# Apocalyptic Rhetoric K-NWG 2024

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## 1NC Shell

### OFF

Apocalypticism K

#### The 1ACs apocalypticism is a tool white supremacy to silence marginalized participation.

Astrida Neimanis et al. 15 (PhD, is a Lecturer at the University of Sydney, Associate Editor of the journal *Environmental Humanities*. Cecilia Åsberg, PhD, is a Full Professor and chair of Gender, Nature, Culture at Linköping University, Sweden. Johan Hedren, PhD, is an associate Professor of Water and Environmental Studies, Linköping University. “Four Problems, Four Directions for Environmental Humanities: Toward Critical Posthumanities for the Anthropocene” https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/ethicsenviro.20.1.67)//conway

“Climate Change: Arctic Sea Ice Melting Twice as Fast as Models Predict” (Osborne 2014);“Climate change is 'great demon of our day'” (Trimmer 2014); “Climate change more dangerous than terrorism” (Wolfgang 2015). This is a small sample of local and global headlines from both major news outlets and more specialized blogs from 2014 and 2015, but such dire surmisals pepper our media daily. As with any discourse, communication is dependent not only on the “facts” but on connotations, associations, imagery and tone. As this sample of climate change communication highlights, in the context of the Anthropocene, a negative tone of urgency is taking considerable hold. While issues such as water pollution, habitat loss, and rising global temperatures are certainly troubling, consistently negative, even apocalyptic, framing may not lead to effective citizen participation and may stifle opportunities for innovative thinking around environmental challenges. Uncertainty about the future may not be avoidable, but how we frame such uncertainty can have significant impact. For example, as recent studies by Morton et al. demonstrate, “higher uncertainty combined with a negative frame (highlighting possible losses) decreased individual intentions to behave environmentally. However when higher uncertainty was combined with a positive frame (highlighting the possibility of losses not materializing) this produced stronger intentions to act” (Morton et al. 2011, 103). Other researchers point out that apocalyptic narratives may have some awareness-raising value (e.g. Yusoff and Gabrys 2011), but we aver that they must be balanced with alternative narratives that can inspire more creative problem solving and a strong sense of participation and involvement. It is worth pointing out that apocalyptic or doomsday scenarios are also, perhaps somewhat more perniciously, related to prior discourses within sociobiology that worked to pose “no future” scenarios for already vulnerable populations (usually racialized and colonized people, and of low socio-economic means). As Yasmin Gunaratnam and Nigel Clark highlight, drawing on the work of Paul Gilroy, white supremacism has often functioned through a denial of the right of black populations to the future or to be future-oriented. These authors relate this to climate change in terms of a “moral climatology” that must be fought against through a close intertwining of questions of racial justice with climate justice ones (Gunaratnam and Clark 2012). This example could be extrapolated to all sorts of environmental “crises” that position colonized, marginalized or vulnerable groups at the brink of disaster and extinction—not only are they materially more vulnerable to many forms of ecological generation, but their agency and future imaginaries are also placed under erasure discursively. Moreover, we could link this problem directly to the lack of investment that many elite communities in the temperate global North and 0West may feel in

#### Their performative attachment to such framing makes extinction and the impacts they attempt to prevent *more likely* to happen – vote neg to reject the 1ACs apocalyptic soap opera.

Dorian Lynskey 24 (is a writer for many news outlets and media sources including the Guardian. Dorian is a podcaster and author of [33 Revolutions Per Minute](https://guardianbookshop.com/33-revolutions-per-minute-9780571241354) and [The Ministry of Truth](https://guardianbookshop.com/the-ministry-of-truth-9781509890736). “‘End of the world vibes’: why culture can’t stop thinking about apocalypse” 3/23/24 https://www.theguardian.com/books/2024/mar/23/end-of-the-world-vibes-why-culture-cant-stop-thinking-about-apocalypse)//conway

What would Herzog say now? **Conservatives and progressives offer competing narratives of decline and doom. Many climate activists speak of irreparable breakdown and even human extinction.** There are new terms such as doomer, polycrisis and Generation Dread. A peer-reviewed 2021 survey of people aged between 16 and 25 around the world found that 56% agreed with the statement “Humanity is doomed”. In a 2020 YouGov poll, nearly one in three Americans said they expected an apocalyptic event in their lifetimes, with the Christian Judgment Day relegated to fourth place by a pandemic, climate change and nuclear war; zombies and aliens brought up the rear. While promoting his doomsday satire Don’t Look Up in 2021, director Adam McKay awkwardly tried to define this era: “the Great Awfulization … or the Gilded Rage … You can just really call it collapse culture … There’s such a list of things to keep your eye on.” We love to talk about the death of this and the fall of that, and to boast that we are there to witness it. We do like to feel special This is not the religious end of time, or eschaton, that has fascinated humanity for thousands of years, but the end of the world as a pervasive mood – a vibe. “It’s pretty clear the world is ending,” Marc Maron says in his comedy special End Times Fun. “I don’t want to shock anybody. Seems to be happening though.” Everybody laughs. Nobody responds as if this were a preposterous claim, just as no reviewer of Sally Rooney’s Beautiful World, Where Are You seemed taken aback by one character’s insistence that there is “no chance for the planet, and no chance for us” and “we are standing in the last lighted room before the darkness, bearing witness to something”. Sheila Heti compares life in 2022 to “being in a plane that was slowly twirling to the ground” in her quietly apocalyptic novel Pure Colour. “Hey, what can you say?” sings the comedian Bo Burnham in his satirical ballad That Funny Feeling. “We were overdue / But it’ll be over soon, you wait.” An entirely routine way to express dissatisfaction with the world is to say that it is ending. In her 2021 novel Fake Accounts, Lauren Oyler pokes fun at what she sees as a propensity to wallow in self-loathing and impotence: **“the popular turn to fatalism could be attributed to self-aggrandizement and an ignorance of history, history being characterized by the population’s quickness to declare apocalypse finally imminent despite its permanently delayed arrival”. This is a fallacy known as presentism, or chronocentrism: the delusion that one’s own generation is experiencing what has never been experienced before and will never be experienced again. Such temporal egotism has been baked into apocalyptic thought** since John of Patmos promised “The time is at hand” in the Book of Revelation. As Frank Kermode argued in his classic 1967 book The Sense of an Ending, we resist the idea that we live in the middle of history, unable to know how it all ends or to be a part of the climactic drama. To make sense of life, Kermode wrote, “we need fictions of beginnings and fictions of ends, fictions which unite beginning and end and endow the interval between them with meaning”. Therefore, even if we are not religious, we like to think that our own time is a unique and crucial turning point. The word crisis comes from a medical Latin term for the point in an illness that decides whether the patient will recover or die. We seem to be built to imagine that we live, if not at the end of the world, then at least at the end of an era. **We love to talk about the death of this and the fall of that, and to boast that we are there to witness it. We do like to feel special.** “We always want a ‘conclusion’, an end, we always want to come, in our mental processes, to a decision, a finality, a full stop,” DH Lawrence wrote not long before his death in 1930. “This gives us a sense of satisfaction. All our mental consciousness is a movement onwards, a movement in stages, like our sentences, and every full stop is a milestone that marks our ‘progress’ and our arrival somewhere.” The fact that this is an illusion, Lawrence thought, does not make it any less powerful. In this way we attempt to take the mess and mystery of the future, which has always been frightening because it is the ultimate unknown, and tidy it into a story. It is hard to deny that we live in perilous times. As of January 2023, the hands of the Doomsday Clock – the symbolic timepiece maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1947 – point for the first time to 90 seconds to midnight on account of the climate crisis, Covid-19, disruptive technologies, rising authoritarianism and the revenant menace of nuclear war arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Martin Rees, the UK’s Astronomer Royal, believes the 21st century could be the one “where we as humans destroy ourselves”. But it should not diminish the importance of the problems we face now to say that the anxieties of earlier generations felt no less profound. We are not inclined to appreciate the bad things that have not happened to us – the conflicts and famines avoided, the diseases prevented, the lives saved – nor to measure our anxieties against the ordeals of the past. There have always been doomers. In 1974, the year I was born, French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing declared: “The world is unhappy. It is unhappy because it does not know where it is going and because it senses that if it knew, it would discover that it was heading for disaster.” One week in September 1965, the most popular song in America was Barry McGuire’s warning that we were on “the eve of destruction”. In 1945, HG Wells wrote in his final book, “this world is at the end of its tether. The end of everything we call life is close at hand and cannot be evaded.” In 1919, Dutch historian Johan Huizinga wrote that it was “bad form to praise the world and life openly. It was fashionable to see only its suffering and misery, to discover everywhere signs of decadence and of the near end – in short, to condemn the times or to despise them.” He was ostensibly describing the late middle ages. In AD250, Cyprian of Carthage asked: “Who cannot see that the world is already in its decline, and no longer has the strength and vigour of former times? There is no need to invoke Scripture authority to prove it. The world tells its own tale and in its general decadence bears adequate witness that it is approaching its end.” You get the picture. What is notable now is that apocalyptic angst has become a constant: all flow and no ebb. One might have assumed from the millions of words devoted to the end of the world during the 1990s that the noise about it would reach a millennial crescendo, but instead it has grown and grown. In 1989, Susan Sontag suggested the title of Francis Ford Coppola’s movie Apocalypse Now was wishful thinking and what we are living with instead is “Apocalypse from Now On”. This must come to some degree from the fact that we absorb more news, which is to say bad news, than at any time in history. Speaking during the second world war, long before 24-hour news or the internet, the poet Wallace Stevens argued that the “pressure of reality” overwhelms our sense of perspective: “It is not possible to look backward and to see that the same thing was true in the past. It is a question of pressure, and pressure is incalculable and eludes the historian.” These stories are increasingly pessimistic: the comet hits, the zombies reign, the planet burns. There is simply no end of ends One can feel the pressure of reality in the frenzied overload of REM’s 1987 hit It’s the End of the World as We Know It (and I Feel Fine) or the work of Don DeLillo. In DeLillo’s 1991 novel Mao II, the author Bill contends that the novel has been displaced as a source of truth and meaning by the news, which “provides an unremitting mood of catastrophe. This is where we find emotional experience not available elsewhere. We don’t need the novel … We don’t even need catastrophes, necessarily. We only need the reports and predictions and warnings.” When Daphne’s fatuous husband Cameron (Theo James) damns **the news as “an apocalyptic soap opera”** in The White Lotus he has a point. In the online era, we have a baleful new word for this experience: **doomscrolling**. Social media gives the impression that things are worse than they are while at the same time making things worse than they need to be. More than ever, the surest way to be praised for speaking to the times is to say that the times are awful. It can seem almost unserious to believe that things are not getting irreversibly worse. **The corpus of end-of-the-world stories is immense and ever-growing.** In the past decade or so, we have seen dramas (Melancholia), horrors (It Comes at Night), war movies (World War Z), comedies (This Is the End) and satires (Don’t Look Up); sitcoms (The Last Man on Earth), animations (The Mitchells vs the Machines) and songs (Phoebe Bridgers’ I Know the End); TV shows based on comic books (The Walking Dead), computer games (The Last of Us) and bestselling novels (Station Eleven; Leave the World Behind). These stories are increasingly pessimistic: the comet hits, the zombies reign, the planet burns. There is simply no end of ends. Most obviously, these stories turn fear into entertainment. Through movies that make the unthinkable enjoyable, wrote Sontag in her 1965 essay The Imagination of Disaster**, “one can participate in the fantasy of living through one’s own death and more, the death of cities and the destruction of humanity itself”.** Contemplating annihilation can certainly be a valuable means of reckoning with death, loss, abandonment and a capricious universe, but one can also detect the rumbling of a bad conscience – a dark suspicion that the end might be richly deserved. Usually, a writer will pass some kind of judgment on the world that is in peril. It is not hard to tell the optimists from the pessimists, the activists from the nihilists and the humanists from the misanthropes. Sometimes **there is an explicit craving for the end, because the world is exhausting and insoluble.** In the character of Justine in Lars von Trier’s movie Melancholia, or the novels of Kurt Vonnegut, or Morrissey crying “Come, Armageddon!” on Everyday Is Like Sunday, we find a vivid desire for it all to be over. Multiple impulses can coexist in the same story because when the subject is humanity itself it is reasonable to be ambivalent. These are the questions that make the genre fizz: do we expect the end of the world? Do we deserve it? Do we secretly long for it? What would we miss and what would we love to banish to oblivion? Many friends asked me if submerging myself in this subject was depressing. On the contrary, I found that it relieved the “pressure of reality” and the narcissism of the present. The signal fact about the end of the world is that it has not happened yet, despite numerous predictions. In Emily St John Mandel’s 2014 pandemic novel Station Eleven, an actor who has been studying art history remarks that “you see catastrophe after catastrophe, terrible things, all these moments when everyone must have thought the world was ending, but all those moments, they were all temporary. It always passes.” Of course, in that novel it doesn’t pass and almost everybody dies. The world is too full of nasty surprises for us to be complacent.

## Framework

### Research/Scholarship 1st

#### Responsibility for scholarship is key.

Marit Hammond 21 (is a Lecturer in Environmental Politics at Keele University. “Imagination and critique in environmental politics” 2/1/21 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2021.1880062)//conway

In this context, scholars have highlighted the urgent relevance of critical perspectives on the environmental crisis, in light of their potential impact on mainstream discourse and on formal politics. Its reflexivity can offer a ‘contrapuntal schematization to those advanced by big business, grand science, or national governments’ – in short, those driving the formal political discourse in Western societies – ‘about what the future good life could be’ (Luke 2003, p. 239). Eva Lövbrand and her co-authors argue the more recent ‘Anthropocene’ framing of the crisis in particular has overemphasised the role of the natural sciences, producing a post-political narrative around ‘environmental rather than social change’ (Lövbrand et al. 2015, 212, original emphasis). They argue critical and interpretive social sciences are needed to re-politicise the discussion and to diagnose and destabilise the institutions and power relations at fault (Lövbrand et al. 2015, p. 215). Rather than painting a picture of a singular crisis facing humanity as a whole, this requires research that is attentive to the diversity of human experiences as a result of ‘space, place, politics, power and culture’ (O’Brien 2013, p. 593), and thus also to how this diversity is conditioned by colonialism (Whyte 2017, p. 159). These perspectives imply a link between the nature and ambition of environmental politics scholarship, on the one hand, and environmental politics and resulting policy-making as practiced in a given society, on the other. Critical and imaginative environmental politics scholarship is uniquely placed to challenge an overly managerial, non-critical practice of environmental politics in society. Albeit itself impeded by the effects of neoliberalism (Canaan and Shumar 2008), academia ought to be a space of unconstrained, unbiased research and critical reflection on the state of society and its ideology. Yet, at the same time, academic environmental politics scholarship is not necessarily critical; it also comprises non-critical, problem-solving scholarship that itself matches the assumptions and ambition behind problem-solving environmental political practice. Thus, it is imperative to reflect on any biases within environmental scholarship, and to challenge an overly non-critical culture within this field. As a simple, illustrative analysis, it is instructive (although the reality is always more complex than conceptual categories could capture) to categorise environmental politics scholarship into what can be termed ‘problem-solving’ (or targeted, realist) environmental politics scholarship, on the one hand, and ‘critical’ as well as ‘imaginative’ environmental politics scholarship, on the other. Critical and imaginative scholarship together form the overall category of scholarship that challenges the opposing problem-solving scholarship and practice. The critical approach, on the one hand, challenges problem-solving scholarship and practice in that its ‘big picture analysis’ (Death 2014, p. 5) is expressly oriented toward questioning the state of society, its institutions and power dynamics. Imaginative scholarship, in turn, challenges the implicit ambition behind a problem-solving approach to sustain the current order by exposing this ambition as an unnecessary bias through the envisioning, formulation, and practical realisation of alternative orders that the ideological (in this case, late-capitalist) status quo would have otherwise portrayed as unavailable. Together, contributions on this side of the overall dichotomy thus ‘[unsettle] conventional ways of seeing and doing things’ (Death 2014, p. 6) so as to cast them in a new light and thereby ‘extend the realm of the possible for environmental politics’ (Lövbrand et al. 2015, p. 212). Indeed, as one subtype of critical theorising, the poststructuralist tradition is especially concerned with the role of thought and theory itself in maintaining a harmful or inequitable status quo (Death 2014, p. 4). This implies a need for critical analysis of pertinent scholarship itself. Here I focus on the journal Environmental Politics to evaluate where its role falls in terms of advancing a targeted-realist discourse committed to solving problems within the existing order, on the one hand, or unsettling this very discourse through critical-imaginative thought that extends its remit toward alternative orders, on the other. Environmental Politics is a good candidate for this analysis in that it is widely regarded as one of the leading journals in the field. Founded in 1992, its importance in the field of environmental politics, and indeed political science in general, is underscored by its impact factor of 4.320 (2019), which in the metricised culture of global academic publishing makes it the third most influential journal in political science.1 Reflecting its growth and success, its frequency increased from six to seven issues per year in 2019.2 Its scope is general, as opposed to tied from the outset to one particular sub-tradition within environmental politics scholarship. Indeed, there is no indication that it would marginalise critical and imaginative thought as a matter of editorial preference, with critical environmental scholars wellrepresented on the editorial board.3 Thus, I take Environmental Politics to be one of the most important generalist journals in the area of environmental politics, and as such likely to be broadly reflective of the overall orientation of, and research undertaken by, scholars in this field of Western academia. Of course, what a journal publishes depends on the submissions it receives, which are not fully in its control; and while journal editors inevitably play a role in steering academic discourse, it would compromise their integrity to do so for any self-interested reasons. However, an overly targeted-realist focus is not only reproductive of political domination, but thereby also intellectually counterproductive, as it narrows the space for the generation of new ideas, voices, and perspectives. Thus, the journal has a responsibility here to help reduce this existing bias by prioritising scholarship that has thus far been marginalised, and promoting the overall diversity and inclusivity within the scholarly discourse it facilitates.

### AT: Action Turn

#### The 1AC alarmism inspires skepticism and turns case.

Christina Faust et al 8 (is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Connection Studies at the University of Denver. William Murphy is a Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. Chelsea Stow is a Doctoral Student and Graduate Teaching Instructor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. “Global Warming and Apocalyptic Rhetoric: A Critical Frame Analysis of US Popular and Elite Press Coverage from 1997-2007,” November 2008 http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/6/0/1/2/pages260125/p260125-1.php)//conway

Since the release of Al Gore’s award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with an increasing amount of discourse on climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes that “Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues” (p. 44). Indeed, though the United States emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about changing the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser & Dilling, 2004). In her review of the 1999 book, The Heat is On, Catherine Keller (1999) identifies a tendency to “read [climate change] data apocalyptically” (p. 42), which has devastating consequences for motivating the public to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The apocalyptic tone of climate change discourse may not only encourage a feeling of despair in the face of impending disaster, but also contributes to skeptics’ ability to discredit climate scientists as alarmists (Leiserowitz, 2007). Yet, as Killingsworth and Palmer (1996) suggest, environmental advocates like Rachel Carson have relied upon dire predictions of the world’s end to provoke necessary action: “To employ apocalyptic rhetoric is to imply the need for radical change, to mark oneself as an outsider in a progressive culture, to risk alienation, and to urge others out into the open air of political rebellion.” (p. 41). Though apocalyptic language often reads as divisive, this particular strategy ultimately invites widespread attention to environmental issues. Scholars, opinionists and journalists have drawn connections between an apocalypse and climate change as a discourse and urgent environmental issue; but as our literature review reveals, no sustained analysis has been undertaken concerning the prevalence, and possible implications, of an apocalyptic frame for global warming. As Keller, Leiserowitz, and Killingsworth and Palmer suggest, the possibility of an apocalyptic frame invites attention to important questions concerning how it is best to shape or present information on global warming to encourage productive public discourse and social change. Suzanne Moser and Lisa Dilling (2007), scientists at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, conclude that to inspire a movement to combat global warming, we need “greater multi- and interdisciplinary research on communication and social change” (p. 508). Heeding the call, we consider the following questions guide when approaching communication and climate change: Does apocalyptic rhetoric structure coverage of global warming in the United States’ elite and popular press? In what ways does the United States’ elite and popular press implicitly and explicitly position global warming within the apocalyptic frame? What are the implications of framing global warming apocalyptically? Through a qualitative-critical analysis of US elite and popular press coverage of global warming, we argue that the apocalyptic frame structures much of the discourse, and may be responsible for moving the American public, as Al Gore stated in An Inconvenient Truth, “straight from denial to despair.” By interrogating the apocalyptic frame, we hope to inspire better ways to structure communication about global warming, lessening barriers to individual and collective agency. Media Coverage of Global Warming: Situating the Apocalyptic Frame

#### Fear reverses progress and causes repression.

Martin and Hodder 9 (Brian, PhD, is a Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Wollongong. Patrick, PhD, is a Candidate at the Bega Education Centre of the University of Wollongong, “Climate Crisis? The Politics of Emergency Framing” 9/5/9 https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Climate-crisis-the-politics-of-emergency-framing-Martin-Hodder/7c03e5abb4976df15d8721df456c3097a89b912a)//conway

To convey the sense of emergency, advocates have generally portrayed an imminent climate crisis with an emphasis on catastrophic impacts such as fires, floods, hurricanes, droughts and melting ice. A critic of the emergency frame, Mike Hulme (2006), former director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change in the UK, claims that activists, the media, politicians and even scientists "are openly confusing the language of fear, terror and disaster with the observable physical reality of climate change." One risk in relying on the language of fear to depict climate change is that advocates may exaggerate the dangers, providing sceptics with an easy opportunity to dismiss climate change as "alarmism." Given that 41 per cent of people in the US say news of global warming is exaggerated, the alarmism tactic seems to be ineffective with a significant proportion of the US population (Nisbet 2009). Another drawback to the catastrophe approach is the tendency of people to treat extreme weather events as natural. This leads to a perception that climate change is not caused by human activity and therefore the problem gets dismissed because it cannot be modified by human actions (Moser and Dilling 2004: 36). Evoking fear about climate change is a common tactic; as Nisbet (2009) points out, the film An Inconvenient Truth (2006) was promoted as "by far the most terrifying film you will ever see." There is evidence that fear is a motivator in human behaviour, particularly if it resonates with personal experience or evolutionary fears (Weber 2006). However, because climate change is typically abstract and distant, it may require the evocation of dramatic and relevant consequences to elicit a more widespread personal response (Bennett 2008; Weber 2006). Yet, even though fear may capture audience attention, it often fails to generate active engagement with climate change or motivate changes in behaviour (Moser and Dilling 2004: 39). Indeed, fear often "triggers denial or repression of a problem perceived as overwhelming" (Moser and Dilling 2004: 39; see also Meijnders et al 2001; Nisbet 2009). Similar findings about fear as an inhibiting factor are documented in a review of public health campaigns around HIV and smoking: informing people about how they can take action is more likely to be consistently effective than arousing fears (Ruiter et al 2001). Fear-inducing messages about catastrophe may be counter-productive in terms of inducing behavioural change. Moser and Dilling (2004: 44) suggest that positive and compelling images of a desired future may be more successful in generating change and moving societies towards a better future. The climate debate is no longer just between climate scientists and sceptics, but encompasses disagreements among scientists and advocates over the imminence of catastrophe and responses to it. Using an emergency frame and dismissing staged solutions may polarise climate advocates into those for or against emergency action. The emergency frame could easily marginalise other approaches and undermine democratic norms in decision-making. Further, by shrinking the perceived response time available, the emergency frame can prioritise large-scale technological solutions over social and political change, with arguments that it is too late to save civilisation except by further human interference in the climate system such as geo-engineering (Cascio 2009; Lovelock and Rapley 2007; Thomas 2008). Geo-engineering assumes a human ability to control highly complex systems such as climate that are not fully understood, and risks compounding the problem while failing to address underlying issues. Underlying issues may be obscured by framing climate change as the emergency to be solved. For example, many "solutions" to climate change such as those proposed by Stern (2006) and Garnaut (2008) build in assumptions about continued economic growth. However, the global economy is five times larger than it was fifty years ago (Jackson 2009), an increase paralleled by the over-use and degradation of planetary support mechanisms (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Like carbon emissions, several ecosystem components have passed critical thresholds. But according to Tim Jackson (2009), if the global economy continues to grow at the same rate (if that were possible in the face of "peak oil"), it would be eighty times larger in 2100 than it was in 1960. This raises questions about economic, political, social and ethical systems, and how seemingly paramount problems such as climate change are framed. Although policies to tackle climate change need to begin within the confines of the current system, economic growth must be addressed because the current economic model is a crucial causal factor underlying other apparently more urgent issues. Finally, the focus on climate change as an emergency may render the movement unsustainable. If global warming progresses less quickly than anticipated, climate change may be dismissed as "alarmism." But if climate change does occur quickly and the movement does not succeed in achieving rapid transition, the movement risks losing its momentum and its reason for existence despite the fact that climate change and a raft of other challenges will be an enduring reality. As well as immediate campaigns focussed around stopping new coal mines and coal-fired power stations, the social movement also needs to be preparing for a series of long-term campaigns such as building community resilience around the re-localisation of food and energy resources, and making the transition away from polluting industries.

### AT: Reps Don’t Shape

#### Discourse determines policy outcomes – specifically in the context of the environment.

Detraz and Betsill 8(Nicole, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University, and Michele M., Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University. “Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts,” Paper Presented At The 49th Annual Meeting Of The International Studies Association, 3/26/08, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/5/2/5/9/pages252596/p252596-1.php)

A discourse-analytic approach is appropriate in that **discourses are powerful forces within policy debates**. Discourses can be thought of as “specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorization that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995: 45). This definition suggests that discourses typically involve agency, meaning that individuals can actively shape discourses. It also suggests that discourses are constantly-evolving entities that can be shaped over time. Additionally, examining discourses can shed light on various **power relations** within an issue area. We can understand power relations as struggles “over interests, which are exercised, reflected, maintained and resisted through a variety of modalities, extents and degrees of explicitness” (Lazar 2005: 9). For example, dominant discourses are those that are most likely to be in line with the interests of powerful factions of society. It is unlikely that a discourse that is not in the interest of the powerful will actually be used in policy debates on salient issues. We can use discourse analysis to understand which discourses have made it to the level of policymaking for an issue like environmental change, and what this means for both the powerful and less-powerful in society. Litfin (1999) argues that discourses play an important role in shaping which policies are likely to emerge for a given issue area. According to Haas (2002: 1), Discourses **impart meaning to an ambiguous policy domain.** Discourses are important because **they institutionalize cognitive frames.** They identify issues as problems, set agendas, and define the salient aspects of issues as problems for decision-makers. Each discourse or perspective rests on different assumptions, goals and values… and suggests different policy solutions. They have the effect of defining provocations or crises. As this suggests, the use of one discourse over another has important implications, both theoretically and practically. Our analysis focuses on whether and how discourses linking environmental issues and security concerns have shaped international political debates on climate change. We begin by elaborating two general discourses on the relationship between environment and security, which we call environmental conflict and environmental security. This discussion highlights the various ways that global environmental problems and security issues can be connected and argues that each discourse has distinct implications for political debates and policy making. We then consider whether and how these discourses have shaped the historical international climate change debate as well as the latest Security Council debate in order to determine whether there has been a recent change. We demonstrate that the historical climate change debate has been informed by the environmental security discourse. While recent concern about climate-related conflict is new, we find that this new conflict dimension has been incorporated into the environmental security discourse and thus does not represent a wholesale discursive shift in the international climate change debate. Finally, we consider the possibility of a future discursive shift to the environmental conflict perspective and argue that such a shift would be counterproductive to the search for an effective global response to climate change.

#### Discourse shapes environmental policies and discussions.

Detraz and Betsill 8(Nicole, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University, and Michele M., Associate Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University. “Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts,” Paper Presented At The 49th Annual Meeting Of The International Studies Association, 3/26/08, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/5/2/5/9/pages252596/p252596-1.php)

SECURITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE The discursive framework used to discuss the relationship between security and the environment has direct implications for the policies likely to be developed in response to global environmental challenges such as climate change. It is therefore important to consider what discourses inform political debates on this issue and, in particular, to identify discursive shifts as these will have **implications for the future direction of policy** development. Our empirical analysis aims to determine what discourse(s) (if any) linking environment and security have informed the international climate change debate in the past and whether the recent Security Council discussions represent a discursive shift. In other words, we are interested in situating the April 2007 Security Council debate in a broader historical context.

### AT: Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning is trapped and can’t escape – unpredictability is key to actualize the benefits.

Roger L. Martin 14 (is a Professor Emeritus at the Rotman School of Management at University of Toronto where he served as Dean from 1998-2013, Academic Director of the Michael Lee-Chin Family Institute for Corporate Citizenship from 2004-2019 and Institute Director of the **Martin Prosperity Institute** from 2013-2019. In 2013, he was named global Dean of the Year by the leading business school website, Poets & Quants. “The Big Lie of Strategic Planning” January-February 2014 https://hbr.org/2014/01/the-big-lie-of-strategic-planning)//conway

The natural reaction is to make the challenge less daunting by turning it into a problem that can be solved with tried and tested tools. That nearly always means spending weeks or even months preparing a comprehensive plan for how the company will invest in existing and new assets and capabilities in order to achieve a target—an increased share of the market, say, or a share in some new one. The plan is typically supported with detailed spreadsheets that project costs and revenue quite far into the future. By the end of the process, everyone feels a lot less scared. This is a truly terrible way to make strategy. It may be an excellent way to cope with fear of the unknown, but fear and discomfort are an essential part of strategy making**. In fact, if you are entirely comfortable with your strategy, there’s a strong chance it isn’t very good. You’re probably stuck in one or more of the traps** I’ll discuss in this article. You need to be uncomfortable and apprehensive: True strategy is about placing bets and making hard choices. The objective is not to eliminate risk but to increase the odds of success. In this worldview, managers accept that good strategy is not the product of hours of careful research and modeling that lead to an inevitable and almost perfect conclusion. Instead, it’s the result of a simple and quite rough-and-ready process of thinking through what it would take to achieve what you want and then assessing whether it’s realistic to try. If executives adopt this definition, then maybe, just maybe, they can keep strategy where it should be: outside the comfort zone. **Comfort Trap 1: Strategic Planning** Virtually every time the word “strategy” is used, it is paired with some form of the word “plan,” as in the process of “strategic planning” or the resulting “strategic plan.” The subtle slide from strategy to planning occurs because planning is a thoroughly doable and comfortable exercise. **Focus your energy on the** key choices that influence revenue decision makers—that is, **customers**. Strategic plans all tend to look pretty much the same. They usually have three major parts. The first is a vision or mission statement that sets out a relatively lofty and aspirational goal. The second is a list of initiatives—such as product launches, geographic expansions, and construction projects—that the organization will carry out in pursuit of the goal. This part of the strategic plan tends to be very organized but also very long. The length of the list is generally constrained only by affordability. The third element is the conversion of the initiatives into financials. In this way, the plan dovetails nicely with the annual budget. Strategic plans become the budget’s descriptive front end, often projecting five years of financials in order to appear “strategic.” But management typically commits only to year one; in the context of years two through five, “strategic” actually means “impressionistic.” This exercise arguably makes for more thoughtful and thorough budgets. However, it must not be confused with strategy. **Planning typically isn’t explicit about what the organization chooses not to do and why. It does not question assumptions.** And its dominant logic is affordability; the plan consists of whichever initiatives fit the company’s resources. Mistaking planning for strategy is a common trap. Even board members, who are supposed to be keeping managers honest about strategy, fall into it. They are, after all, primarily current or former managers, who find it safer to supervise planning than to encourage strategic choice. Moreover, Wall Street is more interested in the short-term goals described in plans than in the long-term goals that are the focus of strategy. Analysts pore over plans in order to assess whether companies can meet their quarterly goals. **Comfort Trap 2: Cost-Based Thinking** The focus on planning leads seamlessly to cost-based thinking. Costs lend themselves wonderfully to planning, because by and large they are under the control of the company. For the vast majority of costs, the company plays the role of customer. It decides how many employees to hire, how many square feet of real estate to lease, how many machines to procure, how much advertising to air, and so on. In some cases a company can, like any customer, decide to stop buying a particular good or service, and so even severance or shutdown costs can be under its control. Of course there are exceptions. Government agencies tell companies that they need to remit payroll taxes for each employee and buy a certain amount of compliance services. But the proverbial exceptions prove the rule: Costs imposed on the company by others make up a relatively small fraction of the overall cost picture, and most are derivative of company-controlled costs. (Payroll taxes, for instance, are incurred only when the company decides to hire an employee.) Costs are comfortable because they can be planned for with relative precision. This is an important and useful exercise. Many companies are damaged or destroyed when they let their costs get out of control. The trouble is that planning-oriented managers tend to apply familiar, comfortable cost-side approaches to the revenue side as well, treating revenue planning as virtually identical to cost planning and as an equal component of the overall plan and budget. All too often, the result is painstaking work to build up revenue plans salesperson by salesperson, product by product, channel by channel, region by region. But when the planned revenue doesn’t show up, managers feel confused and even aggrieved. “What more could we have done?” they wonder. “We spent thousands upon thousands of hours planning.” There’s a simple reason why revenue planning doesn’t have the same desired result as cost planning. For costs, the company makes the decisions. But for revenue, customers are in charge. Except in the rare case of monopolies, customers can decide of their own free will whether to give revenue to the company, to its competitors, or to no one at all. Companies may fool themselves into thinking that revenue is under their control, but because it is neither knowable nor controllable, planning, budgeting, and forecasting it is an impressionistic exercise. Of course, shorter-term revenue planning is much easier for companies that have long-term contracts with customers. For example, for business information provider Thomson Reuters, the bulk of its revenue each year comes from multiyear subscriptions. The only variable amount in the revenue plan is the difference between new subscription sales and cancellations at the end of existing contracts. Similarly, if a company has long order backlogs, as Boeing does, it will be able to predict revenue more accurately, although the Boeing Dreamliner tribulations demonstrate that even “firm orders” don’t automatically translate into future revenue. Over the longer term, all revenue is controlled by the customer. **Giant Opportunities Encourage Bad Strategy** Companies in many industries prefer a small slice of a huge market to a large slice of a small one. The thinking is, of ... The bottom line, therefore, is that the predictability of costs is fundamentally different from the predictability of revenue. Planning can’t and won’t make revenue magically appear, and the effort you spend creating revenue plans is a distraction from the strategist’s much harder job: finding ways to acquire and keep customers. Comfort Trap 3: Self-Referential Strategy Frameworks This trap is perhaps the most insidious, because it can snare even managers who, having successfully avoided the planning and cost traps, are trying to build a real strategy. In identifying and articulating a strategy, most executives adopt one of a number of standard frameworks. Unfortunately, two of the most popular ones can lead the unwary user to design a strategy entirely around what the company can control. In 1978 Henry Mintzberg published an influential article in Management Science that introduced emergent strategy, a concept he later popularized for the wider nonacademic business audience in his successful 1994 book, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. Mintzberg’s insight was simple but indeed powerful. He distinguished between deliberate strategy, which is intentional, and emergent strategy, which is not based on an original intention but instead consists of the company’s responses to a variety of unanticipated events. Planning typically isn’t explicit about what the organization chooses not to do and why. It does not question assumptions. Mintzberg’s thinking was informed by his observation that managers overestimate their ability to predict the future and to plan for it in a precise and technocratic way. By drawing a distinction between deliberate and emergent strategy, he wanted to encourage managers to watch carefully for changes in their environment and make course corrections in their deliberate strategy accordingly. In addition, he warned against the dangers of sticking to a fixed strategy in the face of substantial changes in the competitive environment. All of this is eminently sensible advice that every manager would be wise to follow. However, most managers do not. Instead, most use the idea that a strategy emerges as events unfold as a justification for declaring the future to be so unpredictable and volatile that it doesn’t make sense to make strategy choices until the future becomes sufficiently clear. Notice how comforting that interpretation is: No longer is there a need to make angst-ridden decisions about unknowable and uncontrollable things. A little digging into the logic reveals some dangerous flaws in it. If the future is too unpredictable and volatile to make strategic choices, what would lead a manager to believe that it will become significantly less so? And how would that manager recognize the point when predictability is high enough and volatility is low enough to start making choices? Of course the premise is untenable: **There won’t be a time when anyone can be sure that the future is predictable.** Hence, the concept of emergent strategy has simply become a handy excuse for avoiding difficult strategic choices, for replicating as a “fast follower” the choices that appear to be succeeding for others, and for deflecting any criticism for not setting out in a bold direction. Simply following competitors’ choices will never produce a unique or valuable advantage. None of this is what Mintzberg intended, but it is a common outcome of his framework, because it plays into managers’ comfort zone.

## Links

### Link – ‘Apocalyptic’ Framing

#### ‘Apocalyptic’ framing fails and increases the risk of psychological harm.

Kat Kerlin 22 (is an environmental science writer and media relations specialist at UC Davis. “Why Climate Doomsday-ism Doesn’t Work” 8/17/22 https://www.ucdavis.edu/climate/blog/why-climate-doomsday-ism-doesnt-work)//conway

As an environmental writer and media relations officer, I see a lot of coverage of our climate science in the news. Most of the time its accuracy is pretty spot-on or at least close. But once in a while — and f**ar more often** than I’d like — **people use words like “apocalyptic” to describe a report’s findings. That term is a reactionary word to describe the prospect of disaster, and one used when the writer is clearly startled. As a science communicator who is very concerned and yet optimistic about our climate change realities, I think terms like “apocalyptic” are ineffective and potentially damaging.**Let’s look at the word itself. The “Apocalypse” is commonly referenced in the Christian tradition, which I grew up in, I should note. If you ascribe to that tradition, it will not be an effective term to make you act on climate change because it indicates that what’s happening is a divine thing set in motion by God, and there’s nothing you can do about it. It’s the end of the world. So much for spurring climate action. We also need to tell stories about solutions and to be careful about the language we use and its impact. **The real function of terms like “apocalyptic” relates to another overused word: "clickbait.”** (Side note: Clickbait exists. But just because a headline is engaging doesn’t make it clickbait if it’s accurate.) **You don’t get much more sensational than “apocalyptic.” It also gives media consumers the sense that they are observers — like this is a movie they’re watching rather than their very real lives on this planet. So “apocalyptic” is not helpful in news or science communication, and it’s potentially damaging, serving only to panic and sensationalize. Climate anxiety and ill communication** All of this has to do with climate anxiety, which I wrote about recently for UC Davis’ Science & Climate coverage (“[Confronting Climate Anxiety](https://www.ucdavis.edu/climate/anxiety).”) Climate anxiety is a real and valid response to learning about and experiencing climate change. It is made worse by words like “apocalyptic.” It can also be made worse by well-intentioned messages and stories about climate change that aim to scare people to action. I’ve written some of those myself. But often, people don’t get scared to action — they get overwhelmed.

### Link – ‘Climatism’

#### The 1AC is a totalizing prescription which produces ‘Climatism’ – that causes psychic violence and turns case.

Jennifer Bernstein 23 (is the Academic Liaison for the Breakthrough Institute and Editor in Chief of Case Studies in the Environment, Book Review, “Mike Hulme. Climate change isn’t everything: liberating climate politics from alarmism” Polity Press, 11/7/23 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13412-023-00870-5)//conway

My critiques pale in comparison to the value and importance of this book, and I have little of substance to challenge. This is an important and timely book. Hulme convincingly argues that it is fundamentally problematic when an ideology becomes totalizing and prescriptively normative, and climate change is no exception. The “green halo” provided by climate change should not forestall optimism, openness to multiple viewpoints, and protection of the democratic process. In addition to minor quibbles, my core challenge is one I can’t answer either—what does climate pragmatism look like in practice, now and in the future? At core, this book is a topical, concise, accessible, and inevitably controversial foray into **the implications of climate science coalescing into ideology**. Students will find it readable, and because it challenges the reader’s environmental worldviews, they will likely be eager to follow Hulme’s argument to its end. Chapters follow a logical progression, taking the reader through a clear arc of the rise, appeal, consequences of, **and alternatives to climatism.** Each chapter begins and ends with a summary, increasing the potential for comprehension. This book exemplifies the idea that education is not indoctrination insofar as it dares critique the sacrosanct world of climate science and those who advocate for change. Whether readers agree or disagree, the challenge is sound and well-argued. The book’s core message can be distilled like this: **making climate a priority cannot be subsumed by undemocratic dogma, contingent on emergency rhetoric that stamps out deliberation and collective decision-making. When climate becomes prioritized over other, equally valuable priorities and values, problematic and counter-intuitive outcomes can result.** All science, especially climate science and modeling, is culturally situated and fallible and may distort climate’s impacts. The question of causality is much more complex than pointing a finger at the fossil fuel industry. **For many reasons, climate advocates must move from apocalypse and frantic urgency, most of all because it is not an accurate description of impacts and responses to climate change. There is no deadline after which humans cannot act; addressing climate will be an ongoing, adaptive, incremental process.** Despite its overall robustness, there are places where the manuscript fails to deliver. One, climatists are portrayed simplistically, almost as simplistically as he perceives climatists to make sense of climate. Two, through his constant refutation of anticipated criticism, Hulme validates the “us versus them” outlook that he opposes earlier in the manuscript. Three, his description of the negative consequences of climatism is thin. Four, his description of climate pragmatism centers more around how it differs from climatism versus a systematic assessment of how it might translate into policy. And finally, audiences simply might believe that there are much more important “isms” to fight than climate scientists and advocates. Many might believe that the ends *do* justify the means, and there is no reason to decelerate action on climate despite the risk of climatism’s unwanted consequences.The picture Hulme paints of climatism and climatists is a bit of a straw man. While there are the Naomi Kleins and the Michael Manns who serve as ideological climatist anchors, most of society employs multiple ideologies simultaneously. The vast majority of scientists and activists working in the climate realm are well-reasoned and realistic about the issues Hulme raises, such as scientific uncertainty and valuation of local, contextual factors. While Hulme accuses climatists of being overly attached to certainty, most climate scientists understand the uncertainty of their models better than anyone. Hulme argues against the use of GDP as a proxy for well-being, and while there are few absolutists, using GDP as a proxy for well-being has already been robustly critiqued (e.g., Costanza et al. [2009](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13412-023-00870-5#ref-CR4); Van den Bergh [2009](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13412-023-00870-5#ref-CR9), Aitken [2019](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13412-023-00870-5#ref-CR1); Haapanen and Tapio [2016](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13412-023-00870-5#ref-CR5)). **Hulme uses a presidential emergency climate declaration as an example of panicked climatist “just-in-time”-ism.** This is selling climatists short; the emergency rhetoric is simply a means of attaining an additional 136 legal powers, including directing military funding towards environmental outcomes and ending leases for oil and gas drilling. A climate emergency declaration is one of the many tools that can be used to advance strategic outcomes, not a reaction to literal emergency. “Don’t Look Up” is a movie, not a documentary.In his attempt to quell inevitable backlash, Hulme occasionally doth protest too much. The last chapter is a series of counterpoints to critiques that have yet to occur. These include that he is attempting to discredit climate science, distract politics from climate issues, and delay climate action, all of which he effectively rejects. On occasion, Hulme clarifies obvious points, such as that he does not conflate eugenics with climatism. This chapter harkens back to George Lakoff’s 2004 book, *Don’t Think of an Elephant*: once an idea is invoked, one can’t stop thinking about it. Readers may embrace critiques they might have not thought of otherwise. The call-and-return format of the chapter creates an us-versus-them dichotomy, with **climatists becoming the barrier to achieving climate goals.** The existence of this chapter makes apparent that Hulme has already weighed the potential benefit of this book (replacing climatism with climate pragmatism) against the risk (fueling climate delay and denial). Hulme is aware that out-of-context quotes, and examples from this book will be used in an attempt to delay and minimize the need for action on climate, despite this chapter’s counterargument.While Hulme’s unmasking of climatism is thorough and illuminating, he could do more to provide a workable alternative. Hulme’s alternative to climatism, climate pragmatism, “values pluralism over universalism, flexibility over rigidity, and practical results over utopian ideals” (p. 130) where climate does not serve as a single, overarching framework. In Hulme’s telling, climate pragmatism gives due weight to scientific uncertainty, avoids emergency narratives, promotes “technologies of humility,” and recognizes that there are multiple, valid priorities held by different groups and individuals. He advocates for valuing different types of knowledge in defining climate. While these tenets are intuitively appealing, they are *reactions* to climatism not concrete alternatives. They focus on what climate pragmatism isn’t, versus what it is. One concrete suggestion Hulme offers is to focus on achieving the SDGs, rather than using global temperature as a metric for progress on climate change. The larger point is well-taken, but the SDGs are notoriously neoliberal in framework and are grossly lacking in metrics for accurate assessment (Bernstein and Vos [2021](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13412-023-00870-5#ref-CR2)). While Hulme lambasts climatism for unwarranted certainty and unanticipated outcomes, this is assuredly not limited to climatism. Were climate pragmatism to be applied to policy, unintended outcomes would inevitably arise. States Hulme, “The antidote to climatism is to design, promote and mobilize around diverse goals that have a direct bearing on locally contextualized and specific social ecological welfare outcomes” (p. 121). The rhetoric is captivating, but how climate pragmatism would look in practice is harder to visualize. But I am not sure it’s fair to task Hulme with this burden; in carving a statue out of marble, the first task is to remove everything that is not the statue. In pointing in the right direction and laying out the groundwork, Hulme has assuredly chipped away in service of something more plural. As Hulme would advocate, the practice of climate pluralism will be lived and deliberated collectively.Finally, some may read this book and ask, is climatism so bad that it warrants a takedown? So what if our climate models overestimate warming, especially when climate science is continually under attack? Aren’t there worse culprits preventing action on climate, such as oil companies, fossil fuel lobbyists, and the alt-right? Sure, in particular cases, there may be unintended outcomes. But isn’t the alternative worse?To understand this aversion to climatism, it’s worth noting recognizing our cultural memory, at least in North America. From the 1990s through the 2000s, the general public did not vote based on climate, nor was it anything close to a dominant ideology. When climate was mentioned, the science was constantly and aggressively challenged by the media, with fringe scientists given equal footing with mainstream scientists attempting to convince the public that climate change existed. For many who lived through this climate denial era, even those convinced of Hulme’s argument may accept climatism as a step forward compared to what came before. **By molding climate science into a singular narrative arc ending in an impending apocalypse, climatism forecloses the multiple other ways humans can respond to a changing climate.** Hulme is correct in arguing that climatism, while not as unidimensional as portrayed, risks stymying debate and reducing the range of discourse surrounding climate change. This book demonstrates that, on a social level, we should rigorously hold science of *any* kind to the test and be honest about the outcomes.By questioning the fundamental foundation on which climatism rests, from earth science to psychology, we honor the scientific process instead of being on guard against an outcome that could upend a particular narrative structure. **Hulme demonstrates that when concern for climate transforms into an ideology, other equally important concerns become minimized. A unified vision as to what would effectively address climate change is a strategic messaging tool, but in its reductionism forecloses possibilities.** Undoubtedly, climate is and should be a political priority, but as Hulme demonstrates, **climate change ISN’T everything. That doesn’t mean the forces giving rise to climatism can’t be challenged and ultimately envisioned in pursuit of a better world.**

### Link – Emergency Politics

#### Emergency politics result in long-lasting shifts that securitize climate change and fail.

Lucy Holmes McHugh et al 21 (is a PhD candidate in the Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies at James Cook University. Maria Carmen Lemos is a Professor of Natural Resources and Environment and co-director of the Great Lakes Integrated Sciences and Assessments Center at the University of Michigan. Tiffany H. Morrison, PhD, is a researcher at the University of Queensland. “Risk? Crisis? Emergency? Implications of the new climate emergency framing for governance and policy” 8/23/21 https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wcc.736)//conway

What are the potential long-term effects of the new climate emergency framing on governance and policy? Although there is variation in how an emergency frame affects governance, it is possible to draw some common characteristics from the literature (Table 4). While the threat, urgency, and uncertainty of climate emergency framing may stimulate political action, it may also result in governance shifts. Emergencies heighten public attention to leaders and institutions responsible for action, and there may be more bipartisanship, at least initially ('t Hart & Boin, 2001). Emergencies can often change the nature of governance, shifting the status-quo into a new regime (Sabatier, 2007; Weible et al., 2009). Public policy theory suggests that emergencies often disturb stable policy subsystems: new actors are involved, policy actors can change positions, or resources are redistributed (Sabatier, 2007; Weible et al., 2009). In these “states of exception,” there is often reduced scope for slower-moving democratic deliberation, in favor of “experts” or technocratic governing (Anderson & Adey, 2012; Hurlbert, 2017). For example, research from the United Kingdom illustrates how public accountability was eroded during the COVID-19 emergency procurement of health equipment; due to a lack of parliamentary scrutiny and open tendering (Sian & Smyth, 2021). While emergency governance may only be temporary, it often leaves enduring legacies in governance systems due to power shifts between decision-making bodies. For example, Posnerf and Vermeule (2009) found that both the Global Financial Crisis and 9/11 saw increased executive power relative to the legislature in the United States. Raised public expectation for urgent action reduced the political benefits of partisanship, and this strengthened the political legitimacy of the executive to make sweeping policy with little oversight or criticism. After the Euro crisis, European Union governance also changed. Decision-making processes became less reliant on legal and political mechanisms of accountability (Dawson, 2015). These types of governance shifts are problematic because transparency and accountability mechanisms are vital to the functioning of democratic processes and long-term institutional legitimacy. One possible emergency governance shift could be the securitization of climate change. Securitization refers to an issue being addressed from a perspective of conflict and national security. Emergency framing could be used to justify extraordinary measures that may limit the scope of deliberation over climate responses, or result in “politics of catastrophe” whereby policies and governance systems are narrowed (Aradau & van Munster, 2011; Markusson et al., 2014). This framing creates a “them against us” dynamic and reduces the policy options for solving a problem, often circumventing traditional governance processes and design (Brzoska, 2009). Emergency framing could also be used to justify risky experimentation with geoengineering of climate or interventions in ecosystems (Flegal et al., 2019). Finally, the narrative of climate emergency may also serve to legitimize the role of “global experts” to solve a “global problem,” undermining alternative knowledges, worldviews, and interests, such as those from Indigenous communities who may benefit from place-based interventions that also address social injustice (Bravo, 2009). The emergency crisis frame thus has important implications for governance.

### Link – Environmental Security

#### Framing climate change as a problem of ‘environmental security’ causes militarized solutions and serial policy failure.

Maria Julia Trombetta 8 (is a teaching fellow in Politics and Environment at University of Nottingham “The meaning and function of climate security” July 2008 [http://www.academia.edu/868266/The\_meaning\_and\_function\_of\_climate\_security](http://www.academia.edu/868266/The_meaning_and_function_of_climate_security%20date%20accessed%207/21/14))//conway

In order to do so it considers the discourses framing climate change as a threat and analyses the arguments against transforming climate change and more generally environmental problems into security issues. At first, in fact, the concept of ‘environmental security’ appeared to be a good idea, ‘meant to alarm traditional security analysts about the issues that “really” matter’(de Wilde 2001, 2) and increase the relevance of environmental problems in the political agenda .Buzan emphasised that ‘[e]nvironmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.’(Buzan 1991, 19–20) Others welcomed the concept since it ‘plays down the values traditionally associated with the nation-state—identity, territoriality, sovereignty—and implies a different set of values associated with environmental change—ecology, globality, and governance’.( (Dyer 2001,68) Moreover, on analytical grounds, it seemed a way to provide a better account of new typologies of vulnerability and the potential for conflict and violence these vulnerabilities can be associated with. Opponents however were quick to warn that the word security evokes a set of confrontational practices associated with the state and the military which should be kept away from environmental problems. Concerns included the possibility of creating new competencies for the military — militarising the environment rather than greening security (Käkönen 1994)—or spreading a nationalistic attitude to protect the national environment (Deudney 1999, 466–468). As Deudney argued, not only are practices and institutions associated with national security inadequate to deal with environmental problems, but security can also introduce to the environmental debate a zero-sum rationality that can create winners and losers and undermine the cooperative efforts required by environmental problems. Despite this division and the waxing and waning of the debate, depending on which issues dominated the international security agenda, the concept gained ground, slowly but steadily.

### Link – Urgency

#### Climate ‘urgency’ creates states of exception in the name of rapid response.

Havard Haarstad et al 23 (is a Professor of Human Geography at University of Bergen. Jakob Grandin, PhD, is a researcher at SpaceLab, Department of Geography and the Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation at the University of Bergen. Kristin Kjærås, PhD, is a fellow at the Department of Geography and Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation at University of Bergen. Eleanor Johnson is the founder and director of Flowers Consults, Oslo, Norway. “Why the haste? Introduction to the slow politics of climate urgency” 2023 https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiuj9Dhtff9AhVJEFkFHQTQDxsQFnoECA0QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary.oapen.org%2Fbitstream%2Fhandle%2F20.500.12657%2F60320%2F1%2F9781800083288.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1WF-9mkrdNlh\_njtDwfztL)//conway

As climate change is constructed as an urgent problem there is therefore a risk of reinforcing the status quo and its narrow focus on techno-economic solutionism. We are no longer regarded as having the privilege of time needed to pursue more transformative approaches. Thus, the politics of speed leads to our second temporal dimension: the politics of emergency. Politics of emergency refers to the dominant framing of the problem as one that compels us to act quickly and efficiently, while setting other concerns aside. As societies place increasing emphasis on dealing with the effects of failed sustainability action – the wildfires, floods, storms, heatwaves and forced migration to which urban settlements are particu- larly vulnerable – climate change and sustainability are increasingly gov- erned through emergencies. In states of emergency, established norms and considerations are cast aside to deal with immediate problems, opening space for authoritarian forms of governance. Such emergency governance easily becomes a conservative way of organising time that also tends to reproduce social inequalities and lead to oppression (Adey & Anderson, 2012). Emergency has also become a relatively taken-for- granted way for authorities to govern situations and events (Anderson, 2017). When the focus is shifted to postponing future emergencies, argues Hu (2017: 111), there is no room for either gradual development or revolutionary transformation; we get stuck in ‘an indefinite present without exit’. Emergencies create ruptures, discontinuity and risk. Sociologists describe an increasing fragmentation of the present when grand national projects no longer hold us together (Beck & Levy, 2013). This temporal fragmentation might reinforce certain modes of governing societies, such as financial futurities, but undermine others, such as the liberal rule of law (Opitz & Tellmann, 2015). Agamben (2005) described ‘states of exception’, which seem increasingly common as episodes of climate emergency become widespread. Here politics suspend norms and proce- dures key to democratic control, in order to reinstate normalcy. The deliberate declaration of emergency has distinct political effects. As Anderson (2017) shows, emergency discourses may also be used by progressive organisations oriented towards social justice to gen- erate urgent attention to pressing issues and to demand a response. At the same time, scholars disagree about the implications and merits of emergency frames for advancing collective action, and some caution against it (Patterson et al., 2021). The problem arises when emergencies become the norm. Emergency governance may then foreclose democratic deliberation, par- ticipation and environmental impact assessments in order to fast-track policies (Wilson & Orlove, 2019; Van Buuren, Vink & Warner, 2016). Emergency framings may also serve to legitimise large-scale technical interventions, such as geoengineering, in order to resolve the crisis state and maintain the status quo (Markusson & Ginn, 2014). Framing the sus- tainability crisis in terms of emergencies therefore run at the risk of col- lapsing into short-sightedness, undermining our institutions’ capacity for collective deliberation and advancement of justice. Attempts to break out of these constraints lead us to the final tem- poral dimension we want to address here, namely the politics of the future. Imaginaries of the future entail a temporality of hope and pos- sibility. Climate politics is often framed in the long term, 2050 or 2100, which is distant enough for us to imagine having solved the challenge (or living in apocalypse). This is not to suggest that we tend to openly and freely imagine the future – there is a distinctly political element to the construction of ideas about the future, and we learn to think about the future in particular ways. For example, the imaginary of techno- utopianism for urban futures has been advanced by corporate interests with a commercial stake in fantasies of technological ways of imagin- ing cities (Datta, 2015). Imaginaries can be highly ideological projects, driven by different visions of what the ideal society looks like. Nowhere is this clearer than in the climate change discourse, with the strong tenden- cies towards depoliticised, market-driven and technology-centred solu- tionism (Swyngedouw, 2010). Chiara Certomà describes this well in this book (see chapter 21). Yet in this book we also consider imaginaries or imagination as a primary critique of haste, imagination being the mode through which we take as wide and colourful a view as possible of the landscapes with which we and future generations are faced. There is a need to pluralise and diversify ways of thinking about the future (Bina, Inch & Pereira, 2020). Cook argues, in this book, that we need to rethink what innovation is, and move beyond the idea that innovation is about technological advancement (see chapter 20). Ideas of innovation and progress must be better aligned with collective social goods. Some social scientists use thinking about future and utopia as a method for fostering capacity to imagine alternative futures – the education of desire (Levitas, 2003). Gardening and reconnecting with nature could be one such innovation, or education of desire, as Sofia Cele describes in her chapter (see chapter 11). We believe an important task for social scientists is to critique prevailing future imaginaries and, through research, education and critical thinking, expand our capacity to think differently about possibilities that lie ahead**.**

## Impacts

### ! – Climate Necropolitics

#### The impact is climate necropolitics.

Meredith J. DeBoom 21 (Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Geography, University of South Carolina. “Climate Necropolitics: Ecological Civilization and the Distributive Geographies of Extractive Violence in the Anthropocene” 1/12/21 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24694452.2020.1843995>)//conway

Will the declaration of the Anthropocene catalyze a radical revision of the violent geographies that have facilitated climate change? Or will it usher in a “status quo utopia”—a “green” future that is merely a “thinly disguised version of the present” (G€unel 2019, 13)? Epochal moments can sow transformative possibilities, but reaping their potential requires more than declarations. The violence of colonialism did not “magically disappear after the ceremony of trooping the national colors” (Fanon 1963, 60). Likewise, the necropolitical violence that preceded the Anthropocene’s declaration has not magically disappeared upon its introduction. Like the iterations of necropower that have come before, the violence of climate necropower is accumulative. Existing strategies of social debridement—of protecting “us” from “them” while extracting climate solutions from “them” as has been done historically—might reduce carbon emissions, but they are also likely to reinforce rather than rectify existing geographies of violence. Left to fester too long, such sacrificial necrosis risks inciting an endless cycle of inversion—a planet of ever-expanding, diffuse death-worlds created in the name of planetary life. The distributive geographies of climate change and its associated Anthropocenic imaginaries— including which strategies for mitigation are pursued, where, and based on which priorities decided by whom—are likely to set the foundational conditions for the transformative potential or lack thereof of the Anthropocene’s declaration. Understanding these geographies necessitates a multiscalar approach that does not lose sight of the uneven distribution of Anthropocenic violence in the pursuit of existential, technical, and geophysical understanding of the Anthropocene itself. Geographers can contribute to this task by disaggregating the Anthropocene and asking “what is being secured and for whom” through climate change response strategies and, of course, where (O’Lear and Dalby 2015, 207). Trained in approaches that transcend both scale and traditional disciplinary boundaries between the social and the physical or the environmental and the cultural, geog- raphers are well-suited to holding “the planet and a place on the planet on the same analytic plane” (Hecht 2018, 112, italics in original). Such strategies can rec- oncile the Anthropocene as both a much-needed rec- ognition of human-induced violence on a planetary scale and a scalar project that risks obscuring not only “who pays the price for humanity’s planetary footprints” (Hecht 2018, 135) but also who pays the price for mitigating those footprints. Toward that end, this article introduced climate necropolitics as a theoretical framework for analyzing the multiscalar processes, practices, discourses, and logics through which Anthropocenic imaginaries like Ecological Civilization can be used to render intensi- fied extractive violence legitimate in the name of climate change response. I illustrated the applied value of this approach through a case study of investments by Chinese SOEs in uranium mining in Namibia. Applying climate necropolitics to this case study revealed the logics through which socio envi- ronmental violence, as embodied by minority com- munities in Namibia, is reinforced and rendered legitimate by both Chinese and Namibian state actors through the Anthropocenic imaginary of Ecological Civilization. Although my analysis focused on climate change mitigation—namely, nuclear energy—I anticipate that climate necropol- itics could also be applied to analyze the distributive geographies and legitimation strategies associated with other forms of climate violence, including in the realms of climate security (O’Lear and Dalby 2015) and “green” militarization (Bigger and Neimark 2017) as well as adaptation (Thomas and Warner 2019) and vulnerability (Ribot 2014). The argument presented here should not be inter- preted as a call to abandon either the Anthropocene or pursuits of climate change mitigation. Indeed, my argument is to the contrary. The framework of cli- mate necropolitics is a call not to abandon mitiga- tion but rather to expand our definition of mitigation to include the mitigation of violent social relations. It is a call not to abandon the Anthropocene but rather to investigate and seek to rectify its violent manifestations at scales beyond the planetary. As a framework for understanding how and why current strategies for climate change mitiga- tion risk legitimating sacrificial violence against mar- ginalized communities in the name of preserving planetary life, climate necropolitics echoes Ruddick’s (2015) call for an Anthropocene that “renders nei- ther people nor the planet as disposable” (1126). I hope it will prompt my fellow geographers—whether self-identified as physical or human, cultural or envi- ronmental, or, like most, some combination thereof—to attend not only to the practical ques- tions of what must be done to ensure planetary life but also to the ethical questions of what should be done and by whom.

### ! – Militarization

#### Securitized climate discourses cause militarization and dooms politics.

Kester and Sovacool 17 (Johannes works in the Center for Energy Technologies, Department of Business Development and Technology, Aarhus University, Birk Centerpark, Benjamin is a Professor of Energy Policy, Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), School of Business, Management, and Economics, University of Sussex, United Kingdom “Torn between war and peace: critiquing the use of war to mobilize peaceful climate action” 2017 http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/66364/4/Torn%20Between%20War%20And%20Peace%20Critiquing%20The%20Use%20Of%20War%20To%20Mobilize%20Peaceful%20Climate%20Action.pdf)//conway

To conclude, we do thank Delina and Diesendorf (and others) for looking at WWII for policy insights and attempting to bring an air of urgency and security to the climate change mitigation debate. We emphasize with their concerns. We differ, however, with their (rhetorical) tactics. As we have explained above, one dangerous element to securitizing our response to climate change, besides overstatement, is a militarization of our climate and energy actions and policies. Not just the potential that the global system of international relations returns to one of zero-sum interstate competition, but also one that discursively constructs self-other distinctions and antagonizes particular groups within society. Every security call is based on a process wherein individuals devolve part of their sovereignty to a select few who decide what precisely is dangerous, what courses of action are needed and what people need to do to be part of the population that is protected. There is hence a constant tension between democracy and security (Wainwright & Mann, 2013). Furthermore, it needs to be noted that whereas the war metaphor is an example of the use of a security argument to move beyond normal political routines, most of the security practices can actually be found within these routines. In other words, besides the need to act reflexively when using security arguments to advance a particular goal, we call for an awareness to the routines and risk practices that already govern our daily interactions (Foucault, 2007; Stripple & Bulkeley, 2013; compare: Cohen, 2010, p. 216; Oreskes, 2010; Sovacool & Brown, 2015). As part of everyday climate governance, security processes can be found in the risk models that are created for climate change estimations and the business assessments done by companies, but also in the monitoring programs that try to find and identify those who do not play by the rules of the game, be they eco-terrorists, fraudulent energy companies, free riders or irrational consumers, policymakers and planners. Security arguments play a role when they are called upon to increase the urgency of an issue, but it is when they are accepted or enacted that they influence people’s lives. 13 In this respect, we caution that a thoroughly politicized use of security, based on ‘imaginative geographies’ of fear (Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015), has another side that is often left out of academic reflections on security practices like these. Namely, the performative realisation that even we academics, while trying to remain neutral, still give credence to the War that we evoke. 4 Arguing that we need a mobilization to counter the threat of climate change is in this sense controversial and political because it means that we help push forward one particular vision out from the political into the security sphere (Buzan et al., 1998). The fact is that people interpret and frame the threat of climate change (and energy technology) differently, even if they agree on the science (North, 2011, p. 1587; Oels, 2013). From a critical security perspective, this does not mean that people are uninformed, irrational, stubborn or stupid; it means that they have other security claims competing with their perceived individual or social vulnerability to climate change. Moreover, while a discussion on thresholds might not be as attractive as a discussion on catastrophes and the war that needs to be fought to prevent them; these nevertheless form the political process that Delina and Diesendorf try to protect at the end of their article. The question remains therefore: do we really want the current politicization of climate change to become a government driven securitization, where ‘there is a danger that the militarist approach to deal with environmental issues leads to the militarization of the society’ (Kakonen 1994, 4 as quoted in Chaturvedi & Doyle, 2015, p. 132)? Do we really want to go to War? The scholars studying the war analogy see merit in the organizational model of the war analogy yet offer several caveats as to its translation for climate change mitigation, whereas we caution against the unreflective discursive use of the analogy itself. For the words and discourses we use to define climate change as a problem are more than what Hajer (1995) calls simple “modes of talking.” Delina and Diesendorf remind us that such phrases and rhetorical cues can involve more complex modes of thought and particular ways of framing, thinking, and even acting. Despite at times their lack of coherence, such discursive practices 14 are at their core exclusionary and hegemonic as they only authorize certain people to participate and come with discursive forms of internal discipline to maintain order. Discourses such as the militarization of climate change are not to be seen merely as mediums through which to gain support for a cause. They become part of reality, naturalized and invisible. This is perhaps what makes the call to arms so seductive, but also so treacherous.

### AT: Extinction 1st

#### Extinction first framing sacrifices any and all ongoing violence to secure elite dominance.

Olson 15 – prof of geography @ UNC Chapel Hill (Elizabeth, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about: What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006) In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014). As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city. In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent. If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency. In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123). Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming urgency for the body. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle. In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait, has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care. In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning. I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

#### You should heighten our impacts because of the invisibility and scope of structural violence.

Brandy Lee 16 (is an American psychiatrist whose scholarly work includes the writing of a comprehensive textbook on violence. Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA “Causes and cures VII: Structural violence” May–June 2016 Pages 109-114 <http://www.sciencedirect.com.dartmouth.idm.oclc.org/science/article/pii/S1359178916300441>)//conway

Behavioral violence, in measurements by the tolls of street violence or war, is more noticeable, even though the “tranquil” waters of structural violence may contain much more violence. American violence scholar James Gilligan (1999) compared structural violence to the most deadly military conflicts: estimating 49 million military and civilian deaths from World War II, or about 8 million per year from 1939 to 1945, or even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the United States and the former Soviet Union at 232 million, could not even begin to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year, during times of peace as well as of war. In other words, every fifteen years, on average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating thermonuclear war or genocide, perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. He also described structural violence as increased rates of disabilities and deaths among the people who occupy the bottom class. He noted that the suffering of people from lower classes are the product of people above who have collective bargaining power making choices that determine the allocation of resources. Unlike behavioral violence, its lethal effects operate continuously rather than sporadically; it can occur independently of any intention to kill anyone (for example, it can be a byproduct of wishing to maximize one's wealth and power); and it is usually invisible, in the sense that deaths from structural violence may appear to have other causes, natural or violent. More recent figures bear out these conclusions even more startlingly, as we will see in the next section. Gilligan (2001) also articulated how, through the mechanisms of shame, humiliation, and inferiority, the disparities in classes are the most potent cause of behavioral violence, such as suicide, homicide, warfare, or capital punishment (Bloom, 2001). American anthropologist Paul Far1mer (2003) also developed the concept of structural violence by first defining structure as a pattern of collective social actions within institutional practices, law, economic policies, and other habitual elements. These structures can materially manifest through facilities such as roads, server systems, hospitals, and schools. He described violence as suffering resulting from social arrangements that put individuals in harm's way. Since the exertion of structural violence is systematic—that is, indirect—by everyone who belongs to a certain social order, no one is at fault, at the same time as everyone of that order is at fault. Cumulative historical forces and processes work together to constrain individual agency inversely, if not always neatly, with the ability to resist marginalization and oppression, and deny them the benefits of social progress.

#### Dehumanization outweighs all calculable impacts.

David M. Berube 97 (is a former USC faculty member and currently a [professor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professor) of communication at [North Carolina State University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Carolina_State_University) in [Raleigh, North Carolina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raleigh%2C_North_Carolina). His doctorate is from [New York University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_University)and he has studied and taught communication and [cognitive psychology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_psychology) and created the term SEIN (Social and Ethical Implications of Nanotechnology) in his book NanoHype. “NANOTECHNOLOGICAL PROLONGEVITY: The Down Side,” <http://www.cas.sc.edu/engl/faculty/berube/prolong.htm>)//conway

This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn[s]: "its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the genocide of the holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the cuckoo's next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil's most powerful weapon.

## Alternatives

### Alt – Farsightedness

#### Farsightedness is the best approach.

Fuyuki Kurasawa 4 (PhD, is an associate professor in sociology at York University. “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight” 11/19/04 <http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf>)//conway

Lastly, I contended the work of preventative foresight can parry alarmist misappropriation or resignation by advocating a process of public deliberation that blends the principles of precaution and global justice. A farsighted politics can function through the public use of reason and the honing of the capacity for critical judgment, whereby citizens put themselves in a position to debate, evaluate, and challenge different dystopian narratives about the future and determine which ones are more analytically plausible, ethically desirable, and politically effective in bringing about a world order that is less perilous yet more just for our descendants. Many fora, ranging from local, face-to-face meetings to trans- national, highly mediated discursive networks, are sowing the seeds of such a practice of participatory democracy. None of this is to disavow the international community s rather patchy record of avoiding foreseeable calamities over the last decades, or to minimize the difficulties of implementing the kinds of global institutional reforms described above and the perils of historical contingency, presentist indifference toward the future, or alarmism and resignation. To my mind, however, this is all the more reason to pay attention to the work of preventive foresight in global civil society, through which civic associations can build up the latter\*s coordination mechanisms and institutional leverage, cultivate and mobilize public opinion in distant parts of the world, and compel political leaders and national and transnational governance structures to implement certain policies. While seeking to prevent cataclysms from worsening or, better yet, from occurring in the first place, these sorts of initiatives can and must remain consistent with a vision of a just world order. Furthermore, the labor of farsightedness supports an autonomous view of the future, according to which we are the creators of the field of possibilities within which our successors will dwell. The current socio-political order, with all its short-term biases, is neither natural nor necessary. Accordingly, informed public participation in deliberative processes makes a socially self-instituting future possible. Through the involvement of groups and individuals active in domestic and supra- national public spaces; prevention is a public practice, and a public responsibility. To believe otherwise is, I would argue, to leave the path clear for a series of alternatives that heteronomously compromise the well-being of those who will come after us. We would thereby effectively abandon the future to the vagaries of history ('let it unfold as it may'), the technocratic or instrumental will of official institutions ('let others decide for us'), or to gambles about the time-lags of risks ('let our progeny deal with their realization'). But, as I have tried to show here, this will not and cannot be accepted. Engaging in autonomous preventive struggles, then, remains our best hope. A farsighted cosmopolitanism that aims to avert crises while working toward the realization of precaution and global justice represents a compelling ethico-political project, for we will not inherit a better future. It must be made, starting with us. in the here and now.

### Alt – Reject

#### Vote neg to reject the aff – only a full rejection of the 1AC can break from the apocalyptic narratives that legitimize techno-managerialism.

Havard Haarstad et al 23 (is a Professor of Human Geography at University of Bergen. Jakob Grandin, PhD, is a researcher at SpaceLab, Department of Geography and the Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation at the University of Bergen. Kristin Kjærås, PhD, is a fellow at the Department of Geography and Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation at University of Bergen. Eleanor Johnson is the founder and director of Flowers Consults, Oslo, Norway. “‘The apocalypse is disappointing” 2023 https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiuj9Dhtff9AhVJEFkFHQTQDxsQFnoECA0QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary.oapen.org%2Fbitstream%2Fhandle%2F20.500.12657%2F60320%2F1%2F9781800083288.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1WF-9mkrdNlh\_njtDwfztL)//conway

Transgressing this fantasy cuts through this trauma. To begin with, the revelatory promise of the apocalyptic narrative as well as the redemptive, but impotent, insistence on the key importance of behav- ioural and techno-managerial, more eco-sensitive, change has to be fully rejected. In the face of the dystopian imaginaries mobilised to assure that the apocalypse will not happen at some time in the future (if the right techno-managerial adaptive or mitigating actions are taken), the only reasonable response is, ‘Don’t worry (eco-modernisers, Green New Deal pundits, Greta Thunberg, COP-meeting participants, many environmen- tal activists ...), you are really right, the environmental catastrophe will not happen, it has already happened. It is too late, IT IS ALREADY HERE in the actual present conditions of planetary life.’ Many (but by no means all) already live in the post-apocalyptic inter- stices of life, whereby the fusion of environmental degradation and social disintegration renders life ‘bare’. The fact that the socio-environmental imbroglio has already passed the point of no return for many people and places on earth has to be fully asserted. The socio-environmental ruin is already here for many. It is not some distant dystopian promised future mobilised to trigger a response today. Water conflicts, struggles for food, environmental refugees, the extreme social triaging inflicted by the COVID-19 pandemic, the infernal logical of extractivist socio-ecologies, etc., testify to the socio-ecological predicament that choreographs eve- ryday life for the majority of the world’s population, many of whom are living in urbanised environments. It is already too late; it has always already been too late for them. They experience the consequences of the necropolitics that animate the contemporary immuno-biopolitical envi- ronmental state (Ernstson & Swyngedouw, 2017). There is no Arcadian place, time or environment to return to, no benign global socio-ecological past or an ideal climate that needs to be reconstructed, sustained or stabilised**.** It is only within the realisa- tion of the apocalyptic reality of the ruinous now that a new politics might emerge. It is from within the ecological wreckage of the present that a new imaginary of the possible might arise. Directing the envi- ronmental gaze to the perspective of those who are already barely sur- viving within the collapse of the socio-ecological conditions opens up a wide range of new ways of grappling with socio-ecological realities and reveals a vast terrain of different political and socio-technical inter- ventions other than the presently dominant ones. More importantly, it shifts the gaze to those who are already suffering from socio-ecological disintegration now. Surrendering our libidinal attachment to the enjoy- ment of future failure on the one hand and to the injunction to enjoy our neoliberal consumerism and identitarian, but often well-meaning, inscriptions in the present on the other just deflects desire away from embracing the necessity of constructing a different world in the world (Swyngedouw, 2021).

## AFF

### FW – Reps Don’t Shape

#### Reps don't shape reality.

Thierry Balzacq 05. Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Namur University. “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context” *European Journal of International Relations*, London: Jun 2005, Volume 11, Issue 2.

However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional' and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a more radical approach to security problems wherein threats are institutional, that is, mere products of communicative relations between agents, the CS has neglected the importance of 'external or brute threats', that is, threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are - hazards for human life. In methodological terms, however, any framework over-emphasizing either institutional or brute threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, how problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. This is not always true. For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it.

### FW – Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning is key to ensuring actions have ethical consequences.

SamuelBagg 16, Department of Political Science, Duke University, “Between Critical and Normative Theory: Predictive Political Theory as a Deweyan Realism,” Political Research Quarterly June 2016 vol. 69 no. 2 233-244

We could admit, first of all, that resolving disagreement about predicted consequences is useful, and nonetheless maintain that this is simply not the domain of political theory and philosophy. Those who are understandably weary of efforts to scientize the humanities might object that this sort of “pragmatism,” though perhaps on the wane in Philosophy departments in the mid-20th century, began to dominate Political Science with the “behavioral revolution,” and that “predictive” political theory is simply another name for social science as it developed after Dewey’s death. This objection, however nobly motivated, is misplaced: in short, it is exactly because we are not scientists in any strict sense that making these kinds of predictions is our job. The world is not so courteous as to present us only with a limited number of well-defined variables with limited interactions, as we noted above, nor unlimited time to experiment with different forms of social life. In order to aid **important political judgments**, we need to **envision the consequences** of **large-scale changes** to **material circumstances**, **social norms**, **political institutions**, and **cultural narratives**; tasks ill suited, in other words, to the precise tools of science. The role of political theorists, on this conception, is **not** to do **primary research** on the effects of particular empirical interventions, but to **synthesize the best work** from a number of diverse fields, including but not limited to the social sciences, making **larger-scale predictions** about the **consequences** of actions and interventions that **cannot be tested scientifically**. To call this inherently more speculative practice “prediction,” of course, is to stretch the normal scientific meaning of the word, as Dewey acknowledged. It is worth adopting his somewhat provocative usage, however, in order to emphasize the continuity between these practices, which is too often ignored by those on both sides of the ill-conceived descriptive-prescriptive divide. Using a common language of prediction highlights the ways in which these modes of inquiry ought to discipline and learn from one another. In response, then, it might be argued that social scientists, who can evaluate the relevant empirical studies with greater precision and reliability, are still better positioned than political theorists to “discipline” the more expansive and imaginative form of prediction envisioned by Dewey.9 By contrast, it could be added, the sorts of expertise developed by political theorists are not particularly relevant to the needs of large-scale prediction. The objection is instructive, and several answers to it are necessary. First, we must admit that it contains some truth. At present, many political theorists lack the tools necessary to properly interpret and synthesize the relevant findings of other fields. Thus, adopting a Deweyan method of inquiry is not entirely inert: at least some of us should change what we are doing and learn the tools we need to best undertake this kind of large-scale, synthetic prediction. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think that political theorists are the right disciplinary community for the job. Consider first our somewhat idiosyncratic devotion to the study of canonical figures in the history of political thought, many of whom – from Aristotle to Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, and of course Dewey himself – were not only or even primarily political philosophers. As thinkers of a realist bent are fond of reminding us, political theorists have always drawn from and even contributed to the study of history, psychology, economics, and whatever else was available to them, often because they have hoped to make exactly the sort of large-scale predictions Dewey recommends. In advocating an approach to political philosophy grounded in “social theories of power” rather than first principles, for example, Jacob Levy (2015) observes in a realist spirit that if such a social-theoretic approach is “sometimes absent from contemporary normative theory… that is one reason for looking to the history of political thought, where a greater methodological richness can be found” (4). Political theorists’ training in the history of political thought therefore has two important implications: first, that we are already accustomed to grappling with this kind of imaginative prediction; and second, that adopting a similarly “interdisciplinary” approach in our own constructive work does not change the fundamental character of the discipline. Of course, one might think that with the increasing sophistication in our methods of knowledge production since the age of Aristotle or even of Dewey, there is a good reason we now typically sort ourselves into disciplines. In a sense, this is undeniably true: one cannot hope to be at the forefront of so many fields at once, in the way that some of these classical figures could. Even now, however, it is not impossible to ground one’s theoretical perspective in a broad, interdisciplinary understanding of human beings and human societies. Indeed, we might say something even stronger: to be at the forefront of political theory often requires some sort of interdisciplinary synthesis.10 Consider the work, for example, of thinkers as diverse as Elizabeth Anderson, Anthony Appiah, William Connolly, Jon Elster, Sharon Krause, Helene Landemore, Martha Nussbaum, James Scott, Ian Shapiro, and Cass Sunstein, each of whom treats traditional texts alongside work in the social and cognitive sciences. Of course, it is not just quantitative and explicitly experimental knowledge that deserves inclusion – the humanities and interpretive social sciences are also essential to the integrative understanding envisioned here. Since political theorists are more accustomed to using such resources, it does not merit as much attention here, but it does count as yet another reason that it is political theorists and not social scientists trained explicitly in quantitative methods who are the most natural fit for the sort of prediction I have in mind, which is not simply a kind of statistical meta-analysis. Perhaps most importantly, in fact, the very critical and normative methods which a predictive approach seeks to transcend are nonetheless crucial background for its pursuit. Though critical theorists are led astray when they refuse to make any consciously constructive contributions to democratic judgment, for example, Foucault and others are right to challenge the normalizing effects of academic discourses, and the authority with which we presume to perpetuate them. Thus, it is only with an acute sensitivity to these dangers that we ought to proceed in predictive inquiry. Similarly, though analytic normative theorists have a problematic tendency to proliferate abstract discussion of principles at the expense of concrete inquiry into the particular situations of judgment we face, these principles often serve as excellent heuristics, pointing our attention in particularly fruitful directions when examining those concrete circumstances. It is at least partly through engagement with critical and normative theory, in other words, that we become attuned to a genuine diversity of perspectives, the moral patterns which permeate social life, and the relentlessly subtle ways in which power structures our experience. This traditional sort of “expertise” is as relevant as ever to political theory in a broadly predictive mode. Despite its scientific inspiration and the language of hypothesis testing, therefore, we should not mistake Dewey’s project for a naïve scientism; an attempt to make political theory more “objective” or “rational.” As we saw above, his reading of Darwin leads him to question the possibility of a singular rationality. In his interpretations of Dewey, Richard Rorty (1982; 1989) has emphasized the role of narrative and artistic imagining, which for Dewey is indeed a necessary part of the process of social intelligence: “The first intimations of wide and large redirections of desire and purpose are of necessity imaginative. Art is a mode of prediction not found in charts and statistics, and it insinuates possibilities of human relations not to be found in rule and precept, admonition and administration” (LW 10, 352, emphasis added). Rorty imagines that this justifies a surrender of philosophy to poetry – that is, a surrender of logic to narrative (1989, 26). Dewey recognized, however, that we can also go beyond these first intimations about new forms of life, projecting our more systematic social and historical inquiry into the future. For Dewey, art and statistics are both moments of a continuous practice of predictive inquiry, each with irreplaceable contributions to make. What a Deweyan perspective recommends, specifically, is leveraging an integrated, interdisciplinary understanding of human societies to think through the predicted effects of potential “interventions” on larger scales than is possible to predict scientifically. We might do our best, for example, to imagine all of the various consequences of large-scale racial integration, as Elizabeth Anderson (2010) does in The Imperative of Integration. Anderson, a pragmatist explicitly inspired by Dewey, adopts of a wide array of disciplinary lenses to make a synthetic argument that is irreducible to any of them, demonstrating predictive political theory at its best. Others have applied similar methods in evaluating competing regimes for maintaining civic “virtue” (McTernan 2014), achieving deliberative conversions (Bagg 2015), enabling secondorder social reflexivity (Aligica 2014; Bell 2015; Knight and Johnson 2011), and weakening the effect of money in politics (Lessig 2011). We can imagine similarly **wide-ranging predictive approaches** to proposed interventions like instituting **reparations for slavery**, changing our understandings of marriage, **abolishing prisons**, enforcing strict norms of **gender equality**, **opening borders**, undermining norms of individual responsibility, or imposing **global redistributive taxes** on capital. These proposals vary in feasibility, for judgments about which long-term ideals to promote in the broader public sphere are just as **real**, **situated**, and **pressing**, as judgments about **which policies** to support in the **short term**. In fact, since legal theorists and scholars of public policy do occasionally engage in predictive inquiry regarding proposed adjustments to legal and institutional regimes, it is with regard to long-term ideals – and, crucially, all manner of extra-legal norms, discourses, and narratives – that political theorists may have the most to contribute. This brings us, then, to our second major objection: that however valuable it may be for political theorists to do, this task does not respond in any obvious way to realist demands. Again, we must admit from the start that there is some truth to this objection, especially if we assume that contemporary realism is closely tied to classical realists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. One familiar doctrine that might be associated with “realism,” for instance, is that because humans are inherently selfish, they could never attain the levels of social cooperation necessary for socialist, communist, or even liberal internationalist goals. Though this particular claim is not widely-held among contemporary realists, several do exhibit a fear of “utopian” speculation in general, recommending instead an emphasis on basic security from violence and cruelty.11 From this perspective, speculation about open borders and prison abolition must appear quite fantastical. To those who support such radical goals, meanwhile, “realism” might seem an odd label for Dewey’s progressive experimentalism. Nevertheless, we can defend a Deweyan predictive approach as a variety of realism in two ways: first, by distinguishing between “substantive” and “methodological” realism; and second, by emphasizing again the significance of extra-legal norms. It must be admitted that a certain element of the broader realist tradition is pessimistic about the possibilities of cooperation and skeptical of utopian speculation – an attitude we may call “substantive” realism. Nonetheless, this is only one part of realist tradition, and it is one that contemporary realists have de-emphasized. In his pivotal “manifesto” for the realist movement, for example, William Galston (2010) summarizes its four basic components: “the injunction to take politics seriously as a particular field of human endeavor; the proposition that civil order is the sine qua non for every other political good; the emphasis on the evaluation and comparison of institutions and regimetypes, not only principles; and the call for a more complex moral and political psychology” (408). Of these four, only the second – an emphasis on civil order – plausibly implies a pessimistic “substantive” account of human possibility, and even this allows for more ambitious political schemes once the demand for order has been satisfied. The other three components, by contrast, are conducive to a wide variety of social and political projects. Largely eschewing the **blanket pessimism** of their classical forebears, contemporary realists are more likely to endorse what might be called “methodological” realism – i.e., a commitment to political theory that is **comparative**, **contextual**, psychologically rich, **institutionally innovative**, and grounded in **specific situations** of **political judgment**. These commitments, then, are plainly aligned with the Deweyan approach elaborated here, which gives the lie to any necessary connection between a realist methodology and a pessimistic, conservative, or quietist conception of the substantive goals to which we may aspire. Pace those partisans of abstraction who cry “utopophobia” at any mention of particularity or constraint in political philosophy (Estlund 2014), we need not abandon methodological realism just because we reject the conservatism of certain classical realists. Indeed, we may **productively advocate** for **quite radical institutional proposals**, such as prison abolition or open borders – just so long as we do so responsibly, acknowledging the **work that must be done** to **render those proposals feasible**. As this caveat makes clear, a predictive approach does recommend a certain degree of caution. A Deweyan realist will maintain that such apparently infeasible ideals as prison abolition and open borders may be useful in certain situations of judgment, as when expressing long-term goals for society. However, she will also readily admit that they will not typically be called for in everyday political situations requiring collective action, which are **highly constrained** by the dispositions of others. In such circumstances, radical action can **easily** turn out to be **counterproductive**, and as noted above, the point is **definitively not** to engage in **reckless experimentation** for experimentation’s sake. Rather, it is the **express purpose** of predictive political theory to consider which experiments are **worth trying**, and **under what circumstances**; precisely to **avoid**, in other words, the sort of **rash**, **irresponsible “experiments”** that have brought us everything from **Stalin’s gulag** and **Mao’s famine** to **US misadventures** in **Latin America** and the **Middle East**. Far from tempering our enthusiasm for the predictive enterprise, such examples reinforce its **vital necessity**. Methodological realism can help us to distinguish when substantive realism is appropriate, and when it may be relaxed.

### Link – AT: ‘Apocalyptic’ Framing

#### Apocalyptic framing is key to spur individual and institutional action to solve – the alternative is fatal resignation.

Veldman 12 [PhD Candidate Religion and Nature at U of Florida (Robin- National Foundation Fellow at the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship, Spring, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists” Ethics and the Environment, Vol 17 No 1, ProjectMuse]

Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation. National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior. When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper monkeywrenching” (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together. The connection between belief in impending disaster and environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting “dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior: images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212) What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative. All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8] The Apocalyptic Narrative as a Framework for Moral Deliberation In discussing how apocalypticism functions within the environmental community, it will be helpful to analyze it as a type of narrative. I do so because the domain of narrative includes both the stories that people read and write, as well as those they tell and live by. By using narratives as data, scholars can analyze experiential and textual sources simultaneously (Polkinghorne 1988; Riessman 2000). To analyze environmental apocalypticism as a type of narrative is not to suggest that apocalyptics’ claims about the future are fictional. Rather, it is to highlight that the facts to which environmentalists appeal have been organized with particular goals in mind, goals which have necessarily shaped the selection and presentation of those facts. Compelling environmental writers do not simply list every known fact pertaining to the natural world, but instead select certain findings and place them within a larger interpretive framework. Alone, each fact has little meaning, but when woven into a larger narrative, a message emerges. This process of narrativization is essential if a message is to be persuasive (Killingsworth and Palmer 2000, 197), and has occurred not only in the rapidly expanding genre of environmental nonfiction, but in much scientific writing about the environment as well (Harré, Brockmeier, and Mühlhäusler 1999, 69). What defines narratives as such is their beginning-middle-end structure, their ability to “describe an action that begins, continues over a well-defined period of time, and finally draws to a definite close” (Cronon 1992, 1367). Here I will focus on the last of these elements, the ending, because anything we can learn about how endings function within narratives in general will be applicable to the apocalypse, the most final ending of all. An ending is essential in order for a story to be complete, but there is more to it than this. Endings are also key because they establish a story’s moral, the lesson it is supposed to impart upon the reader. In other words, to know the moral of the story, auditors must know the consequences of the actions depicted therein, so there can be no moral without an ending. To take a simple example, when we hear the story of the shepherd boy who falsely claims that a wolf is attacking his flock of sheep in order to entertain himself at his community’s expense, what makes the lesson clear is that when a wolf does attack his flock, the disenchanted town members refuse to come to his aid. By clearly illustrating how telling lies can have [End Page 9] unpleasant consequences for the perpetrator, the ending reveals the moral that lying is wrong. As Cronon explains, it is “[t]he difference between beginning and end [that] gives us our chance to extract a moral from the rhetorical landscape” (1992, 1370). Endings play a similar role in environmental stories. In Al Gore’s book Earth in the Balance (1992), for example, he devotes over a third of the book’s pages to presenting scientific evidence that disaster is imminent.5 As he sums it up, “Modern industrial civilization…is colliding violently with our planet’s ecological system. The ferocity of its assault on the earth is breathtaking, and the horrific consequences are occurring so quickly as to defy our capacity to recognize them” (1992, 269). He builds this argument so carefully precisely because if the ending does not seem credible, the moral he wants readers to draw from the story will not be compelling. If his readers are not convinced that the ending to this story of ecological misbehavior will be a debacle of colossal proportions, they will not become convinced that they need to dramatically alter their ecological behavior. Thus the vision of future catastrophe that Gore presents provides a crucial vantage point from which the present environmental situation can be understood as the result of a grand moral failure, and Gore’s readers are made aware of their obligations in light of it. Gore himself appreciates the importance of this recognition, arguing that “whether we realize it or not, we are now engaged in an epic battle to right the balance of our earth, and the tide of this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join an all-out effort” (1992, 269, emphasis added). Here, as in so many other stories, the ending must be in place for the moral to become clear. To say that endings are essential in order for stories to have morals is already to hint that stories alter behavior, that they can encourage action in the real world even as they invoke an imaginary one. This much is clear from Earth in the Balance (1992): Gore does not just want people to grasp a moral, to perceive some ethic in the abstract—he wants them change their behavior in the here and now. In constructing a narrative with this goal in mind, he is banking on the ability of powerful stories to motivate social change, to be, as Cronon puts it, “our chief moral compass in the world” (1992, 1375). Mark Johnson’s insightful synthesis of cognitive science and philosophy helps explain further how this process of moral guidance occurs. For [End Page 10] Johnson, narrative is fundamental to our experience of reality, “the most comprehensive means we have for constructing temporal syntheses that bind together and unify our past, present, and future into more or less meaningful patterns” (1993, 174). Narratives are also critical to our ability to reason morally, an activity which Johnson asserts is fundamentally imaginative. In this view, we use stories to imagine ourselves in different scenarios, exploring and evaluating the consequences of different possible actions in order to determine the right one. Moral deliberation is thus …an imaginative exploration of the possibilities for constructive action within a present situation. We have a problem to solve here and now (e.g., ‘What am I to do?’…. ‘How should I treat others?’), and we must try out various possible continuations of our narrative in search of the one that seems best to resolve the indeterminacy of our present situation. (1993, 180) Put another way, what cognitive science has revealed is that from an empirical perspective the process of moral deliberation entails constructing narratives rooted in our unique history and circumstances, rather than applying universal principles (such as Kant’s categorical imperative) to particular cases. That we use narratives to reason morally is not a result of conscious choice but of how human cognition works. That is, insofar as we experience ourselves as temporal beings, a narrative framework is necessary to organize, explain, and ultimately justify the many individual decisions that over time become a life. Formal principles may be useful in unambiguous textbook cases, but in real life “we can almost never decide (reflectively) how to act without considering the ways in which we can continue our narrative construction of our situation” (Johnson 1993, 160). Empirically speaking, “our moral reasoning is situated within our narrative understanding” (Johnson 1993, 180, italics in original). The observation that people use narratives to reason morally may help explain the association between environmental apocalypticism and activism. The function of the apocalyptic narrative may be that it helps adherents determine how to act by **providing a storyline** from which they can imaginatively sample, enabling them to assess the consequences of their actions. In order to answer the question, “Should I drive or walk to the store?” for example, they can reason, “If I walk, that will reduce my carbon footprint, which will help keep the ice caps from melting, saving humans and other species.” It is their access to this narrative of impending [End Page 11] disaster that makes such reasoning possible, for it provides a simple framework within which people can consider and eventually arrive at some conclusion about their moral obligations.6 More broadly, it can guide entire lives by providing a narrative frame of reference that imbues the individual’s experiences with meaning. For example, it is the context of looming anthropogenic apocalypse which suggests that dedicating one’s life to achieving a healthier relationship with the natural world is a worthwhile endeavor. Absent the apocalypse, choices such as limiting one’s travel to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, becoming vegetarian, working in the environmental sector (often for less compensation), or growing one’s own food could seem to be meaningless sacrifices. Within this context, on the other hand, such choices become essential features of the quest to live a moral life. The apocalyptic narrative is but one of many ways to tell the environmental story, yet it is one that seems particularly well-suited to encouraging pro-environmental behavior. First, the apocalyptic ending discloses certain everyday decisions as moral decisions. Without the narrative context of impending disaster, decisions such as whether to drive or walk to the store would be merely matters of convenience or preference. In the context of potentially disastrous consequences for valued places, people, and organisms, by contrast, such decisions become matters of right and wrong. Second, putting information about the environment into narrative form enables apocalyptics to link complex global environmental processes to their own lives, a perceptual technique Thomashow describes as “bringing the biosphere home” (2002). Developing this skill is essential because without that felt sense of connection to their own lived experience, people are much less likely to become convinced that it is incumbent upon them to act (2002, 2). Finally, the sheer magnitude of the impending disaster increases the feeling of responsibility to make good on one’s moral intuitions. By locating individuals within a drama of ultimate concern, the narrative frames their choices as cosmically important, and this feeling of urgency then helps to convert moral deliberation into action. With this conceptual overview in place, we can now examine more closely what the relationship between apocalypticism and moral reasoning looks like in practice. [End Page 12]

### Link – AT: Environmental Security

#### **Environmental security key to produce change.**

Matthew 02 (Richard, Prof. of IR and Env. Poliics at UC-Irvine, “In Defense of Environment and Security Research”, ECSP Report, Summer, p 119)

In addition, environmental security's language and findings can benefit conservation and sustainable development.**"'** Much environmental security literrature emphasizes the importance of development assistance, sustainable livelihoods, fair and reasonable access to environmental goods, and conservation practices as the vital upstream measures that in the long run will contribute to higher levels of human and state security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are examples of bodies that have been quick to recognize how the language of environmental security can help them. The scarcity/conflict thesis has alerted these groups to prepare for the possibility of working on environmental rescue projects in regions that are likely to exhibit high levels of related violence and conflict.These groups are also aware that an association with security can expand their acceptance and constituencies in some countries in which the military has political control, For the first time in its history; the contemporary environmental movement can regard military and intelligence agencies as potential allies in the struggle to contain or reverse humangenerated environmental change. (In many situations, of course, the political history of the military--as well as its environmental record-raise serious concerns about the viability of this cooperation.) Similarly, the language of security has provided a basis for some fruitful discussions between environmental groups and representatives of extractive industries**.** In many parts of the world, mining and petroleum companies have become embroiled in conflict. These companies have been accused of destroying traditional economies, cultures, and environments; of political corruption; and of using private militaries to advance their interests. They have also been targets of violence, Work is now underway through the environmental security arm of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to address these issues with the support of multinational corporations. Third, the general conditions outlined in much environmental security research can help organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, and IUCN identify priority cases--areas in which investments are likely to have the greatest ecological and social returns. For all these reasons, IUCN elected to integrate environmental security into its general plan at the Amman Congress in 2001. Many other environmental groups and development agencies are taking this perspective seriously (e.g. Dabelko, Lonergan & Matthew, 1999). However, for the most part these efforts remain preliminary.'

### Perm – Do Both

#### The plan over comes its apocalyptic rhetoric – combining our rhetoric with a policy solution solves the link.

Feinberg and Willer 11 (Matthew and Robb, Psychology Dept and Sociology Dept, UC Berkeley, "Apocalypse Soon? Dire Messages Reduce Belief in Global Warming by Contradicting Just-World Beliefs", Psychological Science January 2011 vol. 22 no. 1 34-38)

These results demonstrate how dire messages warning of the severity of global warming and its presumed dangers can backfire, paradoxically increasing skepticism about global warming by contradicting individuals’ deeply held beliefs that the world is fundamentally just. In addition, we found evidence that this dire messaging led to reduced intentions among participants to reduce their carbon footprint – an effect driven by their increased global warming skepticism. Our results imply that because dire messaging regarding global warming is at odds with the strongly established cognition that the world is fair and stable, people may dismiss the factual content of messages that emphasize global warming’s dire consequences. But if the same messages are delivered coupled with a potential solution, it allows the information to be communicated without creating substantial threat to these individuals’ deeply held beliefs. Our findings extend past research showing that fear-based appeals, especially when not coupled with a clear solution, can backfire and undermine the intended effects of messages (Witte, 1992; 1994). In addition, our results complement recent research showing that framing environmentalism as patriotic can successfully increase proenvironmental behavioral intentions in those most attached to the status quo (Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010). Taken together, these findings stress the importance of framing global warming messages so they do not contradict individuals’ deeply held beliefs. Additionally, our results suggest that reducing individuals’ just world beliefs could result in decreased global warming skepticism. Although we were able to manipulate such beliefs in Study 2, it remains to be seen how just world beliefs could be changed longer-term in field settings.

### ! – Extinction 1st

#### Extinction is unethical and underestimated – prioritize it.

Baum and Barret 18, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. (Seth & Anthony, 2018, “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks,” In Vicki Bier (Ed.) Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, pg. 174-184, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3046668)

A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species.

Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives.

Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives.

Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization.

The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them.

While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

#### **Framing environmental threats in terms of extinction is key to mobilize action.**

Epstein and Zhao 09 – Lab of Medicine @ Hong Kong Richard J. Epstein and Y. Zhao ‘9 – Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, The Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name; Human Extinction, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse

Final ends for all species are the same, but the journeys will be different. If we cannot influence the end of our species, can we influence the journey? To do so—even in a small way—would be a crowning achievement for human evolutionand give new meaning to the term civilization. Only by elevating the topic[End Page 121] of human extinction to the level of serious professional discourse can we begin to prepare ourselves for the challenges that lie ahead. Table 3.   Human Thinking Modes Relevant to Extinction: from Ego-Think to Eco-Think  The difficulty of the required transition should not be underestimated.This is depictedin Table 3as a painful multistep progression fromthe 20th-century philosophical norm ofEgo-Think—defined therein as a short-term state of mind valuing individual material self-interest above all other considerations—to Eco-Think, in which humans come to adopt a broader Gaia-like outlook on themselves as but one part of an infinitely larger reality. Making this change must involve communicating the non-sensationalistmessageto all global citizensthat“things are serious” and “we are in this together”—or, in blunter language, thatthe road to extinction and its related agonies does indeed lie ahead. Consistent with this prospect, the risks of human extinction—and the cost-benefit of attempting to reduce these risks—have been quantified in a recent sobering analysis (Matheny 2007).  Once complacency has been shaken off and a sense of collective purpose created**,** the battleagainst self-seeking anthropocentric human instinctswill have only just begun**.** It is often said that human beings suffer from the ability to appreciate their own mortality—an existential agony that has given rise to the great religions— but in the present age of religious decline, we must begin to bear the added burden of anticipating the demise of our species. Indeed, as argued here, there are compelling reasons for encouraging this collective mind-shift. Forin the best of all possible worlds, the realization that our species has long-term survival criteria distinct from our short-termtribal prioritiescould spark a new social ethic to upgrade what we now all too often dismiss as “human nature**”** (Tudge 1989). [End Page 122]

### Alt – Government Action Key

#### Government action is necessary – the alt locks in existential climate change.

Anthony Leiserowitz 20 (is a senior research scientist at the Yale School of the Environment and director of the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. Leiserowitz published in the book, “A Better Planet: 40 Big Ideas for a Sustainable Future.” “Building Public and Political Will for Climate Change Action” 6/30/20 https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/building-public-and-political-will-for-climate-change-action)//conway

**Global climate change is a “massive collective action problem.” While changes in individual behavior** (for example, energy conservation) **can help reduce emissions, system-level changes to the way human societies use energy and natural resources are necessary to limit global warming to “safe” levels.** Government policy is one important means of system change — including laws, rules, regulations, standards, and incentives. But many climate change policies, from the local level to the global level, founder on the lack of “political will” — the unwillingness or inability of government officials to enact policies that will reduce carbon pollution at the scale and speed required. Public will, especially as expressed through citizen activism, is an important influence on the policymaker process. Strong public demand increases the likelihood that governments will prioritize climate change action. Public will refers to a “social system’s shared recognition of a particular problem and resolve to address the situation in a particular way through sustained collective action.” Indicators of public will can include public support for mitigation policies, contacting government officials, and pro-climate consumer behavior. Importantly, however, there is no single, homogenous “public” — there are many diverse “publics” within any society. Strong public demand increases the likelihood that governments will prioritize climate change action. One key set of citizens is an issue public — a relatively small proportion of a population that is passionate about a specific issue. Issue publics are highly attentive to and seek out information about their issue, have relatively high levels of knowledge, have developed strong and stable attitudes, and are more likely than other citizens to take action on the issue. Some issue publics are diffuse, with few and weak connective ties between individual members. Others are highly organized through social, institutional, or advocacy groups and networks, which can make them powerful political actors. One example of the latter is the National Rifle Association — an organized issue public of approximately four to five million members (in a country of more than 250 million adults) who wield political clout far beyond their numbers on the issues they care about. Public will can thus include at least three levels of citizen engagement: (1) general public support for an issue or policy, (2) an issue public focused on that issue or policy, and (3) an organized issue public mobilized to exert influence on policymakers. In turn, a mobilized issue public can include diverse groups, organized into a coordinated “advocacy coalition” of partners working together to achieve a common goal. Separately, there is always “limited space available on the political or decision-making agenda, that is the continually evolving, brief list of issues that command policy makers’ attention at a given time.” “**Windows of Opportunity” theory says an issue is “most likely to reach the political agenda when three things occur at the same time: a problem is perceived as important and urgent by the public and elites [public will]; viable policy solutions are available; and political commitment to adopt a solution is high [political will].** When these three elements converge, a “policy window” opens during which significant change is possible. All three elements are necessary for policy change, but even then, change is not inevitable. **Advocates have to be ready and able to take advantage of a policy window when it opens. After it closes, only incremental progress is likely until the next window opens.**