is and has been "regime change" in Iran. No thorough appraisal of the impact of the Internet on national political processes has yet been done, certainly not of such uses of cyber warfare. However, the June 12 Iran elections provide a good place to start, mainly because before this election the tools were neither so well developed nor so widely available. For several years moreover, Iran has been systematically targeted by both the United States and Israel for harassment, leadership change or absolute regime change. The tools of cyber interference appear to have been added to covert operations already being conducted along Iran's border with Iraq, an exposed Iranian flank that runs all the way from northern Kurdish territory to the Persian Gulf. The US also is reported to have worked with Iranian exiles, as well as dissident groups such as MEK and the Sunni Jundallah fighters in the Iran/Pakistan frontier region. Parties both in and outside Iran were busy on the Net during the elections and subsequent protests. A striking example of what is possible was an article on one website in which the author, an Iranian exile, suggested it was time to promote a general strike. That was necessary, as the writer saw it, to keep the revolution alive. The piece was not addressed to any specific audience. Had the idea been floated in a telephone message or an email to specific recipients in Iran, the recipients could have been in trouble, but lying loose on the internet, it was "found" policy. There is simply no way to know how widely this suggestion may have been read. Such are the types of cyber interference that could incite a Chinese scale of Net paranoia in Iran. Ritter refers to such cyber activity as Obama's "digital democracy gambit". However, it is evident that the programs of this gambit are not reserved exclusively for Iran. Moreover, if the United States can play such games, so can any other government or any individual or group with modest amounts of hacking skill, equipment and an urge to interfere.


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