## Middle East Topic Paper 2023-2024

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# \*\*\*Executive Summary

### 1---Introduction

#### We propose a topic that requires the affirmative to defend a large change in foreign policy engagement with one or more countries in the Middle East. We anticipate a topic with two broad areas of affirmative cases: first, cases that increase foreign assistance to one or multiple of the resolutional list of countries, and second, cases that provide security guarantees to one or multiple of the resolutional list of countries. Examples of the first category would be financial assistance packages, diplomatic two-party talks, and democracy promotion initiatives. Examples of the second category would be grand bargains and security umbrella offers. The controversy is timely given global shifts in great power attentions on the Middle East, the literature is deep (long histories of international policy analysis on posture toward the Middle East, and a lively debate over “what to do in the Mideast after Afghanistan” and “how to influence Middle East and Central Asian governments that we have major disagreements with”), and the debate community deserves a topic we know will be workable and last for a year of nuanced debate.

### 2---Why Debate Middle East Engagement

#### For the past two years, the debate community has chosen niche topics that were new to policy debate (and in many cases relatively new to scholastic inquiry). This novelty ended in relatively stale topics and an overall difficulty of finding solvency mechanisms with genuine defense that could beat advantage or process counterplans. With this in mind, it is time to return to topics that have been tested for yearlong durability that have in-depth controversy, and adequate evidence on both sides of the debate. *The debate community should debate about whether or not the United States should increase its constructive engagement with countries within the Middle East (and Central Asian) region.* While this topic has happened in the past, this year’s discussion wouldn’t be stale. In fact, a deep analysis of engagement with countries in the Middle East hasn’t happened in college policy debate for a decade (Democracy Assistance, 2012; Middle East, 2007).

#### 1. Middle East debates are timely

#### The time for DEBATING the Middle East is now!

Kaye et al 21 [Dalia Dassa Kaye is an adjunct political scientist at the RAND Corporation. She is also a senior fellow at UCLA's Burkle Center for International Relations. Linda Robinson, Middle East Researcher at RAND, Jeffrey Martini is a senior Middle East researcher at the RAND Corporation, where he works on political and security issues in the Arab World. Ashley Rhoades is a defense policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. Nathan Vest, researcher at RAND, Reimagining U.S. Strategy in the Middle East Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA958-1.html, poapst]

Why the Middle East Still Matters: Moving Beyond the “Should We Stay or Should We Go” Debates Before considering a new strategy, some might ask, “Why bother?” Frustration with the high costs of U.S. military interventions in the Middle East and competing priorities at home and abroad have provoked an understandable debate about whether the United States should continue to invest its resources and maintain its military presence in the region or cut its losses and shift its focus elsewhere.24 Such debates are healthy and long overdue for a region that has consumed U.S. foreign policy and resources for decades. But the key question for U.S. policy in the region is not whether we “stay or go,” but how we engage the region. As suggested earlier, a reimagined strategy that focuses less on military presence and assistance and more on diplomacy, economic investment, and governance might provide a more effective way to stay engaged rather than turning our backs on the region altogether. It is true that from the narrow perspective of energy security the Middle East matters less than it once did. But this is a short-sighted view of the region’s importance. It is exactly because this region is so dysfunctional today that it is still critically important for U.S. interests. Poor governance and weak state capacity create fertile ground for unrest, extremism, and humanitarian crises that have a global impact, including on the United States. When such extremist groups as ISIS rise to power, or when mass displacement leads to political turmoil among our European partners and the rise of anti-democratic forces, U.S. interests are endangered.25 And although U.S. policies over the past decades might have largely succeeded in such aims as securing access to waterways and military bases and protecting regional partners, they have not succeeded in reducing regional conflict; they arguably have contributed to heightened conflict. Indeed, the Middle East has one of the worst track records in the world when it comes to conflict, particularly intra-state or nonstate conflict. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, in the post–World War II era, the Middle East has consistently been the third-most conflict-affected region in the world in terms of interstate conflicts, second to Asia and Africa. When it comes to nonstate conflicts, the Middle East has overtaken Asia in the past decade and produced the second-highest number of conflicts in the world, at times eclipsing Africa as well.26 Finally, the conflict and crises emanating from this region do not stay in the region. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, not to mention the continued conventional arms race, is a global harm. The likely increase in climate-induced migration in the years ahead, or pandemics that do not stop at national borders, can directly affect Americans’ safety. The strategic goal of a more stable and less conflict prone Middle East, which is based on a broad understanding of what contributes to stability, is still a vital interest for the United States. The Middle East, in short, does still matter. The region is worth our continued investment. The challenge is how we go about that investment, who we invest in, and what realistic goals we might help advance.

#### Now is the time for a Middle East debate – situations are ripe for change and there are massive debates with deep evidence sets on both sides.

Walborsky and Habibi 22 [Maya Walborsky graduated from Brandeis University in 2022 with a double major in Economics and Islamic Studies, and a minor in Arabic. She currently works in the field of international development in Washington, D.C.; Nader Habibi is the Henry J. Leir Professor of Practice in the Economics of the Middle East at Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies., assistant professor of economics in Bilkent University (Ankara), research fellow and lecturer on political economy of Middle East at Yale University., Will the U.S. Abandon the Middle East to Focus on China?, https://intpolicydigest.org/will-the-u-s-abandon-the-middle-east-to-focus-on-china/, poapst]

Will the United States reduce its engagement in the Middle East to focus on the Asia-Pacific region in order to contain China? As China emerges as the primary global rival of the U.S., the level of U.S. engagement within the Middle East is unlikely to decrease and might even increase. The U.S. global response to the rise of China could lead to the Middle East emerging as a chessboard for strategic competition between the U.S. and China. The United States is not as directly dependent on Middle East oil as its allies; however, China is. As a result, the region is likely to become the focal point of a China-U.S. rivalry both geopolitically and economically. U.S. policymakers have good reason for seeking to reduce U.S. involvement in the region. After two prolonged and costly military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. policy toward the Middle East faced a barrage of criticism from both the left and right alike. Experts and politicians pointed to the high cost of maintaining a U.S. presence in the Middle East relative to its benefits. The main historical benefit and hence the main cause of U.S. presence in the region has always been its large reserves of oil and natural gas. U.S. dependence on Middle East fossil fuels has diminished significantly, as a result of a sharp increase in oil and gas production domestically. Criticism also came from those concerned about the opportunity cost of diplomatic and military resources that the U.S. has invested in the Middle East. The feeling was that some of these resources must be shifted to Asia in response to the rise of China as the United States’ largest global rival. Beginning with President Obama, successive U.S. administrations have heeded these criticisms in a grand strategy aimed at reducing U.S. military and security engagement in the Middle East. To the extent that disengagement from the Middle East has been motivated by U.S. interest in focusing more on China, it must take China’s engagement with the Middle East into account. The U.S. cannot ignore the Middle East as long as China is a major player in the region. If China continues to expand its involvement in the region, the U.S. must also maintain its presence. As China’s economic and diplomatic ties with the Middle East have increased in recent years and are expected to expand further, the United States is likely to continue its high-level engagement with the region in the context of a global response to the rise of China. An early signal of U.S. policy revision was evident in one of President Biden’s comments during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia: “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran. We will seek to build on this moment with active, principled, American leadership.” During the recent G7 conference, the U.S. and its other fellow members also pledged to spend $600 billion in low- and middle-income countries to counter Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. This marks the first time Western nations have cohesively and concretely set out a plan to counter China’s massive development-spending diplomacy. The most valuable export commodity of the region for China is oil — with China’s dependency on Middle East oil imports growing over the past two decades. In 2020, close to 47% of China’s oil imports came from the Middle East, making China the world’s largest net oil importer. In addition to this high level of energy dependency, China has also emerged as the largest exporter to most Middle Eastern countries. For many countries in the region, the share of China in their total imports exceeds the shares of the United States and major European countries. This was not the case in the 1990s. Bilateral investment between China and the Middle East has also experienced a sharp increase in the past two decades. According to the China Global Investment Tracker data, between 2005 and 2021, China’s investment and construction service projects in the Middle East alone totaled over $200 billion. Even after the pandemic shook up China’s relations with many Western countries, China remained committed to increasing the Belt and Road engagement in the Middle East. Furthermore, the attraction is mutual. Saudi diplomats recently indicated that the kingdom will continue to strengthen its relations with China. The pandemic also provided China an opportunity to promote its healthcare services and digital technologies in the Middle East. This initiative included the joint development of a COVID-19 vaccine with the UAE. In 2013, China announced the Belt and Road Initiative to finance and construct basic industrial and trade infrastructure, such as railroads and commercial ports, throughout the developing world. In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, China has signed long-term economic agreements with many MENA countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Algeria. Allies of the U.S., such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and its adversaries, including Iran and Syria, have shown a willingness to expand economic relations with China. Maintaining relationships with Middle Eastern countries and their adversaries could prove unsustainable in the future, however. Despite this, oil-producing countries have welcomed China with open arms. China’s attraction to oil exporting countries is not surprising. While the U.S. and European demand for Middle East oil has declined, China and other Asian countries are perceived as eager and reliable buyers. China is also challenging the dominance of the U.S. and Europe in sales of advanced technology and weapon systems to the region. This is very worrying to the U.S. with regard to Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE). Based on the multidimensional engagement of China with Middle Eastern countries, the region will play an important role in China’s global economic strategy. China’s dependence on Middle East oil is expected to continue, along with the Suez Canal emerging as the main sea passage route for China’s trade with Europe and North Africa. Furthermore, Chinese firms have become the dominant foreign investors in an important industrial and re-export zone (the TEDA-Suez Economic Zone) on the Western banks of the Suez Canal. Economic control of the Suez translates into control of global trade. Consequently, the strategic importance of the region for China will compel the United States to maintain enough military presence in the Persian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean region. This military presence will enable the United States to disrupt China’s oil imports and global trade in the event of an escalation in U.S.-China tensions. This could potentially turn the Middle East into a battleground for a new Cold War. Rivalry with China will also motivate the United States to maintain its security and diplomatic relations with Middle East oil exporters that supply oil and natural gas to China. The rise of China as a global rival and technological competitor is already the primary focus of U.S. strategy. China and the U.S., however, do not view this rivalry in the same way. Despite the recent escalation of tensions, China has been reluctant to view global relations as a zero-sum superpower competition. Chinese leaders have repeatedly announced that they are not interested in challenging U.S. military supremacy or the current global order. In the Middle East, in particular, Beijing has announced that its primary objective is strong economic relations without undermining U.S. interests. Many political circles in the U.S., on the other hand, view U.S.-China relations as a zero-sum rivalry in which every gain for China is a loss for the United States. This negative perception has already led to tensions with China on many issues in recent years, such as the Chinese telecommunication firm, Huawei, with operations based in Europe and the Middle East. If the United States continues or escalates its efforts to undermine Chinese trade and investment relations with third countries, it is only a matter of time before China is forced to abandon its call for Win-Win cooperation with the U.S. In such case, China will be forced to engage in a Cold War with the U.S., despite its wishes to avoid such an escalation. This scenario is not considered the best outcome for the United States. Most Middle East countries do not share the same view of China as the United States and will be reluctant to take sides in a U.S.-China Cold War. The U.S. will either put considerable pressure on most countries or offer them very attractive incentives to turn away from China. These actions are costly and may face political opposition in the face of large budget deficits. The alternative to this Cold War approach is not to disengage from the Middle East or leave it to China and other U.S. rivals, but to develop a constructive engagement strategy serving U.S. economic and security interests and preserving U.S. leverage on China’s trade partners. This approach would be based on two important principles. First, it is unrealistic for the U.S. to try to evict China from the Middle East or even try to marginalize it. Many Middle East countries value their economic and diplomatic relations with China. Second, the United States has no alternative but to engage in a positive competition with China for economic opportunities and diplomatic influence. In other words, the presence of China will give more bargaining power to Middle Eastern countries in their dealings with the United States and Europe. Realistically, U.S. domestic politics might direct Middle East policy into a mix of Cold War confrontation and constructive engagement with the region.

#### Another

Kaye et al 21 [Dalia Dassa Kaye is an adjunct political scientist at the RAND Corporation. She is also a senior fellow at UCLA's Burkle Center for International Relations. Linda Robinson, Middle East Researcher at RAND, Jeffrey Martini is a senior Middle East researcher at the RAND Corporation, where he works on political and security issues in the Arab World. Ashley Rhoades is a defense policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. Nathan Vest, researcher at RAND, Reimagining U.S. Strategy in the Middle East Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA958-1.html, poapst]

Why a Rethink? U.S. policy in the Middle East across successive administrations has, on balance, failed to produce positive results for American interests or for the region. The administration of Joe Biden will inevitably face a multitude of challenges and continuing crises stemming from the Middle East. But will maintaining long-standing U.S. policies produce different, better outcomes in the future? Or is it time to reimagine some of the fundamental premises underlying American policymaking in the region? We suggest the latter, arguing that a reassessment of traditional approaches and a consideration of an alternative strategic framing is a matter of urgency for U.S. national interests. Despite such trends as growing U.S. energy independence, persistent conflicts in the Middle East continue to threaten Americans’ security and contribute to instability in allied European countries as regional wars produce unprecedented refugee flows and violent extremism. And yet the region also offers untapped opportunities for growth and development, particularly if we are realistic about our long-term goals and the limitations of what U.S. policy can—and cannot—influence. Long-standing U.S. engagement in the Middle East has focused on countering threats, from the Soviet Union during the Cold War to terrorist networks after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). For the past 40 years, the perceived need to counter Iranian influence has been among the more enduring tenets of U.S. policy, with the U.S. government investing considerable attention and resources in this challenge. Although any serious strategy must contend with Iran, our analysis considers what a U.S. regional strategy might look like if confronting Iran, and pursuing a threatism approach (i.e., confronting the threat of the day) more generally, were no longer the primary organizing principle for U.S. policymaking in this region. In this report, we analyze established American interests and relationships with central partners, adversaries, and global competitors, along with the policy tools employed by the United States. We then consider an alternative framework wherein the Iranian challenge is one among several factors the United States should take into account. In assessing the alternative framework, we considered the following four large questions: • How would a U.S. strategy in the Middle East look if our approach shifted from a military-oriented mindset and emphasis on threatism to a positive vision of a less conflict-prone region, one in which the sources of extremism and military competition were reduced to manageable levels? • What if our policies were devised to advance a long-term vision of what we are for, not just what we are against? • What type of Middle East do we want to see emerge from the turmoil of the past decades of conflict, and what realistic objectives can we help advance? • How would key instruments of U.S. policy—political, security, economic, diplomatic, and informational—need to adjust to support a more stable, less conflictprone region that serves its people as well as its leaders? Reimagining American strategy in the Middle East with a positive (but not idealized) vision of outcomes—rather than focusing only on the threats we are trying to contain—could lead to a new set of policy options for future decisionmakers to consider. Despite the aspirations of U.S. officials to pivot away from the Middle East and focus on great-power competition,1 challenges emanating from a region mired in instability, poor governance, and interstate rivalry will continue to affect U.S. interests. This reality suggests that American policymakers will need to stay engaged with the Middle East whether they would like to or not. But it is possible to rethink how we engage the region and, perhaps most critically, for what purpose. At a time of unprecedented economic and public health crises, shifting great-power dynamics, new global energy realities, and fundamental debates about the purpose of U.S. power, we have an opportunity to consider novel approaches to the Middle East. In this report, we consider a framework that goes beyond a short-term crisis-management agenda. We offer an assessment of the advantages and trade-offs of an alternative regional strategy that is focused on longer-term goals that can advance the U.S. interest in greater stability by reducing conflict and the drivers of conflict while improving the lives of the people living in the region. Indeed, after more than a decade of popular uprisings against corrupt, repressive, and incompetent governance in various Middle Eastern countries, no U.S. strategy is likely to succeed without taking into account the well-being and dignity of the region’s people. With the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and climate change creating a toxic mix when combined with the region’s conflicts and governance fail ures, future U.S. strategy can no longer afford to remain at the state and leadership level while neglecting societal ills. Our strategic reassessment of U.S. policies in the Middle East takes these considerations seriously, leading to a critical look at how we deal with regional partners, adversaries and global competitors, as well as the policy tools we leverage to advance our strategic goals. In short, we test the proposition that adopting a different approach might yield better results, both for the region and for the United States.

#### 2. Middle East debates have a HUGE arsenal of decades of research to pull from

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Threatism Has Driven Previous U.S. Regional Policy U.S. policies in the Middle East have evolved since World War II, but the central organizing principle of the U.S. approach has not. That is to say, U.S. policies in the Middle East have largely been driven by confronting the threat of the day. Whether it was Soviet influence, nationalist Arab leaders, terrorist networks, or, after 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. policy centered on confronting external threats in a bid to assert American predominance over regional affairs. This has primarily been accomplished by cultivating and favoring regional partners, or pillars, through security relationships and military assistance to advance this agenda with little investment in or attention paid to the development or well-being of the people living in the region. Repressive leaders were tolerated if they ruled “moderate” states viewed as central to confronting U.S. adversaries in the region—a necessary evil to protect American interests. This prevailing realpolitik, zero-sum view of regional politics has underpinned U.S. policymaking across both Democratic and Republican administrations. During the Cold War, countering the Soviet Union was the primary concern, and regional alignments were structured around confronting the pro-Soviet axis through partnerships with status-quo regional powers; specifically, Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and Egypt in the 1980s. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States pursued a dual containment strategy to counter both Iran and Iraq in the 1990s. After 9/11, the United States shifted from this containment strategy to a focus on the preemptive elimination of threats, as espoused by then-President George W. Bush in the so-called “Bush Doctrine.”2 Under the banner of the Global War on Terror, the United States engaged in a series of major military interventions in the region to counter new nonstate threats—most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although such military campaigns were primarily designed to counter threats posed by Al Qaeda and other Sunni extremist groups, and although the Bush administration’s precise motives for invading Iraq in 2003 are still a matter of debate, they were also couched in terms of democracy promotion. Such framing marked at least a rhetorical departure from the threatism that had defined the previous era. The Bush administration’s “Freedom Agenda” included measures to support the development of democracy, civil society, and the rule of law in Iraq and the broader region, although the turmoil in the country and the rise of new extremist groups overshadowed this agenda.3 However, even during this period of heightened attention on global terrorism, concerns about Iran still shaped American policies, particularly Iranian threats to oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, threats to Israel, and support for terrorism. U.S. military planning has for decades been based on such scenarios as Iran attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz or seizing oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. Massive U.S. arms sales to such partners as Saudi Arabia are framed with the Iranian threat in mind, as are recent efforts to facilitate Arab-Israeli normalization. Indeed, concerns about Iran’s expanding influence spiked considerably following the 2003 ouster of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iran’s most-significant regional adversary.4 Not only did the American invasion of Iraq dramatically overturn the regional balance of power, it also significantly increased the U.S. military presence in the region that continues to this day. With the exception of the 1990–1991 Gulf War, when the United States deployed hundreds of thousands of forces to the Gulf, the Middle East was a small driver of U.S. global force presence in the 1990s.5 U.S. forward presence in Europe was an order of magnitude larger than in the Middle East and, along with Asia, constituted the overwhelming share of U.S. forces deployed in the 1990s.6 The 2003 Iraq war shifted that balance, making the Middle East a significant driver of U.S. forward deployments. Today, the United States has postured an estimated 46,454 U.S. forces in the Middle East.7 Although some of those forces support operations in Iraq and Syria, countering Iran is also a major mission driving these deployments. The Arab uprisings starting in late 2010 only reinforced concerns about instability in the Middle East and Iran’s ability to capitalize on the chaos to expand its influence through nonstate actors, such as Hizballah in Lebanon, Shi‘a militia groups in Iraq, or Houthi rebels in Yemen. Also, Iran’s ability to keep Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in power, with the vital support of the Russian intervention in 2015, furthered the narrative of rising Iranian power. Although Iran’s regional influence often has been exaggerated and its vulnerabilities overlooked, the widespread perception in Washington is that Iran has been “on the march” and is expanding its foothold across the region.8 Echoing Iran’s own grandiose claims,9 analyses in many Arab capitals, in Israel, and from several Washington think tanks regularly refer to Iran as controlling four capitals—in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—and base regional assessments on the premise that Iran is the region’s primary source of instability.10 Early in his first term, President Obama sought to adopt a more peoplecentric approach to the Middle East, declaring his intent—in a high-profile speech in 2011—to “broaden [U.S.] engagement based upon mutual interests and mutual respect . . . [because the United States has] a stake not just in the stability of nations, but in the self determination of individuals.”11 Therefore, with echoes of the Bush administration’s Freedom Agenda, Obama stated that it would “be the policy [and first priority] of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.”12 Despite initial efforts to shift the focus to the people of the region and capitalize on the momentum from the Arab Spring, Obama’s stance toward the region did not in practice depart dramatically from the realpolitik of previous administrations,13 and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, hereafter ISIS) forced the administration to focus on countering terrorism as it forged an international coalition to confront it. Although the United States was still mired in the region because of the rise of ISIS, the Obama administration ultimately sought to shift its focus to Asia and disengage from the conflicts of the Middle East.14 The one exception was Iran policy, which remained a high priority, leading the Obama administration to engage Iran in multilateral negotiations resulting in the 2015 nuclear agreement, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, despite Obama’s attempt to present a more balanced U.S. approach by not picking sides between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. policies continued to support major arms sales to the Saudis and containment policies toward Iran, largely maintaining the wide array of unilateral U.S. sanctions outside the nuclear agreement. Moreover, while seeking to end U.S. involvement in the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration adopted “an aggressive policy of drone strikes and special operations aimed at taking out terrorist commanders,” resulting in an approach to the region that, rhetoric aside, ultimately continued many of the counterterrorism policies of the Bush administration.15 President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the Iran nuclear agreement and subsequent maximum pressure campaign has intensified the U.S. focus on the Iranian threat and marked the most confrontational of policies against Iran to date. The Trump administration’s reinstatement of American unilateral and secondary sanctions has weakened Iranian compliance with the JCPOA and increased Iranian escalation in the region, including attacks on tankers in the Gulf, attacks on Aramco’s oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, and the shooting down of a U.S. drone. The escalation between the United States and Iran moved to direct conflict following the Trump administration’s decision to assassinate Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in January 2020 and Iran’s missile attack in response against American personnel based in Iraq. Cyberwarfare and indirect conflict, through attacks between Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq and U.S. forces, is ongoing. Despite the administration’s NSS, which continued the trend toward a focus on great-power competition, President Trump increased U.S. forces in the region, with the Iran threat serving as a key rationale for continued U.S. engagement.16 The Middle East continues to draw significant American attention as measured by force posture and asset commitments.

#### 3. Controversy on internal regime factions means that the topic gets the depth over particular regime questions like "how do you empower mainstream Taliban but undermine Haqani/IS-K,” “what's a way to get around IRGC in Iran,” etc. Analysis of these regimes are a lot more fluid than the Russia/China discussions (space and functionally alliances), which offer a much more nuanced debate than standard IR topics.

#### 4. Constructive Engagement, Security Guarantees, and Foreign Assistance are all terms of art that make knowing what the topic actually means accessible for all students, as well as making preparing a resolutional slate a doable task for the topic committee.

#### 5. With the media attention on the Middle East concerning violence against Palestinians by the Israeli government, civil war escalation by Saudi Arabia, reversal of the JPOA with Iran by Trump, and continued gender based human rights violations in Iran, debating about the Middle East would be a great recruitment topic for novices. The evidence is relatively easy to find and the topic education is interesting for incoming college freshman. We have had two topics in a row that were relatively difficult recruitment/retention topics for the novice division. This topic would shift those tides.

### 3---Explanation of Core Controversy

#### The central controversy of the constructive engagement debate is about what the foreign policy posture and level of engagement should be with different countries in the Middle East. This controversy is high stakes because of competing perspectives related to recent changes in Middle East posture, power transitions in particular Middle Eastern governments, and rising power attention to the Middle Eastern region and whether the United States role in this region is the cause of that instability and tension or the solution. The potential of global instability, regional tensions, economic upheaval, and hostile military buildups are immense, and discussing the United States role in that region situates the policy debate community within the broader international relations scholarship occurring about this region in the status quo.

#### There’s tons of interesting advantage ground!

Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, 21 – [Brian Katulis is Senior Fellow in National Security and international Policy for the Center for American Progress, Peter Juul is senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress 12-16-2021 "**Strategic Reengagement in the Middle East**," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/strategic-reengagement-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

In the **wake of the U.S. military withdrawal** from Afghanistan, the United States will find it **even harder** to disengage from or downgrade its **ties with the Middle East**. If anything, the region—and America’s relations with its partners there—will become **even more important** moving forward.

Too often, policymakers have seen the Middle East mainly as a region of crisis and instability.

Too often, however, policymakers have seen the Middle East mainly as a region of crisis and instability—and not without reason. But a U.S. policy discussion dominated by the **false choice** between staying in or leaving the region, with a narrow focus on military footprints and tactics, frequently fails to see the **opportunities available** to help the people of the Middle East achieve the greater freedom and prosperity they desire.

A **wider view** of American interests in the Middle East yields **three primary concerns**:

**Security**: **Protecting America**, its **worldwide allies**, and its **regional partners** against **terrorist threats** originating in the Middle East—such as al-Qaida, the Islamic State group, and Iranian terrorist and proxy networks—should **remain a focus** of U.S. engagement in the region. Continued terrorist threats undermine regional and global security, as do ongoing civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. The U.S. homeland is now much more protected and safer from these threats than it was 20 years ago, but America should still take active measures to insulate its regional partners and the broader international system from threats that emanate from the region.

**Economics**: The Middle East’s **energy resources** remain **critical to the global economy**—particularly for **American allies** in Asia such as Japan and South Korea. In addition, over the past two decades, the region itself has quietly emerged as an **international transit hub** connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa. As the United States and other leading economies look toward a post-COVID-19 economic recovery phase, they should work to **broaden and build lasting economic ties** with key centers of innovation in the Middle East and North Africa and look for ways to boost economic ties that support decent work and investments in human capital.

**Values**: More than 10 years after the start of the popular uprisings across the region, the Middle East remains on the **front lines** of the worldwide struggle for **human dignity** and **universal rights**, values that the United States supports—including **religious freedom**, **women’s rights**, and **freedom of expression**. The region’s lack of freedoms prevents its people from achieving their aspirations of dignity and prosperity while undermining its stability in the long term. In a **global context** where Chinese and Russian **technological authoritarianism** and state-dominated capitalism presents itself as an **alternative model of governance**, the Middle East is a contested space in this **global values competition**.

At the same time, the Middle East presents three main, **interrelated opportunities** for American policy:

Generational transitions across the region bring **new perspectives** to the public debate in key countries in the Middle East. New, younger, and more digitally attuned generations unburdened by the politics of the past are coming to power across the Middle East, creating new openings for both **positive and negative change** in the region and within its individual countries—change with the potential to help create new opportunities to advance **liberal values** and **economic progress**. However, there are obstacles to promoting progress on this front, including the complicated diplomatic challenge of showing regional leaders a pathway toward more open and accountable societies—one that draws countries away from the dictatorship and authoritarianism that has crushed human potential in the region for decades.

Economic **changes** in the region open the door to **economic cooperation** in new fields. With regional governments’ stated intention of moving their economies away from **dependence on energy revenues**, **new options** for economic cooperation could emerge beyond the traditional realms of hydrocarbon extraction and military hardware to areas such as tourism, information technology, and clean energy.

Change in America’s **internal debate** about the Middle East can help build a more **sustainable and stable** relationship with the region. Many Americans—policymakers and citizens alike—are looking for ways to protect America’s still-significant interests in the Middle East while devoting less attention and fewer resources to the region. This evolving **domestic policy dialogue** presents an opportunity for the **U**nited **S**tates to **redefine its relationship** with the region to one that focuses as much, if not more, on **political, economic, and social ties** than on military and energy concerns.

#### Debates have history of controversy with differing perspectives about level of US involvement and purpose

Kaye et al 21 [Dalia Dassa Kaye is an adjunct political scientist at the RAND Corporation. She is also a senior fellow at UCLA's Burkle Center for International Relations. Linda Robinson, Middle East Researcher at RAND, Jeffrey Martini is a senior Middle East researcher at the RAND Corporation, where he works on political and security issues in the Arab World. Ashley Rhoades is a defense policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. Nathan Vest, researcher at RAND, Reimagining U.S. Strategy in the Middle East Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\_reports/RRA958-1.html, poapst]

U.S. Interests and Strategic Goals in a Changing Regional and Global Environment Setting New Priorities and Realistic Goals in an Altered Regional Landscape The need to revisit established American interests in the Middle East in an era of growing energy independence, fatigue with past U.S. military interventions, and economic challenges at home is becoming more prevalent across the political spectrum. Institutions with varied foreign policy orientations—from the restraint-oriented Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft to the more-centrist Center for a New American Security and the Brookings Institution—have issued papers calling for similar policy shifts in the region, particularly the need to demilitarize American engagement and increase diplomacy, including with adversaries.19 Former U.S. officials and analysts have penned analogous articles focused on shifting the instruments of U.S. power in the Middle East from military to economic and diplomatic means.20 Our analysis similarly considers such a shift, although we also reflect on the outcomes we are trying to achieve in the region, not just the mechanisms to get us there. Traditional U.S. interests in the region—protecting oil, Israel, and U.S. predominance—are no longer the critical priorities in a changed strategic landscape. Indeed, the United States was largely successful in maintaining these regional interests over the past decades, although at times at high cost. Some analysts argue that such long-standing interests should continue to drive U.S. regional policy and presence in the region.21 But we suggest that the altered regional and global landscape requires a fresh look at core U.S. objectives. The United States became a net energy exporter in 2019 for the first time since 1952.22 Although energy security in the Middle East is still critical, given our allies’ continued reliance on Middle East oil, the global economic crises and oil price plunge likely have deflated the power and influence of oil-rich states in the region for the foreseeable future. The United States is simply less dependent on the region from an energy perspective. American support for Israel’s security is likely to remain strong across the political spectrum for strategic, historical, and domestic reasons, but Israel is the strongest military power in the region and does not depend on the United States for its security. With Israel’s Arab neighbors in disarray domestically and after they recently demonstrated their openness to normalization even without substantive progress toward peace with the Palestinians, Israel sees itself on strong strategic footing. Although a viable and just settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still critical for regional peace, other regional conflicts have overshadowed it in recent years, particularly in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. As a consequence, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer the U.S. priority it once was, even as concerns about an eroding two-state solution grow.23 Finally, maintaining American predominance in the region might not be feasible in an era of great-power competition and in the aftermath of costly U.S. military interventions that have reduced the appetite for more. The global economic downturn likely will only increase the number of domestic voices calling for more restraint in U.S. foreign policy and demands for leaders to focus on challenges at home. The higherpriority American regional interests in today’s geostrategic environment are preventing extremism and nonproliferation; these are the interests that can harm Americans at home or close to home. A region embroiled in conflict, as the Middle East is today, presents the greatest threat to these core American interests because conflict creates a fertile environment for extremism and destabilizing weapons proliferation. Indeed, any conceivable American interest in the region (including the free flow of oil and Israeli security), requires greater regional stability, and particularly a reduction in—if not an end to—devastating regional wars like those of the past decade. Consequently, enhancing regional stability through the reduction of conflict is the central, overriding objective driving our strategic assessment. But our notion of stability is not the traditional concept of states led by strongmen keeping regional order. That concept is not only an outdated model for a region immersed in continued societal unrest against authoritarian and corrupt governance, but also has not brought stability to the Middle East. Authoritarian leaders with zero-sum views of security have only intensified interstate competition and civil wars in the region. Our concept of what contributes to stability thus includes better governance, human and economic development, and rule of law—essentially, leaders who are accountable to their people and who have better capacity to deliver critical services. We are not arguing that stability requires a strategy that brings democracy and peace to the region. That simply is neither realistic in the foreseeable future nor a goal that the United States has the power to dictate—that will be up to the region’s people to decide. But the persistence of widespread protests across the region reminds us of the perils of ignoring the underlying societal issues and failed governance that are fueling grievance, instability, and conflict. The United States can pursue policies that support this wider understanding of stability that encompasses less conflict and violent extremism, including policies that address the root causes of instability and extremism, which are linked to an array of socioeconomic and political challenges. But how do we (1) advance the strategic goal of greater stability and reduced conflict and (2) avoid actions that undermine it with alternative policies that are feasible, effective, and sensitive to cost in an era of limited resources? That is the core question we will address as we consider an alternative U.S. strategy that departs from long-held assumptions and practices toward the region.

#### From a micropolitical perspective, Middle Eastern activists on the ground say that nations are at an INFLECTION POINT for future direction of politics and organizing – providing in depth potential for controversies over best strategies for cultivating social justice and stability within Middle Eastern nations.

Alterman 23 [Jon B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., The Arab World at an Inflection Point, https://www.csis.org/analysis/arab-world-inflection-point, poapst]

Over the holidays, I had lunch with one of the eminences of Arab politics. A former revolutionary, he had spent decades working with Arab leaders and their non-Arab counterparts. He remains sharp, but he has turned reflective. And over lunch, he had a stark admission: “All the strategic choices the Arabs made were wrong.” He went through a list. Arab economies have proven durably weak. Newly independent governments quickly turned repressive. The constant hostility toward Israel proved an expensive distraction. The region became uniquely enmeshed in warfare and terrorism, while other regions moved on. His generation’s legacy to his children is this: a region whose struggles he had expected to be overcome decades ago, yet which seem even more daunting today. After all, he rose in his career amid a burst of optimism. His generation expected the postcolonial world would produce freedom and prosperity, power, and respect. It did not do much of any of those things. And with Arab populations growing swiftly, the energy transition looming, and the rubble of the Arab Spring’s failures still smoldering, the region’s medium-term outlook is even more daunting. It would be a mistake, though, to gloss over the fact that the Arab world is once again at an inflection point. The region’s leaderships are making a set of strategic choices as consequential as the ones their predecessors made earlier in this statesman’s career. The region has an opportunity to make much better strategic choices than it made in the past, and there are signs it is beginning to do so—but not in every case. Economically, governments have turned away from command economies, and they are becoming more thoughtful about state-owned industries. Middle Eastern governments (and their militaries) for too long seized on their ready access to capital to compete against the private sector. The imbalance was made even greater by anemic banking systems that made private capital even harder to come by. Crony capitalism became a pervasive form of corruption, securing local political leaders but smothering investment. There is an increasing understanding throughout the region that small and medium enterprises need to be engines of employment and engines of economic growth, and governments are increasingly interested in creating environments that give space for such activities. Managing the transition will be hard. Arab economies are shot through with subsidies—about 70 percent of Egyptians are eligible for heavily subsidized bread—and in poorer states, those subsidies barely keep the middle class from falling into poverty. The International Monetary Fund correctly focuses on providing a durable safety net for the poor, but the fragile middle classes represent similar numbers in many cases, and they are far more likely to be politically active than the truly economically desperate. These middle classes stand to grow profoundly more alienated, especially as governments with no ideological or political message provide outsized rewards to the already wealthy. One way to do so requires rapid progress toward better governance. While government services are generally improving, it is often from a low base. Procedures are cumbersome and time consuming, and outcomes can be uncertain. Arguably, ongoing digitization efforts will ease and speed outcomes, and also provide a pathway toward fairness, creating fingerprints when individuals receive extraordinary treatment. Yet, as users of government websites in the United States and elsewhere can attest, poor implementation can hamstring even highly literate users, while simultaneously marginalizing poor and illiterate users. Every government does not take kindly to the idea that it should be responsive to citizens either, and many are prone to see calls for accountability as existential challenges. To that end, it is troubling to see Arab governments pouring resources into efforts at surveillance and management of public debate. The state-owned broadcasters of 50 years ago are still there, but they are increasingly inconsequential. Instead, governments are focusing their efforts on coordinated social media campaigns and pervasive surveillance of electronic communication. One can have a debate about whether electoral politics promote consensus or polarization, and whether they drive politicians to embrace unaffordable entitlement spending at the expense of strategic investments. But it seems irrefutable that it is harder to achieve governmental excellence when a suggestion is seen as sedition, or a critique is taken as evidence of disloyalty. The resort to surveillance is not merely a sign of governments’ lack of confidence in themselves. It breeds a dangerous self-confidence on the part of governments and cultivates fear among their citizenries. The economic and social costs of the strategy will accrue over time. The region will have to grapple with the growing disparities between rich and poor, within countries and between them. The conviction that the rich are growing richer while the poor grow poorer becomes harder to sustain when those who feel they are growing poorer are increasingly literate, mobile, and connected to each other, and united by a shared feeling of injustice. Wealthier Gulf countries are exploring greater investments in the Levant and North Africa, and that is a positive trend. It is important that the benefits of such investment be widely felt. It is harder to judge if the region will be able to move away from its more recent legacies of violence. With civil wars and insurgencies still raging, an array of proxies with support from inside and outside the region, and an enduring sense of disenfranchisement, the sources of violence seem durable. At the same time, one should not underestimate the importance of religious authorities narrowing the scope of legitimate violence. This move has been most profound in the Gulf, but its impact has spread to the Levant and North Africa. Inflection points in history are often recognized only after they have passed. Small details create patterns, and patterns combine to create trends, but they are hard to see in the moment. Even so, it does feel like an inflection point is upon us. The older revolutionary saw his vision unrealized after having power. The revolutionaries of 2011 saw their visions unrealized after being denied power. But what will they do now, and what world will they give to their children?

### 4---Wording Options

#### We advocate a resolution that maintains fidelity/similarity to the structure of the 2007-2008 Middle East Constructive Engagement topic to allow a more focused conversation during the topic committee meeting of which countries to include in the ballot options. However, there are a few other terms of art that could be chosen instead of *constructive engagement*, *security guarantees*, and *foreign assistance* while maintaining fidelity to the controversy area of increasing overall engagement with Middle Eastern countries (resolution six option below).

#### Here is a list of sample resolutions that may be included in the final slate:

#### Resolution One: Exact Same Stem as 2007, New Country Set

**United States Federal Government should increase its constructive engagement with the government of one or more of**: (country list, see below for suggestions) **and it should include offering them a security guarantee(s) and/or a substantial increase in foreign assistance.**

#### Resolution Two: Similar Stem as 2007, New Country Set

United States Federal Government should increase its constructive engagement through an offer of a security guarantee and/or a substantial increase in foreign assistance with the government of one or more of the following: (country list, see below for suggestions)

#### Resolution Three: Constructive Engagement Only

The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its constructive engagement with the government of one or more of the following: (country list, see below for suggestions)

#### Resolution Four: Security Guarantee/Foreign Assistance Only

The United States Federal Government should offer a security guarantee or a substantial increase in foreign assistance with the government of one or more of the following: (country list, see below for suggestions)

#### Resolution Five: Foreign Assistance Only

The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its foreign assistance with the government of one or more of the following: (country list, see below for suggestions)

\*\*NOTE: FA could definitionally include security cooperation, providing a justification not to include SG at all (see Parker 22 in definition section)

#### Resolution Six: The Most Distinct

The United States Federal Government should substantially increase [*security cooperation, security assurances*] and/or *financial assistance* with the government of one or more of the following: (country list, see below for suggestions)

#### Country List Explanation:

The authors of this paper recommend that each working have between four and five countries included. We highly encourage the inclusion of the following four countries: Afghanistan, Iran, the Palestinian Authority, and Saudi Arabia.

Beyond those four, we have found good literature for the following countries (in order of preference): Iraq, Israel

#### Some initial definition work for these terms is included below, but the rest are in the Definitions section of the Appendix and should be expanded upon at the topic meetings.

#### Constructive Engagement:

#### Has to meet three conditions.

Chan, 96 (N., “Gentle or Slow Persuasion”, Burma Issues Newsletter Vol. 3 No. 4 <http://www.burmaissues.org/En/Newsletter/BINews1996-03.php>) AJW

By definition, a policy of "constructive engagement" used by one country to relate to another country must satisfy three conditions: 1. Rather than dealing with sensitive issues, such as human rights abuses and/or dictatorship, in a confrontational and immediate way, a long-term strategy to slowly encourage democratic change and respect for human rights is carried out. 2. Important economic and political relationships between the two countries are established and strengthened. 3.Conditions are placed on the country in question, and these conditions must be met within a specified time-frame for the good relationship to continue. In other words, one country tells another, "We will encourage investments and greater political dialogue with you if, and only if, you meet these specific conditions by a specific date."

#### Security Guarantees:

#### The term “security guarantees” is well-defined.

Maliuta ND [Maliuta, Yaroslav, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University Department Member, ND. "Legal Notion of the Terms "Security Assurances", "Security Guarantees" and "Reassurances" in International Security Law." *Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University*, Accessed: 4/25/2023. <https://www.academia.edu/16541504/Legal_Notion_of_the_Terms_Security_Assurances_Security_Guarantees_and_Reassurances_in_International_Security_Law>]

Security guarantees come from two main sources: 1) collective security organizations (NATO is the most greatest example) and 2) bilateral defence treaties (for example, mutual defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, The Treaty of mutual cooperation and security between Japan and the United States of America etc.)

Security guarantees are usually defined in the text of a treaty as a duty

“to come to one’s defense when it faces external aggression”.

 In comparison, security assurances are commonly contained in other international legal acts and are expressed in terms of a promise

“to provide cooperation and aid (or “assistance”) in case of aggression”.

 That means that security guarantees impose much stronger obligation, than assurances do, because they are inferred from the source of international law – an international treaty (subject to Art. 38 of IC Charter).

#### Foreign Assistance:

#### Foreign assistance is well defined.

Emma E. Parker, 22 – [Emma Parker is Doctor of Philosophy Public Policy George Mason University, The Securitization of United States Foreign Assistance, George Mason University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, Fall 2022, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2778886325?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true>] nl

Foreign Assistance. Foreign assistance as defined in the **Foreign Assistance Act of 1961** is:

any tangible or intangible item provided by the United States Government [including “by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty”] to a foreign country or international organization under this or any other Act, including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal, or mixed property, any agricultural commodity, United States dollars, and any currencies of any foreign country which are owned by the United States Government....9

This dissertation looks at **all types of foreign assistance** but focuses on assistance to countries at peace. The U.S. provides foreign assistance for **several different purposes**, and Congress has authorized several foreign assistance accounts to meet these objectives. **The Congressional Research Service** has identified **12 major foreign assistance** accounts **including bilateral development assistance, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian assistance, military assistance, and the “other” category** that includes a variety of smaller accounts, most of which are to deal with contingencies and post-conflict transitions.10

### 5---Advantage Ground

#### The core advantage ground will center on several issues:

#### 1---Resolving different internal links to resolving specific scenarios of instability

#### 2---Changing United States leadership strategies in the region

#### 3---Promoting global governance initiatives

#### 4---Navigating particular regime factions

#### 5---Addressing Human Rights violations

### 6---Affirmative Mechanisms/Solvency

#### There are major categories of proposals currently debated in the literature depending upon the country in question---these proposals frequently implicate values such as levels of foreign engagement and global influence, which creates room for fruitful discussions about international security and diplomacy. Beyond that, on the critical side, the countries suggested for discussion within the Middle East are affected by legacies of colonial and militaristic violence making structural violence questions about engagement a rich area for critical analysis.

#### We also include example solvency advocates for some of these proposals in the “Aff” section in the appendix---there are MANY proposals out there that talk about potential ways to engage each individual country, with unique details, providing an excellent room for mechanism innovation over the season.

### 7---Core Negative Generics

#### 1---Disadvantages---There are many DAs to the core requirement of the topic (increasing US engagement in the Middle East):

#### A---Diplomatic Capital

Wasser et al., 22 (Becca Wasser, Senior Fellow for the Defense Program at CNAS, Howard Shatz, Senior Economist; Professor of Policy Analysis, John Drennan, senior program officer in USIP's Center for Russia and Europe, Andrew Scobell, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Brian Carlson, head of the Global Security Team of the Think Tank at the Center for Security Studies, Yvonne Crane, Communications Analyst, “Crossroads of Competition: China, Russia, and the United States in the Middle East”, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA325-1.html>)

The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) both feature the concept of strategic competition, defined as a new era of interstate rivalry characterized by “growing political, economic, and military competitions.”1 These iterations of the NSS and NDS prioritize long-term strategic competition with great powers over longstanding threats (notably terrorism), a switch from previous strategic guidance.2 The strategies cite China and Russia as the biggest threats to the United States because of their desires to export their authoritarian models and erode the U.S.-led international order to gain economic, political, and military influence over other countries.3 In many respects, the NSS and NDS herald the return of great-power competition (a peacetime competition between strong states) and of a multipolar environment for the first time since the Cold War—a paradigm shift from the low-intensity conflicts against nonstate actors that the United States had been fighting since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Emerging from those documents are new efforts to define what strategic competition actually entails and how the United States can best compete with China and Russia.4 Although strategic competition is theoretically global in nature, the majority of recent U.S. efforts have concentrated on Asia and Europe.5 The logic in that approach is that strategic competition is likely to play out in the backyards of both China and Russia, given their greater interests in these regions and concerns over U.S. involvement in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The concentration on these two regions also reflects another common theme of the NDS and NSS: that the United States has finite resources and therefore must prioritize its activities. However, in much the same way that the Cold War was fought in peripheral states outside the United States’ and Soviet Union’s respective spheres of influence, the periphery—such geographic locations as the Middle East—could once again play an essential role in this new stage of competition.6

#### B---Alliances/Relations

Saunders and Fearey, 14 (Emily Cura Saunders is a PhD candidate in political science at Claremont Graduate University's School of Politics and Economics, Bryan L. Fearey is Director of the National Security Office, 4/28, “The Least Bad Option? Extending the Nuclear Umbrella to the Middle East”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2014.897117>)

P-5 Considerations The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, specifically China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States, also known as the Permanent Five or P-5 countries, will all also have specific concerns regarding the potential of U.S. offers of extended deterrence into the Middle East. We examine each in turn. Both the United Kingdom and France are part of the NATO construct originally designed to counter Soviet threats during the Cold War. As discussed earlier, the 2012 NATO Defense Deterrence Posture Review reaffirmed its commitment to remaining nuclear alliance. As such, The UK would likely be amenable to the possibility of U.S. offers of extended deterrence in the Middle East. While France is within the NATO alliance and a close U.S. ally, it might well have a different view. France has a long history of close alliances with certain Middle East countries (e.g., Algeria), and has shown increased interest, such as the recent agreement with the UAE to place a French military base there. It seems to have more involvement in the region than some of the other NATO states. Nevertheless, through close consultations with France, the extension of security guarantees into the Middle East would likely be seen positively. Russia and China are, however, likely to be very displeased with such an extension. They have continually blocked sanctions and resolutions toward Iran. The fact remains that China is Iran's biggest trading partner, so the U.S. interfering in the regional affairs is likely to be seen as unfavorable to China's economic ambitions and energy needs. Russia, however, is no stranger to U.S. nuclear guarantees, as NATO was ostensibly founded to counter the Soviet nuclear threat. While Russia may object to the extension, it may be more likely to understand it. That being said, for the U.S. to extend a nuclear guarantee, it would not need the blessing of the P-5, although it should consider the reactions of Russia and China. Another thing that would need to be taken into account when considering nuclear security arrangements with Middle Eastern states is the concerns of those already under the U.S. nuclear guarantee. France and the UK, along with the rest of NATO and America's Asian allies, would need to feel that they were not being passed over or ignored with regard to U.S. security guarantees with each of them. Further, the U.S. would also need to clarify that such commitments would not mean that NATO would be expected to be engaged in a conflict in the event of an attack on a Middle Eastern state covered by the U.S. umbrella. The U.S. would also be tasked with assuring both their NATO and Northeast Asian allies that the U.S. extended deterrence commitments and capabilities remain sufficient to meet their security concerns.

#### C---Appeasement

Hoffman and Whitson, 3-28-23 (Jon Hoffman is the research director at Democracy for the Arab World Now, Sarah Leah Whitson is the executive director of Democracy for the Arab World Now, “Breaking Away From Secret Concessions in the Middle East”, <https://prospect.org/world/2023-03-28-secret-concessions-middle-east/>)

Emboldening Illiberal Behavior The potential Saudi-Israel normalization is designed to appeal to those in Washington who have adopted the Abraham Accords framework as the new guiding rod for Middle East policy, including the Biden administration and leading voices on both sides of the political aisle in Congress. But there has been virtually no public discussion about the extension of these accords, nor even a basic inquiry about whether they require U.S. concessions to achieve what Israel and the Arab states already want and could bargain for on their own. There’s been even less transparency about what kind of commitment the unprecedented security guarantees to Saudi Arabia would entail—including potentially U.S. troops—and the circumstances under which Saudi Arabia could demand the U.S. exercise them. A security commitment to Saudi Arabia or other illiberal actors in the region would formalize and further solidify U.S. support for a top-down, reactionary axis, designed to maintain through fierce repression the regional status quo of autocratic and apartheid governance. Previous normalizations between Israel and other Arab states have been rooted in advancing the strategic interests of political elites within these countries, preserving the prevailing illiberal order that continues to dominate the Middle East, and assuring that the United States remains deeply enmeshed in the region as their security guarantor. Such a security commitment would also encourage erratic and aggressive foreign policies by these actors, secure in their knowledge that the U.S. would be obliged to come to their defense. The record to date shows that U.S. military, political, and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia and the UAE has not only emboldened, but enabled, their reckless, belligerent behavior, most prominently in their nearly eight-year war in Yemen that has resulted in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. When U.S. support has been absent, such as in its opposition to the Saudi/Emirati plan to invade Qatar or the lack of response to the likely-Iranian attack on Saudi’s oil facilities in Abqaiq in 2019, it has encouraged peace and reconciliation. New security guarantees would risk new conflicts, effectively sacrificing U.S. lives to preserve the illiberal status quo that dominates the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been quite open about its purely mercantile relationship with the United States, willing to oppose the U.S. whenever it serves their interests or the whims of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Saudi Arabia refused to support sanctions on Russia or to increase oil output in the wake of spiraling oil prices last fall, despite President Biden’s humiliating journey to Jeddah to kiss his ring and plead his case. Indeed, MBS capped off the insult by hosting President Xi for a lavish, formal state visit immediately after Biden left, and announcing billions in new deals with China. Today, Saudi Arabia continues to pour financial and military resources into supporting allied authoritarian actors engaged in gross abuses, and continues its ham-handed campaigns of transnational repression and surveillance targeting activists and dissidents around the world, including inside the United States. Meanwhile, domestic repression has reached Kafkaesque new heights. Multiple women have been sentenced to decades in prison for innocuous tweets. A prosecutor is seeking the death penalty against ten former judges for “being too lenient.” MBS even sentenced 72-year-old American-Saudi engineer Saad Almadi to 19 years in prison, also for a few critical tweets, at exactly the same time the crown prince was demanding recognition of immunity in a lawsuit against him for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Saudi authorities released Almadi last week, announcing without explanation they had dropped all charges, apparently a chit offered up as they haggle for the security guarantees. But he remains travel-banned in the country. It’s almost as if MBS, even as he doubles down on his lawless, cruel rule, is trying to prove that he can still bring the U.S. to its knees, palms open, eyes looking the other way. This is what our support makes possible. If the security deal proceeds, the lesson Saudi Arabia and other regional autocrats will learn is that bad behavior is actually rewarded by Washington, paving the way for other regional actors to pressure the United States into providing more formal commitments. So long as the United States continues backing such actors, it will further exacerbate the region’s greatest divide, between long‐​standing autocratic regimes and the people they rule over. The United States already maintains a vast network of security commitments in Europe and Asia, and extending such guarantees to the Middle East would represent a counterproductive distraction and draining of critical resources. We’ve been told by multiple administrations that the U.S. wants to disengage from the region and its conflicts. Yet here we are actually considering expanding them? It makes no sense.

#### D---Pivot/Resolve

Hoffman and Whitson, 3-28-23 (Jon Hoffman is the research director at Democracy for the Arab World Now, Sarah Leah Whitson is the executive director of Democracy for the Arab World Now, “Breaking Away From Secret Concessions in the Middle East”, <https://prospect.org/world/2023-03-28-secret-concessions-middle-east/>)

Reverse Leverage The parallel news of a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered with Chinese assistance, was designed in part to project an image that Beijing is filling a U.S. “void” in the Middle East. This is despite the fact that regional-led efforts to bring together the two countries, primarily by Iraq and Oman, had been ongoing since 2021. Beijing was able to capitalize on this relatively low-hanging fruit. For Saudi Arabia, the sealing of such an agreement under the veneer of Chinese diplomacy allows Riyadh to further pressure the United States into believing that it is losing regional influence. Saudi officials have themselves admitted this: According to The Wall Street Journal, “in private, Saudi officials said, the crown prince has said he expects that by playing major powers against each other, Saudi Arabia can eventually pressure Washington to concede to its demands for better access to U.S. weapons and nuclear technology.” **As the United States is increasingly drawn to other regional theaters, U.S. partners in the Middle East have sought to manipulate Washington’s anxiety about losing its position relative to Russia or China through a form of “reverse leverage,” designed to keep America deeply engaged in the region** as the guarantor of the prevailing status quo. Such maneuvering has accelerated dramatically following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE clashing repeatedly with Washington over oil prices, sanctions on Moscow, U.N. resolutions condemning the invasion, and more. Over the past year, they have increasingly pushed for a formal, bilateral U.S. security guarantee under the auspices of repairing such relations. Many in Washington have begun to embrace this narrative and push for greater U.S. regional commitments, lest these ostensible “partners” continue to turn to Moscow or Beijing. As the United States increasingly perceives its interests in the Middle East through the lens of great-power politics and the Abraham Accords framework, so too have regional states sought to exploit such frameworks to advance their own interests. The foundation for increased U.S. security commitments may already be in motion. In June 2022, former Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz confirmed that Israel is building a U.S.-sponsored regional air defense network called the Middle East Air Defense Alliance (MEAD). Not much is known about MEAD, but news of the “alliance” comes after reports of high-level cooperation between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, and there have been efforts to bring in Saudi Arabia as well. Recently, officials from the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, and Bahrain convened in Manama, Bahrain, to push forward with the establishment of the Negev Forum, designed to further integrate security cooperation in the region. In January 2023, the Negev Forum was convened again, with the second annual Negev Summit set to be held this spring. Israeli officials told Axios that this is “the beginning of a regional alliance” designed to build off of the foundation established by the Abraham Accords. While it is unlikely Moscow or Beijing possess the ability or desire to project force in the Middle East, even if Russia or China expanded their regional footprint in the wake of a drawdown by the United States, this would not be detrimental to U.S. strategic interests. As the world enters into a new period of multipolarity, core U.S. interests have shifted away from the Middle East. The only way the Middle East poses a threat to core U.S. interests is if Washington continues to double down on failed policies that have effectively substituted the interests of regional autocrats for our own. Additionally, though some may point to the loss of regional arms sales as a negative ramification, when compared to the costs of maintaining U.S. primacy in the Middle East—estimated to be around $65–$70 billion annually, not to mention the trillions of dollars spent on U.S. wars—such “profits” are dwarfed in comparison. Not to mention the fact that this money only serves to enrich arms manufacturers. The expanded presence of Russia and China in the Middle East should not trigger knee-jerk panic about lost U.S. primacy, but be seen as an opportunity to do what successive administrations have promised is a priority: withdraw from our military entanglements in the region. A better strategy would consider replacing our military influence with broader economic, education, and cultural investments, while reducing our reliance on fossil fuel to thwart politically motivated squeezes on supply.

#### 2---Counterplans---There’s many ways to read CPs on this topic, advantage counterplans will be well-researched and specific, many process CPs will be specific to the resolution, and every aff has an applicable set of generics.

#### A---QPQ:

Many authors argue that leveraging conditions on US engagement is key to effective strategy and long-term stability

Watts et al, 21 (Stephen – Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation, alongside Jeffery Martini, Jason Campbell, Mark Toukan, and Inhyok Kwon. “Securing gains in fragile states.” Published Q3 2021. <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA200/RRA250-1/RAND_RRA250-1.pdf>.) GMU NR

U.S. material **resources are finite**, as are the patience and room to maneuver the **partner’s leaders** have. For leverage to work, it must be properly focused on **key priorities**. To minimize contradictions between realizing the underlying **conditions t**hat reduce the risk of conflict recurrence and achieving immediate warfighting objectives, the United States must carefully prioritize where it will focus **its leverage**. When that prioritization is settled, hard (ex ante) conditionality should be considered for the highest **priority demands**, with success more likely when U.S. demands are delivered by a cabinet secretary or other senior official from Washington. Clearly and Consistently Communicate U.S. Demands

The best-designed leverage strategy will fail if the partner does not understand what the United States **is demanding** of it. Conflicting signals from the United States only serve to strengthen the partner’s position at the **expense** of the United States. When engaging with a partner, the United States must speak with a single voice, and senior leaders should ensure that message is faithfully conveyed by all interlocutors. Planners also need to resist the temptation to engineer elaborate, highly complex solutions that the partner is less likely to understand. This requires simplifying requests for the sake of clear communication. It also requires taking into account cultural factors and considering the partner’s room to maneuver before deciding to use leverage. Develop Frameworks and Capabilities for Monitoring Partner Compliance

One of our findings is that the United States has typically had the information it needed to monitor critical elements of partner compliance. This finding does not mean, however, that the United States faces few challenges in observing partner behavior. U.S. personnel can take a number of actions to improve decisionmakers’ understanding of U.S. partners. There is a particular need for developing leading (as opposed to lagging) indicators and warnings that alert the United States to partner efforts to exclude identity groups or hijack the development of security forces to advance personal ambitions. There is also a need to improve understanding of partner preferences at the subnational level. Carefully Select Sanctions for Noncompliance and Inducements for Cooperation

U.S. practitioners need to offer **carrots and sticks** in such a way as to **compel compliance** with the most critical **U.S. demands** while not alienating the partner. By carefully mapping what the partner is seeking, the United States will be in the best position to advance its priorities while compensating the partner with inducements for its cooperation. Even relatively small gestures demonstrate sensitivity to the leaders of another nation and provide them with face-saving opportunities to reinforce their position among their followers. As for sanctioning noncompliance, this task is the responsibility not only of senior officials and general officers but also of unit commanders operating in the field. Unit commanders can base the amount of **military assistance** they provide to the partner on the **partner’s commitment** to principles it has agreed to. These commanders often control the key assets (e.g., fires support, targeting packages) the partner seeks, increasing **U.S. leverage.**

#### B---Multilateralism:

There are solvency advocates for CPs that pursue broader multilateral engagement.

Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, 21 – [Brian Katulis is Senior Fellow in National Security and international Policy for the Center for American Progress, Peter Juul is senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress 12-16-2021 "Strategic Reengagement in the Middle East," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/strategic-reengagement-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

**Build joint efforts to address climate change**

The Middle East already faces the **challenges of climate change**, with Israel suffering a deadly heat wave in May 2020 that was obscured by the COVID-19 pandemic.20 Aging power grids in **Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran** have not been able to cope with summer temperatures that now routinely rise to 122 degrees Fahrenheit.21 Climate change will exacerbate existing **water scarcity problems** in Yemen and the Jordan Valley in the years ahead as well, with Jordanian farmers seeing their growing season shrink by two months.22 Gulf Arab states confront a **double bind**: They remain dependent on oil and natural gas for their revenues, yet they will face the **brunt** of climate change over the course of the **coming century**, including potential heat waves that could render cities such as Doha and Dubai too hot for human habitation.23

In short, climate change will further stress the region’s **dysfunctional** social contracts and economic models—perhaps to the **breaking point**. Although U.S. climate policy understandably focuses on big issues such as domestic investment in clean energy or grand diplomatic deals such as the Paris Agreement, climate change also represents an opportunity for the United States to **put diplomacy first** in the Middle East and to **transform its relationships** with the people of the region.24 Indeed, current U.S. climate envoy and former Secretary of State John Kerry has already made multiple trips to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to discuss climate policy.25 For their parts, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have committed to net-zero carbon emission goals for 2050 and 2060, respectively, while Iraq has pledged to end gas flaring in its energy industry by 2030.26

While various country-specific bilateral climate mitigation programs run by the U.S. Agency for International Development could help, **a wider regional approach** that leverages the region’s wealth and technical know-how **would be beneficial.** Climate policy represents a **potential arena for cooperation** both within the Middle East and between America and its regional partners. Israel possesses the **technical know-how** to help with the climate challenge, while the Gulf states remain at least rhetorically committed to transitioning away from their own dependence on fossil fuel revenues. The United States can serve as a **key broker** between these countries on this vital subject, perhaps building on Israeli participation in the joint U.S.-UAE Agriculture Innovation Mission for Climate announced at President Biden’s virtual climate summit in April.27

For all the important differences between the United States and countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt on human rights issues and political freedoms, these countries will play **important roles** in the efforts to implement a **global energy transition** and combat climate change in the Middle East and **around the world**. Saudi Arabia, for instance, not only remains the world’s **leading oil producer** but also is deeply involved in international climate negotiations such as the recent round of U.N. climate talks in Scotland—and often **not in constructive ways**.28 But as the United States and other advanced industrial countries transition away from carbon-intensive energy sources—such as recent announcements from U.S. automakers indicating that they will shift to all-electric vehicle production lines and the electric vehicle infrastructure investments in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act29—**transitioning** Saudi Arabia’s economy away from its dependence on oil revenues will become even more **imperative**.

#### C---Nongovernment/Other Countries:

#### A competitive CP could involve the US engaging with non-governmental actors or non-resolutional countries in the area of the aff, for example the US could engage with local actors to enhance counterterrorism efforts.

Amira Jadoon 22, 8-15-2022, "A year after the fall of Kabul, Taliban's false commitments on terrorism have been fully exposed," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/a-year-after-the-fall-of-kabul-talibans-false-commitments-on-terrorism-have-been-fully-exposed-188132>] nl

A **global threat**?

**Emboldened militant groups** in Afghanistan pose a threat not just to the country itself, but also to the region and potentially the **global community**.

The Taliban’s success in **retaking Afghanistan** encouraged an already-**resurgen**t [Pakistani **Taliban**](https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/05/evolution-and-potential-resurgence-tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan) to pursue a **campaign of violence** and push for [political concessions](https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/five-things-watch-islamabad-pakistani-taliban-talks) from the Pakistani government.

Similarly, al-Qaida’s **global network** of affiliates has drawn **inspiration** from the Taliban’s victory. And despite the symbolic blow of [al-Zawahri’s death](https://theconversation.com/who-was-ayman-al-zawahri-where-does-his-death-leave-al-qaida-and-what-does-it-say-about-us-counterterrorism-188056), many of those affiliates in the Middle East and Africa [remain operationally unaffected](https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-strong-is-al-qaeda-a-debate/) by any fallout from the U.S. strike.

In spite of the success of that operation, [debate continues](https://mwi.usma.edu/over-the-horizon-counterterrorism-new-name-same-old-challenges/) over the **effectiveness** of the United States’ [**over-the-horizon** counterterrorism strategy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/over-the-horizon-biden-afghanistan-counter-terrorism/), which involves the launching of surgical strikes and special operations raids from outside the country.

The **al-Zawahri** operation demonstrated that **sound intelligence** can result in **effective targeting** of high-profile terrorists. But [counterterrorismexperts](https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/05/politics/us-counterrorism-afghanistan/index.html) [including ourselves](https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-leader-killed-in-us-raid-where-does-this-leave-the-terrorist-group-176410) remain concerned over whether such strikes can be effective in targeting less prominent militants who nevertheless play a critical role in the day-to-day operations.

To **bolster the strategy**, [the U.S.](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react-al-qaeda-chief-ayman-al-zawahiri-is-dead-whats-next-for-us-counterterrorism/) could seek out more **robust relationships** with resistance groups **hostile** to the Taliban, as well as with neighboring [**Central Asian countries**](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/06/21/us-central-asia-counterterrorism/), such as **Tajikistan and Uzbekistan**, in order to bolster the **intelligence** needed to conduct over-the-horizon strikes. But such partnerships would not come without their downsides, including further isolating the Taliban.

International **diplomatic efforts** and U.S. **counterterrorism operations**, along with internal pressure from resistance groups and jihadist rivalries, may **encourage** the Taliban to **reform** its ways.

#### 3---Kritiks:

#### A---Empire/Biopower

Chávez-Moreno 20 [Laura, Assistant Professor at UCLA Department of Chicana/o & Central American Studies, "U.S. Empire and an Immigrant’s Counternarrative: Conceptualizing Imperial Privilege," SAGE Journals, 5-26-2020, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0022487120919928, Accessed 7-21-2022, LASA-CB]

The dehumanization of immigrants in the present moment (e.g., policies separating families, detaining them in concentration camps, and shooting immigrants with impunity; Abramsky, 2019; Grandin, 2019) and the U.S. government interference in other countries (Vossoughi et al., 2020) augment a pressing need for education scholars and practitioners to recognize one particular silenced history more acutely: the U.S. empire. I define U.S. empire1 as a nation-state that has devised a sociopolitical process for domination beyond its settler-colonial borders through threats of military force and/or interference in foreign nation-states for its own benefit. Imperialism is an oppressive mechanism that irrupts into people’s lives, pressuring some to flee their homelands and become immigrants, peoples of diaspora (Brah, 1996; J. González, 2011).2 In using the terms empire/imperialism, I refer to the American settler-colonial nation-state (Calderon, 2014; Coloma, 2013) as an oppressive force that also operates outside of its borders and affects foreign populations—with dire consequences for the Othered.

#### B---Settler Colonialism

Lorenzo Veracini, Associate Professor of History and Politics at Swinburne University of Technology, Spring 2022, “Settler Colonialism in the Middle East and North Africa: A Protracted History”, <https://merip-org.mutex.gmu.edu/2022/05/settler-colonialism-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-a-protracted-history/?fbclid=IwAR2aKPrGZcLxK7aSCc6XRsp_Z-ZynrpBVq-Rp0kJHAOSEQCpAeGqFlplhF0>, 4-26-23, -PGR

Settler colonialism is not only relevant to the history of the Middle East and North Africa but also to the way the region’s future is imagined. Today, Turkey is considering whether to turn the Kurdish-majority northeast Syrian region of Afrin, which it has occupied since 2018, into a new settlement project, albeit with Syrian Arab refugees instead of Turkish nationals. The proposed resettlement of these refugees, which could build on decades of Turkey’s experience of occupying Northern Cyprus, falls within the parameters of settler colonialism as a distinct mode of domination. If carried out, Afrin would become a new and alternative Syria—permanently separated from the rest of the country and supported by a foreign power. As demonstrated by Britain’s imperial sponsorship of the Zionist colonization of Palestine, a state does not need to be settling its own nationals to pursue a settler-colonial project.

Still, the future of global settler colonialism emanates from the Middle East in other ways. Palestine remains a global laboratory of settler domination through containment, a repressive practice that pursues the logic of elimination by targeting the links that a specific community maintains with the wider world. Increasingly, countries around the globe demand the sophisticated technologies of containment and control that Israel has developed and “battle tested” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over the last 30 years. The occupation is increasingly marketable around the world. India, for example, has borrowed from Israeli strategies and purchased some of its technologies for its emerging settlement project in occupied Kashmir. The Pegasus spyware has been acquired and used widely by autocrats in the region and beyond. The United States has also provided an eager market; in 2019 the [FBI purchased](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/world/middleeast/israel-pegasus-spyware.html) and tested Pegasus to consider its potentials for domestic use, and a growing body of evidence has pointed to the Israel Defense Force’s contribution to the increased militarization of US policing. In short, we are witnessing the convergence and globalization of technologies of domination and modes of settler-colonial domination. As in the past, the region remains a crucial node in transnational networks of colonialist ideas and repressive practices.

#### C---Security/IR Kritiks

Armstrong 17 [William, Empire and its legacy in the Middle East, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/william-armstrong/empire-and-its-legacy-in-the-middle-east-106756]

The order born from Ottoman rubble was midwifed by Western imperialists. There has been a lot of talk about “artificial countries” and arbitrary “lines in the sand” at the root of today’s problems. But as Roger Hardy writes in “The Poisoned Well,” a vivid account of the half-century between 1917 and 1967, those borders are less important than what goes on within them. “If Western powers are at fault,” Hardy suggests, “it is not primarily for the way they drew the borders of the Middle East after the First World War, but because their interaction with the region ... has often served to accentuate the crisis of the state, rather than helping to resolve or mitigate it.” Today, he argues, “Islamism, the Arab Spring, and global jihadism are the products, not of artificial borders, but the long-simmering crisis of the state.”

#### D---Racial Capitalism

Mayo 22 [Peter; Professor, speaker, editor, writer, and former head of the Department of Arts, Open Communities and Adult Education at the University of Malta, in Malta, “Antonio Gramsci, Settler-Colonialism and Palestine”, Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies, Volume 21, Issue 2, October, 2022, 21(2), pp. 151–175, (<https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/hlps.2022.0293?role=tab>) // Makinde]

Furthermore, **being oppressed** in one **context** and **oppressors** in others is **manifest**, in a colonial context, in instances of ‘**divide and rule’**, a theme broached by **Freire** in the fourth chapter of **Pedagogy of the Oppressed.** Segmentation on racial/ethnic lines constitutes a **key contemporary strategy of divide and rule** predicated on the process of **internalising** the **oppressor’s image**. This becomes more important in a period of **hegemonic globalisation** where producers are segregated on **ethnic, national and geographical** (North-South) **lines**. This is connected with the notion of the ‘oppressor within’, a situation evident, for instance, in the perpetration of acts of violence against people constructed as different and whose characteristics do not fall within Eurocentric terms of reference. Edward Said mentions the case of a friend of his son who had been tortured by the Israeli repressive forces and who now carries out the same task, from which he suffered, on the **Palestinian side as interrogator for the Palestinian Authority**.3

This situation applies to **Western countries** developing their economy on **immigrant labour** and at the same time being places where fear of and ‘**competition’** against the ‘**Other’** prevail. It also applies to countries such as Paulo Freire’s native Brazil with its complex set of racial politics involving whites, positioning themselves as being of European stock, south-east Asians to a limited extent, blacks and Indigenous people. The last mentioned are still among the greatest victims of rapacious **capitalist speculation** in areas such as the Amazon. They are victims of the sort of contemporary atrocities which Eduardo Galeano saw as a continuation of the old ‘Conquistador’ mindset (Galeano 2009). Freire’s chilling account of and reflection on the wanton killing (immolation) of a Pataxo Indian, Galdino Jesus dos Santos, in a piece included in the posthumous collection of essays grouped together under the title Pedagogia da indignação (Pedagogy of Indignation) (Freire 2000), highlights the continuation of barbarous racist acts in Brazil. This particular crime is an example of the oppressor consciousness residing within people who use **white supremacy** as a means of positioning themselves **against alterity**. It gives them that sense of ‘**positional superiority’**, to use Said’s (1978) pervasive term. This positional superiority would allow a few of them, such as the boys in Brazil, to **kill fellow humans for their sport**, like ‘flies to wanton boys’ in the blinded Gloucester’s famous line from Shakespeare’s King Lear.4 People regard others, of different ethnic and social location, as ‘lesser beings’-disposable beings- who can be killed with impunity. This marks a colonial attitude that takes us back to the time when the Indigenous of Latin America, in places such as Protosi in modern day Bolivia, were entombed (see Marx’s Capital Vol. III) or maimed for life in the gold and silver mines (Galeano 2009). It takes us to the time when Indigenous people (conventionally and perhaps problematically called ‘Aborigines’) were hunted as game with impunity in Tasmania. It hearkens back to when slaves from Africa were bought, sold or hanged, if not thrown into the sea during transport, in the thick of the slave trade.

While on the topic of human disposability and hierarchical being, I would point out that ‘**Orientalism’**, **as a construction of the West**, had the effect, on the young Edward Said and others, of making them feel as though they were ‘**lesser people’**5. It reflects the same mind-set that led Europeans in the past to consider others as ‘**subhuman’** and commit the atrocities just mentioned.

More importantly, in the case of occupied lands, such as the Americas (America has wider territorial scope than simply the United States), and centuries later, Palestine, it is also the attitude which relegates a particular section of society, in a land being coveted by a specific ethnic group and foreign imperial forces for a variety of motives (Masalha 2018), to an officially ‘invisible’ mass — all this, despite the fact **that these people are most visible**, **very much the ‘elephant in the room’**.

This **mass can be overlooked**, ignored in key decisions regarding the land’s new nationhood or can be chased out at will, as with the Nakba of 1948 and later. Those who remain are given an **inferior citizenship** — the fate of **dispossessed people throughout world history.** Examples include, once more, the Indigenous of America, the term again used in its broad North, Central and South American sense. They become disposable, exposed to the constant dangers of **ethnic cleansing**. No wonder that strong relationships have been established over the years between a **representative organisation of the Palestinian people** and a key movement of dispossessed peoples, the MST — the Movimento Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Movement of Landless Rural Workers) in Freire’s Brazil. The famous picture featuring Yasser Arafat and João Stedile, then leaders of the PLO and MST respectively, is emblematic of this affinity between the two peoples.

**Violent, racist, sexist, cross-Indigenous, anthropocentric and homophobic** acts are examples of the kinds of behaviour that indicate the presence of the ‘**oppressor’s image’** inside the oppressed. Again, this behaviour can be encouraged by a **colonial strategy of ‘divide and rule’** (Freire 1970: 137). One can point, as a relatively recent example, from among the many similar examples throughout history, to the inter-Indigenous carnage in the 1990s resulting from the Belgian colonial pitting of Tutsis and Hutus against each other in Rwanda. In colonial India, different hierarchies of social differences, especially caste differences, were availed of by the ‘British Raj’ for the same purpose. These differences were not overcome once the postcolonial independent Indian state was established, and persist until now (Guha 2009). Planting a Jewish state in the midst of Arab territories is often seen to have a similar function within the imperial geopolitics of the region.

Furthermore, there is the splitting of **Palestinians into Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem**. This situation is congenial to a policy of ‘**divide and conquer’**. The Oslo accords allowed for the reduction of Palestinians to ‘disparate fragments’ each fragment engaged in its own struggle for survival. (Bahour 2017) Then there is the factionalism that exists within the Palestinian population in terms of political representation, apart from divisions that smack of an Indigenous or regional nature, of which more anon.

#### In addition, there are countless other relevant Ks that are specific to individual countries or particular types of US engagement. (See the Appendix Area Negs/K Headers)

### 8---A2: Other Concerns

#### A2: Too Big

Yes, there is a lot of aff ground. However, the affirmative is required to re-engage with countries where our engagement to this point has been symbolic or even withdrawn. Beyond that, the negative has very good generic ground. If an affirmative doesn’t include a condition in the plan, the conditions counterplan is built in offense. If the affirmative includes a condition, they can pic out of the condition. There is a healthy T debate on whether or not engagement would require conditions or not. The appeasement, entanglement, and alliances disadvantage ground is robust. This topic allows a lot of aff creativity with the understanding that the negative has decades of “get out of the middle east” literature to structure their 1NCs.

#### A2: Foreign Assistance is too vague/broad

We would agree. Foreign assistance can include a lot of things. That is why we would recommend that resolutions have a floor ceiling structure so a more limiting term like constructive engagement can modify foreign assistance. In a world where the committee errs against a ceiling/floor model, we would recommend a wording with a more limiting mechanism requirement than foreign assistance.

#### A2: “One off” small engagement affs

Constructive engagement implies/requires a creation of a long term/lasting collaboration. Small engagement affs would have to create that to be topical. Beyond that, the advantage ground for these types of affs is more limited and leaves them incredibly vulnerable to pics out of constructive engagement, non-government engagement counterplans, and advantage counterplans. These affs also still link to the general disadvantages like diplomatic capital, appeasement and alliances. If the neg can survive a year where the Fetal Personhood DA was core neg ground, we will be fine with a topic where the entanglement and alliances DAs are core ground.

#### A2: Link Uniqueness (we already engage)

The evidence about engagement strategies moving away from the Middle East and toward other arenas is really good. See the “Why Debate the Middle East” section. Overall, US engagement with the Middle East has become more symbolic and less genuine over the past several years. The resolution would also require a substantial reengagement with countries, forcing link magnitude.

There is obviously always going to be some level of engagement in the ME by the US, but the main global perception right now is that the US has broadly shifted focus from the ME. The neg arg of “even if the aff wins that there is some engagement with these countries happening now, the broad perception is that the US is leaving the ME” is a relatively easy one to win for link articulation. See the NEG appendix “Link UQ Section” for evidence.

#### A2: Unifying neg ground?

The Pivot DA (see discussion under link uniqueness above), alliance DA, diplomatic capital DA, QPQ or pic out of QPQ counterplans, topicality arguments about the extent of engagement and whether constructive implies a deeper relationship, etc. are all core negative arguments in the neg arsenal that can constructure unifying strategy.

#### A2: I do not want to debate an IR topic

Considering the topic rotation requirement, the community has to debate an IR topic either this year or next year. At least this is a GOOD one. Also, please read the K-Top Level section in the appendix. We have not had a genuine engagement with the critical side of the Middle East question for a decade. K debate has drastically changed over the past decade. The opportunity for critical education is huge and well worth an investigation of the Middle East topic.

#### A2: What about K Ground

When we initially thought about putting this topic paper together, we began under the assumption that the likelihood would be that the community would vote for an IR topic this year. Two years of tepid domestic/legal topics made us pretty confident that the majority lean would be for an IR controversy. With that in mind, we started considering what IR topic would be a good compromise for debaters who prefer talking about issues “at home” and debaters who fall more in the “international relation wonk” camp. We genuinely believe this topic is that.

A large swath of cultural and philosophical grappling with the history of US involvement in the Middle East would characterize it as one of blood for soil, oil for security, Orientalism/Islamophobia, genocidal politics, cartographic conquest and colonization, and steeped in legacies of economic and militaristic violence.

In this overview section, this paper wants to outline where we see the topic going when it comes to the “top level” of critical discussions. While we have other sections with carded examples of K arguments, this section is more tailored to showing the overarching controversy areas for critical analysis.

In general, we foresee the major philosophical tenets critical analysis would draw from falling under links about empire, sovereignty, and coloniality. While other IR topics can say the same, we believe the mechanism of “increased engagement” “foreign assistance” “constructive engagement” and “security guarantee” centers the controversy much better than other IR topics will. Beyond that, centering conversations around the Middle East, in our opinion, is a unique facet of this topic for critical engagement. There is a legacy of violence behind US occupation and engagement within the Middle East that deserves policy debate engagement. Critical policy debate has seen a huge shift in depth and analysis since the last Middle East focused topic. The fact that an entire decade of debate has passed since we have last had engagement with a Middle East focused topic is reason enough for a critical debate revisit.

As more and more Palestinians die at the hands of the IDF, as the US defends pulling out of Afghanistan after 20 years of military occupation that destroyed the lives of many in the region without any attempt at a soft transition, as several military weapons producers consider new “LGBT Pride” weapons fleets, as countless women fight for equality in Iran while being murdered for their political dissent, as civil war rages in Saudi Arabia, there is a growing need for a reckoning within policy debate that attunes to questions like “*what then?*” “*why increase US presence?*” “*what about the similarities of those instances of violence to violence in the domestic US?*”

This is unpacked more in the Appendix “K-Top Level-Overview” section.

# \*\*\*Appendix

# Definitions

## Constructive Engagement

### Constructive Engagement---Can’t Be QPQ

#### QPQ =/= constructive engagement, = conditional engagement, entirely different kind of engagement.

Baker, Georgetown University Foreign Service Graduate School professor, 2000 [Pauline, president of the Fund for Peace, *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*, edited by Richard Haas and Meghan O'Sullivan, http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815733550/html/203.html#pagetop, 95-97]

Thus, at the outset, the United States adopted a position of **unconditional engagement** with the South African government. However, it became apparent after a couple of years that the approach was not yielding the promised results. As some analysis’s concluded, "Crocker's strategy contained two basic problems. First, it failed to take into account the changing military situation inside Angola; and second, it assumed that South Africa was interested in a settlement."5

When violent unrest erupted in South Africa in 1983, a backlash ensued against **constructive engagement** as well as against the White regime. The thesis triggered **the antithesis**, a policy of conditional engagement that held internal change in South Africa as its primary objective. This antithesis involved a mix of incentives and penalties enacted by Congress over the veto of a popular president after two years of grassroots anti-apartheid activism in the United States. **The new approach was not merely an adjustment to existing policy, but a totally different form of engagement**, aimed at different targets and using different policy instruments. Engagement was no longer directed at the government, but at supporting the anti-apartheid opposition in South Africa. At the same time, the South African government was also targeted with limited trade and financial sanctions, which would be lifted if Pretoria adopted specific measures that would lead to negotiations with the black opposition. A commitment to lift sanctions when those steps were taken was the new incentive for Pretoria. The measures were spelled out in a clear road map defined in the legislation, the Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA). The measures did not call for total isolation or abdication of the white government, but rather defined a set of five "doable" actions that would level the playing field for negotiations.

### Constructive Engagement---Must Be QPQ

#### Constructive engagement = QPQ

Burma Issues Newsletter, March 96, "Gentle and Slow Persuasion?" <http://www.burmaissues.org/En/Newsletter/BINews1996-03.php>

By definition, a policy of "**constructive engagement**" used by one country to relate to another country **must satisfy** three **conditions:**

1. Rather than dealing with sensitive issues, such as human rights abuses and/or dictatorship, in a confrontational and immediate way, a long-term strategy to slowly encourage democratic change and respect for human rights is carried out.

2. Important economic and political relationships between the two countries are established and strengthened.

3. Conditions are placed on the country in question, and these conditions must be met within a specified time-frame for the good relationship to continue. In other words, one country tells another, "We will encourage investments and greater political dialogue with you if, and only if, you meet these specific conditions by a specific date."

#### Constructive engagement is a quid pro quo---otherwise it’s just appeasement.

Gambill, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin editor, May 04 [Gary C., " American Sanctions on Syria: A Diplomatic Masterstroke?" The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, http://www.meib.org/articles/0405\_s1.htm]

However, the logic (or illogic) of constructive engagement - that offering sizable and tangible carrots in return for good behavior is more effective than sanctioning bad behavior - remained imbedded in official American thinking about Syria. Over the next three decades, constructive engagement morphed into appeasement (constructive engagement's ugly cousin). Damascus was given two of the most handsome carrots ever delivered by the United States - tacit recognition of its lucrative control over Lebanon and freedom to illegally import Iraqi oil at cut-rate prices, earning the regime over $1 billion annually (American officials objected shortly after Bush came to office, but soon stopped complaining about the illicit trade, which at any rate could have been brought to a halt by air strikes on the Iraqi side of the Syrian-Iraqi oil pipeline). But these carrots were not given in return for good behavior. They were given in spite of its refusal to compromise with Israel, end its support for terrorist groups, or halt its strategic realignment with Iraq in the waning years of Saddam Hussein's reign.

#### Constructive engagement in the Middle East requires a quid-pro-quo

Gambill, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin editor, 03 [Gary C., "The American-Syrian Crisis and the End of Constructive Engagement," The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0304_s1.htm>]

Until last month, the parameters of American policy toward Syria were strictly defined by the State Department's doctrine of constructive engagement, a diplomatic operating principle inspired by the successful use of US economic and military aid during the 1970s to facilitate Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's acceptance of a bilateral peace treaty with Israel. The underlying assumptions of US constructive engagement in the Middle East are that the capacity of the United States to reward "good behavior" far exceeds its capacity to punish "bad behavior" (which was largely true during the Cold War) and that the latter is ineffective in conditioning policymaking in the Arab world for a variety of cultural and historical reasons.

#### Constructive engagement requires a punitive measure.

Davies, 8 (Joanne, Consultant for the African Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, February 20, “South Africa and Constructive Engagement: Lessons Learned?”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03057070701832858>) AJW

Dr Chester Crocker was appointed as Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in 1981. Before his appointment, he had published an article entitled ‘South Africa: Strategy for Change’ Footnote6 in which he outlined his favoured policy of constructive engagement towards the governments of the southern African region – and Pretoria in particular. Just as Mbeki argues today, Crocker maintained that hostile rhetoric levelled at the apartheid regime in South Africa only served to increase Pretoria's intransigence and made the South African government more hostile towards the idea of a gradual dismantling of the apartheid regime. This, he believed, is what had happened during the Carter administration. Constructive engagement would involve an open dialogue with Pretoria, together with a reduction of counterproductive punitive measures such as certain export restrictions. In this way, Washington could maintain a friendly relationship with the South African government – which was important both for American geo-strategic and economic/trading interests – while gaining the confidence of Pretoria and thus enabling Washington to influence South Africa towards a gradual change away from apartheid. Certainly the administration was united in its public condemnation of apartheid. In Congressional hearings, Crocker always made clear: …our strong moral and political convictions about a system based on legally entrenched racism … any system that ascribes or denies political rights on this [racial] basis – including the right of citizenship itself – is bound to be … repugnant.Footnote7

#### Has to meet three conditions.

Chan, 96 (N., “Gentle or Slow Persuasion”, Burma Issues Newsletter Vol. 3 No. 4 <http://www.burmaissues.org/En/Newsletter/BINews1996-03.php>) AJW

By definition, a policy of "constructive engagement" used by one country to relate to another country must satisfy three conditions: 1. Rather than dealing with sensitive issues, such as human rights abuses and/or dictatorship, in a confrontational and immediate way, a long-term strategy to slowly encourage democratic change and respect for human rights is carried out. 2. Important economic and political relationships between the two countries are established and strengthened. 3.Conditions are placed on the country in question, and these conditions must be met within a specified time-frame for the good relationship to continue. In other words, one country tells another, "We will encourage investments and greater political dialogue with you if, and only if, you meet these specific conditions by a specific date."

#### Constructive engagement requires a demand for political reform

BNetBusiness Dictionary, ND **,** http://dictionary.bnet.com/definition/constructive+engagement.html

Constructive engagement- the policy of maintaining limited political and business links with a country while continuing to demand political or social reform in that country

#### Constructive engagement requires quid pro quo.

Baker, University of Texas at Austin International Business Law professor, 2000 [Mark B., Law and Policy in International Business, "Flying Over the Judicial Hump," 32 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 51, l/n]

n184 See Monthly Review, **Constructive Engagement** in Areas of Conflict, at http://www.sustainability.co.uk/monthly-review/April2000/APR2000-perspective-engagement.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2000) (using the Dictionary of 20th Century World Politics to define constructive engagement as "the continuation of political and economic ties with regimes with which a state has severe disagreements in the expectation that ties will eventually lead to changes in the objectionable policies and practices").

### Constructive Engagement---Includes Pressure

#### Constructive engagement includes both carrots and pressure

Griswold and Groombridge, Cato Center for Trade Policy Studies associate director and research fellow, 6-28-01 [Daniel T. and Mark A., "The Right and Wrong Ways to Pressure China," <http://www.cato.org/dailys/06-28-01.html>]

**Combining normal trade relations and diplomatic pressure would constitute** a coherent policy of "full and **constructive** **engagement**." It would combine the exceptional American virtues of idealism and economic liberty, transcending a morally blind commercialism on the one hand and ineffective and self-destructive trade sanctions on the other.

#### Constructive engagement includes carrots and sticks

APN (Americans for Peace Now), 3-12-07, "Major Jewish Peace Group Calls on Bush to Engage with Iran," <http://www.peacenow.org/hot.asp?cid=3519>

Americans for Peace Now (**APN**) today **called on** the **Bush** Administration **to** change course on Iran and **abandon** its longstanding **sanctions**-only policy **in favor of** limited, **constructive engagement, characterized by a combination of carrots and sticks.**

### Constructive Engagement---Excludes Pressure

#### Constructive engagement excludes pressure

Gambill, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin editor, May 04 [Gary C., " American Sanctions on Syria: A Diplomatic Masterstroke?" The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, http://www.meib.org/articles/0405\_s1.htm]

Until March 2003, American policy toward Syria closely adhered to the State Department's doctrine of constructive engagement, a diplomatic principle inspired by the use of American military and economic aid to facilitate Egypt's defection from the Soviet bloc and acceptance of peace with Israel in the 1970s. Parallel American efforts to woo Syria with economic aid after the 1973 Yom Kippur War never bore fruit (Syrian President Hafez Assad not only refused to negotiate with Israel, but actively tried to sabotage Egypt's move toward peace). However, the logic (or illogic) of constructive engagement - that offering sizable and tangible carrots in return for good behavior is more effective than sanctioning bad behavior - remained imbedded in official American thinking about Syria.

#### The use of pressure is the polar opposite of constructive engagement

Baker, Georgetown University Foreign Service Graduate School professor, 2000 [Pauline, president of the Fund for Peace, *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*, edited by Richard Haas and Meghan O'Sullivan, http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815733550/html/203.html#pagetop, 95-97]

Thus, **at the outset, the U**nited **S**tates **adopted** a position of **unconditional engagement** with the South African government. However, it became apparent after a couple of years that the approach was not yielding the promised results. As some analysis’s concluded, "Crocker's strategy contained two basic problems. First, it failed to take into account the changing military situation inside Angola; and second, it assumed that South Africa was interested in a settlement."5

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#### Any precise definition of engagement requires excluding pressure- otherwise the term is meaningless

Haas and O'Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program director, 2000 [Richard N., former senior aid to President George bush, and Meghan L., Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Program fellow, *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*, http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815733550/html/203.html#pagetop, 1-2]

Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### Constructive engagement is the opposite of sanctions

Nouraee, human rights lawyer, 02 [Layla, “REASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: STIMULATING REFORM THROUGH ECONOMIC MEANS,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 25 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 535, l/n]

Constructive engagement was initially used as an alternative to sanctions with regard to South Africa. See id. The goal was to facilitate and hasten racial and political reform within South Africa through asserting strategic engagement.

#### Constructive engagement excludes pressure

Gambill, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin editor, May 04 [Gary C., " American Sanctions on Syria: A Diplomatic Masterstroke?" The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, http://www.meib.org/articles/0405\_s1.htm]

Until March 2003, American policy toward Syria closely adhered to the State Department's doctrine of constructive engagement, a diplomatic principle inspired by the use of American military and economic aid to facilitate Egypt's defection from the Soviet bloc and acceptance of peace with Israel in the 1970s. Parallel American efforts to woo Syria with economic aid after the 1973 Yom Kippur War never bore fruit (Syrian President Hafez Assad not only refused to negotiate with Israel, but actively tried to sabotage Egypt's move toward peace). However, the logic (or illogic) of constructive engagement - that offering sizable and tangible carrots in return for good behavior is more effective than sanctioning bad behavior - remained imbedded in official American thinking about Syria.

### Constructive Engagement---Includes 3rd Parties

#### Constructive engagement can involve third parties.

Gambill,Middle East Intelligence Bulletin editor, April 03 – [Gary C., "The American-Syrian Crisis and the End of Constructive Engagement," The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0304_s1.htm>]

Until last month, the parameters of American policy toward Syria were strictly defined by the State Department's doctrine of constructive engagement, a diplomatic operating principle inspired by the successful use of US economic and military aid during the 1970s to facilitate Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's acceptance of a bilateral peace treaty with Israel. The underlying assumptions of US constructive engagement in the Middle East are that the capacity of the United States to reward "good behavior" far exceeds its capacity to punish "bad behavior" (which was largely true during the Cold War) and that the latter is ineffective in conditioning policymaking in the Arab world for a variety of cultural and historical reasons.

American efforts to woo Sadat in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War were paralleled by constructive engagement of Syrian President Hafez Assad. The United States pressured Israel to withdraw from part of the Golan Heights captured from Syria during the 1967 war, provided Syria with several hundred million dollars of economic aid, **and** tacitly supported the entry of Syrian troops into Lebanon (ostensibly to rein in radical Palestinian groups threatening the overthrow of its government).

### Constructive Engagement---Requires Normalizing Relations

#### Constructive engagement requires implementing relations

Nouraee, human rights lawyer, 02 [Layla, “REASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: STIMULATING REFORM THROUGH ECONOMIC MEANS,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 25 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 535, l/n]

A useful and effective policy strategy would include elements of **constructive engagement**. 133 The principle relies upon the basic premise that a **middle ground** exists between direct military confrontation and imposing sanctions to address foreign policy and security concerns. 134 The policy assumes that after [\*556] **implementing relations with the target country**, **economic and trade inducements and benefits would help introduce political change**. 135 The concept assumes that **dialogue and negotiation** are more effective in securing foreign policy objectives than exclusion or overt coercion. 136

#### Constructive engagement with Iran requires implementing relations

Nouraee, human rights lawyer, 02 [Layla, “REASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: STIMULATING REFORM THROUGH ECONOMIC MEANS,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 25 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 535, l/n]

Since 1953, the changing face of Iranian politics has always involved the United States - either directly by instigating a coup, or indirectly by supporting new leadership. 130 Severing ties between the two countries now coincides with the general population's desire for reform with one ingredient missing: U.S. involvement. 131 While the reform movement continues to grow and stabilize, the United States should be calculated in determining the form of future assistance. 132

A useful and effective policy strategy would include elements of constructive engagement. 133 The principle relies upon the basic premise that a middle ground exists between direct military confrontation and imposing sanctions to address foreign policy and security concerns. 134 The policy assumes that after [\*556] implementing relations with the target country, economic and trade inducements and benefits would help introduce political change. 135 The concept assumes that dialogue and negotiation are more effective in securing foreign policy objectives than exclusion or overt coercion. 136

### Constructive Engagement---Requires Economic Engagement

#### Constructive engagement requires economic engagement

Nouraee, human rights lawyer, 02 [Layla, “REASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: STIMULATING REFORM THROUGH ECONOMIC MEANS,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 25 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 535, l/n]

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#### Constructive engagement = economic

Nouraee, human rights lawyer, 02 [Layla, “REASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN: STIMULATING REFORM THROUGH ECONOMIC MEANS,” Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 25 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 535, l/n]

Constructive engagement was initially used as an alternative to sanctions with regard to South Africa. See id. The goal was to facilitate and hasten racial and political reform within South Africa through asserting strategic engagement. See id. Inducements to change, in the form of trade concessions, loans, and other incentives, were accompanied by clearly defined and limited negative conditions. See id.

#### Constructive engagement requires economic engagement

Tu, lawyer, J.D. from the University of Washington, June 05 [Kevin V., Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, "EXTREME POLICY MAKEOVER: RE-EVALUATING CURRENT U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT," 14 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y 771, l/n]

To date, United States foreign policy toward Vietnam has been characterized by **constructive engagement**, 7 the theory that **increased trade and economic relations** will expose the target country to democratic ideals, thus effecting improvements in human rights.8

#### Constructive engagement requires an economic relationship

Baker, University of Texas at Austin International Business Law professor,2000 [Mark B., Law and Policy in International Business, "Flying Over the Judicial Hump," 32 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 51, l/n]

Vodanovich cites the first U.S. use of **constructive engagement** as a tool to aid in ending South African apartheid. Essentially a compromise, it appeased the liberal constituency in the United States by recognizing apartheid as contrary to human rights--yet it also pleased conservatives by refusing to isolate South Africa--thus realizing its economic value. Thus, **constructive engagement** came about as a way to influence human rights activities within a violating country **via an economic-governmental relationship** with the violator.

### Constructive Engagement---4 Options

#### There are four options for constructive engagement.

Feaver, 6 (Peter, Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University, “The Clinton Administration’s China Engagement Policy in Perspective,” Paper Presented at the Conference on War and Peace at Duke University, Available Online at https://web.duke.edu/pass/pdf/warpeaceconf/p-feaver.pdf, Accessed 06-22-2016, p. 8-9) AJW

4. The Debate Over Constructive Engagement Misstates the Alternatives The Clinton Administration frames the debate as a choice between constructive engagement and containment. This is sloppy analysis but shrewd rhetoric. Sloppy analysis because, in fact, containment is not the opposite of engagement. The opposite of engagement is isolationism. Isolationism can either be generalized, as was the case for the first hundred years of the American Republic (at least vis-a-vis Europe) or specific, as was the case with US-Albanian relations during the Cold War. Framing the issue this way, however, is shrewd rhetoric because virtually no one supports isolationism. The Clinton Administration says that if you do not want isolationism, you must therefore support our policy. This of course, misstates the area of real debate. There is a widespread consensus that the United States needs to engage China. The true debate is over how to engage. Under the rubric of constructive engagement, there are four basic options depending on the degree to which the interests of the players overlap: (1) direct confrontation/rollback, where one country seeks to diminish the position of the other (viz. U.S. policy on Iraq); (2) containment, where one country seeks to limit the advances of another country’s position (viz. U.S. Cold War [end page 8] policy on the Soviet Union); (3) appeasement, where one country seeks to manage the apparently inevitable advance of the other with concessions on minor points so as to avoid concessions on major issues (viz. British policy on the United States at the turn of the century); or (4) enlargement, where [one] country views the other’s interests as so harmonious that virtually any advance for one is an advance the other (viz. U.S. policy on Great Britain ever since World War I). Given this more accurate range of choices, it is evident that the Administration has adopted a general posture of constructive engagement (not isolationism) and under that general rubric is pursuing a specific policy of appeasement. Several years ago, I asked the architect of the Administration’s Asia security policy what was the difference between our policy and a policy of appeasement. His response: “Appeasement has a long and distinguished history in diplomatic affairs.”

### Engagement---Must Be QPQ

#### Any precise definition of engagement requires a quid pro quo---use of incentives to change the behavior of a target country.

Haas and O'Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program director, 2000 [Richard N., former senior aid to President George bush, and Meghan L., Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Program fellow, *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*, http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815733550/html/203.html#pagetop, 1-2]

**The term engagement** was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the word **appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations**. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. **Except in the few instances in which the** **U**nited **S**tates **has sought to isolate a regime** or country, **America** arguably **"engages" states** and actors **all the time** in one capacity or another **simply by interacting with them**. **This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation**. In our usage, **engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends** to a significant degree **on positive incentives to achieve its objectives.** Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet **the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on** the extension or provision of **incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the U**nited **S**tates **has important disagreements**.

## Foreign Assistance

### Foreign Assistance Definition---Main

#### Foreign assistance is well defined.

Emma E. Parker, 22 – [Emma Parker is Doctor of Philosophy Public Policy George Mason University, The Securitization of United States Foreign Assistance, George Mason University ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, Fall 2022, <https://www.proquest.com/docview/2778886325?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true>] nl

Foreign Assistance. Foreign assistance as defined in the **Foreign Assistance Act of 1961** is:

any tangible or intangible item provided by the United States Government [including “by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty”] to a foreign country or international organization under this or any other Act, including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal, or mixed property, any agricultural commodity, United States dollars, and any currencies of any foreign country which are owned by the United States Government....9

This dissertation looks at **all types of foreign assistance** but focuses on assistance to countries at peace. The U.S. provides foreign assistance for **several different purposes**, and Congress has authorized several foreign assistance accounts to meet these objectives. **The Congressional Research Service** has identified **12 major foreign assistance** accounts **including bilateral development assistance, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian assistance, military assistance, and the “other” category** that includes a variety of smaller accounts, most of which are to deal with contingencies and post-conflict transitions.10

### Foreign Assistance Definition---Other

#### Here’s some tables showing categories of US foreign assistance.

CRS Report, 22 – [<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40213>] nl





#### It includes humanitarian, developmental, and security assistance.

United States Department of State 22, – ["United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability," US Department of State, 4-1-2022, <https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/>] nl

**Foreign Assistance**

Foreign assistance – **including** humanitarian, development, and security sector assistance – is a critical tool to address fragility, respond to and mitigate conflict and crises, and promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.  In fragile contexts, needs are often most acute, but so too are the impediments to effectively delivering assistance.

#### Foreign assistance is tied to an objective and can take a number of forms.

CRS, 22 (Congressional Research Service, 1/10, “Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy”, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40213>) AJW

Foreign assistance is the largest component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many Members of Congress as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy. On the basis of national security, commercial, and humanitarian rationales, U.S. assistance flows through many federal agencies and supports myriad objectives. These objectives include promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, improving governance, expanding access to health care and education, promoting stability in conflict regions, countering terrorism, promoting human rights, strengthening allies, and curbing illicit drug production and trafficking. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign aid has increasingly been associated with national security policy. At the same time, some Americans and Members of Congress view foreign aid as an expense that the United States cannot afford given current budget deficits and competing budget priorities. In FY2019, U.S. foreign assistance, defined broadly, totaled an estimated $48.18 billion, or 1% of total federal budget authority. About 41% of this assistance was for bilateral economic development programs, including strategic economic assistance; 35% for military and nonmilitary security assistance; 20% for humanitarian activities; and 4% to support the work of multilateral institutions. Assistance can take the form of cash transfers, equipment and commodities, infrastructure, education and training, or technical assistance, and, in recent decades, is provided almost exclusively on a grant rather than loan basis. Most U.S. aid is implemented by nongovernmental organizations rather than foreign governments. The United States is the largest foreign aid donor in the world, accounting for nearly 23% of total official development assistance from major donor governments in 2019 (the latest year for which these data are available). Key foreign assistance trends since 2001 include growth in development aid, particularly global health programs; increased security assistance directed toward U.S. allies for anti-terrorism efforts; and high levels of humanitarian assistance to address a range of crises. Adjusted for inflation, annual foreign assistance funding since FY2003 has been higher than in any period since the Marshall Plan was implemented in the years immediately following World War II. In FY2019, Afghanistan, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq received the largest amounts of U.S. assistance, reflecting long-standing commitments to Israel and Egypt, the strategic significance of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the strategic and humanitarian importance of Jordan as the crisis in neighboring Syria continues. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa regions each received 25% of assistance allocated by country or region in FY2019, followed by South and Central Asia, at 14%.

#### It emphasizes 5 principal goals.

USAID 05 [USAID, United States Agency for International Development US Department of State, 01/2005. "U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide." *US Department of State*, Accessed: 4/25/2023. <https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo13449/PNADC240.pdf>]

Authorization: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), Chapters 1 and 10 of Part I.

“ ... [for] sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the

knowledge and resources essential to development and to build the economic, political, and

social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives.”

“United States development cooperation policy should emphasize five principal goals:

1. Alleviation of the worst physical manifestations of poverty among the world’s poor majority;

2. Promotion of conditions enabling developing countries to achieve self-sustaining economic growth with equitable distribution of benefits;

3. Encouragement of development processes in which individual civil and economic rights are respected and enhanced;

4. Integration of the developing countries into an open and equitable international economic system; and

5. Promotion of good governance through combating corruption and improving transparency and accountability.”

### Foreign Assistance---Excludes …

#### Foreign assistance excludes funding for cultural exchanges, military training, peacekeeping, covert intelligence, military equipment, and export promotion.

Lancaster, USAID former deputy administrator & Van Dusen, USAID former senior career officer**,** 5 (Carol & Ann, “Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid- Confronting the Challenge of the Twenty First Century” p. 6-7)

The principal tool for promoting development abroad has long been foreign aid. ”Foreign aid” (used interchangeably here with “international assistance”) is another term that means different things to different people. Some think of it as a policy. Others regard it as any public resource transferred abroad. Still others define it as only those resource transfers that are specifcally intended to help recipients. International assistance is not a policy; rather it is an instrument of policy. It has multiple purposes, only one of which is to benefit the recipients of that aid, and it has a specific set of characteristics. International assistance, or foreign aid, as defined here means

A voluntary transfer of public resources from one government to another government, international organization, or nongovernmental organization (including not-for-profit organizations working on specific issues, public interest organizations, churches and their associated organizations, universities, foundations, even private, for-profit business enterprises) to improve the lives and livelihoods in the country receiving the aid, among other goals.

This definition is close to the definition of official development assistance (ODA) offered by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) but differs in two ways. First, it defines impact more broadly by including activities intended primarily to address global issues such as HIV/AIDS and global climate change, democracy promotion, and support for economic and social transitions in former socialist countries. Second, our definition is more expansive in what it includes. The DAC defines ODA as those concessional resources transferred to poor countries. Transfers to countries on the World Bank’s list of “high income” countries (with per capita incomes above $9,200 in 2001) for three years or more are not considered official development assistance but rather official assistance (OA). Thus the DAC would not include aid to countries such as Israel, Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Romania in its definition of ODA. Because the DAC’s distinction between ODA and OA underestimates the full development assistance effort of the United States, this study includes both OA and ODA in its examination of U.S. international assistance. Funding for cultural exchanges, covert intelligence, export promotion, the purchase of military equipment, and training or peace-keeping missions will not be counted as international assistance.

### Foreign Assistance---Excludes Courts

#### Foreign assistance directly promotes economic development---doesn’t include aid for courts or tribunals

Roper and Barria, Eastern Illinois University political science professors, 06 [Steven D., International Studies Coordinator, and Lilian A., Designing Criminal Tribunals, 60-70, print.google.com]

For the DAC, foreign assistance qualifies as official development assistance based on the following criteria: The assistance is undertaken by official agencies, promotes economic development and welfare as its main objectives and has a grant element of 25 per cent or more.3 Tribunal financing is not targeted at poverty reduction, macroeconomic policy and is only tangentially related to state and democracy-building.

### Foreign Assistance---Excludes Cultural Exchanges

#### Foreign assistance excludes funding for cultural exchanges

Lancaster**,** USAID former deputy administrator & Van Dusen, USAID former senior career officer, 5 (Carol & Ann, “Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid- Confronting the Challenge of the Twenty First Century” p. 6-7)

The principal tool for promoting development abroad has long been foreign aid. ”Foreign aid” (used interchangeably here with “international assistance”) is another term that means different things to different people. Some think of it as a policy. Others regard it as any public resource transferred abroad. Still others define it as only those resource transfers that are specifcally intended to help recipients. International assistance is not a policy; rather it is an instrument of policy. It has multiple purposes, only one of which is to benefit the recipients of that aid, and it has a specific set of characteristics. International assistance, or foreign aid, as defined here means

A voluntary transfer of public resources from one government to another government, international organization, or nongovernmental organization (including not-for-profit organizations working on specific issues, public interest organizations, churches and their associated organizations, universities, foundations, even private, for-profit business enterprises) to improve the lives and livelihoods in the country receiving the aid, among other goals.

This definition is close to the definition of official development assistance (ODA) offered by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) but differs in two ways. First, it defines impact more broadly by including activities intended primarily to address global issues such as HIV/AIDS and global climate change, democracy promotion, and support for economic and social transitions in former socialist countries. Second, our definition is more expansive in what it includes. The DAC defines ODA as those concessional resources transferred to poor countries. Transfers to countries on the World Bank’s list of “high income” countries (with per capita incomes above $9,200 in 2001) for three years or more are not considered official development assistance but rather official assistance (OA). Thus the DAC would not include aid to countries such as Israel, Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Romania in its definition of ODA. Because the DAC’s distinction between ODA and OA underestimates the full development assistance effort of the United States, this study includes both OA and ODA in its examination of U.S. international assistance. Funding for cultural exchanges, covert intelligence, export promotion, the purchase of military equipment, and training or peace-keeping missions will not be counted as international assistance.

### Foreign Assistance---= Quid Pro Quo

#### All schools of thought concur- foreign assistance includes a quid pro quo

Brainard, Brookings Global Economy and Development Program director, 07 [Lael, former deputy assistant to the president for international economic policy, Security by Other Mean, "A Unified Framework for U.S. Foreign Assistance," http://www3.brookings.edu/press/books/chapter\_1/securitybyothermeans.pdf]

Unified Framework for **U.S. Foreign Assistance**

Establishing a coherent conceptual framework requires bridging two professional communities engaged in aid policymaking and analysis that start with sharply contrasting frames of reference. National security profession- als and **political scientists tend to view foreign assistance as a** “soft power” **tool designed to achieve** diplomatic and **strategic ends**, **often through an implicit bargain with the recipient government**. In contrast, **development practitioners** and economic officials tend to **view foreign assistance as a resource flow for poverty alleviation** and development, implying that assistance should be allocated according to recipients’ policy environment and needs. **The development community also** often **favors a quid pro quo** but for very different ends: to leverage policies conducive to growth and poverty alleviation.

## Government

### Government Definition---General

#### Government 1.

**Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law**, **96**, Merriam-Webster, Inc., http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/government, last visited 8-7-07

Main Entry: gov·ern·ment

Function: noun

1 : the act or process of governing; specifically : authoritative direction or control

2 : the office, authority, or function of governing

3 : the continuous exercise of authority over and the performance of functions for a political unit : RULE

4 a : the organization, machinery, or agency through which a political unit exercises authority and performs functions and which is usually classified according to the distribution of power within it b : the complex of political institutions, laws, and customs through which the function of governing is carried out

5 : the body of persons that constitutes the governing authority of a political unit or organization: as a : the officials comprising the governing body of a political unit and constituting the organization as an active agency b cap : the executive branch of the U.S. federal government c : the prosecution in a criminal case in its capacity as agents of the political unit <the government failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt> —gov·ern·men·tal adjective —gov·ern·men·tal·ly adverb

#### Government 2.

The **American Heritage** Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, **06**, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/government, last visited 8-7-07

gov·ern·ment- n.

 1. The act or process of governing, especially the control and administration of public policy in a political unit.

 2. The office, function, or authority of a governing individual or body.

 3. Exercise of authority in a political unit; rule.

 4. The agency or apparatus through which a governing individual or body functions and exercises authority.

 5. A governing body or organization, as:

 1. The ruling political party or coalition of political parties in a parliamentary system.

 2. The cabinet in a parliamentary system.

 3. The persons who make up a governing body.

 6. A system or policy by which a political unit is governed.

 7. Administration or management of an organization, business, or institution.

 8. Political science.

 9. Grammar The influence of a word over the morphological inflection of another word in a phrase or sentence.

#### Government 3.

**Dictionary.com** Unabridged (v 1.1), **no date given**, Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary (06), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/goverment, last visited 8-7-07

gov·ern·ment

–noun

1. the political direction and control exercised over the actions of the members, citizens, or inhabitants of communities, societies, and states; direction of the affairs of a state, community, etc.; political administration: Government is necessary to the existence of civilized society.

2. the form or system of rule by which a state, community, etc., is governed: monarchical government; episcopal government.

3. the governing body of persons in a state, community, etc.; administration.

4. a branch or service of the supreme authority of a state or nation, taken as representing the whole: a dam built by the government.

5. (in some parliamentary systems, as that of the United Kingdom)

a. the particular group of persons forming the cabinet at any given time: The Prime Minister has formed a new government.

b. the parliament along with the cabinet: The government has fallen.

6. direction; control; management; rule: the government of one's conduct.

7. a district governed; province.

8. political science.

9. Grammar. the extablished usage that requires that one word in a sentence should cause another to be of a particular form: the government of the verb by its subject.

[Origin: 1350–1400; ME < OF governement. See govern, -ment]

## Offer

### Offer Definition---General

#### Offer 1.

**Dictionary.com** Unabridged (v 1.1), **no date given**, Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary (06), http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/offer, last visited 8-7-07

of·fer –verb (used with object)

1. to present for acceptance or rejection; proffer: He offered me a cigarette.

2. to propose or put forward for consideration: to offer a suggestion.

3. to propose or volunteer (to do something): She offered to accompany me.

4. to make a show of intention (to do something): We did not offer to go first.

5. to give, make, or promise: She offered no response.

6. to present solemnly as an act of worship or devotion, as to God, a deity or a saint; sacrifice.

7. to present for sale: He offered the painting to me at a reduced price.

8. to tender or bid as a price: to offer ten dollars for a radio.

9. to attempt or threaten to do, engage in, or inflict: to offer battle.

10. to put forth; exert: to offer resistance.

11. to present to sight or notice.

12. to introduce or present for exhibition or performance.

13. to render (homage, thanks, etc.).

14. to present or volunteer (oneself) to someone as a spouse.

#### Offer 2.

The **American Heritage** Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, **06**, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/offer, last visited 8-7-07

Offer- v. tr.

 1. To present for acceptance or rejection; proffer: offered me a drink.

 2.

 1. To put forward for consideration; propose: offer an opinion.

 2. To present in order to meet a need or satisfy a requirement: offered new statistics in order to facilitate the decision-making process.

 3. To make available; afford: The situation offers us the opportunity to learn more.

 4. To present for sale.

 5. To provide; furnish: a hotel that offers conference facilities.

 3.

 1. To make available; afford: The situation offers us the opportunity to learn more.

 2. To present for sale.

 3. To provide; furnish: a hotel that offers conference facilities.

 4. To propose as payment; bid.

 5. To present as an act of worship: offer up prayers.

 6. To exhibit readiness or desire (to do something); volunteer: offered to carry the packages.

 7. To put up; mount: partisans who offered strong resistance to the invaders.

 8. To threaten: offered to leave without them if they didn't hurry.

 9. To produce or introduce on the stage: The repertory group is offering two new plays this season.

## One or More of the Following Areas

### ‘Or’ = One or More

#### “Or” means any of options are fine, or more.

Scalia ’12 [Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner; 2012; Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States; American lawyer, lexicographer, and teacher; Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, “Conjunctive/Disjunctive Canon,” Ch. 12]

The conjunctions and and or are two of the elemental words in the English language. Under the conjunctive/disjunctive canon, and combines items while *or* creates alternatives. Competent users of the language rarely hesitate over their meaning. But a close look at the authoritative language of legal instruments—as well as the litigation that has arisen over them—shows that these little words can cause subtle interpretive problems. Although these conjunctions can appear in countless constructions, we have identified six types of sentences in which they most frequently appear in legal instruments.

#1: The Basic Requirement

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Conjunctive List | Disjunctive List |
| You must do A, B, and C. | You must do A, B, or C. |

With the conjunctive list, all three things are required—while with the disjunctive list, at least one of the three is required, but any one (or more) of the three satisfies the requirement. Hence in the well-known constitutional phrase cruel and unusual punishments,1 the and signals that cruelty or unusualness alone does not run afoul of the clause: The punishment must meet both standards to fall within the constitutional prohibition.2 The same point holds true for the phrase necessary and proper3 in Article I of the Constitution.

## Security Guarantee

### Security Guarantee Definition---Main

#### The term “security guarantees” is well-defined.

Maliuta ND [Maliuta, Yaroslav, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University Department Member, ND. "Legal Notion of the Terms "Security Assurances", "Security Guarantees" and "Reassurances" in International Security Law." *Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University*, Accessed: 4/25/2023. <https://www.academia.edu/16541504/Legal_Notion_of_the_Terms_Security_Assurances_Security_Guarantees_and_Reassurances_in_International_Security_Law>]

Security guarantees come from two main sources: 1) collective security organizations (NATO is the most greatest example) and 2) bilateral defence treaties (for example, mutual defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, The Treaty of mutual cooperation and security between Japan and the United States of America etc.)

Security guarantees are usually defined in the text of a treaty as a duty

“to come to one’s defense when it faces external aggression”.

 In comparison, security assurances are commonly contained in other international legal acts and are expressed in terms of a promise

“to provide cooperation and aid (or “assistance”) in case of aggression”.

 That means that security guarantees impose much stronger obligation, than assurances do, because they are inferred from the source of international law – an international treaty (subject to Art. 38 of IC Charter).

### Security Guarentee---More

#### Security guarantee means protecting an actor against adversaries.

Tandon, 22 (Aakansha, writer for RepublicWorld, “Russia-Ukraine war | Explained: What Are 'security Guarantees' That Ukrainian President Zelenskyy Is Demanding?”, <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/explained-what-are-security-guarantees-that-ukrainian-president-zelenskyy-is-demanding-articleshow.html>)

What is a security guarantee? Amid ongoing developments, President Zelenskyy is expecting to build some external security arrangements for his nation that had witnessed macabre devastation in the past month. While bowing down to Russia’s demand, Ukraine has agreed to keep itself ‘neutral,’ and moreover, erased the possibility of joining NATO in future. However, at the same time, it is expecting world leaders to act as its ‘security guarantors,’ which essentially means that in any war-like situation against Russia, the guarantor nations will be legally obligated to support and protect Kyiv. A security guarantee can be defined as an implicit or explicit promise given by an outside power to protect the adversaries during the period of agreement implementation. It contains either obligation to provide assistance or a promise to not use specific weapons or other destructive instruments.

### Security Guarantee---= Don’t Attack (Iran)

#### Committing not to use force against Iran is a security guarantee

Leverett, **former NSC Middle East affairs senior director**, 12-4-06 [Flynt, this guy’s more qualified than god: New America Foundation American Strategy Program Geopolitics of Energy director, MIT political science professor, former CIA senior analyst, and former Middle East expert on the Secretary of State's staff, "Dealing with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options toward Iran," <http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/leverett_diplomatic.pdf>]

As part of a strategic understanding addressing all issues of concern to the two parties, the United States would commit not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (This is the **essential substance** of a **U.S. security guarantee**.27)

### Security Guarantee---Includes Non-proliferation Initiatives

#### Non-proliferation initiatives are a security guarantee

Bülent Aras, **Fatih University IR Professor**, 2002, "The Caspian Region and Middle East Security," Mediterranean Quarterly 13.1 (2002) 86-108

The transfer of nuclear technology, the potential ecological crises related to the production of nuclear raw materials and energy, and the dangers inherent in existing stockpiles are among the main threats to a peaceful and stable Central Asia. Such considerations make the integration of the region into the global security system necessary, especially in the fields of nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. 23 Integration with global security initiatives and developments could provide a reliable **security guarantee** allowing stability and sustainable growth in the region.

### Security Guarantee---= Unconditional

#### Security guarantees are unconditional

Walter**, University of California** **political science professor,** 02[Barbara, San Diego Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, print.google.com, 64-5]

The second criterion was more stringent. **In order for an offer to be classified as a security guarantee, an outside state** or international organization **had to follow through** with its promise **and provide the expected services**.

#### Many types of security guarantees can be unconditional without hurting aff ground- like CBMs and DDR programs

Freeman, Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, November 03 [Jill, "Security Guarantees," <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/security_guarantees>]

**Security guarantees can range from** signed multi-party **treaties to public promises of support**. The nature of conflict resolution generally requires the assurance to come in a written form, and it is often included in peace accords. **The increasing use of CBMs and** demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (**DDR**) **programs** within peace agreements **highlights the need to address a variety of security concerns** to establish and maintain peace.

#### A security guarantee can be an unconditional guarantee of human rights protection

Freeman, Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, November 03 [Jill, "Security Guarantees," <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/security_guarantees>]

Also important within security guarantees are assurances for basic protection of human rights, promotion of economic reconstruction, and redistribution and protection during the transition. According to Doyle and Sambanis, international capacities can foster peace by serving as a substitute for limited local capacities and alleviating factors that feed deep hostility.[12]

### Security Guarantee---= Positive or Negative

#### Security guarantees can be positive or negative

Freeman, Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, November 03 [Jill, "Security Guarantees," <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/security_guarantees>]

Barbara Walter defines security guarantees as "an implicit or explicit promise given by an outside power to protect adversaries during the treaty implementation period."[1] **A security guarantee can be positive or negative in nature**, containing **either an obligation to provide assistance or a promise to not use** specific **weapons** or other destructive instruments.

### Security Guarantee---= QPQ

#### US security guarantees are given as quid pro quos.

Layne**, Texas A&M international studies professor,** 06[Christopher, Cato visiting fellow, *The* *Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 the Present*, 154]

First, **during the cold war, Japan** (and, during the 1970s, West Germany) **subsidized U.S.** budget and trade **deficits as a quid pro quo for U.S. security guarantees.**

## Security Cooperation

### Security Cooperation Definition---Main

#### “Security cooperation” currently only fits into 9 categories.

Defense ’21 [Office of the Secretary of Defense; May 2021; “Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 President’s Budget: Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding,” https://open.defense.gov/Portals/23/Documents/Security\_Cooperation/Budget\_Justification\_FY2022.pdf]

Title 10, Chapter 16, Section 301 of the U.S. code defines security cooperation as “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows:

• To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations

• To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation.

• To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests.

The Department has made significant reforms to align strategic guidance with resource allocation; establish an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) program; and create a comprehensive, common picture of the Department’s budget for security cooperation activities as well as related programs that engage foreign partners. This budget display is representative of the Department’s progress to date in achieving security cooperation reform and realizing congressional intent in Title 10, Chapter 16 security cooperation.

Section 381(a) of Title 10, U.S. Code, requires a consolidated budget of security cooperation programs and activities be included annually along with the President’s Budget request to Congress. The consolidated budget display is intended to enhance planning and oversight of security cooperation programs and related activities across the DoD. This fourth annual budget display demonstrates how DoD plans, programs, and budgets for programs and activities to align with the Department’s strategic objectives.

This budget display includes the $6.5 billion requested by the Department for FY 2022 to conduct security cooperation programs and activities. It focuses primarily on the funding requested for programs and activities that will be executed under the authorities in Chapter 16 of Title 10, U.S. Code. It also includes funding requests for non-Chapter 16 programs and activities that include some elements or activities that are consistent with the security cooperation definition, including the Coalition Support Funds, the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and the CounterIslamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). This display excludes classified programs, such as programs authorized under Section 127e of Title 10, U.S. Code, “support of special operations to combat terrorism.” The budget display also excludes Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug activities authorized under Section 284(c) of Title 10, U.S. Code, “Support for counterdrug activities and activities to counter transnational organized crime.”

In identifying the specific funds allocated to security cooperation, the Department focused on costs that could be directly tied to security cooperation or similar activities. Many DoD activities, especially in the Military Services, could be viewed as security cooperation. However, for the purposes of this display, the Department focused on the situations where a security cooperation program is expected to incur an additional cost above and beyond what the Department would already be doing. For example, if U.S. forces are planning to conduct a training event and two observers from a partner nation are expected to attend, the Department would not reflect the costs of that exercise in this budget display. However, if DoD paid for the travel, lodging and subsistence of those observers to support attendance, then those costs would be captured in this display.

Changes from FY 2021 Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding book include:

• Realigned the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) and Institute for Security Governance (ISG) from Category 4, Capacity Building, to Category 6, Management, Infrastructure and Workforce development to better align these Program / Activities with the category objectives.

• Realigned Border Security from Category 4, Capacity Building, to Category 3, Support to Operations, to better align with this Program / Activity with the category objectives.

• Added the Regional Defense Fellowship Program (RDFP) to Category 5, Educational and Training Activities. Consistent with the FY 2021 defense appropriations bill, RDFP has been realigned as a standalone program.

• Created Category 9, Cooperative Threat Reduction, and realigned the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program from Category 4, Capacity Building, to the new category to reflect the program’s distinct authorities and mission.

Categories of Security Cooperation Programs and Activities

This budget display groups security cooperation programs and related activities and the respective authorities through which they are executed into nine (9) categories. Categories 1-5 mirror the subchapters in Chapter 16 of Title 10. The budget display also includes Categories 6-9 as follows: requests that fund the reforms to management and oversight inside the Department (Category 6), humanitarian and assistance activities (Category 7), and partner security forces funds for counterterrorism activities and combating insurgencies (Category 8), and cooperative threat reduction efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Category 9).

The nine security cooperation and related activities categories of this display are summarized below:

Category 1: Military to Military Engagements – Security cooperation programs and activities related to the interaction between U.S. military personnel and the national security forces of friendly foreign countries, including the exchange of military personnel, payment of incremental expenses, and bilateral and regional cooperation programs.

Category 2: Training with Foreign Forces – Security cooperation programs and activities related to training with military and non-military security forces of friendly foreign countries, as well as the payment of related training and exercise support.

Category 3: Support to Operations – Security cooperation programs and activities that provide logistic support, supplies, services, specialized training, loan of equipment, and reimbursements to support the conduct of operations in which the U.S. military may or may not be directly participating.

Category 4: Capacity Building – Security cooperation programs and activities that build the capacity of a friendly foreign country’s security forces through the provision of defense articles and services, including institutional capacity building efforts with international partners.

Category 5: Educational and Training Activities – Security cooperation programs and activities related to the participation of foreign personnel in DoD-sponsored education and training programs, including the Regional Centers for Security Studies.

Category 6: Management, Infrastructure, and Workforce Development – Activities that encompass the administration, management, and oversight of security cooperation programs, to include personnel, information technology, facilities, and costs associated with ensuring a qualified security cooperation workforce, such as the establishment of a certification program.

Category 7: Humanitarian Assistance Activities – Security cooperation programs and activities associated with humanitarian and/or civic assistance for friendly foreign countries.

Category 8: Partner Security Forces Funds – Security cooperation programs and activities associated with the professionalization, cultivation, and sustainment of partner security forces in Afghanistan to counter local insurgency and transnational terror organizations, as well as in Iraq, and Syria with a focus on preventing the reemergence of ISIS.

Category 9: Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities – Title 50 activities focused on working with partner civilian and military departments to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and WMD-related materials to U.S. national interests.

### Security Cooperation Definition---Other

#### Security coop entails transferring defense articles, mil-to-mil exercises, military education, and building partner capacity. Both DOD-implemented Title 22 and DOD-administered Title 10 programs.

Arabia ’21 [Christina; May 17; CRS Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade; Congressional Research Service, “Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation,” https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11677.pdf]

Security Cooperation (SC) Overview

The Department of Defense (DOD) uses the term security cooperation (SC) to refer broadly to DOD interactions with foreign security establishments. SC activities include

• the transfer of defense articles and services;

• military-to-military exercises;

• military education, training, and advising; and

• capacity building of partner security forces.

SC programs are intended to encourage and enable partner nations (PNs) to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. They are considered a key tool for achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. These activities are executed through both DOD-administered SC programs (authorized under Title 10, U.S.C.) and DOD-implemented State Department (DOS) security assistance (SA) programs (authorized under Title 22, U.S.C). Beyond grant-based programs, SC encompasses the Foreign Military Sales program and enables U.S. and PN collaboration on defense articles. The following sections focus on DOD “Title 10” activities.

SC: Policy and Objectives

SC activities aim to achieve particular objectives in support of U.S. national security and defense strategies. Specifically, SC may build defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests, enhance military capabilities of U.S. allies and partners, and provide the United States with access to PNs. Under the overarching goal of furthering U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, SC emphasizes partnerships, aiming to be mutually beneficial for the United States and its partners. SC activities aim to develop and strengthen a PN’s ability to provide internal security, contribute to regional security efforts, combat shared threats, and increase military interoperability with the United States.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) signaled the Trump Administration’s intention to shift SC activities from nearly two decades of prioritizing counterterrorism toward “great power competition” (GPC) with Russia and China. The shift raised questions as to how SC should be realigned to meet this objective and what the implications could be for scaling down counterterrorism-focused SC activities in Africa and the Middle East, especially as Russia and China increase their influence. Some DOD officials and defense analysts have suggested that rather than a shift, counterterrorism, as well as irregular warfare, should remain priorities within GPC. The Biden Administration has yet to release a new NDS; however, its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance broadly identifies authoritarianism and strategic competition as priority threats that require coordination and cooperation with allies and partners.

SC: Roles and Responsibilities

Many SC activities require DOD to coordinate with multiple DOD components and other federal departments, primarily DOS. Some DOD SC activities require varying levels of coordination with DOS. Within DOD, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) exercises overall direction, authority, and control over SC matters.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) represents the interests of the Secretary of Defense and USD(P) in SC matters and is tasked with directing, administering, and executing many SC programs, developing SC policy, and providing DOD-wide SC guidance. DSCA is also DOD’s main interlocutor between the PNs, implementing agencies, and the defense industry. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) oversees and approves some SC training activities that are managed by DSCA. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) coordinates those SC activities executed by special operations forces (SOF). DOS leads U.S. foreign aid and has final say on SA. DOS’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) is the principal link to DOD and ensures that SA is integrated with other U.S. policies and activities at the country, regional, and global levels. PM also determines PN eligibility, appropriate SA programs, and which defense articles and equipment are permitted for transfer.





Title 10 SC Reforms from the FY2017 NDAA

The post-9/11 period saw the rapid and piecemeal expansion of DOD SC activities, mainly as temporary authorities that required annual renewal in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328) consolidated and codified existing Title 10 SC authorities into 10 U.S.C. §§301-386. Other provisions aimed to make improvements to the SC programs and themselves, as well as improvements in the management and oversight of those programs. Key reforms from the FY2017 NDAA included requirements for the following:

• A consolidated DOD budget request for Title 10 SC programs and activities (10 U.S.C. §381); the first was released for FY2019.

• Harmonized congressional notification requirements for most DOD train and equip programs (10 U.S.C. §333).

• Institutional capacity building programs to strengthen partner defense institutions (10 U.S.C. §332).

• A DOD SC Workforce Development Program to manage a professional workforce in support of SC programs and activities (10 U.S.C. §384).

• A program of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) to be informed and supported by strategic evaluations on initial PN assessments, monitoring of implementation, and the efficiency and effectiveness of SC programs and activities (10 U.S.C. §383).

### Security Cooperation Definition---Requires DoD

#### “Security cooperation” requires the DOD.

Kerr 18 [Alexandra Kerr is a Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) in the Center for Complex Operations (CCO). In addition to her research on U.S. defense strategy, security cooperation, and the evolution of security threats in the 21st Century, she leads CCO’s Defense Institution Building initiative. Prior to joining NDU, Alexandra was Assistant Director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Prior to joining CFR, Alexandra held a postgraduate fellowship in conflict mediation at the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva. During her studies she held several research positions, including at the University of Oxford, the University of Saint Andrews, the political risk division of Lloyds of London, and the UN World Food Program in Rome. She holds undergraduate and Master’s degrees in International Relations from the University of Saint Andrews in Scotland, and a Master’s degree in International Conflict from the Department of War Studies in King’s College London. “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” Connections, 17.3]

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance). DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.[21] After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.[22] Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

#### DOD agrees.

Epstein and Rosen 18 (Susan Epstein is a specialist in foreign policy; Liana Rosen is a specialist in international crime and narcotics) “U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends,” CRS Report, 2-1-18, <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45091.html>

DOD uses the term security cooperation to refer to activities authorized by provisions in Title 10 and National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs). The FY2017 NDAA defines security cooperation as "any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the Department of Defense with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: To build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. To provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation. To build relationships that promote specific United States security interests."11 Security assistance is also used as a generic term used throughout the U.S. government to describe assistance provided to foreign military and security forces, regardless of the agency providing that assistance. The annual State Department congressional budget justification (CBJ) identifies six budget accounts under the heading "International Security Assistance," which are commonly referred to as the State Department's security assistance portfolio. DOD also uses the term security assistance to refer specifically to a group of State Department programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and Arms Export Control Act (AECA), funded by State Department appropriations and managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), an agency under the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD)(P).

#### “Security cooperation” is classified as a formal DOD function for 50 years

DOD ’21 [US Department of Defense. “DOD Recognizes 50 Years of Security Cooperation.” 9-3-21. DOA: 1-10-22. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2764407/dod-recognizes-50-years-of-security-cooperation/> //shree]

There have been relations between America's military and the militaries of other nations since the United States first became a country. However, it wasn't until 1971 that the Defense Department created the Defense Security Assistance Agency — later renamed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency — to make security cooperation a formal function of the Defense Department.

Now a half century later, as DSCA turns 50 years old, it is still focusing on its original mission to build enduring partnerships between U.S. and partner nation militaries, making both participants stronger.

There have been many changes over the past five decades, but the value of Security Cooperation, or SC, to achieve our strategic goals has endured, according to DSCA Director Heidi Grant, the first permanent SES civilian to lead the agency. "Senior leaders across the U.S. government turn to the SC enterprise for solutions to help solve the most pressing U.S. defense and foreign policy challenges. In this era of renewed strategic competition, DSCA must play a leading role, guiding the SC enterprise into a new age of transformation and innovation," she added.

Security cooperation involves all the DOD interactions, programs and activities carried out with foreign security forces and their institutions. This includes exercises, training, armaments cooperation, information sharing, collaboration, foreign military sales, ministry advising and humanitarian assistance.

#### Even the DOS thinks “security cooperation” must be DOD-led

Scott 17 [Vice Admiral for the US Navy. Publication prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Security Cooperation.” Joint Publication 3-20. 5-23-17. DOA: 1-10-22. <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf> //shree]

Security Cooperation in Strategic Context

Security cooperation (SC) provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives.

Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration.

SC Purposes

SC helps develop partnerships that encourage and enable PNs to act in support of aligned US strategic objectives. SC activities often complement other United States Government (USG) foreign assistance to provide stability, help mitigate drivers of conflict, and assure key partners and allies. Additionally, SC supports US military campaign and contingency plans with necessary access, critical infrastructure, and PN support and enables the achievement of strategic objectives, such as deterring adversaries, preventing conflict, and enhancing the stability and security of PNs.

SC and the Instruments of National Power

SC programs and activities are normally integrated and synchronized with the other instruments of national power depending upon how other interagency partners implement the national strategy (e.g., national security strategy) to achieve strategic objectives.

Security Sector Assistance and United States Foreign and Defense Policies

In accordance with foreign policy direction established by the Department of State (DOS), DOD leads on defense policy issues that involve national security interests with military or defense equities. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-23, Security Sector Assistance, details the USG effort to implement security sector assistance (SSA) more efficiently, including the strategy to build security relationships, partner capacity, and capabilities to achieve national security objectives. PPD-23 establishes the integrated country strategy (ICS) as the core organizing document for USG foreign assistance activities supporting a particular PN. ICSs link goals for the PN to US national security priorities, SSA objectives, and if appropriate, to regional security objectives.

#### Congress defines SC as DOD specific.

Quinn ’19 [Major Jason A. Quinn; 2019; Judge Advocate in the United States Army; the Military Law Review, “Other Security Forces Too: Traditional Combatant Commander Activities Between U.S. Special Operations Forces and Foreign Non-Military Forces,” vol. 227]

Under this definition, “security sector assistance” includes the relevant policies, programs, or activities of any executive agency. Complicating matters, though, Congress has considered a proposed definition for “security sector assistance” that, in contrast to the presidential policy definition,130 encompasses DoS programs, but not DoD or other executive agency programs.131 In addition, Congress has defined “security cooperation” as DoD specific,132 but it has not defined “security assistance.”

The DoD adheres to the presidential policy definition and further defines “security cooperation” as all its relationship building and foreign partner development activities, including “security assistance,” which the DoD defines as a subset of security cooperation that is funded and authorized by the DoS and administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.133 The DoS, on the other hand, uses the term “security assistance” in a manner that contradicts the DoD's definition, employing it to describe any DoS or DoD assistance to foreign military or other security forces.134

### Security Cooperation Definition---Doesn’t Require DoD

#### “Security cooperation” includes the DOS.

Simontis 13 [MAJ Nicholas R. U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589722.pdf>]

How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.

The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.

#### “Security cooperation” could use any of the USFG.

Zaccor ’5 [Albert; August; Colonel in the US Army and Atlantic Council Senior Fellow; the Atlantic Council of the United States, “Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy,” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005\_08\_Security\_Cooperation\_and\_Non-State\_Threats.pdf]

It is an oft-repeated mantra that in order to defeat transnational terrorism, and by extension other related non-state threats, the United States must apply all the elements of national power, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.34 The OSD SCG directs that DOD Security Cooperation “will be integrated with other elements of national power…in order to achieve national security, defense, and foreign policy objectives.”35 This formulation, while helpful, obscures two key facts. First, Security Cooperation includes activities that by their very nature involve the simultaneous application of more than one element of national power. Security Cooperation at a minimum requires the combination of diplomatic relations, military assistance, military-to-military contacts, and public diplomacy. In other words, Security Cooperation is itself an application of at least three of the classic elements of national power.36 Second, DOD is not the only entity in the USG that interacts with foreign governments to achieve the stated objectives: relationships, capabilities, information and intelligence, and access. The Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and to a lesser extent, other departments and agencies, conduct activities aimed at the accomplishment of these objectives, broadly understood. There is, however, no common USG, or interagency, definition or concept of Security Cooperation.37 We will return to this issue in the final section of this paper. For the purposes of the present discussion, this paper offers the following working definition of Security Cooperation:

Footnote 37.

37 Even within DOD there are programs, notably directed against WMD proliferation, that are not covered under the rubric of Security Cooperation. See the discussion of the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative, below.

Footnote 37 ends. The article continues.

Security Cooperation refers to all USG assistance provided to foreign law enforcement, security, and defense establishments in support of national defense, security, and foreign policy objectives.38

Footnote 38.

38 The application of the Security Cooperation paradigm to the entire USG requires a precise definition of security. Defined too broadly, Security Cooperation would simply be a surrogate for foreign policy. Limiting the objectives to specific enumerated defense and security objectives and assistance to foreign establishments playing a role in national security or defense is necessary to circumscribe the issue adequately.

Footnote 38 ends. The article continues.

This expanded definition of Security Cooperation will help us to see how the USG may leverage its programs and activities to fight terrorism and related non-state threats.

The role of Security Cooperation in countering non-state threats is clearly reflected in U.S. strategy. The NSS states that the U.S. will cooperate with nations to counter terrorism and WMD proliferation, assisting those that are willing but unable, and persuading those that are able but not willing.39 The National Military Strategy (NMS) develops the concept of forward defense, or “Countering Threats Close to Their Source.”40 This is the recognition that the United States’ first line of defense is abroad, and that it is necessary to “patrol strategic approaches” and extend U.S. defensive capabilities beyond our borders to create an active “defense in depth.”41 In this context, Security Cooperation is best understood as a set of tools that can shape the strategic battlespace by creating the conditions necessary to accomplish U.S. security and defense objectives.42 As the NMS’s focus on forward defense indicates, these activities are by their nature anticipatory, preparatory, and defensive.43 They are best used as part of a long-term comprehensive strategy to put in place the relationships, capabilities, information and intelligence, and access to facilitate future offensive and defensive actions to counter non-state, as well as more traditional, threats.

Security Cooperation Goals

Before turning to a detailed discussion of the contribution that Security Cooperation can make to fighting non-state threats, let’s briefly examine the four main goals of security cooperation in that context.

Relationships

Fighting strategic criminals will require the cooperation of a variety of governments, including those outside our established alliance relationships. We are not capable of compelling the kind of “willing and competent cooperation” that we need.44 Security cooperation provides powerful tools to persuade foreign governments to work with the U.S. in support of common objectives. Senior U.S. commanders, notably current and former Geographic Combatant Commanders, regularly stress the critical contribution that Security Cooperation activities make to building the kinds of relationships with foreign leaders that set the stage for successful U.S. operations. The example most often cited is the role that US Central Command (CENTCOM) Security Cooperation activities played in persuading Central Asian leaders, notably in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan by granting access to bases and overflight rights.45 In addition to granting access, good relationships aid in building a common threat perception, which is a necessary precondition for any substantial cooperation. Relationships with foreign defense leaders can also provide the U.S. with influence over the policy direction of key partner states, including efforts at defense reform and the shape of force structure changes. Finally, good relationships make it more likely that foreign governments will share information with the U.S., including, in the extreme case, early warning of potential attack.46

Intelligence and Information Sharing

Relationships built on trust and mutual interests are also necessary to obtain cooperation from foreign governments in the area of Intelligence and Information. It is useful to separate the distinct, but related, issues of Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence Security Cooperation. Intelligence Sharing is a critical element in the fight against non-state threats, or strategic crime. By its nature, however, such sharing involves sensitive sources, methods and arrangements, normally in the context of a bilateral relationship. Its sensitivity requires delicate handling in highly restrictive channels. Intelligence sharing, in practice, falls outside the scope of Security Cooperation. Intelligence Security Cooperation, on the other hand, involves the development of interoperable and cooperative intelligence systems and processes designed to enhance the ability of one partner to work with one or several other partners. The core activities in Intelligence Security Cooperation are analytical and expertise exchanges, familiarization, training, and traditional Security Assistance. Both Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence Security Cooperation are mutually supporting. It is clear that the quality and reliability of intelligence we get from our partners depends on the competence, capability, professionalism, and trustworthiness of their national intelligence services and how compatible their operations are with ours. Intelligence Security Cooperation provides the tools to develop long-range relationships with foreign partners to improve both the quality of the intelligence we share and our ability to work together.

Access

The National Defense Strategy stresses the requirement to secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action for U.S. forces.47 This includes obtaining permanent and deployment basing and overflight. Security Cooperation directly supports access by developing relationships with foreign partners based on trust and mutual interests. Senior officer and other official visits contribute to this by demonstrating U.S. commitment to a defense relationship and staying abreast of host nation priorities, concerns, and requirements. Some Security Cooperation activities directly support access by improving host nation infrastructure, notably airbases, ports, and troop facilities, to support U.S. forces during operational and training deployments. Other activities improve host nation capabilities through training, equipping, and exercises. The NMS recognizes that access has an informational dimension that goes beyond the purely physical access to a partner’s territory, facilities or airspace:

“…theater security activities with multinational partners provide access to information and intelligence critical to anticipating and understanding new threats.”48

This insight is important in determining the contribution Security Cooperation can make to countering non-state threats. While DOD and the military services remain understandably focused on the physical dimension of access and its support to current and future operations, the fight against strategic criminals requires that we pay greater attention to securing strategic access to information and information networks controlled by our partners, allies, and adversaries. In some cases “virtual access” to databases, data flows, raw and finished intelligence, sensor data, and other forms of information may be more critical to the success of military operations than the ability to access an airfield, port or overflight corridor. Security Cooperation tools can also support the attainment of this non-traditional form of access.

#### The DOD definition is bad.

Lenze ’17 [Major Anthony Lenze; 2017; Judge Advocate in the United States Army; Military Law Review, “Traditional Combatant Commander Activities: Acknowledging and Analyzing Combatant Commanders' Authority to Interact with Foreign Militaries,” vol. 225]

Security cooperation is now a term that encompasses “any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the [DoD] with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a [strategic] purpose ... [.]”85 The DoD assigns such strategic importance to security cooperation that, with the help of Congress, it created the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to direct and guide the execution of all DoD security cooperation programs.86 The DSCA helps administer security cooperation, now a multi-billion dollar industry within the annual Defense appropriation.87 With all the money and strategic brainpower pouring into security cooperation, newcomers to the field may presume fully-vetted, standardized terms and definitions. However, this could not be further \*656 from reality.

Members of the DoD frequently mischaracterize security cooperation or outright disagree with respect to its doctrinal definition.88 For example, the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) used the term security cooperation to include rebuilding damaged infrastructure and establishing conditions necessary to end military operations in Afghanistan.89 With the exception of combat operations, it would seem that almost any military action could fit under the 2010 NSS's version of security cooperation.90 Nevertheless, if security cooperation is in fact an evolving term in the DoD, making sense of the authorities under which the military executes security cooperation events is even more troublesome.91 This is especially true when authorities are based upon a set of specific terms. Hence, with doctrine lagging behind and accompanied by undefined terminology, no authority in the realm of security cooperation is more ambiguous than the authority for military-to-military contacts.92 With ambiguity surrounding military-to-military contacts, planners and lawyers should defer to commanders to decide the best way to employ these strategic interaction events. The fate of 10 U.S.C. §168 and its ultimate repeal is illustrative of this point.

#### Even the DOD isn’t clear!

Zaccor ’5 [Albert; August; Colonel in the US Army and Atlantic Council Senior Fellow; the Atlantic Council of the United States, “Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy,” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/46290/2005\_08\_Security\_Cooperation\_and\_Non-State\_Threats.pdf]

Lack of Doctrine

Part III of this paper offered a definition of Security Cooperation that could be common to the entire USG, not just the Department of Defense. The USG interagency has no such common definition because it lacks a common conceptual understanding of how to translate higher level strategic guidance into specific programs designed to accomplish strategic objectives.

The Department of Defense, despite its size, its diversity, and the scope of its Security Cooperation activities, has such a common understanding. DOD’s process is not without its flaws.113 During the late 1990s and the early 21st century, however, the department has successfully established a rational set of procedures for translating the strategic guidance in the National Security, Military, and, now, Defense Strategies, into specific programs executed by the military commands, services, and defense agencies.114 This process promotes discipline by forcing subordinate organizations to demonstrate that their Security Cooperation activities directly support specific objectives in the higher-level strategies. Efforts are under way to discipline the process further by establishing an assessment mechanism to provide feedback on the effectiveness of programs and activities.115 One reason for the success of the DOD program is OSD’s publication of periodic Security Cooperation Guidance. This document, in addition to providing authority for subordinate organizations’ Security Cooperation activities (see more below), serves the purpose of an informal doctrine, stipulating not only the “what,” but the “how” and the “why” of Security Cooperation.116

Footnote 113.

113 For example, there are still failures to coordinate and inadequate integration among DOD managed programs. Amy Chou, OSD Strategy Office, interview by the author, 14 Jan 05.

Footnote 113 ends. The article continues.

In order for the USG interagency to plan and execute Security Cooperation programs and activities in an integrated and synergistic manner, a doctrine, or common conceptual framework, for Security Cooperation is necessary. Such a doctrine would have to define what Security Cooperation is, and, what it is not.117 It would have to define precisely which departmental and agency programs qualify as Security Cooperation and outline a procedure for combined interagency planning, programming, and execution. Armed with such a common conceptual framework, executive branch officials and program managers will be better equipped to engage in integrated planning and program execution. True success in this effort, however, will depend on the resolution of the other problems of authority, funding, and process and organization.

Footnote 117.

117 As has been suggested here, activities to improve foreign partners’ security capabilities conducted by any department or agency would qualify as Security Cooperation. In contrast, general foreign development assistance, although related to security and part of broader U.S. foreign policy, would probably not. Even within DOD, this is not totally clear. Officials in OSD’s Counter-proliferation Policy office refused to admit that activities intended to improve the maritime security capabilities of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in support of counter-proliferation would be included under the definition of Security Cooperation and declined to integrate their program formally with other DOD Security Cooperation efforts.

Footnote 117 ends. The article continues.

Unclear Authority

The USG lacks a clear authoritative basis for guidance of Security Cooperation programs and activities. This is rooted in the lack of overall strategic planning in the USG and the ad hoc and department-specific nature of the planning that does occur. 118 There is no equivalent of the OSD Security Cooperation Guidance for the interagency to guide the programmatic activities of executive branch departments and agencies. The strategy documents, such as the NSS or National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, provide overall strategic intent, goals, and objectives, and suggest broad means for accomplishing them. The strategies successfully link the various non-state threats by cross-referencing them and demonstrating the interconnected nature of terrorism, WMD proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and transnational organized crime. This high-level strategic guidance does not result in integrated strategies, however, because the goals and objectives are too broad to drive implementation at the program level and because there is no requirement for departments and agencies to develop integrated plans.

#### Security cooperation is agent agnostic in practice – even includes the National Guard Bureau

Jansen 10 [Colonel John Jansen. United States Army National Guard. This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. NATIONAL GUARD STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA520003.pdf>] NG = National Guard

Civil Security Cooperation events focus on contacts and activities facilitated by the broad-spectrum civil cooperation (education, legal, medical, science, economy) between partner nations.38 The role of the NG is to facilitate and enable the execution of these events, and it is able to do so because its access to the entire social fabric of the U.S. Guidance for these events comes from the Ambassadors’ MSPs and do not require GCC approval. Unlike mil-to-mil and mil-to-civ events, which are authorized by Title 10 USC, these events are executed under Title 22 USC authority. Resources needed to run this pillar of the program come from a variety of sources to include, but not limited to, government agencies, federal and state grants, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, private sector organizations, and other initiatives. Civil Security Cooperation events are the means to achieving the fourth goal of the program and are the most difficult to resource.

## Security Assurances

### Security Assurances Definition---General

#### Security assurances are defined clearly.

Knopf 12 [Knopf W, Jeffrey, a professor and program chair of nonproliferation and terrorism studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and a senior research associate with the institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2012. "Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation." *Stanford University Press*, Accessed: 4/25/2023. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvqsdm64>]

Assurances are promises. They involve declarations or signals meant to convey a commitment to take or refrain from taking certain actions in the future. Specifically, assurances can be defined as attempts by one state or set of states to convince another state or set of states that the senders either will not cause or will not allow the recipients' security to be harmed.

## Substantially Increase

### Substantially Increase---Considerably-

#### “Substantially increase” means make considerably greater.

Viviano ’13 [David; July 29; Justice for the Supreme Court of Michigan; Lexis, “People v. Hardy,” 494 Mich. 430]

The phrase begins with the words "conduct designed." HN8 "Designed" means "to intend for a definite purpose."25 Thus, the word "designed" requires courts to evaluate the intent motivating the defendant's conduct.26 Next, we come to the words "substantially increase." "Substantial" means "of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, etc."27 To "increase" means "to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment."28 Applying these definitions to the relevant text, we conclude that HN9 it is proper to assess points under OV 7 for conduct that was intended to make a victim's fear or anxiety greater by a considerable amount.29

#### “Substantially increase” means making considerably greater.

Beckering ’19 [Jane N; March 28; Court of Appeals Judge in the State of Michigan; Westlaw, “People v. Guthrie,” No. 341269, 2019 WL 1411111]

The Hardy Court addressed what is required to establish that a defendant engaged in conduct “designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense,” reasoning as follows:

The phrase begins with the words “conduct designed.” “Designed” means “to intend for a definite purpose.” Thus, the word “designed” requires courts to evaluate the intent motivating the defendant's conduct. Next, we come to the words “substantially increase.” “Substantial” means “of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, etc.” To “increase” means “to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment.” Applying these definitions to the relevant text, we conclude that it is proper to assess points under OV 7 for conduct that was intended to make a victim's fear or anxiety greater by a considerable amount. [Hardy, 494 Mich. at 440-441, 835 N.W.2d 340.]

# Aff

## General

### General---Civil Wars

#### US engagement is necessary to deal with ongoing internal conflicts in the Middle East.

Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, 21 – [Brian Katulis is Senior Fellow in National Security and international Policy for the Center for American Progress, Peter Juul is senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress, 12-16-2021 "Strategic Reengagement in the Middle East," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/strategic-reengagement-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

**Strategic reengagement** in the Middle East requires renewed **U.S. diplomatic efforts** to end destructive internal conflicts in **Syria**, **Yemen**, and **Libya**. Active U.S. diplomacy will prove critical toward untangling and de-escalating these civil wars while simultaneously addressing **persistent threats** from terrorist networks with a **global reach**. Until civil wars in the region subside significantly, the Middle East will not be able to reach its full potential, and security threats will persist and thrive amid the chaos and disorder that this bloodshed generates.

The United States should suffer no illusions about how difficult it will be to de-escalate conflicts as disparate and long-lasting as those in Syria, Yemen, and Libya.

**Syria**

The continued presence of American forces in northeast Syria gives the United States significant diplomatic influence in the country. The United States should use its remaining leverage as best it can to help bring about a negotiated political settlement to Syria’s civil war. If this proves unrealistic, the United States should attempt to forge a durable de-escalation agreement that stabilizes existing areas of international influence in the country, includes major players such as Russia and Turkey, and puts an end to major fighting for the foreseeable future.38 America should also use its influence to keep cross-border humanitarian corridors beyond the control of the Assad regime open in the face of Russian attempts to use them to force recognition of the regime.39

In addition, the United States should continue to pursue accountability for the Assad regime through policy vehicles such as the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.40 These sanctions provide an important diplomatic tool that the United States can use to discourage other nations from normalizing relations with Assad. That task may prove easier with traditional American allies in Europe than with security partners in the Middle East, but the sanctions approach should still be attempted, and America’s Middle East partners should be warned against active participation in efforts to rehabilitate the Assad regime. Waivers for U.S. sanctions against the Assad regime remain a powerful tool that should be wielded to discourage these partners from taking normalization too far. The U.S. government should be stingy with these waivers and place strict conditions on those it does grant to its regional partners.

**Yemen**

Multiple internal disputes and regional military interventions in Yemen make the country’s security challenges severe and exceptionally difficult to resolve. In the short term, the United States should focus on bringing major fighting between the Iranian-backed Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition to an end through rigorous diplomacy that takes military realities into full account. Over the long run, American diplomacy must move beyond the immediate Saudi-Houthi hostilities and help Yemenis devise new modes and methods of political decentralization that can help keep divisions between the country’s various political factions from erupting into renewed violence. Doing so will require a broader base of persistent diplomatic engagement with factions beyond the Houthis and the internationally recognized Hadi government. As a RAND Corp. study succinctly put it, “[A] peace agreement negotiated among elites is not enough to ensure an enduring peace in Yemen.”41

In engaging with this broader range of Yemenis, it will prove vital to work with longtime American regional partners such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman—all of whom have influence and relationships with a wide range of Yemen’s factions, including the Houthis. These countries—along with other possible international partners such as the United Kingdom—could constitute a new contact group focused on the long-term questions of political decentralization and post-conflict reconstruction in Yemen. The Biden administration’s move to appoint a special envoy for Yemen and dispatch national security adviser Jake Sullivan to Saudi Arabia to discuss the conflict represent important steps in this direction.42

Bringing stability—if not peace—to Yemen will require patient and persistent U.S. diplomatic engagement over a long time frame, as well as humility about America’s ability to achieve rapid progress.

**Libya**

In contrast to Syria and Yemen, Libya appears on a more stable path to conflict resolution. In October 2020, U.N.-brokered negotiations produced a cease-fire agreement between Libya’s two main factions: the Turkish- and Qatari-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli and the Emirati-, Egyptian-, and Russian-supported faction led by former Libyan military general Khalifa Haftar in the country’s east.43 The United States should focus its diplomacy on maintaining and implementing the cease-fire deal brokered by the United Nations. Perhaps the most important role the United States can play in making the cease-fire deal work is by helping to rein in the mutually destructive interventions embarked upon by allies and partners such as the UAE and Turkey.44 Patient, quiet diplomacy has helped maintain a relative sense of calm in Libya this year, and the country is poised to hold national elections in late December 2021.

The United States should suffer no illusions about how difficult it will be to de-escalate conflicts as disparate and long-lasting as those in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. American diplomacy will not necessarily achieve results quickly or easily and must therefore remain persistent and aware of the ebb and flow of the fighting it hopes to end. Even when agreements to end civil wars are reached, implementation will prove crucial—**requiring U.S. engagement** in the region well beyond the signing of peace deals.

### General---Democracy Promotion

#### Increased US engagement is necessary to promote democracy.

Steven Heydemann, 23 – [Steven Heydemann is a nonresident senior fellow in the [Center for Middle East Policy](https://www.brookings.edu/legacy/4DC53AD8-689C-4664-BB83-27886C4DB20F) and the Janet Wright Ketcham ’53 Chair of Middle East Studies at Smith College, "Around the halls: Brookings experts on Biden’s performance in the Middle East," Brookings, 2-3-2023, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/02/03/around-the-halls-brookings-experts-on-bidens-performance-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

Steven Heydemann on **prioritizing support for democracy** in the region.

President Biden took office two years ago promising to **restore America’s role** as an advocate of **democratic change** around the world, including in the Middle East. **Two years** in, his commitments have led to **no meaningful change** in U.S. policy. Biden’s “fist-bump” visit to Saudi Arabia in July was a diplomatic fiasco that undermined his efforts to restore a democracy agenda. Improvement will require **more** than a change of tone.

Biden’s democracy agenda is at odds with the core tenets of his Middle East policy. In the wake of **failed U.S. interventions** in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, and the instability and turmoil that followed the Arab uprisings, Biden has embraced a “**less-is-more**” approach to the Middle East, rejecting the hubris of grand schemes and refusing to overcommit and under-deliver. His policy-lite approach emphasizes stability over managed change. It has **narrowed** the focus of U.S. engagement in Iraq and Syria to modest counterterrorism initiatives with far less emphasis on the causes of terrorism. For the region’s **autocrats**, deft interpreters of Biden’s wink-and-a-nod references to democracy who embrace counterterrorism to justify repressive rule, this approach is a **welcome assurance** that they have a **free hand** to govern as they please. For this to change does not require a return to failed schemes to remake the Middle East. But it will require that Biden act **more forcefully** to hold autocrats **accountable** for their conduct.

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## Afghanistan

### General

#### US constructive engagement with Afghanistan is key to solve the humanitarian crisis and instability risks.

Wayne, 22 (Earl Wayne is Former Career Ambassador to Afghanistan, Argentina, and Mexico; Distinguished Diplomat in Residence, School of International Service, American University. 2nd September, 2022. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/afghanistan-united-states-must-stay-engaged>.) GMU NR

One year after the fall of Kabul and departure of U.S. troops, the United States still has an important policy and action agenda regarding Afghanistan but with less leverage in a country suffering serious problems. Millions in Afghanistan face the dire effects of a devastating humanitarian and economic crisis. The Taliban government is focused on installing its version of an Islamic Emirate and cementing control. The new regime gives little priority to including non-Taliban Afghans or to the human rights of women, girls, or others who do not share their vision. Nor does the Taliban give priority to concerns raised by the United States and others in the international community. There is clear evidence that the Taliban are providing a haven to terrorist friends in al Qaeda and indications that they are sheltering radical Islamic groups from the region as well. The United States has also not yet fulfilled the promises of protection and refuge to many Afghans who worked closely with the US and shared its laudable objectives over two decades. Far too many of these Afghan friends are still in Afghanistan or other countries seeking to come to the United States. The United States needs to address these issues as effectively and quickly as possible, while trying to maintain unity of effort with other international partners. The Taliban’s poor behavior is helping to maintain international unity. No country has yet formally recognized their government. Going forward, the United States needs to be clear headed about its many mistakes from 2001-2022. It is essential to keep in mind that the United States undermined its own interests and those of Afghanistan with a terrible exit strategy – an unsound 2020 agreement with the Taliban followed by a deeply flawed plan to move toward peace and withdrawal, and then tragic errors during the 2021 departure (despite the heroic efforts at the Kabul airport). Though the United States cannot redo earlier mistakes, it can acknowledge and act on its enduring moral responsibility toward the Afghan people as well as its security interest preventing Afghanistan from again harboring terrorists. Some would like to forget and turn away, but the United States still has an important, tough path to tread to meet its continuing responsibilities toward the Afghan people. The U.S. approach needs to be humble not arrogant, patient not rushed, caring for those in need, thoughtful and creative maintaining international support, and tough-minded yet ready to act when the opportunity arises to make gains for the Afghan people or to deal with serious security threats. This means continuing to engage with the Taliban where and when the US can convey important messages and make progress. The United States should remain open to working out practical steps to help Afghanistan’s economy better sustain Afghan citizens and businesses. It must continue to engage in getting more aid safely to Afghans and in restoring respect for the rights of women and girls. However, the United States should not make concessions to get progress when the Taliban won't concede anything. Taliban leaders seem to have learned from US behavior in the past several years that they can ignore what the US wants and the US will eventually give them what they want. The United States should continue its laudable humanitarian relief programs, working closely with international organizations, NGOs, and other donors so that aid is effectively and securely delivered, without it being siphoned off to the Taliban government or corrupt actors. The United States can only hope to make progress effectively with an active diplomacy that maintains and builds strong coalitions with international partners. That coalition work must reach beyond partners with whom the US shares priority objectives, such as human rights and democracy, to maintaining as much unity as possible with countries such as China and Russia and with Afghanistan’s neighbors including Pakistan and Iran. Afghanistan’s neighbors have a particularly important role as they have clear interests in a stable Afghanistan, in an Afghanistan that does not shelter or export extremism, and in an Afghanistan with whom they can have good neighborly relations. And the Taliban have practical day-to-day interests in engaging with them. The pressure/temptation for neighbors to accommodate the Taliban will likely grow.

#### More evidence.

Lisa Curtis, 21 – [Lisa Curtis is is Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security and former Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Council Senior Director for South and Central Asia from 2017 to 2021, “How America Should Deal With the Taliban, Avoiding the Diplomatic Errors That Doomed the U.S. Withdrawal”, Foreign Affairs, 9-20-21, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-09-20/how-america-should-deal-taliban>] nl

As the United States ends its mission in Afghanistan, U.S. policymakers have already begun to reckon with American military failures over 20 years of fighting. But the war’s disastrous finale was not solely the result of armed conflict. In cataloging its mistakes, Washington must also **seriously evaluate** its diplomatic efforts—**especially** peace talks with the **Taliban** led by U.S. negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad.

Both President Donald Trump and President Joe Biden made clear their desire to **end U.S. military involvement** in Afghanistan. But the negotiations, which were largely held on Taliban terms, were **neither** necessary nor desirable—in fact, the eventual deal struck in Doha likely hastened the Taliban’s victory. If Biden wishes history to judge his withdrawal from Afghanistan as an acceptable foreign policy decision, his administration must reckon with this **diplomatic failure** and begin to take a **tougher** and **more realistic** approach toward the Taliban. Doing so is the only way to prevent the reemergence of a **global** terrorist **hotbed**.

Unfortunately, the Trump administration’s desperation to conclude a deal will make this process more difficult. Three years of negotiations empowered Taliban hard-liners, many of whom now play central roles in the new interim government—including al Qaeda–linked Haqqani network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani. As they craft a post-withdrawal strategy, U.S. officials must therefore change their diplomatic tack—judging the Taliban by their actions before granting them international recognition or economic assistance. This approach, coupled with a new counterterrorism strategy, is the best way to protect vital U.S. interests in the years to come.

**ROSE-COLORED GLASSES**

Although the United States spent years locked in negotiations with the Taliban, Washington’s approach to those talks was often defined by **wishful thinking**. The so-called **Afghanistan Papers**—confidential documents published by The Washington Post in December 2019—showed that U.S. military leaders often provided rosy assessments of the military situation or told political leadership that the United States had “turned a corner” in the fight against the Taliban, even when facts showed **otherwise.** As deputy assistant to the president and National Security Council senior director for South and Central Asia from 2017 to 2021, I witnessed senior civilian officials **ignoring or papering over** facts that did not comport with their **diplomatic agendas**.

This predilection produced a number of **serious**[**negotiating errors**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-05-04/ashraf-ghani-afghanistan-moment-risk-and-opportunity) that eventually came to define the resulting Doha agreement, the deal paving the way for a U.S. troop withdrawal in exchange for Taliban pledges to counter terrorism and refrain from attacking American soldiers on their way out. The first mistake—the result of a misguided belief that the Taliban would eventually agree to negotiate with the U.S.-backed government in Kabul—was the U.S. decision to exclude the Afghan government from talks, which prematurely **conferred legitimacy** on the Taliban.

The second error was failing to **condition** the pace of the talks on Taliban violence levels. Washington’s unwillingness to suspend negotiations, even amid escalating violence, revealed the United States’ desperation for a deal. In the end, the **only requirement** Washington imposed on the Taliban was to reduce violence for six days before signing the agreement.

The third error, based on wishful thinking that the Taliban were actually interested in negotiating a political settlement rather than fighting their way back to power, was forcing Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners without a commensurate concession from the Taliban, such as reducing violence.

Among the Taliban prisoners released was the Afghan army sergeant Qari Hekmatullah, who in 2012 murdered three Australian soldiers in cold blood while they rested on their base. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison pleaded with Trump not to force Ghani to release Hekmatullah. It was unnecessary to free this hardened Taliban killer, especially when one of Washington’s most trusted allies was opposed to it. The Trump administration, for its part, hoped that Hekmatullah’s release would facilitate peace talks—a belief that turned out to be wildly unfounded. Instead, the Taliban used the Doha process to enhance their international legitimacy and divide the Afghan leadership.

Altogether, U.S. concessions **weakened** the Ghani government, **sowed divisions** among anti-Taliban leaders, and signaled to Afghan security forces that the United States was [**switching horses**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-10/how-good-war-went-bad), sapping their will to fight. The United States would have been **far better off** negotiating its withdrawal **directly** with the Afghan government, something that Ghani himself proposed in early 2019. By doing so, the United States would have avoided demoralizing its Afghan partners as Washington pulled back U.S. forces. Instead, by simultaneously withdrawing its troops and making a political deal with the government’s enemy of 20 years, Washington ended up handing the country over to the Taliban.

**TERRORIST TIES**

Throughout the talks, U.S. negotiators also **failed** to accurately assess the Taliban’s remaining links to terrorist groups. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Khalilzad repeatedly claimed that the Taliban had agreed to break ties with al Qaeda, despite **mounting evidence** to the contrary. In October 2020, Edmund Fitton-Brown, United Nations Coordinator for the Islamic State, al Qaeda, and Taliban Monitoring Team, said the Taliban had promised al Qaeda before the Doha agreement was signed that the two groups would remain allies. Fitton-Brown also reported that al Qaeda was already celebrating the departure of U.S. and NATO forces from the country as a victory for global radicalism. In a report released in early June 2021, the United Nations also noted that the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda **remained strong** and that the Taliban had done little to sever links that had been “cemented through second-generational ties.” This was despite explicit language in the eventual agreement stating that the Taliban would instruct their members not to cooperate with groups that posed a threat to the United States and its allies.

It is too early to determine exactly how the Taliban’s victory will alter [terrorism trends](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-09-14/al-qaeda-versus-isis) in the region. Still, initial indicators are **worrisome**. After Kabul’s fall, the Taliban appointed a hard-line interim government headed by Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund, who served as foreign minister and then deputy prime minister during Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the new interior minister, has a $5 million FBI bounty on his head for his role in terrorist attacks that killed U.S. citizens. An exception to this hard-line rule is Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, now deputy prime minister, who spent eight years in a Pakistani jail before Khalilzad requested his release to participate in peace talks. Baradar is more moderate and was part of a group of insurgents who engaged in negotiations with Hamid Karzai when he was Afghan president in 2009. Baradar’s relegation to deputy, however, appears to be a sign that hard-line Taliban factions currently have the **upper hand**.

**LIKE-MINDED PARTNERS**

As the United States **reckons** with these failures, policymakers in Washington must learn from their negotiating mistakes and **alter U.S. diplomatic strategy** accordingly. A **crucial part** of this process will be developing a [**collaborative strategy**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-09-17/american-power-after-afghanistan) with the European Union, United Kingdom, and other like-minded states to press the Taliban to meet specific **human rights** and **counterterrorism conditions**. This approach would stand in sharp contrast to Khalilzad’s focus on coordinating closely with China and Russia—countries that, unlike the United States’ European partners, place little value on respect for human rights.

Although the United States will need **lines of communication** with the Taliban to get its remaining citizens and allies safely out of the country and deliver **humanitarian assistance**, there should be no rush to establish formal diplomatic relations with a group that remains allied with terrorists. By closely coordinating with allies and partners and setting clear conditions for engagement, Washington stands the best chance of successfully shaping future Taliban behavior. Striking the appropriate balance is particularly critical here, as nearly 70 percent of the Afghan government’s budget came from foreign aid. The donor community must determine how to meet Afghans’ basic needs while not rewarding the Taliban with diplomatic recognition and economic assistance before the group has earned it.

A **central condition** for **any future engagement** should be Taliban respect for **human rights** and **governance standards**. During their first week back in power, the new leadership went to great lengths to show the world that their movement had evolved on issues of governance, terrorism, and women’s rights. The Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid gave a press conference in Kabul where he offered amnesty to those who worked for the government, vowing that there would be no reprisal killings. He said women would be allowed to work, study, and participate in society “within bounds of Islamic law.”

Contrary to Mujahid’s statements, however, women were later told to stay in their homes until the Taliban rank-and-file received instructions on how to treat women properly. The Taliban subsequently banned women’s sports and mandated that women attend only all-female university classes. There have also been reports of the Taliban preventing girls from attending school beyond the primary level and threatening female police officers. Donor countries should make clear that further limits on women’s rights and participation in society, education, and the economy will impact the Taliban’s ability to access international finance.

The United States also must **maintain** Treasury Department sanctions on individuals involved in terrorism. Washington should **not accede** to Taliban demands to remove the sanctions merely because these leaders now hold positions of power. Furthermore, the United States should refrain from unfreezing $9 billion in U.S.-held Afghan assets so long as terrorist leaders such as Sirajuddin Haqqani remain part of the Taliban government.

Finally, the Biden team should work closely with like-minded UN Security Council members, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to resist Chinese and Russian pressure to lift sanctions without conditions. In particular, the United States and its European allies should be clear that unless the Taliban establish a more **inclusive government**, the UN waiver that allowed sanctioned Taliban leaders to travel internationally will be withdrawn when it comes up for renewal later this year. As former **U.S. State Department officials** have noted, the Taliban misused the waiver to gain **international legitimacy** while continuing to **wage war** and **assassinate** Afghan civil society leaders, journalists, and human rights activists.

### Diplomatic Engagement

#### Here is a solvency advocate for an Afghanistan aff---Diplomatic engagement allows the US to move beyond a limited, post-withdrawal Afghanistan policy to a more comprehensive approach, which can better protect US interests in the region and contribute to lasting peace and stability.

Miller 22 [Miller, Laurel, Director of the Asia Program at the International Crisis Group. From 2013 to 2017, she was deputy and then acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the US State Department, 4/1/2022. "Protecting US Interests in Afghanistan." *Global Politics and Strategy Vol 64(2)*, Accessed: 4/26/2023. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2022.2055820?journalCode=tsur20>] Biggs

The United States has several reasons to want a more serviceable relationship with Afghanistan, **even under Taliban rule**. Firstly, the US has an ongoing security interest in preventing Afghanistan from becoming a base for transnational terrorist groups operating there that could harm the US or its allies.Footnote9 Secondly, the US has a moral and reputational interest in securing the departure of Afghans endangered because of their past involvement in American efforts in the country, as well as in helping the population at large preserve some of the social and economic advances of the last two decades.

Thirdly, the US has a political and security interest in tamping down anti-Western sentiment in and around Afghanistan by ameliorating the country's humanitarian and economic degradation. A more representative form of government is desirable from a democratic perspective, but it is not necessarily a core US interest. If the Taliban took Western advice and did broaden the composition of their government, that might help bolster the regime's durability by defusing the grievances of ethnic and regional groups who feel unable to influence the new political arrangements. But it is not certain that inclusivity would lead to a durably more peaceful Afghanistan because the potential would remain for violent competition over political power and economic resources.

At least for the time being, however, **Taliban regime collapse would not be advantageous for the US**. It would surely produce more chaos in the security environment, more bloodshed and greater humanitarian disaster. Although the US may not wish to shore up the Taliban regime, it would be prudent for it to avoid actively delegitimising it or undermining its stability. Simply neglecting Afghanistan might be the path of least resistance, but that course would not enable the US to satisfy any of its interests. Washington needs to affirmatively define the relationship it wishes to have and actively work to establish it.

Defining a steady-state relationship

Perhaps the most obvious lesson from US involvement in Afghanistan is that ambitions should be kept well in check. Any relationship that Washington could realistically establish in the near to medium term would be limited, and **should have four main features**. **Firstly**, the relationship should involve **persistent and routinised diplomatic engagement by US government personnel,** based in Kabul, through an interests section housed within another country's embassy. **Secondly, beyond** providing **humanitarian aid, it should incorporate a** modest **development-assistance programme** focused on supporting livelihoods and well-being in areas such as healthcare, education, agriculture and rural development. **Thirdly, the US should amend** the **sanctions** architecture, tailoring it to specific activities of concern, such as arms transfers to Afghanistan or terrorist-group financing. **Finally, direct engagement of US personnel with** specific high-level **Taliban figures** **whom** **Washington regards as** politically or **morally inappropriate** interlocutors **based on** **past** or ongoing **actions** **should be limited**.

A relationship with these characteristics could enable the US to protect its interests by maintaining open lines of communication on US counter-terrorism concerns and offering the Taliban sufficient diplomatic normalisation and foreign aid to incentivise the regime to reduce the risks of terrorist activity in Afghanistan. It would also give the US a diplomatic platform for persistent engagement to, among other things, facilitate the exit of Afghans who had been promised a path towards immigration to the US. In addition, **it would enable the U**nited **S**tates **to** help **prevent worstcase humanitarian outcomes**, and afford it influence in international efforts to reduce Afghanistan's aid dependency over time.

Such a relationship also would provide the US with diplomatic means - limited, but more robust than they currently are - to press its concerns about governance and human-rights issues. Though results in these areas would probably be marginal, **the Taliban's desire for** international **legitimacy might** at least **give the US** and other outside actors **enough collective leverage to rein in the most egregious conduct**. The persistent engagement envisioned here would also enable the US to gain, develop and maintain a better understanding of facts on the ground than it currently has.

The policy basis for sustaining such a relationship would not be that the Taliban are satisfying US desires for how the group governs, but rather that the group is willing to engage with Washington on matters relevant to US interests. To be viable, Washington would probably need to dangle the possibility of full recognition and reciprocal re-establishment of embassies, even though that is not likely to be politically feasible for some years.

One tempting question is whether the United States' relationship with Afghanistan could evolve roughly along the lines of its bilateral relationship with Vietnam after the war, to the point where the US State Department referred to Afghanistan, as it now refers to Vietnam, as one of America's 'trusted partners with a friendship grounded in mutual respect'.Footnote10 It's not impossible, but full normalisation of that relationship and lifting of a trade embargo did not happen until 20 years after the war. It is premature to plot out the longer-term evolution of the US-Afghanistan relationship, not least because it is not yet clear how and for how long the Taliban regime will govern. But the Vietnam example does counsel that the US should remain alert to any opportunities for expanded normalisation.

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## Israel

### Conditions

#### The US can offer a quid pro quo to Israel—US support in exchange for restrained and democratic behavior.

Amos Harel, 23 – [Amos Harel is one of Israel's leading media experts on military and defense issues. He has been the military correspondent and defense analyst for Haaretz for the last 25 years, "Around the halls: Brookings experts on Biden’s performance in the Middle East," Brookings, 2-3-2023, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/02/03/around-the-halls-brookings-experts-on-bidens-performance-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

Amos Harel on the Biden administration and the **crisis** of **Israeli democracy**.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict might not be the Biden Administration’s top priority, but Washington may be Israel’s **last hope** as the Jewish state welcomes its most extreme government in history. Benjamin Netanyahu’s legal troubles have driven him to form a coalition with two **extreme right-wing** parties, along with two **ultra-Orthodox** parties. In the hope of halting his trial, Netanyahu has been willing to make **unprecedented concessions** to his partners. The results could trigger a **flareup** with Palestinians regarding the Temple Mount (Haram a-Sharif) in Jerusalem and **continued tensions** regarding the legalization of Israeli outposts in the **West Bank**.

Netanyahu desperately needs U.S. support for what he sees as potentially his two most important foreign policy achievements: a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia and an aggressive stance on Iran’s nuclear project. If the administration insists on a **quid pro quo** — **American assistance** in return for Netanyahu **restraining** his political partners’ actions in the territories — he may be **forced** to agree.

Caught in the crosshairs could be the Israeli army’s new Chief of Staff, Lt. General Herzi Halevi, who assumed his role on January 16. Netanyahu, under growing pressure from his extreme-right partner Bezalel Smotrich, has agreed to move the office of Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories to Smotrich’s direct responsibility, ignoring the military’s complaints.

In the past, U.S. administrations have found ways to communicate with Israeli generals in order to **maintain restraint**, most notably when Netanyahu was considering a **unilateral strike** against Iran between 2009 and 2012. **It should do so again.**

#### More evidence for that type of proposal.

Matthew Duss, Zaha Hassan, 23 – [Matthew Duss is a visiting scholar in the American Statecraft program at the Carnegie Endowment, Zaha Hassan is a human rights lawyer and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "How the Biden Administration Should Approach the New Israeli Government," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1-17-2023, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/17/how-biden-administration-should-approach-new-israeli-government-pub-88822>] nl

On December 29, shortly after Israel[swore in](https://www.axios.com/2022/12/29/israel-netanyahu-far-right-government-ben-gvir-smotrich) the most right-wing government in its history, journalist Barak Ravid [reported](https://www.axios.com/2022/12/30/jake-sullivan-israel-netanyahu-meeting) that U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan would soon travel to the region for talks with the new government. These talks offer President Joe Biden’s administration an opportunity not only to **clarify U.S. goals** and **red lines** but also to begin to **restore consistency** with its rhetoric on **human rights** and **international law** and prevent further **violent escalations**.

The new Israeli government has declared its goal of enforcing the Jewish people’s “[exclusive and indisputable rights](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israel-swears-in-netanyahu-as-prime-minister-most-right-wing-government-in-countrys-history)” in the entirety of Israel and the Palestinian territories, amounting to an intention to consolidate an undemocratic ethnostate. But blaming this all on Netanyahu’s hard-right coalition members, such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, alone is incorrect. Preventing the creation of a Palestinian state and asserting the exclusive national rights of Jews in the Holy Land have been Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s [lifetime projects](https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/book-review-trying-to-win-the-war-of-the-womb-a-place-among-the-nations-benjamin-netanyahu-bantam-17-99-1463886.html).

The new government’s support for **aggressive expansion** of settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories is not a break from past policies but the logical culmination of them. The previous government of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid may have been less personally corrupt and openly racist than Netanyahu’s, but judged by its behavior—[**violent escalation** against Palestinians in the West Bank](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/12/israel-un-experts-condemn-record-year-israeli-violence-occupied-west-bank#:~:text=At%20least%20two%20Palestinians%20were,occupied%20West%20Bank%20in%202022.), [**expulsions of Palestinian families**](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/22/world/middleeast/israel-palestinians-caves.html), [**demolition of Palestinian homes**](https://theintercept.com/2022/02/25/israel-palestine-west-bank-demolitions/), and [**expansion of settlements on Palestinian land**](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/growing-israeli-west-bank-settlements-test-us-position-ahead-biden-visit-2022-07-11/)—that government was no less committed to entrenching a one-state reality.

In considering what approach to take in the future, the Biden administration should consider the approach that led here. While U.S. administrations have taken various tacks to the situation, one thing has remained nearly consistent: they have protected Israel from any negative consequences—political, diplomatic, economic, or otherwise—for its [illegal policies](https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129722) in the occupied territories. Only carrots are offered and offered again—**never sticks**. Not since George H.W. Bush’s administration [withheld Israeli loan guarantees](https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/18/world/bush-rejects-israel-loan-guarantees.html)in 1992 has the United States imposed any meaningful consequences for settlement activities. In the thirty years since, the settler population in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) has grown from an [estimated 115,000 in 1992](https://fmep.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/2.2.pdf) to [over 450,000 today](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-settlers-have-high-hopes-after-netanyahu-election-win-2022-11-07/#:~:text=More%20than%20450%2C000%20people%2C%20or,minority%20of%20the%20settler%20population.).

This carrot-heavy approach has **incentivized further abuses** and been **detrimental** to U.S. efforts to strengthen a rules-based international order in other areas. ~~Turning a blind eye to~~ [Ignoring] Israel’s occupation and de facto annexation of parts of Palestine looks hypocritical, especially to communities in the Global South to whom Washington is trying to appeal, as the United States simultaneously leads opposition to Russia’s occupation and illegal annexation of parts of Ukraine.

The administration should immediately and publicly acknowledge the applicability of international law as stated in previous United Nations Security Council resolutions, including [UNSC 2334](https://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/SRES2334-2016.pdf), which was passed at the end of former president Barack Obama’s administration and affirmed that Israel’s actions to change the status of occupied territories is without legal validity. Doing so will clearly signal to the new Israeli government, and to the world, that the United States will not support its undemocratic agenda and potentially strengthen efforts in support of diplomacy and nonviolence.

To that end, the administration should **cease** offering [**blanket political cover**](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/19/a-history-of-the-us-blocking-un-resolutions-against-israel) for Israeli policies at the United Nations and not object to the upcoming [advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/12/commission-inquiry-welcomes-general-assembly-resolution-requesting-icj)relating to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. The United States has more than enough global problems, and expending valuable time and energy preventing legitimate accountability for a partner state should not be a priority.

U.S. domestic law also applies. The administration should [r**eview military assistance**](https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/12/bringing-assistance-to-israel-in-line-with-rights-and-u.s.-laws-pub-84503) to Israel to ensure that these funds—[over $3.8 billion a year](https://www.bbc.com/news/57170576)—are consistent with legislation that restricts the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment to legitimate self-defense. Any Israeli security unit found to be in violation of these restrictions should be deemed ineligible for assistance, as required by current U.S. law, unless and until sufficient remedial steps are taken. This is not, as some critics will inevitably claim, applying a double standard to Israel. It is ending a double standard.

In the longer term, the United States should heed calls to [center rights and human security](https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/29/approaching-peace-centering-rights-in-israel-palestine-conflict-resolution-pub-84397) in its **future engagement** with Israel. Several recommendations along these lines can be found in Carnegie’s 2021 paper “[Breaking the Israel-Palestine Status Quo](https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/breakingtheisraelpalestinestatusquo),” which urges the administration to prioritize the **rights and security** of both Israelis and Palestinians and to make clear that the United States will not support any dispensation that fails to guarantee **full equality** and enfranchisement for all those residing in the territory under Israeli control. This approach holds the best chance for arresting the quickly declining status quo and averting an upsurge in violence, which many in the region believe is imminent. It will also strengthen U.S. **consistency and credibility** in advocating for normative behavior in matters of **international peace** and security elsewhere around the world.

Like any government, Israel must be presented with **clear consequences** for its choices. The approach we are recommending would take time and is likely to incur political costs for the administration, but if the United States wants to be taken seriously when it speaks about human rights and international law, then it must show that it applies the same principles and norms to friends as well as foes.

### US-Israel Security Coop

#### The aff could deepen the US security relationship with Israel.

Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, 21 – [Brian Katulis is Senior Fellow in National Security and international Policy for the Center for American Progress, Peter Juul is senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress 12-16-2021 "Strategic Reengagement in the Middle East," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/strategic-reengagement-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

**Deepen U.S.-Israel bilateral relations** ahead of the next phase of security cooperation

U.S. **strategic reengagement** in the Middle East **must** include a **stronger foundation** for U.**S.-Israel bilateral ties**—one that is less vulnerable to short-term domestic political considerations in both countries. A mainstay in the bilateral relationship is **security cooperation**, but it needs to evolve toward a new paradigm based on broader **joint cooperation** and less dependence on U.S. taxpayer aid.59 The two countries should continue ongoing discussions planning for the future of U.S.-Israel security cooperation as the current **memorandum of understanding** signed at the end of the Obama administration draws to a close.

These discussions should result in a series of **bilateral agreements** that create a **new framework** for security cooperation between the two countries. These agreements could cover **technology transfers**, **joint defense research** and **development projects**, and **regulation of cyber**-warfare firms, **among other** topics.60 Moreover, these new agreements should directly address U.S. concerns about Israel’s ties with China in several sensitive areas such as infrastructure and information technology.61 This framework would allow both countries to move toward a **security relationship** whose **mutual benefits** are more readily apparent.

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## Israel/Palestine

### General

#### There’s deep academic controversy over recommendations to increase engagement with Israel and Palestine both.

CAP, 21 – [The Center for American Progress is a well-known research institute with expertise in international relations, "U.S. Diplomatic Leadership Is Needed to Restore Security and Protect Rights in the Middle East Conflict," Center for American Progress, 5-17-2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/u-s-diplomatic-leadership-needed-restore-security-protect-rights-middle-east-conflict/>] nl

The **devastating human costs** of the ongoing conflict in Gaza and Israel continue to rise. The Center for American Progress calls on the Biden administration to adopt a **more proactive** and **engaged approach** that prioritizes protecting human rights and security and the lives of the most vulnerable, particularly children.

In the first week of this latest episode of violence, dozens of children and women have been killed. The conflict has harmed and undermined press freedom. The violence must stop now. The United States has a special role in upholding **international standards** of human rights **consistently**, especially in the most difficult and complicated situations, such as the current conflict between the Israeli government and Hamas.

The United States should launch a **diplomatic campaign** led by senior U.S. officials aimed at achieving an immediate ceasefire in the conflict between Hamas and Israel. Urgent action in the short-term should focus on ending the violence and putting human security first, with the top priority focused on safeguarding the basic freedoms of the most vulnerable civilians threatened in the conflict.

As it works to achieve a ceasefire, the Biden administration should connect these immediate efforts with a longer-term vision that bolsters Palestinian and Israeli leaders who seek to address the vulnerabilities and inequities exposed once again by the latest crisis, and build a more sustainable future for both peoples. The long-term goal should seek to advance a new type of diplomacy and politics where Palestinian and Israeli leaders are more responsive to their people. The vision should focus on ensuring two democratic, secure, and sustainable states that safeguard the basic freedoms of those living there.

**U.S. leadership on this front is essential**—this country has uniquely diverse relationships in the region that could produce the conditions necessary for progress. In the immediate, the United States should act on the following two fronts.

**Security and immediate conflict resolution.** The United States should continue providing appropriate support consistent with U.S. laws to Israel and the Palestinian Authority to **bolster the capacity** of the legitimate governing authorities to protect all people, especially the most vulnerable exposed to the current conflict. No sustainable resolution is possible as long as people feel threatened by violence. The United States has a role in making the parties feel secure and **encouraging actions** that support functioning democracies, which will best serve Israelis and the Palestinians alike. It should continue to urge Israeli authorities to respond to the horrifying intercommunal violence within Israel by seeking to apply the rule of law equally to all citizens of Israel. The United States should also continue to support long standing efforts by the Palestinian Authority to **maintain security** in a manner that respects the basic rights of its people.

**Diplomacy to achieve an immediate ceasefire and open channels for urgent humanitarian aid.** Security support measures are the essential ingredient for diplomacy working for an immediate ceasefire. But these efforts require an all-hands-on deck **diplomatic surge** working in close coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and other international actors. President Joe Biden’s calls to leaders represent important initial steps. But the United States needs to launch a diplomatic surge working by, with, and through Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, all countries that have their own networks of relationships with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas to achieve a ceasefire. President Biden and the Senate should expedite the nomination and confirmation of a U.S. ambassador to Israel. Active **diplomatic engagement** and **security coordination** with all of these actors can serve as a buffer against retrograde elements, including Iran, Hezbollah, and terrorist networks who actively seek to inflame the situation and exploit the insecurity of ordinary Palestinians and Israelis.

These two immediate steps should serve as a starting point for a **more engaged** long-term approach that addresses conditions that caused the current environment of overwhelming fragility and volatility. A steady and reliable **strategic reengagement** by the United States on the Arab-Israeli front should lead with **diplomacy** backed by a regional **political and security approach** that supports freedom and equality inside a **two-state resolution** to the conflict.

#### More evidence for that proposal.

Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, 21 – [Brian Katulis is Senior Fellow in National Security and international Policy for the Center for American Progress, Peter Juul is senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress, 12-16-2021 "Strategic Reengagement in the Middle East," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/strategic-reengagement-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

**Work to improve the day-to-day lives of Israelis and Palestinians**

Charting a new horizon on the Israeli-Palestinian front means working toward steady progress on the security, economic, and living conditions of Palestinians and Israelis alike.62 These efforts to strengthen U.S. ties with the Palestinians and Israel should serve as a foundation for a long-term effort seeking to link U.S. diplomatic, economic, and security engagement to progress on the ground in ways that bolster political support for a negotiated settlement that satisfies both parties. This progress needs to be connected to regional diplomacy to increase political support in Israel, with Palestinians, and with the broader region for negotiations over final status issues.

Overall, U.S. diplomacy should demonstrate that negotiations produce tangible results that benefit average Palestinians and Israelis and lay the groundwork for a future Palestinian state.Moving forward, a renewed U.S. diplomatic push should aim to synchronize diplomacy and institution-building efforts in ways that combine to produce a new political horizon for both Israelis and Palestinians. Potential areas where U.S. diplomacy could prove effective include rebuilding or refurbishing schools and health clinics in Area C (parts of the West Bank currently under full Israeli control) or an expansion of Palestinian rights to access olive groves, stone quarries, and other resources in Area B (parts of the West Bank under Palestinian civil administrative control but shared Israeli-Palestinian security control) and Area C.63

Launch an inclusive regional diplomatic initiative that builds on recent normalization accords, includes the Palestinian leadership, and seeks an updated Arab Peace Initiative.

### 2-State Solution

#### The aff could engage with both Israel and Palestine to pursue a two-state outcome and remedy violence in the interim.

Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, 21 – [Brian Katulis is Senior Fellow in National Security and international Policy for the Center for American Progress, Peter Juul is senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress 12-16-2021 "Strategic Reengagement in the Middle East," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/strategic-reengagement-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

Create conditions for progress and greater regional integration with **renewed and inclusive diplomacy** on the Arab-Israeli front. The United States should seize upon the openings provided by recent normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab countries to **improve conditions** on the **Israeli-Palestinian front**, include the Palestinians as central actors, and move from the current one-state reality toward a **two-state outcome.**

#### The US could engage with both countries to work towards keeping a 2-state solution viable.

Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, 21 – [Brian Katulis is Senior Fellow in National Security and international Policy for the Center for American Progress, Peter Juul is senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress 12-16-2021 "Strategic Reengagement in the Middle East," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/strategic-reengagement-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

As May 2021’s **unrest in Jerusalem** and renewed **fighting in Gaza** make clear, no policy of **strategic reengagement** in the Middle East would be complete without a **thorough examination** of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. The United States should leverage recent normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab countries to improve conditions on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Though major progress on the core Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not appear likely at the moment, **stepped-up U.S. diplomatic engagement** that seeks to achieve gradual and simultaneous progress on multiple fronts can improve the lives of both Israelis and Palestinians while keeping the possibility of an **ultimate two-state outcome** viable.

The Biden administration should approach Arab-Israeli relations as the **keystone** of a broader, robust **diplomatic approach** that seeks steady progress on multiple fronts across the region simultaneously, with four main areas of focus:

Renew, strengthen, and broaden ties between **Palestinians and Americans**.

Deepen **U.S.-Israel bilateral ties** and prepare for the next phase of **security cooperation**.

**Work with Palestinians and Israelis** on a set of **targeted measures** to steadily improve the quality of life of Palestinian and Israeli people.

Launch an inclusive regional **diplomatic initiative** that builds on recent normalization agreements, **includes the Palestinian leadership**, and seeks an updated Arab Peace Initiative.

Taken together, these approaches can help keep the prospect of a two-state outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alive by improving the lives of Israelis and Palestinians while building on recent regional diplomatic progress.

## Palestine

### General

#### The US could build upon the US-Palestine relationship through diplomatic, military, and/or economic engagement.

Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, 21 – [Brian Katulis is Senior Fellow in National Security and international Policy for the Center for American Progress, Peter Juul is senior policy analyst at the Center for American Progress 12-16-2021 "Strategic Reengagement in the Middle East," Center for American Progress, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/strategic-reengagement-in-the-middle-east/>] nl

**Relations** between Americans and Palestinians should exist on their **own terms** and not be treated simply as a **subsidiary** to U.S.-Israel relations or other regional relationships.

As the United States works to **reestablish ties** with Palestinians, the Biden administration should keep a number of policy considerations in mind, beginning with the likelihood of a generational transition in Palestinian politics away from the current leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas and toward an increasingly fragmented political landscape with no clear leaders or dominant factions. Understanding the **complexities** of Palestinian politics and society remains critical and **requires deeper** diplomatic, cultural, and economic **engagement** between Americans and Palestinians. That **engagement** can start with the **reopening** of the **U.S. consulate** in East Jerusalem, but it must not end there.

At the same time, the United States should maintain its security engagement with the Palestinian Authority. As the United States resumes **security cooperation** with the Palestinians,57 the Biden administration should assess this cooperation and look for ways to **improve it** by encouraging the **Palestinian Authority Security Forces** to operate more effectively and with **greater respect** for the basic freedoms of the Palestinian people. This festering discontent with an authoritarian Palestinian Authority is likely to be a major issue in Palestinian politics moving forward.58

## Iraq

### General

#### There are experts in foreign policy recommending the United States expand its engagement with the new government in Iraq.

C. Anthony Pfaff, 22, – [[Dr. Tony Pfaff](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/expert/c-anthony-pfaff/) is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative and the research professor for Strategy, the Military Profession, and Ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, "Iraq has a new government. The United States would benefit from broad engagement with all Iraqi stakeholders.," Atlantic Council, 11-4-2022, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/iraq-has-a-new-government-the-united-states-would-benefit-from-broad-engagement-with-all-iraqi-stakeholders/>] nl

From the US perspective, the October 13 selection of Abdul Latif Rashid as **president** and Mohammed al-Sudani as **prime minister** may not bode well for the formation of an **inclusive government** or the strengthening of US-Iraq ties. The fact that the Shia Coordination Framework, which includes parties with strong affiliations to Iran, was able to exploit the government formation process to overturn the results of a [popular election](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/forming-new-government-iraq-possible-scenarios) held in 2021 will undermine the Iraqi public’s already fragile faith in the political system. Moreover, the [framework’s](https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/223-iraq-tishreen.pdf) close affiliation with Iran-backed militias suggests a return to 2018-2019, when militias intensified malign activities, such as asset stripping, violent suppression of protests, extortion, and attacks on US forces. These [conditions](https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/223-iraq-tishreen.pdf) culminated in widespread protests in [October 2019](https://icg-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/223-iraq-tishreen.pdf), where these same Iran-backed militias, as well as government forces, used violence to bring them under control.

It also does not help that Muqtada al-[Sadr](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/15/iraqs-sadrist-camp-refuses-to-join-new-government), who played an instrumental role in providing an alternative to the Iran-backed parties, has rejected participation in the new government. His ability to agitate and mobilize protests suggests that Iraq is headed for more instability and violence unless the new government finds a way to accommodate the Sadrist agenda. Even worse, the United States does not appear well-positioned to do much about it. Neither Iraq’s Iran-backed political parties, their militias, nor the Sadrists have much interest in anything but superficial ties with the United States. Given that they will be the dominant voices in Iraq for the foreseeable future, the United States **could** find itself with little room to engage.

So, on the surface, it would seem that US options are limited. However, by adopting an **opportunistic approach** that engages a range of Iraq’s stakeholders, **the United States** can create space for more **constructive engagement**. This approach avoids simply imposing costs—such as sanctions or limiting security cooperation and arms sales—and, instead, emphasizes creating more attractive alternatives that are better in line with US and Iraqi interests.

Of course, the United States may conclude that Iran’s apparent dominance, coupled with the Iraqi government’s inability to make meaningful reforms, suggests that there is little to be gained by increased engagement. However, despite the current government’s setback to Iraqi democracy, all hope may not yet be lost. [Sudani](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/13/iraqs-new-prime-minister-designate-who-is-mohammed-al-sudani) resigned from the Dawa party in 2020 after protests were underway to reportedly advance his political career because he believed voters were more interested in independent candidates. This suggests that he may be open to incorporating more of a nationalist reform agenda in future policy.

Moreover, despite dominance by Iran-backed parties, the [framework](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/08/understanding-iraqs-coordination-framework) also includes more moderate factions, such as Ammar al-Hakim’s National Wisdom Movement and former prime minister Haider al-Abadi’s Victory Alliance, who are united primarily, if not only, by their opposition to Sadr, and little else. Even if these more moderate elements do not get adequate representation in the new government, it is also likely that [Kurdish](https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/29770-Kurdish-parties-to-get-four-ministries-in-Iraq%E2%80%99s-new-cabinet%3A-KDP-official) parties will hold key cabinet positions, with the Foreign Ministry reportedly going to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Justice Ministry to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These last points suggest that the United States could benefit by engaging a wide range of Iraq’s subgroups to not just find, but create a way ahead.

One other reason for hope is, presumably, no one wants a return to the conditions that sparked protests in October 2019. That means Sudani will have to pay attention to the appearance, if not the fact, of Iranian influence as well as signal openness to reform. Such measures should include curbing militia violence against protestors, attacks against US interests, and committing to early elections. Doing so should increase the value of cooperation for all sides. Given justified cynicism regarding its government, turning that increased value into an actual incentive to cooperate, however, will depend on how substantive those measures really are. Here again, is space where **US engagement** could **prove profitable.**

[Shaping alternatives](https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/952/) depends first on understanding the choices actors perceive they have. Iraq’s internal stakeholders are the government, Iran-backed militias and political parties, and the public. This breakdown is, of course, an oversimplification; however, it represents the broad tensions inherent in Iraq’s current political situation. It also represents the major actors who have the ability to influence the choices of other actors significantly. So, it should be useful to illustrate the approach under consideration here.

Given the context of US-Iraq relations, one way to express the Iraqi government’s interest is to increase its benefit from cooperation with the United States without triggering a backlash from militias and other Iranian proxies. From the perspective of the militias, one way to express their interest is to maximize access to government funding and other resources, oppose any US presence, and engage in criminal activity without triggering a costly response from the government, the public, or even the United States that returns them to the conditions of October 2019. While the Iraqi public represents its own diverse set of actors, one can broadly express their interest in adequate public services, good government, and employment opportunities without subjecting themselves to authoritarian or sectarian rule and malign external influences.

Shaping the choices of these actors depends on a couple of things. First, is having credible and capable measures that other actors believe is in their interest to implement and will leave them better or worse off if they fail to cooperate, depending on what choice one tries to incentivize. Second, one can use these measures to change the stakes relative to a particular interest. When in competition, for example, the higher the stakes, the less likely other actors will cooperate. In fact, lowering the stakes is one way to understand efforts to reform the Muhasasa system, whose sectarian nature accounts for much of Iraq’s political impasse. By creating a new system where parties can afford to lose an election, one creates more space where the will of the Iraqi people—not their demographic make-up—can have greater expression.

Finally, if one can change the status quo relative to other actors, one can raise or lower others’ thresholds for acting, even if they do not prefer that status quo to an ideal alternative. For example, measures that improve the economic status quo by improving diversity and opportunity can make alternatives, like militias, **less attractive**. Since militias would arguably benefit from such improvements, their threshold to oppose them, especially if they can happen on a broad scale, may be high enough to disincentivize any challenge.

Taken together, these factors allow one to better calibrate offers, requests, and demands to improve the likelihood of cooperation. Credible and capable measures frame what one can do; changing the stakes can change what other actors should do; and changing the value of the status quo can impact actors’ decisions about what they will do. For example, the United States and Iraqi governments appear to have disincentivized another lethal escalation between Iran-backed militias. This has been achieved by lowering the stakes of the US presence via formally transforming the mission to a largely advisory one.

Given that this transformation did not significantly change the US ability to assist Iraqi forces, it effectively lowered the stakes associated with the US presence while raising the militias’ value of the status quo, since that transformation did not fundamentally change its capability to assist Iraqi forces.

So, as far as a way ahead, the United States would benefit from **broad engagement** across a range of Iraqi stakeholders—including those adversarial to the United States—to **identify interests** and opportunities to **facilitate cooperation**. Such an approach will typically yield modest results, but these results can accumulate and place the United States in a **better position** than the alternative of limiting its engagement.

### Conditions

#### Here’s a conditional proposal to significantly increase engagement with the Iraqi government through offering increased US support for internal reforms.

[Anthony H. Cordesman](https://www.csis.org/people/anthony-h-cordesman) and Grace Hwang, 21 – [Anthony H. Cordesman is the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Energy. Grace Hwang is a program coordinator and research assistant with the Burke Chair in Strategy and the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. "Iraq: The Missing Keystone in U.S. Policy in the Gulf," CSIS, 4-29-2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/iraq-missing-keystone-us-policy-gulf>] nl

**The U.S. Can Only Help an Iraq that Helps Itself, and Aid Must Be Conditional**

Any discussion of such aid options must be **prefaced** with the fact that the U.S. can only really aid Iraq if Iraq’s leaders take **far more responsibility** for their own actions. If there is any common lesson that the U.S. can learn from virtually every U.S. intervention since the end of World War II and the colonial era, it is that outside aid cannot transform a nation’s political, security, and economic structure, it can only help a country that is prepared to help itself and that can lead its own process of change.

Outside aid can be a **powerful catalyst** if it focuses on the reforms a country is already considering and ready to make, but the United States cannot force ethnic and sectarian unity on Iraq’s military and security forces. It cannot create an Iraqi power structure that finds the right ways to integrate the PMFs and Kurdish forces into Iraq’s central government forces. It can only help Iraq pursue its **own reforms** of its internal security, police, and justice systems. It cannot create the kind of economic growth that leads to **lasting stability** by demanding plans that do not reflect both a country’s political and social priorities for change and that it is actually **willing** to implement.

At the same time, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and past U.S. efforts in Iraq have all made it clear that the U.S. cannot ignore sources of tension and conflict in a country’s political system, ignore the incompetence and corruption of its government, or ignore the weaknesses in its security efforts and its failures in achieving internal security in ways that do not breed division and extremism. The U.S. cannot transform the nations it seeks to help, but aid must be coupled to successful internal efforts at reform.

The U.S. – and any security and civil aid coalitions it forms or joins – should certainly advise and propose where this will help Iraq **move forward**. However, the lessons of the last few decades make it all too clear that outside powers like the United States cannot impose their own values and systems on nations with different cultures and values and transform them from the outside. And, these lessons also make it clear that donors cannot rely on a host country’s plans or pledges of reforms that do not materialize, and that aid efforts **cannot succeed** by tolerating **corruption, waste, and failure**.

There are obvious risks in any outside aid effort. Iraq may or may not have reached the point where its leaders will agree on the necessary reforms and plans, although the most recent Iraqi proposals and plans do reflect some progress. It is even less clear that they will actually implement the plans and reforms they propose without outside incentives and pressure.

This makes the “**conditionality**” of all aid efforts a **critical path** to any **lasting success**. The **grim lessons of** U.S. efforts in Iraq **since 1991** make it **brutally clear** that security and civil aid must be tied to Iraqi ability to make actual progress, to its honesty in using aid, and the effectiveness of key aid programs and reform efforts.

Important as Iraq may be strategically, the U.S. – and any states its joins with – should **make it clear** from the outset that it will **only provide aid and support** if Iraq creates **effective** plans and programs, uses aid effectively and relatively honestly, and assumes basic responsibility for its own future. A nation’s needs for aid are irrelevant if it cannot use the aid effectively and take such responsibility.

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## Iran

### General

#### The controversy over Iran is rich and deserving of analysis

Sadjadpour 22 [KARIM SADJADPOUR is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 'Iran's Hollow Victory: The High Price of Regional Dominance', Foreign Affairs, 101(2), poapst]

Few countries have maintained clearer or more consistent aspirations over the last four decades than the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since 1979, when Islamic revolutionaries transformed the country from an U.S.-allied monarchy into an ardently anti-American theocracy Iran has sought to expel the United States from the Middle East, replace Israel with Palestine, and remake the region in its image. Unlike U.S. strategy toward Iran and the greater Middle East, which has shifted markedly with different administrations, Iranian strategy toward the United States and the Middle East has exhibited remarkable continuity. Tehran has not achieved any of its lofty ambitions, but it has made progress toward them--and it is feeling emboldened by its recent successes.

Over the last two decades, Iran has established primacy in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, the four failed or failing states that constitute what Iranian officials call their "axis of resistance." It has done so by successfully cultivating regional militias, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, and by exploiting the power vacuums left by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Arab uprisings of 2010-11. Neither the United States nor Iran's regional rivals have demonstrated the will or the capacity to challenge Tehran's foothold in these countries.

Iran has also exacerbated numerous other U.S. national security challenges, including nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare, terrorism, energy insecurity, and the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen and that between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Although Tehran and Washington have faced numerous shared threats since 1979--including the Soviet Union, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State (or ISIS)--U.S. attempts to induce or pressure Iran to shift course have repeatedly failed. The Islamic Republic has proved too rigid to bend and too ruthless to break.

Like a bodybuilder with failing organs, however, Iran displays external vigor that conceals ultimately incurable internal maladies. The historian John Lewis Gaddis defines grand strategy as "the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities." Iran has invested more of its limited capabilities in its aspiration to upend the U.S.-led world order than perhaps any other country in the world, including China and Russia. In so doing, it has neglected the well-being of its people and made itself poorer and less secure. Moreover, the gulf between the Islamic Republic's aspirations and its capabilities means that Iran will continue to bleed national resources to subsidize regional militias and external conflicts, deepening the public's economic, political, and social frustration and necessitating ever-greater repression.

Despite the disillusionment it has wrought, Iran's revolution has not mellowed with age. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's 82-year-old supreme leader, is one of the world's longest-serving and most dogmatic autocrats. Since becoming supreme leader in 1989--the last time he left the country--Khamenei has skillfully vanquished four Iranian presidents, brutally quelled several mass uprisings, expanded Iranian power throughout the Middle East, and withstood efforts by six U.S. presidents to sideline him, engage with him, or coerce him. He has never met face-to-face with a U.S. official and has so far prohibited Iranian diplomats from talking to their U.S. counterparts during the ongoing negotiations over whether to revive the 2015 nuclear deal. He has handpicked fellow hard-line "principlists"--so called for their loyalty to the revolution's principles--to run the regime's most powerful institutions.

Khamenei's commitment to Iran's revolutionary principles is driven by his own desire for self-preservation. Like many dictatorships, the Islamic Republic faces a reform dilemma: it must open up and adapt to survive, but doing so could destroy it. In contrast to more pragmatic Iranian revolutionaries, such as the former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Hassan Rouhani, who favored a Chinese-style economic opening and rapprochement with the United States, Khamenei long ago concluded that abandoning the revolution's principles--including its opposition to the United States and Israelwould be like taking a sledgehammer to the pillars of a building. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which Khamenei believes was hastened by Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost reforms, further convinced him of the wisdom of Alexis de Tocqueville's warning that "the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways."

Although ending their four-decade cold war would serve the interests of both Iran and the United States, Washington will not be able to reach a peaceful accommodation with an Iranian regime whose identity is premised on opposing the United States and whose leader believes that softening this opposition could cost him everything. Nor are there any quick fixes--whether in the form of greater U.S. engagement or more pressure--that can swiftly change the nature of the U.S.-Iranian relationship or the Iranian regime. For this reason, the United States must deal with Iran like any adversary: communicate to avoid conflict, cooperate when possible, confront when necessary, and contain with partners.

IDEOLOGY BEFORE NATION

Like many old civilizations that have experienced great triumphs and great humiliations, Iran is both self-assured and deeply insecure. The ancient Persian Empire was arguably the world's first superpower. But for centuries before 1979, foreign powers usurped Iran's territory and violated its sovereignty. Between 1813 and 1828, imperial Russia forcefully seized vast territories in the Caucasus from Persia under the Qajar dynasty. In 1946, Soviet forces occupied and sought to annex Iran's northwestern province of Azerbaijan, only to be expelled thanks to the efforts of U.S. President Harry Truman. Seven years later, in 1953, the United Kingdom and the United States orchestrated a coup that deposed Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq.

Given this history, many Iranians, regardless of their politics, believe that great powers want to prevent their country from becoming prosperous and independent. The Islamic Republic, like many dictatorships, exploits this history to justify its internal repression and external ambitions: peaceful protesters, civil rights activists, and journalists are invariably tarred as foreign agents and subjected to violence and imprisonment. Iran defends its nuclear ambitions and its cultivation of regional militias--which flagrantly violate the sovereignty of its Arab neighbors--as both an inalienable right and a form of resistance against foreign imperialism.

Since its inception, Tehran's revolutionary regime has placed its ideological aspirations above the prosperity and security of the Iranian people. In doing so, it has routinely made decisions that were deeply detrimental to the country's national interests--for instance, prolonging its ruinous eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s in order to consolidate domestic power and, more recently, prohibiting covid-19 vaccines from the United States in the midst of a pandemic that has devastated Iran. (After thousands of preventable covid-19 deaths, the ban was quietly rescinded.)

No country in the Middle East has Iran's combination of geographic size, human capital, ancient history, and vast natural resources. But instead of leveraging these endowments to become a global economic power or to promote its national interests, the Islamic Republic has built its foreign policy on the twin pillars of confronting the United States and Israel. Using three distinct ideologies--anti-imperialism, Shiite sectarianism, and Iranian nationalismit has cultivated diverse partners across the Middle East and beyond and used them as proxies against its enemies.

Tehran's ideal vision is a Middle East in which there is no U.S. presence, a popular referendum has rendered Israel a Palestinian state, and Khomeinist theocracy is a source of inspiration for Arab and Muslim hearts and minds. This vision is far from becoming a reality. Despite its military drawdowns from Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States retains between 45,000 and 65,000 troops in the Persian Gulf, mostly to deter Iran. Israel, for its part, is a global technological hub that is more integrated into the Arab world than ever before, especially now that it has normalized relations with Bahrain, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates. And the model most Arabs aspire to is the socially liberal, globally integrated, and economically prosperous UAE, not Khomeinist Iran.

Still, Iran is closer to realizing its vision than it was a decade ago. Back then, the United States had nearly 200,000 troops in Afghanistan and Iraq; now, that number is 2,500. Meanwhile, Syria's once embattled leader, Bashar al-Assad, who owes his life to Iranian support, is slowly being normalized by Arab governments. And in addition to Hezbollah in Lebanon and various Shiite militias in Iraq, Iran can count the Houthis in Yemen as devoted allies willing to launch attacks against their common adversaries.

AXIS OF MISERY

Iran's success in the Middle East is as attributable to opportunism as it is to resolve. The Lebanese civil war, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the Arab uprisings all created power vacuums that Iran filled with its network of foreign militias, whose total ranks now number between 50,000 and 200,000 fighters. In other words, the story of the modern Middle East is more about Arab weakness than Iranian strength: Arab disorder has facilitated Iranian ambitions, and Iranian ambitions have exacerbated Arab disorder.

The crown jewel of the Iranian Revolution is Hezbollah. Founded in 1982, following Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the group pioneered the strategy that Iran would come to embrace with other proxies: carrying out lethal attacks against U.S. forces in the Middle East in order to turn American public opinion and weaken U.S. resolve. In October 1983, it attacked a multinational peacekeeping operation with truck bombs, killing over 300 people while they slept, including 241 U.S. soldiers. Iran and Hezbollah celebrated the attack but denied official responsibility. Four months later, the Reagan administration began withdrawing U.S. forces from Lebanon.

Today, Hezbollah is the most powerful force in Lebanon. It assassinates its political opponents and critics with impunity, runs its own underground economy, and reportedly has more than 100,000 rockets and missiles capable of striking Israel. It denounces its Lebanese adversaries as traitors but no longer even pretends to be independent from Iran. "We are open about the fact that Hezbollah's budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, are from the Islamic Republic of Iran," Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said in a 2016 speech. "As long as Iran has money, we have money. . . . Just as we receive the rockets that we use to threaten Israel, we are receiving our money."

Iran followed a similar approach to turn Iraq into an inferno for the United States, fearing that Washington planned to use a successful, democratic Iraq as a platform to subvert or threaten Iran. Iranian-backed Shiite militias employed improvised explosive devices to cause as many as 1,000 American casualties. Unlike the United States, which was saddled with the task of rebuilding Iraq, Tehran sought only to thwart Washington's efforts. As Qais al-Khazali, the leader of an Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Iraq, told U.S. military interrogators, the United States spends "billions" on the war, while Iran spends "millions"--and yet Iran is more effective. Today, Iran's Shiite militias are Iraq's most powerful fighting force and a predatory Mafia that both enriches itself and secures Iran's interests in the country.

Iran and its militias also played a decisive role in preventing the collapse of the brutal Assad regime in Syria, Tehran's lone governmental ally in the region. What began as a tactical partnership against Saddam's Iraq in the 1980s has been sustained by mutual antipathy toward the United States and Israel and by shared survival instincts. Despite renewed efforts by Arab states to lure Assad away from Tehran, the two governments are now dependent on each other: Assad needs Iran's money and arms, and Tehran needs Syrian territory as a bridge to Hezbollah and a beachhead against Israel. In 2017, the BBC reported that Iran was building a "permanent military base" in Syria as an additional front against the Jewish state.

Despite theocratic Iran's moral pretensions, its proxies, under economic duress, have increasingly turned to the illicit economy to grow their wealth. The cash-strapped Syrian government's most valuable export is now Captagon, an illegal amphetamine that Hezbollah traffics globally with Tehran's tacit support. The Iranian government, which has executed thousands of its own citizens for drug offenses, has become the de facto kingpin of one of the world's largest narcotics smuggling networks.

More recently, Tehran has added Yemen to the list of countries where it wields significant sway through proxy militias. Iran provides the Houthis, who seized power in Sanaa in 2014, with weapons and other forms of support also reportedly financed in part through the illicit sale of drugs. This has proved to be a low-cost way for Tehran to inflict enormous financial and reputational damage on Saudi Arabia, which is estimated to have spent over $100 billion on its intervention in Yemen and is widely considered to be responsible for the conflict's horrific humanitarian toll. The Houthis' intolerant rule and provocative slogans--wishing death to America, Israel, Jews, and followers of the Bahai faith--reflect the ideology of their Iranian patrons. And the group has sought to do to Saudi Arabia what Hamas and Hezbollah have long done to Israel--except with precision drones and other twenty-first-century technology instead of antiquated rockets and suicide bombers.

As the Middle East's lone theocracy Iran has learned to harness Islamist radicalism--Sunni as well as Shiite--better than any of its peers. Among the reasons Tehran has bested its Sunni Arab rivals is that virtually all Shiite radicals are willing to fight for Iran, whereas most Sunni radicals, including al Qaeda and ISIS, oppose the ruling Arab governments. Indeed, Tehran's top criterion for strategic alliances is ideology, not religion, as evidenced by its close ties with the Sunni radical groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to which it has given billions of dollars to fight Israel. "Iran is one of the countries that helps Hamas most," Moussa Abu Marzouk, a grateful Hamas official, said in a 2021 interview. "The only country that ignores the limits imposed on Hamas is Iran. It helps us militarily in training, weapons, and expertise."

Tehran has even occasionally worked with Sunni fundamentalists--including al Qaeda and the Taliban--who regularly attack Iran's Shiite brethren, whom they consider to be heretics. Instead of prioritizing Iran's national interests, the Islamic Republic's grand strategy is built on a hierarchy of enmity: any enemy of the United States and Israel is a potential partner for Tehran. As Khamenei put it in 2021, "We will support and assist any nation or any group anywhere who opposes and fights the Zionist regime, and we do not hesitate to say this."

SUCCESS BEGETS HUBRIS

What began as a revolution against the corruption and repression of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi is now an Islamist foreign legion that is elbow deep in its own far greater political repression, assassinations, hostage taking, economic corruption, and drug trafficking. For all of Iran's success in cultivating militant groups across the Middle East, however, there are tangible signs that it has overreached. Opinion polls show that nearly two-thirds of young Arabs in the region now view Iran as an adversary, a sizable majority of Arabs of all ages want Iran to withdraw from regional conflicts, and more than half of Arab Shiites hold an "unfavorable" view of Iran. In recent years, Iraqi protesters have attacked and set fire to the Iranian consulates in Najaf and Karbala--two Shiite shrine cities that are longtime Iranian strongholds in Iraq--and Lebanese Shiites have protested against Hezbollah in the southern Lebanese city of Nabatiyah.

Mutual fears of Iran also helped midwife the Abraham Accords, the 2020 normalization agreements that gave Israel a strategic foothold several dozen miles from Iran's border. Khamenei, who denounced the accords as a "betrayal to the Islamic world," still contends that the plight of the Palestinians is the most important issue in the Islamic world, and he continues to dedicate significant resources to resisting Israel. His support for regional proxies in the occupied territories and elsewhere has created an axis of misery that stretches across the Middle East: Syria and Yemen are still mired in civil war, and in Lebanon, a recent Gallup poll revealed that 85 percent of the population finds it difficult to get by, over 50 percent cannot afford food, and 63 percent want to leave the country permanently.

Iran's regional policies may be alienating Arabs, but they are unlikely to provoke a meaningful backlash from the United States. In contrast to radical groups that have launched direct attacks on U.S. soil, such as al Qaeda and ISIS, Iran's theocrats--who control a nationstate with vast resources and therefore have much more to lose--target U.S. interests in the Middle East using proxies and drones, giving them two degrees of separation. Moreover, Iran aims to wield its significant influence in the Middle East without taking any responsibility for day-to-day governance. No major national security decision can be made in Iraq or Lebanon without the blessing of Iran's Shiite militias, yet those same militias bear no responsibility for addressing unemployment or corruption, or for collecting garbage. Iran's militias have the power; the government has the accountability.

Where the Iranian regime's grand strategy threatens its own survival is on the home front. As Iran's economy has deteriorated, Iranians have naturally come to question the government's policies, including its hostility toward the United States and its external adventurism. Among the slogans commonly heard at popular protests in Iran are "Forget about Syria; think about us" and "They are lying that our enemy is America; our enemy is right here." Yet there are often two prerequisites for the collapse of an authoritarian regime: pressure from below and divisions at the top. Although Iran is experiencing increasing popular tumult, for now the regime's security forces appear--from afar, at least--to be united and willing to kill, while the country's discontented masses are divided and leaderless.

This near-term stability means that Iran's grand strategy will not change as long as Khamenei is supreme leader, and it will probably outlast him, given its perceived success. The United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan has emboldened Tehran to try to force Washington to abandon Iraq and its military bases in the Persian Gulf. And given the relatively low penalties Iran has paid for its regional policies--certainly compared with the enormous costs Tehran has endured in the form of sanctions and sabotage for its nuclear intransigence--it has little reason to cease supporting militias across the Middle East.

UNITED FRONT

Four decades of hostility have spawned a library's worth of facile prescriptions for ending the U.S.-Iranian cold war. Why doesn't the United States simply pursue diplomacy make peace with the Islamic Republic, or side with the Iranian people to overthrow the regime? Yet the most fundamental question has no easy answers: How should Washington deal with an adversary that eschews direct dialogue, whose identity is premised on hostility to the United States, and that has both the resources and the resolve to sow chaos throughout the Middle East and kill thousands of its own citizens to preserve its power? Washington's perception of Iran has suffered from four decades of estrangement and strategic narcissism, with policymakers believing that Iran's revolutionary ideology can be either moderated by American engagement or extinguished by American toughness. Many progressives think that Tehran's intransigence is merely a reaction to hostile U.S. policies, whereas many conservatives have posited that greater economic hardship would force Tehran to choose between its ideology and the regime's survival. Yet for Khamenei, preserving Iran's revolutionary ideology is both an end in itself and a means to ensure the regime's survival.

As is often said of Russia, the Islamic Republic has sought security in the insecurity of others. And just as Iran has taken advantage of ideological, sectarian, and religious divisions to gain influence in weak states, it has proved equally adept at exploiting competition among great powers. Given that Washington has only limited leverage over Tehran--virtually all Iranian trade is with countries other than the United States--an effective strategy to contain and counter Iran will require both U.S. leadership and international consensus building.

The first step toward such a strategy is forging domestic political consensus. Up until the 2015 nuclear deal was signed, Democrats and Republicans were in broad agreement about the nature of the Iranian regime and its threats to regional security. The 2015 accord--which lifted U.S. and international sanctions in exchange for Iranian nuclear concessions--polarized the policy debate along partisan lines: Republicans accused the Obama administration of appeasement, and Democrats accused the Republicans of being warmongers.

Yet the broad contours of a bipartisan Iran strategy are clear. Republicans may passionately oppose the Iranian regime and the nuclear deal, but they also recognize that their constituents do not want another U.S. conflict in the Middle East. Democrats, for their part, may be generally supportive of engaging with Tehran and returning to the nuclear deal, but polls from the Pew Research Center show that 70 percent of Democratic voters have an "unfavorable" view of Iran. In other words, there is enough bipartisan common ground to build consensus around a sober understanding of the nature of the Iranian regime, one that does not exaggerate the threat Iran poses to the United States itself but also does not minimize the threat it poses to Washington's interests and partners in the Middle East.

Transatlantic consensus is also critical. For the last few decades, European countries have intermittently pursued dialogue with Tehran, and dangled economic incentives, in the hopes of moderating Iranian policies in four areas: human rights, proliferation, terrorism, and Middle East peace. Yet this dialogue has failed to yield any meaningful changes in Iran's internal or external policies. To the contrary, Tehran has threatened to exacerbate Europe's refugee crisis with its regional policies and has continued to take European residents and citizens hostage, even executing a French resident in 2020. Partly as a result, European public opinion remains as critical of Iran as is U.S. public opinion.

Arguably the only time that European policy has positively influenced Iranian behavior was in 2012, when the EU, in close coordination with the Obama administration, ceased importing Iranian oil, which paved the way for the 2015 nuclear deal. An Iranian government that feels that Europe is on its side--as it did in 2018, after U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear deal--will not compromise in the face of U.S. demands.

But Washington will need to pursue cooperation beyond Europe. By some estimates, Iran's oil exports to China have quadrupled over the last year, reducing the urgency of Tehran's need to return to the nuclear deal. Any effort to shift Iran's calculus will require buy-in from China. Although Washington and Beijing view Iran differently, they share the common goal of wanting to avoid both an Iranian bomb and conflict with Iran. What is more, China seeks a stable Middle East to ensure the free flow of oil from the region. Iran's detention of oil tankers and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE--each of whose trade with China exceeds Iran's--threaten Chinese interests more than they threaten U.S. interests, given that the United States has become a net energy exporter.

Finally, the United States will need to help strengthen those Arab countries where Iran currently holds sway and foster unity among them. Iran exploits Arab states with weak and embattled governments or fractured societies. Just as nationalism played an instrumental role in combating Soviet and Western colonialism in the twentieth century, Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian, and Yemeni nationalism--or a collective Arab nationalism--will be needed to repel Iranian influence and restore these countries' sovereignty. Inter-Arab unity is also crucial. The recent rift between members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, resulting in Saudi Arabia and the UAE blockading Qatar from 2017 until early 2021, significantly undermined the council's ability to articulate common concerns about Tehran's nuclear and regional policies.

Although the United States, Europe, and China have divergent interests vis-a-vis Iran, none of them wants to fight a war with Iran or see Tehran get the bomb. Washington united these powers during the negotiations that preceded the 2015 nuclear deal, and it should try to do so again in new talks on Middle Eastern security. A region that does not respect the rule of law, sovereignty, or the free flow of energy serves no one's interests (with the possible exception of Russia's). The same is true of a region where terrorist groups are resurgent. Washington must work to persuade its partners of this fact--and then rally them to expose Iran's malign activities and limit and counter its capabilities.

KING OF THE RUBBLE

Iranian power in the Middle East appears ascendant, but it will likely prove ephemeral. Arabs who chafed under centuries of Turkish and Western hegemony will not countenance Iranian influence easily. Even those Arabs seen as sympathetic to Iran, such as former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who spent years living in exile in Tehran prior to his political career, harbor private resentment toward the country. "You don't know how bad it can be until you're an Arab forced to live with the Persians," Maliki once told the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad.

Tehran's grand strategy burns the candle of Iran's resources and credibility at both ends, exporting the same political repression, social intolerance, and economic misery abroad that Iranians have long endured at home. Iran could remain king of the rubble for years or even decades. Few foreign or regional powers have the desire or the capacity to challenge Iranian primacy in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, and after two decades of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is virtually no U.S.

support for sending more American troops to die in the Middle East. Like a skyscraper with a rotting foundation, therefore, the Islamic Republic could continue to cast a shadow over parts of the Middle East, although precariously, for the foreseeable future.

Or the structure could come crashing down. Washington cannot change Iranian aspirations to counter American influence and end Israel's existence, but it can--with the help of other countries--contain Tehran until the country gets a government that seeks to do what is good for Iran instead of what is bad for its ideological enemies. Ultimately, the Islamic Republic's grand strategy will be defeated not by the United States or Israel but by the people of Iran, who have paid the highest price for it.

### New Nuclear Deal

#### The US could reignite its previously failed pursuit for diplomacy over a renewed nuclear deal with Iran.

Trita Parsi, 22 – [Trita Parsi is Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Last Chance For America and Iran, A New Nuclear Deal Won't Survive Without a Broader Rapprochement”, Foreign Affairs, 8-26-22, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/last-chance-america-and-iran-new-nuclear-deal>] nl

As war rages on in Ukraine, **diplomacy** is on the cusp of **prevailing** in Vienna. Against the odds, negotiators are poised to revive the Iran **nuclear agreement** and block Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon—**a crucial U.S. interest.** According to officials who are familiar with the draft of the agreement circulated in Europe and Tehran in the latter half of August, Iran will once more give up its stockpile of enriched uranium, apart from 300 kilograms enriched at lower levels. It will also cease all enrichment above 3.67 percent and remove thousands of advanced centrifuges from operation. Iran will also have **no pathway** to a plutonium-based nuclear weapon. Perhaps most important, its nuclear program will once more be fully open to intrusive **International Atomic Energy Agency** inspections.

If the agreement is **formally adopted**, it will mark a **significant breakthrough** for U.S. national security and **stability** in the Middle East. Instead of contending with Iran inching closer to bomb, the United States can now look forward to having the Iranian nuclear program in a box at least for the next two years. The aftermath of Donald Trump's **withdrawal** from the original 2015 agreement, when Iran returned to a **rapid expansion** of its **nuclear program** and came closer than ever to having the material for a nuclear weapon, clearly shows that the United States is **better off** with the deal **than without it.** But as it currently stands, the new iteration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will be precarious at best.

Critics will contend that the new deal is shorter and weaker rather than longer and stronger. Some of these arguments have merit. **Iran's breakout capability**—the amount of **time** it will take for Tehran to **amass the material** for a nuclear bomb will be **six to nine months** rather than the original 12 months. Still, from a **nonproliferation standpoint**, even a half year is **vastly superior** to Tehran's current **breakout capability** of roughly a **few days**. And whereas the original JCPOA contained restrictions of up to 20 years on Iran's nuclear program, the revived deal may last only as long as a Democrat is in the White House, since key Republican leaders have already publicly committed to killing the deal if a Republican is elected in 2024.

#### Here's a solvency advocate for significantly increasing our engagement with Iran through direct dialogue, that’s key to establishing a durable nuclear deal, and normalizing trade relations.

Trita Parsi, 22 – [Trita Parsi is Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Last Chance For America and Iran, A New Nuclear Deal Won't Survive Without a Broader Rapprochement”, Foreign Affairs, 8-26-22, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/last-chance-america-and-iran-new-nuclear-deal>] nl

**TALK AND DO BUSINESS**

For Iran, one of the easiest **strengthening steps** concerns direct **diplomacy**. With the JCPOA renewed and sanctions lifted, Tehran's refusal to engage in **direct dialogue** with Washington will increasingly appear **ungrounded**. Moreover, U.S.-Iranian talks should **not be limited** to U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Rob Malley and his Iranian counterpart, Ali Bagheri-Kani, discussing the nuclear deal. Dialogue between the two countries should instead be **normalized** to the extent possible by **establishing direct contact** between Blinken and Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, as well as between U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Ali Shamkhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran. Neither country's interest has been served by **decades without dialogue**, and addressing the nuclear file in a narrow and minimal way will do little to build **broader trust** between the two sides.

By **reestablishing diplomatic channels**, both sides can **dramatically lower** the cost for future governments and administrations to begin talks. Although this doesn't guarantee that a future Republican administration won't withdraw from the JCPOA, direct **engagement** between the two sides may **help persuade** a future **GOP president** to **stick with the deal**. The problem here lies on the Iranian side, but **Tehran** may have **realized the folly of refusing dialogue** with Washington. Indeed, **Iranian officials told me** in 2019 that they believed that **had they engaged** with Trump in early 2017**,** he might not have quit the **nuclear agreement** in the first place.

A second way to strengthen the deal would be to make it **more ambitious**. The past few months of negotiations were complicated because the JCPOA was **not broad enough** to warrant significant **political sacrifices**, nor was it narrow enough to render its risks negligible. Accordingly, the Biden administration's effort to seek a larger deal is, in principle, well founded: the **necessary amendments** to make the deal **durable** are hard to justify unless the agreement is enlarged.

For instance, the **assurance** Iran seeks against a second U.S. exit was **not fully addressed** in the renewed JCPOA but can and **should be dealt with** in subsequent talks. The original JCPOA did provide such an assurance—snap-back sanctions—but it applied only to Iran. An **enlarged agreement** should make the cost of **violating** the deal **more symmetric** for all parties. After all, Washington cannot claim to be the guarantor of a rules-based international order and also insist it cannot be expected to uphold agreements beyond one political cycle.

The **strongest way** to ensure sustained American compliance, however, would be to **open direct U.S.-Iranian trade.** The JCPOA waived U.S. sanctions only on third countries. It did not permit trade between the United States and Iran. **Longer restrictions** on Iran's nuclear program could be **negotiated** in return for **lifting** primary U.S. sanctions. This would **open the Iranian economy** to American businesses and create something the **original JCPOA lacked**—a **powerful constituency** in the United States that would resist any repeat of **Trump's folly** in the **future**. Hard-liners in Tehran will likely resist such a move, but Iran's experience with the JCPOA proved the futility of relying solely on secondary sanctions relief. As long as U.S. companies were absent from the Iranian market, pulling out of the JCPOA had little to no economic impact on the U.S. economy.

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## Saudi Arabia

### General

#### Increasing engagement with Saudi Arabia access various advantage areas and mechanisms that will generate fruitful debates.

Niranjan Shankar 22, [Niranjan Shankar is correspondent for the National Interest, "Can the U.S. Win the Long Game for the Middle East?," National Interest, 8-3-2022, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/can-us-win-long-game-middle-east-203951>] nl

President Joe Biden’s recent trip to the Middle East, and particularly his meeting with Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), have so far generated mixed reviews. Laudatory observers highlight the [joint statement](https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2022/07/16/Joint-Saudi-US-statement-sees-vital-agreements-action-plan-to-tackle-global-issues) released by the two countries after the Jeddah summit on numerous agreements relating to **energy**, **defense**, **Iran**, **technology**, [**food security**](https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-will-announce-1-billion-food-security-during-arab-summit-2022-07-16/), [**Vision 2030**](https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/saudi-arabia-vision-2030-could-inspire-region-by-mohamed-a--el-erian-2016-05?barrier=accesspaylog), and **regional conflicts** such as the **war in Yemen**. Critics, on the other hand, deride the Biden team for neither securing explicit commitments from the Gulf states to boost oil production nor achieving major diplomatic breakthroughs. Progressives have also [lamented](https://www.vox.com/2022/7/19/23220600/biden-middle-east-policy-human-rights) that Biden’s fist-bump with the crown prince, whose government he vowed to make a “[pariah](https://www.hoover.org/research/partner-or-pariah-saudi-arabia-biden-administration-and-human-rights)” over the murder of [Jamal Khashoggi](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/07/biden-saudi-arabia-visit-jamal-khashoggi-legacy/670531/), marks the death knell of his supposed [values-centric](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/biden-put-rights-heart-us-foreign-policy-then-he-pulled-punches-2021-09-13/) approach to foreign policy.

While it is true that Biden’s visit is unlikely to alleviate high oil prices in the short-to-medium term, yield an “Arab NATO,” or significantly expedite the path to normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, many commentators set too high a bar of what was achievable during the trip, overlooking its long-term implications for the U.S.-Saudi partnership and American policy in the Middle East more broadly.

Rather than a **desperate attempt** to secure immediate deliverables, Biden’s meeting with the crown prince should be interpreted as the first of many steps towards forging a **stronger relationship** with regional partners, embracing a more **assertive stance** against Iran, and establishing a more **stable alliance** with the Saudis that transcends partisanship, which both Democrats and Republicans can build upon. With a consistent and bipartisan [realist](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2022-07-06/americas-new-realism-middle-east) Middle East policy, the Saudis and other **crucial allies** will view Washington as a more **dependable patron** and will thus be **more willing** to engage on various **geostrategic** and **diplomatic** issues. The president’s attempt to **reset** America’s relationship with its Gulf allies also presents Washington with an opportunity to pursue a more pragmatic and sustainable human rights agenda: a balance between a problematic policy of **unconditional support** and a counterproductive “pariah” strategy.

### Security Guarantee

#### The affirmative could create dramatically expand the existing security relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Steven A. Cook, Martin Indyk, 22 – [Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship at the CFR. He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. Martin S. Indyk is the Lowy distinguished fellow in U.S.-Middle East diplomacy at the CFR. Previously, Indyk served as President Barack Obama's special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, he was executive vice president of the Brookings Institution and he was the founding director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, “The Case for a New U.S.-Saudi Strategic Compact”, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 94, June 2022, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CFR_CSR94_U.S.-SaudiStrategicCompact.pdf>] nl

**A NEW STRATEGIC COMPACT**

With separation being undesirable and a realist reconciliation unreliable, then it is timely to consider a more **fundamental reconceptualization** of the original U.S.-Saudi understanding.

The heart of this new strategic compact would be an **agreement** to counter the threat from Iran. For the United States, **Iran** remains the **principal source** of **instability** in the Middle East. Its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, its support for subversive forces across the region, and its hegemonic and sectarian ambitions present a **constant challenge** to U.S. interests at a time when the United States is preoccupied with greater threats elsewhere. Washington therefore needs reliable and capable regional partners to balance and counter Tehran. As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia can play an **important role** in that regard.

For Saudi Arabia, Iran, too, represents the **principal threat** to its interests, particularly the defense of its homeland, the protection of its oil interests, and the **internal stability** of its wards and friends in the Sunni Arab world. The Saudis worry, however, that the United States prefers to accommodate rather than confront Iran’s regional ambitions. They view the original JCPOA as enabling Iran’s aggressive policies in the region, and they fear that a return to that deal would have a similar result. Indeed, as Iran nears the nuclear weapons threshold, the Saudis have become focused on how nuclear capabilities could afford Iran protection for even greater **regional troublemaking**. They are also concerned that a U.S.-Iran **rapprochement** will empower Iran to **fill the vacuum** left by a U.S. withdrawal from the region.

This explains why bin Salman raised the idea with Biden administration officials who recently met him of a **security guarantee** similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (**NATO**), in which **an attack on Saudi Arabia** would be treated as an **attack on the United States**. (The UAE and Egypt have requested similar security guarantees.) Put simply, Saudi Arabia is looking to the United States to provide a more **reliable deterrent** against Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions and more effective means to defend itself against the missile and drone attacks of Iran’s proxies. This indicates that, notwithstanding his pique at Biden, the crown prince remains interested in a **new security understanding** with the United States. That opens the door to a more **fundamental reimagining** of the U.S.-Saudi relationship.

At its foundations, this new compact would require the United States to recognize the growing importance of Saudi Arabia to American interests in the Middle East, and the consequences that would flow from that reality. And Saudi Arabia would need to recognize the responsibilities that would come from assuming a constructive role as a pillar of stability in a U.S.-supported Middle Eastern order.

On that basis, the two sides would need to negotiate a package of reciprocal steps in which both sides would make parallel commitments to each other. The precise contents of this package would require a detailed negotiation, but the basic elements can be outlined. Given the distrust that now exists in the relationship, and the difficulty of some of the steps, it will be necessary to adopt an incremental approach, putting in place the essential building blocks first and constructing a more elaborate structure over time as each side demonstrates its commitment and reliability. Nevertheless, it would be important to agree on a road map from the outset.

**U.S. SECURITY ASSURANCES**

To deal with the reliability gap, the United States would need to be prepared to provide security assurances to Saudi Arabia, which could come in a variety of forms. A NATO-like treaty commitment to consider an attack on Saudi Arabia as an attack on the United States would require a formal guarantee endorsed by two-thirds of the Senate. Given Saudi Arabia’s low standing in Congress, that is simply unachievable even if it were desirable. However, the United States could reemphasize the Carter Doctrine’s general pledge to prevent any attempt by a hostile power to gain control of the Gulf region. It could then enter into a Strategic Framework Agreement with Saudi Arabia, as it has done with Singapore, for example. That agreement provides a U.S. commitment to enhance bilateral defense and security cooperation to deal with common threats and promote regional peace and stability.32 While this combination does not provide a security guarantee, it would commit the United States to maintaining a favorable balance of power in the region and provide the means necessary for Saudi Arabia to defend itself through much closer defense cooperation with the United States. Those verbal commitments could be buttressed by establishing formal consultative mechanisms, joint military exercises, integrated defenses, and other hard-power manifestations of an American commitment to Saudi security.

If a higher degree of reciprocation were justified by Saudi behavior, the United States could also commit to immediate consultations in the event of an urgent security threat to the kingdom and to respond in accordance with its constitutional processes. That would mirror the Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. Security (ANZUS) Treaty (albeit without congressional endorsement) and the consultative procedures outlined in Article 4 of the NATO Treaty.33 The United States could also borrow from the Taiwan Relations Act and commit to treating an attack on Saudi Arabia as a threat to the peace and security of the Gulf and “of grave concern to the United States.” Similarly, President Biden could commit to making available the necessary arms to enable Saudi Arabia to “maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities.”34 That would, of course, require congressional acquiescence, which would be forthcoming only if the Biden administration could point to Saudi actions that justified it.

None of those assurances provide the ironclad commitment of NATO that would automatically treat an attack on Saudi Arabia as an attack on the United States. That would depend on the circumstances. But the more Saudi Arabia acted like a reliable ally, the more the United States would feel obliged to come to the kingdom’s defense. And the deeper the defense cooperation and interoperability of defense systems, the more credible the deterrent and the more likely an appropriate military response from the United States.

If the current negotiations to return to the JCPOA nuclear agreement break down and Iran continues its advance to the nuclear threshold, the United States would also need to consider extending a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia in exchange for a Saudi commitment to forgo any acquisition of an independent nuclear capability, including forgoing uranium enrichment. Providing Saudi Arabia with some form of nuclear umbrella would represent a far-reaching commitment by the United States. However, the United States has already committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The more that commitment seems in doubt, the more necessary extended deterrence will become. The alternative could well be a Saudi Arabia that seeks its own nuclear weapons, helping to fuel a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

#### More evidence for that proposal.

Steven A. Cook, Martin Indyk, 22 – [Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship at the CFR. He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. Martin S. Indyk is the Lowy distinguished fellow in U.S.-Middle East diplomacy at the CFR. Previously, Indyk served as President Barack Obama's special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, he was executive vice president of the Brookings Institution and he was the founding director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, “The Case for a New U.S.-Saudi Strategic Compact”, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 94, June 2022, <https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/CFR_CSR94_U.S.-SaudiStrategicCompact.pdf>] nl

**CONCLUSION**

With the United States now focused on a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine and a rising China in Asia, Biden and bin Salman could take the easy way out and continue on their separate ways, coping with high oil prices on the one side and an increasingly dangerous neighborhood on the other without relying on each other. Or they could return to the realist compact that worked well for the first five decades of U.S.-Saudi relations, even though that approach is not sustainable over time and the costs for U.S. interests, should it fail again, could become considerable. In either case, outside powers would seek to fill the vacuum left by the United States in the Gulf, Iran would increase its efforts to assert its hegemony over the Arab world, and a nuclear arms race could take off in the volatile Middle East. Saudi Arabia, too, will hardly be more secure if that scenario unfolds. The risks and costs to both sides associated with these two alternatives make it imperative to consider a third way of negotiating a reciprocal process of **strategic rapprochement**. Such an effort is admittedly a tall order, requiring a mutual commitment and a sustained seriousness of purpose on both sides. At a time when the United States is preoccupied elsewhere, taking on a new security commitment in the Middle East looks like a repudiation of the bipartisan effort of the last three presidents to end U.S. engagement in the Middle East’s conflicts. Yet, without U.S. support for a more stable Middle Eastern order, the United States will be dragged back into conflicts there sooner than war-weary Americans imagine because events in the Middle East directly affect American security interests. Moreover, the crisis in Ukraine and Iran’s advancing nuclear program have together created a plastic moment in which **major adjustments** to the U.S.-Saudi relationship become possible to contemplate and necessary to achieve, especially given potential immediate benefits, such as opening the Saudi oil spigot and relieving the pressure in the oil market.

Saudi Arabia, too, would have to make difficult sacrifices to achieve the new compact, breaking—or at least not renewing—its quota agreement with Russia and moving back into the American orbit with all that would mean for its current policies at home and abroad.

Nevertheless, to manage the multiple crises of this era in the Middle East and beyond, the United States needs a responsible Saudi partner, and Saudi Arabia needs a reliable U.S. one. Seventy-seven years after President Roosevelt met King Abdulaziz, the time has come for the United States and Saudi Arabia to secure the future of their relationship by attempting to achieve a **new strategic compact** for the twenty-first century.

### Conditions---Humanitarianism/MBS Repression

#### The aff could advocate for conditioning US support to Saudi Arabia on meeting human rights standards—that forces MBS behavior change.

Khalid Aljabri 22, – [Khalid Aljabri holds a master’s degree in international affairs from The Fletcher School and an MBA from MIT. His writing and commentary focus on foreign policy and national security issues in the Middle East. He has written for the Washington Post and Foreign Policy and has been quoted by the New York Times, The Atlantic, Foreign Affairs and the Guardian among other outlets. "Biden’s Weak Stand in Saudi Arabia Could Kick MBS’ Repression Machine Into Overdrive – But It’s Not Too Late to Act," Just Security, 8-8-2022, <https://www.justsecurity.org/82576/bidens-weak-stand-in-saudi-arabia-could-kick-mbs-repression-machine-into-overdrive-but-its-not-too-late-to-act/>] nl

Ever since assuming de-facto power several years ago, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MBS, has built a **ruthless repression machine** by recruiting [loyal](https://mei.edu/publications/crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salmans-people)operatives **cementing** his control of the security forces, distorting religious doctrine and [criminalizing](https://law.stanford.edu/2020/01/29/saudi-crackdown-on-dissent-violates-kingdoms-international-legal-obligations/) dissent. But despite the immense power he consolidated, MBS’ **power play** lacked a crucial component – **international legitimacy** – particularly after he was ostracized by the West for ordering the murder and dismemberment of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Tragically, President Joe Biden, who once pledged to hold the crown prince accountable and make his regime a [“pariah,”](https://theintercept.com/2019/11/21/democratic-debate-joe-biden-saudi-arabia/) has gifted MBS the legitimacy he craves and validated his transnational repression strategy. Biden’s fist bump with MBS during his recent visit to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was a stomach-churning display of how the U.S. administration has sacrificed its [values-based foreign policy](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/) rhetoric to a false idea of realism – without any real wins.

**It’s not too late**, though, for Biden to change course in a way that lives up to American values while gaining ground for U.S. interests.

If there was one true winner coming out of this Biden visit, it was MBS. The Saudi Press Agency [immediately disseminated choreographed photos of the two leaders side by side](https://twitter.com/spagov/status/1547975531311669249?s=20&t=822X3kFRDpVsJnqloIgcrA), marking an end to MBS’ isolation and [completing his rehabilitation project](https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/23/opinions/saudi-crown-prince-biden-rehabilitation-tour-miller/index.html).

But beyond giving a major **reputational boost** to MBS, Biden has rendered him more dangerous than ever. Right after Biden’s visit, one of Saudi Arabia’s top diplomats, pressed by the BBC over the Kingdom’s targeting of detractors, [affirmed](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62189543) MBS’s repression doctrine: “What you may call a dissident, we call a terrorist.”

Of course, this was the same pretext used to go after Khashoggi. Last year, by [distorting](https://twitter.com/aalodah/status/1387433475142258693?s=21&t=HkS0fYTneF6WclCl0i0GTQ) a religious text, MBS inferred that dissent is an act of extremism that warrants murder, and three weeks before Khashoggi’s assassination, a senior state-sponsored cleric issued a [fatwa](https://sabq.org/saudia/qkxf4x) authorizing the killing of dissidents who disobey political leaders.

While MBS apologists have [portrayed](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-model-for-a-saudi-reformer-1531868178) him as a religious reformer, his misappropriation of religion to justify assassinations exposes him as an extremist.

By once again declaring that peaceful dissent is tantamount to terrorism, the Saudis have undermined their own spin that Khashoggi’s assassination was a one-off mistake rather than a symptom of systematic repression. Clearly, then, Biden’s [confrontation](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/07/15/remarks-by-president-biden-on-his-meetings-in-saudi-arabia/) of MBS over his involvement in Khashoggi’s murder – an account repeatedly and disingenuously [disputed](https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-fm-disputes-bidens-claim-condemned-mbs-over-khashoggi-death-2022-7) by the Saudis –  failed to shift the Saudis’ calculus. If anything, the president’s visit taught MBS, who recently spoke about a [1,000-person hit list](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/04/mohammed-bin-salman-saudi-arabia-palace-interview/622822/) and professional assassins, that he can get away with future murders, too.

Since his time as President Barack Obama’s vice president, Biden has witnessed the evolution of MBS’s repression, which began long before Khashoggi’s murder. In 2015, my father, Saad Aljabri, a former top Saudi intelligence official, refused MBS’s request to deploy Saudi counterterrorism agents to abduct and forcefully return a dissenting Saudi royal from Europe. MBS then fired my father and formed his own private unit, known as the [Tiger Team](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/mbss-rampaging-anger-will-not-silence-questions-about-jamal-khashoggi/2018/10/16/5a0bf43a-d182-11e8-b2d2-f397227b43f0_story.html), to execute the mission in Europe and target other foes through [renditions](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2KYQWPUbG4), [kidnapping](https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/08/how-saudi-prince-sultan-disappeared), [torture](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/07/28/salem-almuzaini-torture-saudi-arabia-mbs/) and [assassinations](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/12/saudi-general-may-have-tortured-death-ritz-carlton-crackdown/). Three years later, Canadian authorities stopped members of the same squad from entering the country to harm my father.

As president, Biden declassified a [CIA report](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/26/us/report-jamal-khashoggi-killing.html) that concluded MBS’s culpability in the Khashoggi assassination and [sanctioned](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0038) the hit team, but refrained from imposing direct sanctions on him. Because the crown prince has faced **no real consequences** for his reckless actions, MBS hasn’t stopped targeting detractors.

Just last month, a Saudi royal court operative who bullied U.S.-based Saudi dissidents, was [arrested](https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-canada-arrests-dubai-united-arab-emirates-9d04fff334bfc0702c9dc186b01c3f3c) and charged with lying to the FBI. And, a week before Biden traveled to Jeddah, 14-year-old Saudi American Rakan Aldossari recounted his [escape](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/06/mbs-saudi-arabia-family-escape-biden/) from Saudi repression after the Biden administration ignored his pleas for help –  a story in which Biden’s indifference is as troubling as MBS’s hostage-taking.

Many other [American citizens](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/14/biden-saudi-arabia-mbs-imprisoned-american-citizens-khashoggi/) whom Biden has [pledged](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/07/09/joe-biden-saudi-arabia-israel-visit/) to free are still barred from leaving Saudi Arabia. The president’s inability to secure their release prior to expending **significant political capital** by granting a presidential visit to MBS indicates serious flaws in his approach to dealing with the crown prince.

Before Biden announced his trip to Jeddah, and despite my family’s [plight](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/28/this-former-intelligence-official-was-hero-hes-now-target-brutal-campaign-by-mbs/) at the hands of MBS, I [urged](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/05/26/saudi-arabia-united-states-relations-biden-repression-conditions/) the president to address relations with the Kingdom, albeit **with conditions** that include reciprocal respect of American interests and values. Despite Biden’s belief that the presidency [“should stand for something,”](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/05/biden-wants-to-get-out-more-seething-that-his-standing-is-now-worse-than-trumps-00037278) it is not clear why he proceeded with his lopsided, **one-way concessions**.

While the president has already sparked predictable [outrage](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/15/a-fist-bump-at-the-palace-biden-squares-off-with-mbs-00046106), whether the fist-bump was a legacy-defining moment or a bad chapter in a hero’s story remains to be seen. I believe Biden is a principled leader who genuinely seems to care about human rights. And I remain hopeful that **not all is lost**.

By **complementing realism** with **humanitarianism** and demanding **reciprocal concessions** before any future engagements with MBS or meeting Saudi demands, Biden can recast how this moment will go down in history.

The president should start by insisting that the regime free political prisoners, including American prisoners, and that it lift the [travel bans](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/saudi-court-upholds-sentence-of-womens-rights-activist-loujain-al-hathloul) that have entrapped peaceful activists and their families.

If Saudi Arabia wants to continue a **constructive** intelligence/counterterrorism **partnership**, it must make substantive reforms to **reverse the trend** of targeting dissidents who pose no real threat and to refocus on legitimate security risks.

Biden has also repeatedly [justified](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/07/26/biden-yemen-truce-saudi/) his engagement with MBS by pointing to the need for **Saudi cooperation** in bringing the **disastrous war** in Yemen to an end. While the United Nations-brokered ceasefire was a positive step forward, a final resolution is necessary to end the suffering and restore regional stability. The president should **make clear** that American support for the regime is **contingent** on **nothing short** of an **iron-clad commitment** from MBS to a **peace settlement**.

If he **changes course**, Biden can be remembered for driving a **successful reset** that salvaged the relationship, advanced mutual interests, and expanded overlapping values.

### Conditions---Israel Deal

#### The United States could engage with Saudi Arabia and condition the provision of security guarantees on the normalization of relations with Israel. A main advantage would be about developing regional alliances to counter Iran.

Dion Nissenbaum, Dov Lieber and Stephen Kalin, 23 – [Dion Nissenbaum is an award-winning reporter covering U.S. policy in the Middle East and regional security for The Wall Street Journal, Dov Lieber is a Wall Street Journal correspondent covering Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Stephen Kalin is a foreign correspondent for The Wall Street Journal based in the Middle East, where he has lived since 2009, "WSJ News Exclusive," WSJ, 3-9-2023, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-seeks-u-s-security-pledges-nuclear-help-for-peace-with-israel-cd47baaf>] nl

Saudi Arabia is asking the U.S. to provide **security guarantees** and help to develop its civilian nuclear program as Washington tries to broker **diplomatic relations** between the kingdom and Israel, people involved in discussions between the two countries said.

Striking a **normalization deal** between Israel and Saudi Arabia has become a priority for President Biden and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu amid a looming confrontation with [Iran over its nuclear program](https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-iran-edge-toward-nuclear-deal-as-israel-warns-it-cedes-too-much-to-tehran-11661352794?mod=article_inline) and military aid to Russia during [the Ukraine war](https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-hit-in-one-of-russias-biggest-missile-barrages-this-year-ae9d4b91?mod=article_inline). The Biden administration is deeply involved in the complex negotiations, the people said, and any deal would reshape the Middle East’s political landscape.

The Saudi demands for security guarantees and nuclear aid are among the daunting obstacles to a deal, as some Washington lawmakers will likely oppose those measures. There remains caution in Riyadh about striking a deal that would come under fire in the Arab world and exacerbate tensions with Iran.

Support in Saudi Arabia and across the Arab world for openly embracing Israel has also cooled in recent weeks as [violence surges in the West Bank](https://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-palestinians-caught-in-escalating-cycle-of-violence-in-jerusalem-and-west-bank-11675001861?mod=article_inline) to levels not seen in nearly two decades and Mr. Netanyahu presses ahead with [judicial-law changes](https://www.wsj.com/articles/netanyahu-advances-overhaul-of-top-israeli-court-drawing-thousands-of-protesters-ee0287d7?mod=article_inline) that have [triggered massive protests](https://www.wsj.com/articles/israeli-military-officers-threaten-to-refuse-to-serve-if-judicial-overhaul-passes-5ce022f8?mod=article_inline), some of the people said.

Daniel Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel who now focuses on strengthening Israel-Arab world ties as a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, called a potential deal “a very tough Gordian knot to cut.”

“**Normalization** between Israel and Saudi Arabia, **facilitated** by the United States, is in all three parties’ interests,” he said. “But that doesn’t mean it’s easy to arrange.”

Still, U.S., Israeli and Saudi **officials** said **a deal is possible**. Mr. Netanyahu is looking to build on Israeli ties to the Arab world that expanded in 2020 with [the so-called Abraham Accords](https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-israel-u-a-e-bahrain-sign-peace-accord-11600191303?mod=article_inline), when four Muslim nations committed to normal relations with Israel.

Saudi Arabia has **intensified security ties** with Israel in recent years with an eye to confronting Iran and sees growing potential for business deals as the kingdom looks to [**diversify its economy** away from oil](https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-seeks-to-lure-global-miners-in-bid-to-overhaul-its-economy-11673542526?mod=article_inline). A deal would mark a diplomatic victory for Mr. Biden, who has had repeated clashes with Saudi Arabia over human rights, oil prices, the war in Yemen and support for Ukraine.

If Saudi Arabia—home to the two holiest sites in Islam—were to establish **formal ties** with Israel, it could send a signal to other Arab and Muslim leaders that they would be free to embrace Israel while also accelerating U.S.-led efforts to create a **regional military alliance** to **counter Iran**.

## Kritikal

### Overview

#### A large amount of the discussion above unfolds a narrative about the Middle East requiring US intervention. While the most conservative leaning of that discussion would not be ripe for kritikal affirmation, there are a swath of topics within the Middle East constructive engagement vein that could warrant an instrumental engagement for critical aims. For example, there are a mass amount of human rights violations occurring in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Palestinians are literally fighting for national survival. While these approaches are a more soft-left critical engagement, there are definitely approaches to a topic about Middle East engagement that could be more hard-left/critical. In fact, we would argue it is probably the best topic on this slate of options for critical debate.

#### Many critical scholars have begun to grapple with the history of US engagement with the Middle East, articulating a need to attune to the hidden, ideological nature of imperial desires. For example, Jeff Colgan’s (2021) book *Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order*, unpacks the history of oil economies by metropoles, paying particular focus to the inevitability of capitalist securitization logics and imperial domination tied to desires for energy security. Dochuk’s (2020) work follows a similar vein.[[1]](#footnote-1)

#### In the next header, we have a couple cards from indigenous scholars articulating a need to tether decolonial notions of refusal to explication of violence in Palestine.

#### Jasbir Puar’s work on homonationalism, which has now been taken up by many other queer scholars, represents a fruitful area of critiquing the epistemological backing for US involvement in the Middle East, merging a critique of hegemony, imperialism, Orientalism, and heteronormativity.

#### But beyond an evaluation of history, there is also a need to understand the evolving present in the Middle East. Since the 2012 democracy assistance topic, there has been a swath of changes on the micropolitical end that deserve both critical affirmative and negative unpacking. There have been specific activism milestones in the Middle East since we last debated the topic.

#### The Arab Spring was at its initial peak during the MENA Democracy Assistance topic, but the fruits of activists’ labor in that area were not seen until the years after, and the fight continues (<https://time.com/5926742/arab-spring-decade/>; https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/02/mena-repression-and-violence-fail-to-stamp-out-arab-activism-10-years-since-mass-uprisings-of-2011/).

#### Middle East Matters is a diasporic collective evolving out of the massive gender based human rights violations in Iran, focused on access to reproductive health and ethnic collaboration, with the goal of crafting a new age of Middle east micropolitical revolution (<https://www.vice.com/en/article/jg8n44/how-these-young-activists-are-uniting-middle-easterners>).

#### LGBTQ+ activism through grassroots organizations like the Arab Foundation for Freedoms and Equality within the Middle East has reached much higher heights, focusing on paths for survival despite institutional hurdles and authoritarian repression (<https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/16/audacity-adversity/lgbt-activism-middle-east-and-north-africa>)

#### Digital activism against digital authoritarianism has located ways to navigate imperial desires while pushing for the voices of countless to be heard (<https://pomeps.org/digital-activism-and-authoritarian-adaptation-in-the-middle-east>)

#### Artists all over the Middle East have used aesthetic mediums as a revolutionary staging ground (<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/collection/art-mena-medium-activism>)

#### Poets in Iran have used affect and the power of their words to stage a micropolitical resistance against dominant and violent governance (<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/video/mandana-zandian-power-words-form-activism-iran?collection=110974>)

#### The World Cup in 2022 saw protesters like Peter Tatchell staging the “first-ever public LGBTQ+ protest in the Gulf.

#### Each of these instances of activism shows the need for debate attention, because just as tactics may represent the chance for successful revolution – they can also come with potential violent backlash and failure to succeed (https://tcf.org/content/commentary/why-protests-evolve-or-dont-in-the-middle-east-europe-and-north-america/). For example, while Tatchell’s World Cup protest inspired waves of support, it also led to massive repression legislation by Iraq, *“In Iraq, politicians have continued to wage a culture war against homosexuals. Al-Sadr launched a*[*petition*](https://twitter.com/iraqmedianet/status/1598234908945747969)*to gather one million signatures committed to “combatting sexual deviants” (author’s translation), and parliamentarians are pushing a*[*bill*](https://www.siasat.com/iraq-parliament-drafts-law-to-ban-publications-on-lgbtq-concerns-2479200/)*to criminalize “anyone who would for any reason ‘publish or promote’ homosexuality.”” (*[*https://www.csis.org/analysis/lgbtq-advocacy-middle-east-backfires*](https://www.csis.org/analysis/lgbtq-advocacy-middle-east-backfires)*)*

#### This topic presents an opportunity for engagement over tactic formation. A hard investigation of what methodologies and strategies can best support survival and revolution, how to avoid governmental crackdown, etc.

#### Beyond that, words like “foreign assistance” in the resolution provide a creative way to engage the topic. How may diasporic connections between activist groups on the ground in the US and abroad come together to create strategies of mutual assistance? What does it mean to constructively engage? These moments of rhetorical play in topic are unique when discussing engagement with the Middle East, since so much of the work on the ground arose from counterhegemonic readings of what “political work” is in the first place.

#### For example, Abawi (2023) articulates that Western depictions of Muslim women perpetuated hegemonic tropes of helplessness and victimhood, erasing long histories of resistive politics. They advocate for a recentering Brown Muslim women and girl’s resistance as critical to anti-colonial praxis

Zuhra Abawi, Assistant Professor of Education and Program Coordinator of the Masters in Educational Leadership program at Niagara University, March 4th 2023, “Strength through Resistance: Drawing Critical Connections between Malalai of Maiwand and Malala Yousafazai to Counter Western Narratives of Muslim Girlhood”, The Power of Oral Culture in Education, <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#Sec3>, 4-27-23, -PGR

The enduring message of the two stories is the recentering of Brown Muslim women and girls’ leadership and resistance as central to anti-colonial resistance. Through the hegemonic Western lens, Pashtun women and girls have been objectified as oppressed and helpless, while frontline women’s resistance to imperialism has been vastly ignored by Western feminism (Akseer, [2015](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR4)). The narrative of the ‘plight’ of Afghan women in particular has rather been utilized to justify ongoing domination of Afghanistan. The story reclaims Afghan women’s role in anti-imperial and anti-colonial struggles in Afghanistan through an anticolonial and transnational feminist framework (Berry, [2003](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR8); Dei, [2010](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR15); Grewal, [2005](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR54); Wa Thiong’o, [1986](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR50); Wane, [2008](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR52)). Malalai’s story re-positions Brown Muslim women as central to anti-colonial political and educational movements in the tribal regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan and carves out a narrative of resistance that dismantles hegemonic Western ideas, and portrayals of Muslim women and girls have had and continue to perpetuate devastating consequences. The West controls the ways in which these narratives are mass produced and conveyed in order to deflect notions of power and the ways in which power and dominance are monopolized to displace Black and Brown bodies in the all-encompassing campaign of neo-colonial and capitalist exploitation. In this juncture, whiteness is innocence and humanized within its saviourism, most notably, George Bush’s notorious ‘War on Terror’ that justified itself through a deficit lens concerning Muslim women and girls. In this case, violence was commissioned based on the need to ‘save’ the oppressed, Brown, burka-clad women and girls (Abdelkarim, [2021](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR53); Elhinnawy, [2021](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR16)). What these dominant narratives often ignore is that militant groups, the Taliban in this case, are by-products of Western imperialism (Ahmad, [2017](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR2)). Malala follows the lead of Malalai and countless generations of women and girl activists who came before her, who risked their lives and the lives of their families in order to run covert underground schools to continue their education (Povey-Rostami, [2007](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR41)). Women and girls have not only long advocated for their rights, but have been instrumental to rebuilding communities, which have been displaced by conflict, through solidarity. The overarching challenge in creating access to education, particularly for women and girls, is ongoing, chronic conflict and foreign meddling. Prior to the Soviet Union’s devastating invasion of Afghanistan, access to education for women and girls, especially in urban areas, was near universal. Historically, access to education was restricted along ethnic lines that often and unfortunately marginalized the Hazara population. The hegemonic Western discourses that suggest that Islam is incompatible with women’s education are deeply inaccurate and flawed and work to perpetuate harmful ideas of Muslim women and girls and the men in their societies (Khurshid, [2017](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR26)). Universities and institutions of higher education were also open to women; my grandmother herself graduated from Kabul University as a nurse. Following the Soviet invasion, a multi-ethnic and multi-tribal, heterogeneous Afghan population united through their shared religion of Islam, under clandestine CIA policy, in stark opposition to an atheist communist regime that defined the USSR at the time (Coll, [2004](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR14); Griffin, [2001](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR55); Maley, [1998](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR29); Rashid, 2010). Upon the USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, after decimating the country and committing what is considered genocide against the Afghan people, a power vacuum existed enabling a civil war and the formation of various factional warlords that sought to carve up the country based on ethnic identities. As many young orphaned refugees returned home after being indoctrinated into madrassas abroad, having been immersed in variations of Islam uncommon to Afghanistan, the Taliban was formed in Kandahar under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar, himself a veteran of the war. Many of the talibs (students) had grown up only knowing war and their version of Islam, based upon the Deobandi School of Thought (Maley, [1998](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR29)), with no knowledge of the old Afghanistan that under the monarchy was considered one of the most peaceful countries in Asia (Ataullahjan, [2021](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR7)). Due to the radicalization of the Taliban government, once revered for bringing peace and order, women and girls were pushed out of public life and began creating complex underground educational networks to empower one another. Afghan women and girls continue to battle the challenges and barriers they face in accessing education because of Western military imperialism, which catastrophically disrupted decades of tribal life and self-sustainability. In addition to the establishment of comprehensive underground educational systems, Afghan women also formed the Revolutionary Association of Afghan Women (RAWA) as a framework for women’s political activism in the country. The organization was founded by Nahid-i-Shaid and Meena Kamal, who were both killed, but the organization thrives on the backs of new generations of Afghan women and girls through various health and educational programmes (Brodsky, [2009](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR10)). There is a much needed discussion that must take place concerning the diversity of Muslim women and girls, as the assumption that a singular Muslim woman’s experience is pervasive (Khurshid, [2017](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR26)). Moreover, the hegemonic narrative of a singular experience is further perpetuated by the ubiquity of white authors (mostly women) writing about Brown Muslim women and girls. These books effectively exoticize the lives of Muslim women and girls and further reinforce harmful colonial stereotypes of gender binaries, oppression and backwardness (Sensoy & Marshall, [2010](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR43)). Sensoy and Marshall ([2010](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR43)) critique how white Western narratives of Muslim girlhood ultimately perpetuate orientalist norms of the Occident/West being innately superior to the Orient/Middle east/south Asia (Said, 1978). The authors discuss how these colonial relationships play out in *The Breadwinner*, a book about a young girl in Taliban-led Afghanistan, written by a white Canadian woman. They refer to this phenomenon as ‘missionary girl power’, to describe ‘strategies that construct first world girls as the saviours of their “Third World” sisters’ (p. 296). While the term Third World, in and of itself, is problematic and outdated, the term that will be utilized is the Global South. Books and media narratives that frame the lived experiences of, and speak for Brown Muslim women and girls further to erase their political activism, agency and resistance, the likes of which white Western women cannot fathom. In order to recentre the lived experiences of leaders and activists such as Malalai and Malala through counter stories, the following lesson plan encourages students to undertake their own research in order to counter hegemonic constructions of Muslim girlhood. These Orientalist discourses, widely played out in the media, depict Islamic societies as perpetually ‘backward’, confined to the past and unable to evolve. In this vein, all social ills and control mechanisms are attributed to the men in their societies who are predisposed to violence and brutality. This narrative was compounded with Western media and saturated images of Afghan women being flogged, stoned and shot in execution style in soccer stadiums. The ultra-masculine warlords that characterize all Muslim men in the eyes of the West force veiling on women, while conveniently silencing the hijab as political resistance, as well as the trauma enacted by European colonizers in the forced and public unveiling ceremonies of Muslim women and girls (Falecka, [2017](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18537-3_4#ref-CR18)). These colonial media depictions perpetuate harmful, deficit perspectives of all Muslims as extremists, whilst wilfully ignoring the devastating impacts and repercussions past and ongoing colonial and imperialist projects have across the Islamic world.

### K Aff---Iran---Collective for Black Iranians

#### Antiblackness discussions are intimately tied to Iranian discourse – affirming a method of storytelling like the Collective for Black Iranians is necessary to combat transnational antiblack violence

Beeta Baghoolizadeh and Priscilla Kounkou Hoveyda, Summer 2021, Kounkou Hoveyda is a human rights lawyer, has a decade of experience working with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as well as other UN agencies and non-governmental organizations that focus on building international and national policies for the most vulnerable populations around the world. She is also a documentary filmmaker. Baghoolizadeh is an assistant professor of history and Africana studies at Bucknell University and serves as the resident historian for the Collective for Black Iranians, “Writing Ourselves into Existence with the Collective for Black Iranians”, Summer 2021, <https://merip-org.mutex.gmu.edu/2021/08/writing-ourselves-into-existence-with-the-collective-for-black-iranians-299/?fbclid=IwAR2aKPrGZcLxK7aSCc6XRsp_Z-ZynrpBVq-Rp0kJHAOSEQCpAeGqFlplhF0>, Middle East Research and Information Project, 4-26-23, -PGR

Six Black and Afro-Iranians based in Canada, Germany, France and the United States launched the Collective for Black Iranians in August 2020 out of the necessity to be seen, to be heard and to be understood.

As of May 2021, the Collective for Black Iranians has developed a lively audience of over 20,000 followers from all over the world. The Collective centers the Black and Afro-Iranian experience through various media in Persian and English in collaboration with their network of resident artists, storytellers and filmmakers.

Despite a centuries-long presence in Iran, Black Iranians are regularly written out of national historical narratives. Sailors, merchants, laborers, religious leaders, political figures and enslaved people all connected the East African and Iranian coasts. By the nineteenth century, however, Iranians saw East Africans largely through the lens of enslavement. Although Iranians had, for centuries, enslaved Caucasians, Central Asians, South Asians and East Africans, geopolitical changes ultimately left East Africans most vulnerable. While some East Africans were enslaved as date farmers or [pearl divers](https://yalebooks-yale-edu.mutex.gmu.edu/book/9780300192018/slaves-one-master), the prevalence of [domestic workers](https://escholarship.org/content/qt6z7609nz/qt6z7609nz_noSplash_690048ab4e5a7aaf94bfaa9ae80ebed0.pdf?t=o8at2n) in urban centers informed Iranian conventions about race, particularly [Blackness](https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2833/). In the cities, enslaved East African men, women and children worked as nannies, cooks, pages, escorts and housekeepers to manage elite and wealthy Iranians’ day-to-day lives. Persian speakers commonly used the term “siyah” or “black*”*as an adjective to describe a variety of people, ranging from people from Baluchistan to elsewhere in the subcontinent. But the growing association of East Africans with enslavement turned the term “Black” into a noun that referred specifically to enslaved East Africans.

The groundbreaking work of the Collective for Black Iranians is the first and only effort of its kind in Iran that brings together the voices of Black and Afro-Iranians, sharing their stories and experiences to foster greater racial consciousness and combat the anti-Black racism endemic to the Iranian community. Their work has been featured in multiple news outlets, including Al Jazeera, AJ+, *The New Arab* and more, and they have partnered with Because We’ve Read book club and Cassava Republic Press to create a unit around the history of race, Blackness and enslavement in Iran. In September 2021 the Collective will be showcasing their first multimedia exhibition at Twelve Gates Arts in Philadelphia, PA, a show titled “Hastim: We are Here.”

Beeta Baghoolizadeh interviewed a founding member of the Collective for Black Iranians, Priscillia Kounkou Hoveyda, in April 2021. Kounkou Hoveyda, a human rights lawyer, has a decade of experience working with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as well as other UN agencies and non-governmental organizations that focus on building international and national policies for the most vulnerable populations around the world. She is also a documentary filmmaker. Baghoolizadeh is an assistant professor of history and Africana studies at Bucknell University and serves as the resident historian for the Collective for Black Iranians. She is currently writing her book, *The Color Black: Enslavement and Erasure in Iran*

**Beeta:** Since the launch of the Collective at the end of August 2020, storytelling through art, music and film has been a major thread in the efforts to center and amplify Black Iranian voices. Could you tell us about the power of storytelling in the Collective’s work?

**Priscillia:** Storytelling plays a significant role in both African and Iranian cultures. At the Collective we are all about standing at the intersection of who we are and sharing the power of what it means to be who we are. Hence, we naturally use storytelling to do so. We tell the stories of Iranian and African and Black realities that many didn’t know existed, to ensure that we learn from one another in ways that enable us to cohabit in this global society, now equipped with a greater understanding of one another.

We are, in a way, the griots of the Iranian community. In ancient West African tradition, griots were the storytellers of their times—they observed society and recounted its stories so that those stories are never forgotten. Equally important, griots asked that the stories they’ve told are retold so that they are owned by all. The Collective, in that same griot tradition, conveys the stories of Black and Afro-Iranians from around the world and then asks audiences to share these stories so they are owned by all of us.

We make an effort to improve accessibility; all our content is available in both Persian and English. Our goal is to be available in more languages because we believe that identity is transnational.

**Beeta**: How do you choose what stories to share?

**Priscillia:** We founded the Collective with a pool of Black and Afro-Iranian storytellers in Iran and from across the Iranian and African diaspora. We are already a village of voices, so we have looked toward the Collective—that is, to its founding and contributing members—to begin to share segments of who we are to inspire others to do the same. For example, another founding member, Parisa Nkoy, shares the story of her love for singing. She explains, however, that she never sang in Persian within her Iranian community for fear of being mocked because she is Black. And so through the series “Voices from Home,” Parisa [sings](https://www.instagram.com/p/CGS6jH2HRZN/) a song by the famous Iranian singer Googosh.

In other cases, one of us knows of someone else who is Black and Iranian and/or of African descent, whether a relative, a friend, an acquaintance. Or we admire someone’s art. For example, I had known Pegah Bahadori before launching the Collective. She is Iranian of African descent, from southern Iran, a student in psychology and now a contributing member to the Collective. Pegah has taken our audience to powerful [moments](https://www.instagram.com/p/CNLf4dFglEp/) from her childhood and she’s taught us so much about who we are by paying attention to what we may not have known. She explained during our roundtable conversation around Transnational Blackness how the vast majority of people around her did not know about the Persian Gulf slave trade and Iran’s involvement in it.

Once we’ve identified storytellers, they decide what story to tell based on who they are; the Collective then becomes a creative echo by sharing and amplifying their voices.

**Beeta**: The role of memory seems to operate at two different levels throughout the work of the Collective. Many of the scenes and stories shared are directly from different members’ memories of their own experiences—for example, Arameh Anvarizadeh’s [recollections](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OoPUnfzzck0) of her birthday in Iran or Melika Khorsandipour’s [memories](https://www.instagram.com/p/CG2kXKSAZ7C/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link) of being mocked for her taste in clothing. Then there is the second layer, where we’ve presented historical stories gathered from archival sources or memoirs to combat the erasure of the history of enslavement and abolition in Iranian Collective memory. How are these two different layers of memories related, if at all?

**Priscillia:** There are indeed two layers of memories that the Collective strives to connect. In fact, I would add a third one: the memory of the future. This future-oriented memory is not yet integrated into our work, but we wish to set the ground for its formation.

The first layer is the one that connects memory to the past. This is history and it is important to know all its dimensions, especially those that are relevant to living with one another today. Within Iran and among the Iranian community at large there is a general lack of knowledge about the Persian Gulf slave trade, for example, and the fact that enslavement was only abolished in 1929 in Iran. Dialogues around race are either scarce or foreign—literally and figuratively. I grew up hearing folks say to me, “We do not have Black People in Iran,” even after I tell them I am also Iranian. My experience is echoed by many other Black Iranians who have also constantly felt the need to explain how they can be both.

It was clear to the Collective that there was work that needed to be done in the realm of memory and consciousness, the awakening of what is there but we do not know. The other layer of our work on memory grounds us in the present and establishes through stories like Arameh’s in Los Angeles and Melika’s in Bandar Abbas that we are here, not only in Iran and throughout the Iranian diaspora but also throughout the world. Melika’s stories are here to teach us that we, Black women who are also Iranian, share a current Iranian reality—at family gatherings, at wedding ceremonies, at Nowruz celebrations. At every single Iranian moment. Black women are here and history should remind everyone that we were, and indeed are, always here.

The Collective’s work, then, is essentially one of writing ourselves into existence—in the past, the present and the future.

**Beeta**: When scrolling through the Collective’s Instagram account ([@CollectiveforBlackIranians](https://www.instagram.com/collectiveforblackiranians/)), we might think of the artwork as an album of these memories, personal and forgotten, along with quotes and reminders to help us build more memories in the future. What role does the art play in the retelling of these stories?

**Priscillia:** I see art as a tool to communicate emotions and to connect with one another. Using art to place Blackness in the Iranian reality, or the Iranian reality in Blackness, is another way of writing, or in this particular case drawing, ourselves into existence.

I used to sit with my grandma cutting sabzi (green herbs) for hours in Tehran. She’d gossip about every single relative and I’d just listen mostly in detached approval. The*panke*(fan) would be on the floor making more noise than wind, my melanated skin becoming one with my Iranian reality. I shared that memory of my childhood in Tehran with Alex Eskandarkhah, another founding member, and he could mirror me, echo me with his memory of seeing his Afro-Iranian grandmother cut sabzi in their garden in Abadan in southern Iran. I thought that was important: that echo. And this memory is now embodied in a [piece](https://www.instagram.com/p/CFfSuLuAg7Q/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link) produced by the Collective with British Iranian artist Sahar Ghorishi.

Similarly, the Collective has worked to imagine and visualize some of the histories available to us today. For example, we created a series on the life of Khyzran in a visual format, researched by you, Beeta, and illustrated by Iranian American artist Mina Jafari. Khyzran was born in Zanzibar in 1834 and trafficked into Iran in 1856, where she advocated for her own and others’ freedom. In one [piece](https://www.instagram.com/p/CFr0QQLgBSk/), we see Khyzran on a dhow holding Walladee, a young, enslaved boy she had tried to free.

A very touching series produced by the Collective, #WritingOurselves, says it loud and clear: we are here. In this series, we continue to put art at the service of history and advocacy. For example, we created art around the fact that in 1867 a census showed that 2.5 percent of Tehran’s population was Black.[[1]](https://merip-org.mutex.gmu.edu/2021/08/writing-ourselves-into-existence-with-the-collective-for-black-iranians-299/?fbclid=IwAR2aKPrGZcLxK7aSCc6XRsp_Z-ZynrpBVq-Rp0kJHAOSEQCpAeGqFlplhF0" \l "_edn1) Let’s bear in mind that migrations were not only forced, some people chose to migrate due to economic opportunities or other forms of social mobility. In collaboration with Congolese artist Ben Lugamba and under your guidance as our resident historian, we produced a [piece](https://www.instagram.com/p/CH1XMZPgSu-/?utm_source=ig_web_copy_link) representing Black African Iranians’ presence in Tehran at the time. It truly is a visual invitation to seeing Blackness in Iranian history. Art is used here in our effort to redress the erasure and the subsequent formation of a void around being Black, African and Iranian simultaneously—being Iranian and of African descent or African of Iranian descent.

As griots, we are now drawing the history of our African ancestors into existence, for the world to see us.

**Beeta**: I remember before the Collective was launched, you, Priscillia, were telling me how you asked Mina Jafari to illustrate the scenes in color, as opposed to black and white. Since then, each of the resident artists have brought their own signature color palettes to the artwork—bright yellows and pinks, earth tones, pastels and more. Can you tell us about the role of color in storytelling and how it relates to the Collective?

**Priscillia:** I can discuss the different palettes of browns with artists for hours. Color is so important at the Collective—particularly the color black or brown as it translates into actual palettes of colors. It is the importance of drawing the color black or brown and thereby ensuring that Black Iranian folks are seen in Iranian visuals. It is about also taking control of the way color is used, and thus, the way race and being Black are perceived. I was and still am often called “*siyah*” in the streets of Tehran, Bandar Abbas or Isfahan. And of course, again, I am not the only one. The color of our skin gets folks’ attention and the reactions to it vary. We know it to be a reality for many other Black Iranians—the mocking, the teasing, the singling-out, the anti-Blackness. We use art here with talented Mina Jafari and others, like Black American artist Chyna Dumas, Iranian American Kimia Fatehi or Afro-Iranian artist Arefeh Avazzadeh, to take control over the representation of the colors Black and brown in our community.

The Collective is simply here to say that Black is beautiful.

**Beeta**: Some of these histories are difficult to listen to—for example Narges’ [story](https://www.instagram.com/explore/tags/hajinaneh/) of being enslaved and sold repeatedly in Tehran in the early twentieth century, only to find freedom with the help of Haji Naneh. How have your many audiences reacted to these stories? Black Iranians in diaspora and in Iran, other Iranians, non-Iranians?

**Priscillia:** The most common reaction has been one of shock for not being aware of the existence of Black women of African descent who were indeed enslaved not so long ago in Iran. Others doubt the veracity of what we are bringing forward because, perhaps, they cannot comprehend how these stories remained unknown all their lives. What’s important for us to emphasize is the erasure of Blackness not just in history but also in Iranian contemporary society, including in its diasporic iterations. Most Iranians, worldwide, would tell you that they had “no clue there were Black people in Iran.” Or they say that “it is not the same as Black people elsewhere.” All of those are ignorant, and quite harmful, statements.

When confronted with these difficult but important histories, we are presented as a community with the possibility of living a more informed understanding of ourselves and one another. We can ask ourselves, individually and as a community, what this newfound and important information means to me as an Iranian, whether in Iran or within the diaspora, whether Black and/or of African descent or not.

What it also shows is the importance of democratizing history and access to “knowledge” to enable conversations. We’ve received messages about discussions among friends in cafes in southern Iranian towns—Abadan, Bushehr, Bandar Abbas—about the practice of enslavement and the impact it has left on their towns. There are also messages of 30-something-year-old Afro-Iranian men and women telling us stories of a grandparent hailing from Africa, photos of chosen migrations, languages being intertwined between Persian, Arabic and Swahili, as well as anecdotes of an African “relative” who, in stories passed down at family reunions, is described as someone who always worked for the family as a “servant.” There’s some sort of racial consciousness that is happening thanks to our work. If it weren’t for the grassroots efforts of the Collective, these conversations would remain available only to an elite that rarely includes, let alone is led by, the voices that they research.

**Beeta:** You have often described the work of the Collective as “creatively disruptive.” What does it mean to creatively disrupt? What are some of your future plans in this regard?

**Priscillia:** Albert Camus wrote about “creating dangerously” and the social responsibility of all artists. “Any publication must be an act,” he wrote. Well, what I mean by work that creatively disrupts is what this renowned French Algerian author said much more eloquently decades ago. The Collective’s work is creatively disruptive because it is work that makes the society we are living in think. Think about fundamental topics such as race, a topic that was never discussed from the perspective of Black folks in the Iranian community. Think about the interconnections between Africa and Iran and think about the importance of the resonance of the words “Black is beautiful” in Persian.

The Collective plans to continue bringing forward points of view that were ignored or erased in Iranian culture in order to shift the discourse in ways that acknowledge the many segments that make up who we are. We will be making more short films that continue to focus on Black stories in Iran and throughout its diaspora. We are envisioning an animated series telling the stories of Black Iranian women like Khyzran and Haji Naneh. We will also be producing more advocacy pieces that remind our community that Black is beautiful and that being Iranian should always also potentially mean being Black and vice-versa. We are also working hard to show our work offline in Tehran, Los Angeles and Toronto through art exhibits and more. So, stay tuned for more.

### K Aff---Palestine---Refusal

#### Refusal is a disruptive, generative process using alternative modes of sovereignty, organizing, and power to fundamentally alter sovereignty which creates new critical subjectivities

Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal, PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1-27-23, “On Indigenous Refusal against Externally-Imposed Frameworks in Historic Palestine”, Millenium Journal of International Studies, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359>, -PGR, 3-25-23

Indigenous Refusal in the Face of Liberal Politics of Recognition

Critical Indigenous scholars theorise on two forms of anticolonial Indigenous resistance: Indigenous refusal and Indigenous resurgence. My fieldwork and research on the context of historic Palestine have led me to identify both of them increasingly throughout recent times. This article focuses on Indigenous refusal, a political practice that exists and is exerted not only in the face of the colonial project in and of itself[42](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn42-03058298221131359) but also of the politics of recognition imposed by other actors, mainly those that epitomise the Global North.

The goal of refusal is to truly dismantle the colonial discourse and edifice in their entirety, but also the relationship between it and the Global North. They do so by denying them any kind of moral or legal legitimacy to ask Indigenous people to ‘perform’ within a specific framework.[43](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn43-03058298221131359) The anticolonial resistance project defended by, amongst others, Glen Coulthard and Audra Simpson, who in turn draw on authors such as Kanienʼkehá꞉ka scholar Taiaiake Alfred and Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar and writer Leanne Simpson, is openly adversarial and constantly preoccupied with the link between Indigeneity and sovereignty, both as situated understandings of political life[44](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn44-03058298221131359) and assertion of other lifeworlds.[45](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn45-03058298221131359) Unsurprisingly, the Black Radical Tradition has also privileged the concept and praxis of refusal as a feature of a ‘fugitivity’ that escapes from inclusivity and yearns for alternative and dissonant forms of power.[46](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn46-03058298221131359) Fred Moten and Stefano Harney speak of refusal of the range of choices offered by the oppressor – in this case, whiteness in a racialised world order – as a ‘first right’ through which it is possible to ‘reshape desire, reorient hope, reimagine possibility and do so separate from the fantasies nestled into rights and respectability’.[47](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn47-03058298221131359)

The political practice of refusal does not pay attention to the ambivalence of the colonial and related discourses and refuses to normalise their – purportedly liberal – approaches. The refusal of offers of recognition that emanate from institutions in one way or another related to the colonial project has the immediate effect of disturbing and interrupting the power of the colonial project, since it exposes the asymmetries of power on which the latter is based.[48](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn48-03058298221131359) This refusal targets the state and Western theory(ies), and consequently requests to engage in a decolonisation process in exclusively Indigenous terms.[49](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn49-03058298221131359) Resistance based on refusal can take different forms within a vast repertoire of actions: it can be visible or not, it can be reactive or not, and it can range from day-to-day resistance to the organisation of protests that denounce the colonial project. In many cases, it adopts what Coulthard calls confrontational ‘direct action’, according to which the colonial project and the hegemonic narrative are ‘illegitimate’ and Indigenous people resort to assertive, even disruptive, actions that deny any possibility of negotiations.[50](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn50-03058298221131359)

What are the contours of the imagined radical futures Indigenous refusal undyingly looks at? The very notions of self-determination and sovereignty seem to be at stake. Throughout the decades and in line with the liberal universalisation of rights, sovereignty has been equated with national independence, the outcome of internal – mainly institutional – and external – legitimisation and inclusion- attainments, and therefore depends on outwardly-imagined conditions of possibility.[51](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn51-03058298221131359) Craved for decades, it seems increasingly clear that it is but a construct to perpetuate structural asymmetries in the (post)colonial system. What refusal proposes is an ‘active unmaking of sovereignty’, hand in hand with ‘a new spatialization of struggle’.[52](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn52-03058298221131359)

Disengaging and declining to submit to existing frameworks is not enough. Refusal aspires to dismantle the colonial discourse and apparatus as a whole but is also a generative practice. In that regard, the concept of ‘autonomy’ is essential. It is related to self-government but has nothing to do with the willingness to be ruled under/subject to a different sovereign rule. Zapatistas, for instance, openly speak of autonomy as a different form of power and ‘an antidote to the dispersed form of global paracoloniality’ [53](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn53-03058298221131359) Non-negotiated autonomy and more dispersed power and accountability are crucial to creating new imaginaries and social worlds that translate into practices of self-organisation strengthening links within an Indigenous community.[54](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn54-03058298221131359) For lack of a better term, a new kind of sovereignty takes shape: Indigenous sovereignty is tied to rights, albeit to the rights demanded by the community and not to any approximation of universal – thus, depoliticised – rights. External validation is not a requirement and is not even appreciated.

Indigenous Palestinian Refusal Against Spatio-political Arrangements and Frameworks Imposed by the Global North

This article contends that the Palestinian struggle has recently witnessed the amplified weight of the figure of Indigenous refusal. This refusal simultaneously denounces the colonial project and declines to comply with the expectations imposed from abroad, mainly from the Global North. Refusal understands that colonisation has material and psychological effects, notably by suppressing the ability to imagine themselves as a body and their future. For it seems increasingly clear that power dynamics cannot be dismantled – not even shifted – without confrontation, refusal is undoubtedly portrayed as a provocation. It is an inducement to reflect beyond occluded frameworks, a promising avenue to recover – and remake – humanity,[55](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn55-03058298221131359) to shape alternative, stronger and more resilient subjectivities. Ultimately, to imagine futures that will surely be perceived and cast as ‘radical’. The following paragraphs will examine how this refusal has manifested itself given different facets of Global North-related impositions on the Palestinians and their struggle.

#### Refusal is necessary for Palestinian resistance of the structuring violence of the Global North

[Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#con), PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1-27-23, “On Indigenous Refusal against Externally-Imposed Frameworks in Historic Palestine”, Millenium Journal of International Studies, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359>, -PGR, 3-25-23

This article highlights that rather than an exception, the question of Palestine should be viewed as a laboratory of dynamics that modulate the contemporary world, more specifically the Global South(s).[2](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn2-03058298221131359) Any reading of the context in historic Palestine must make clear that Palestinians are not a homogeneous group of people but rather a place where ‘different stories meet, ignore, or pass each other’.[3](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn3-03058298221131359) Their political grammar is deeply sensitive to the workings of power in its multiple forms, both when it comes to the domestic and the international.

As a consequence of the entanglements between liberal political orders and colonial relationships, Global North narratives and frameworks about the Palestinian struggle systematically derogate and undermine Palestinian aspirations. We have witnessed that dejection many times in the last years: from the double standards when reacting to the war in Ukraine to the equidistant communiqués expressing concern in the face of ethnic cleansing in Sheik Jarrah. Consequently, a growing number of Palestinians progressively refuse any external imposition regarding their narrative, demands, and modes of political life. Palestinians have started to openly problematise the international community in an example of a ‘triple critique’: against Israel’s settler-colonial project, the Palestinian leadership, and the international society. That criticism does not just target how the international society sanctions Israeli impunity by cynically shelving its normative commitment to international law when confronted with settler narratives of power and security. The international community, specifically the Global North, is accused of having become part of the problem through the imposition of models, frameworks, behaviours and conditions, mainly when it comes to ‘the politics of appeal.[4](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn4-03058298221131359)

Proposed here as an original theoretical contribution, this article considers current Palestinian political discourse and practices to identify the contemporary articulations and initiatives that could be categorised as ‘Indigenous refusal’ defying specific spatio-political arrangements and, with it, the deep-seated attachments between the Global North and Israel’s settler-colonial project. It should be pointed out that Palestinian refusal is, in essence, nothing new. The foundations of the current momentum have been laid for decades. Contemporaneous refusal casts light on the evolution of the international context throughout recent years. It aligns with several initiatives on the ground and scholarly developments in challenging the imperial connections and colonial continuum that have shaped the (post)colonial model and still articulate a hierarchised system ruled by the Global North and mediated by the latter’s impositions.

Drawing on Critical Indigenous Studies, the article explores the connections among the increasing awareness of the pernicious role of the Global North in the context of historic Palestine, mainly by imposing a series of parameters – corporeal and non-corporeal – and a growing Indigenous Palestinian questioning of these impositions. To push away accounts based solely on a fatalist interpretation of Indigenous present and future centred on suffering and dispossession,[5](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn5-03058298221131359) a growing number of Indigenous scholars stress the need to centre analyses on Indigenous acts of resistance, in line with the futurity of decolonisation. That is also the case with an ever-developing segment of Palestinian political discourse and actions on the ground. The latter asserts that the Palestinian context is not only about suffering and victimisation, but also about parallel and overlapping geographies of collective and individual resistance and agency.

Those intersections are also gradually shed light onto by Palestinian refusal, giving way to several connections and shared struggles and, above all, to new constellations of political imaginations preoccupied with global justice. Palestinian refusal can plausibly be understood as an aggravation. However, it is also a form of dialogue in which it is the oppressed who set the terms, a reaction to the manifold ways in which liberal politics of recognition can manifest themselves in relation to the so-called ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, be it the externally-underwritten negotiations, neoliberal frames or the paths through which Palestinians are allowed to contest and exercise resistance.

The article will first set the conceptual framework, displaying how Critical Indigenous Studies could help us inquire into a growing Palestinian political discourse and practices. The second section offers an analysis of the central concept of liberal politics of recognition which can be channelled through a framework and set of actions imposed by the Global North. The third examines Indigenous refusal as a political practice to reaffirm Indigenous sovereignty and rearticulate bonds within the community. The concept of Indigenous refusal is then empirically applied to examine different discourses and practices that can be interpreted as Indigenous Palestinian refusal questioning impositions from the Global North. The article concludes by offering suggestions for a future research agenda on the textured differences between decolonisation and decolonial approaches.

### K Aff---Iraq---Activists

#### Iraqi women’s rights organizations are fighting for a better future in numerous ways. U.S assistance continues gendering the democracy narrative which perpetuates Western violence, the AFF is a refusal to engage in those terms and to instead support the on the ground women organizations.

**Ali,** Z. (**2023**)[ Iraqi Women’s Activism—20 Years After the US Invasion Middle East Research and Information Project <https://merip.org/2023/04/iraqi-womens-activism-20-years-after-the-us-invasion/> GMU JAF]

**No, no, your voice is not shameful, your voice is a** revolution!” **Thousands of Iraqi women shouted these words in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square in October 2019**. The **unprecedented scale of women’s** participation **helped turn** what could have been just another wave of **popular protests**, which had grown more common over the past decade, **into** an **uprising**. Thawra Tishreen (the October Revolution) saw ordinary people demonstrating against the political class and the system that had been put in place following the US-led invasion in 2003. **Women’s participation** and visibility **in Tishreen highlights** the **dynamism of women-led grassroots movements** today. Groups like the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq, Iraqi Women Network as well as informal women’s networks have emerged in the past 20 years. As wider protest movements have developed in Iraq, particularly in the past decade, these women-led groups have also broadened their scope to include social and political issues. A new generation of young women protesters has emerged. The nature of their demands speaks to the daily challenges they face amid economic crises, the collapse of state institutions and services, waves of violence and militarization and the rise of heteropatriarchal conservatism. The politicization of both gender and sect has had disproportionate consequences for women—jeopardizing their legal rights and control over their mobility and bodily freedom. Women have also endured the repression of a regime supported by various armed groups, one that rules through armed violence. **Women activists are fighting back in the limited social and political space they have left.** Sectarian Politics and Women’s Rights The **US-led invasion and occupation administration put political groups in power that attempted to undo** one of the most important legacies for Iraqi women: the **Personal Status Code**. Prominent feminist groups such as the Iraqi Women’s League, as well as the anti-imperialist, secular left, had championed the **1959 Personal Status Code** to **protect women’s rights.** It established a minimum marriage age of 18 and guaranteed the right to divorce and inheritance. The law was a product of the Iraqi women’s movement, and the first woman minister in Iraq and the Arab world, Naziha al-Dulaimi, helped write it. It united the rights of Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi’as under one law and openly challenged the conservative political elite installed during the former British mandate From the Archives: “Conspiracy of Near Silence—Violence Against Iraqi Women,” in MER issue 258.In 2003, however, **political groups** linked to Shi’i Islamist political parties (largely in exile) **proposed to completely abolish Iraq’s Personal Status Code**. When this **attempt failed, thanks in part to protests by women’s groups**, Shi’i parties proposed an alternative: to establish a sectarian-based Personal Status Code. Their proposal marked a significant break with the code’s political legacy, reflecting instead the nature of the system put in place by the US administration in 2003. Commonly called the muhasasa system, it defined political representation based on communal belonging through ethnic (such as Arab or Kurd), sectarian (Sunni, Shi’a) and religious (Muslim, Christian and other) affiliations. Along these lines, some Shi’i political forces have been pushing for the Iraqi parliament to adopt a code based on Shi’i jurisprudence commonly referred to as “Jaafari Law.” This law—which would apply to Iraq’s Shi’as—could permit marriage for girls as young as nine and allow unions with no legal protection for women. It would also weaken the power of the previously state-appointed judges in determining whether cross-sectarian marriages are possible, instead granting this power to sectarian religious authorities. If the Jaafari Law was adopted by the Iraqi parliament, it would render women second-class citizens and provide a further legal foundation for the marriage of minors, which has proliferated in the last two decades in the absence of functioning state institutions and services and widespread poverty. Women’s rights **groups like the Baghdad Women’s Association** have **launched campaigns** over the years **to combat child marriage**, **advocate for a welfare state** **and fight to preserve legal protections for women.** In the past decade, **women’s rights groups** have also **fought to adopt a law** **that would criminalize domestic violence** and provide shelters for women victims of abuse and trafficking. Instead of supporting these campaigns, however, **Iraqi authorities have repressed some of the groups**. The O**rganization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq,** for example, the **only organization that runs shelters in the country outside of Iraqi Kurdistan**, has been criminalized for its advocacy. In 2020, the **Iraqi government filed a lawsuit attempting to strip the organization of its legal right to operate**. Meanwhile, its leader Yanar Mohammed has faced death threats. Women and the Collapse of the Welfare State The **US-led invasion is one node in a longer story of Iraq’s eroding welfare state and its outsized impact on Iraqi women**. In 2003, Iraq was already in survival mode. Still not recovered from the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led coalition bombings during the first Gulf War, it had also faced over a decade of UN sanctions, some of the most drastic ever imposed on a country. Sanctions constituted what philosopher Joy Gordon has called “the invisible war.”[1] Read Joy Gordon on “The Enduring Lessons of the Iraq Sanctions,” from MER issue 294.Sanctions altered the social fabric of Iraqi society, destroyed the middle class and plunged the majority of the population into poverty. The Iraqi state, historically a major employer, could no longer rely on its main source of revenue, oil sales. It cut employees’ salaries as well as essential public services. As has been well-documented, sanctions also played a central role in the development of everyday corruption and in the formation of mafia-like groups connected to the Baath regime. Prior to the sanctions**, Iraqi women were among the most educated in the region** and **worked in almost all sectors**, although predominantly in the public sector. They took advantage of strong state services, such as higher education, health care, childcare and public transportation. **Since 2003,** however, **public services have been mostly privatized, which has left them dysfunctional or absent.** The **dire conditions in post-invasion Iraq are not the result simply of neoliberalism, where aggressive privatization is often related to public land grabbing and violent dispossession**. Iraq used to have robust and functioning infrastructure before it was destroyed by US-led wars. **Women can no longer rely on universal health care and supported childcare**. Every aspect of life in Iraq is costly, including access to running water, electricity, childcare and basic health care. Women’s employment has plummeted with the collapse of the public sector. These changes have impacted all Iraqis, but it is **women who are disproportionately affected** and who are already facing challenges from legal discrimination and heteropatriarchal societal norms. The Everydayness of Violence Despite all the rhetoric claiming that the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq would support or “save” Iraqi women, 20 years later the so-called War on **Terror continues to shape women’s everyday experiences of insecurity.** The spatial political economy of the post-2003 regime is materialized in T-walls…Together with razor wire, sandbags and a maze of checkpoints, they form the pattern of everyday life in the capital.The **limitations on women’s social and spatial mobility are particularly visible in Baghdad**, a city divided by concrete walls and checkpoints. The spatial political economy of the post-2003 regime is materialized in T-walls—reinforced, blast proof concrete slabs, commonly referred to as “Bremer walls,” after the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority during the early years of US occupation, Paul Bremer. Together with razor wire, sandbags and a maze of checkpoints, they form the pattern of everyday life in the capital. **Women have to go through these checkpoints** **guarded by armed male soldiers on a daily basis.** In many ways, cities like Baghdad and Basra have experienced what Stephen Graham, in his reflection on military capitalism, has labeled an “urbicide,” a form of political violence intended to kill cities by pushing away the urban poor, maintaining ethnic and class separation through armed violence and privatizing public goods for the benefit of corporate interests and big business.[2] In Baghdad, ethno-sectarian separation has a very concrete spatial, bodily and material reality, determined by the US administration’s decision to divide areas of the city according to sect, religion and ethnicity. Class divisions are in turn connected to political divisions since access to resources and wealth is often conditional upon being part of a network with strong ties to the political elite.[3] Political clashes between armed groups result in yet more roadblocks and T-walls and thus more social control for people who circulate. Of course, such mechanisms of control impact everyone, but their effects on women are particularly pronounced.[4] In Baghdad, armed groups associated with the political elite police the streets in ways that reinforce a heteropatriarchal social order. Since 2003, Iraqi women’s rights activists have been caught between fighting to preserve their existing legal rights—under threat from conservative social forces—and demanding their basic rights to security and dignity—under siege from the violent social, political and ethno-sectarian crisis provoked by the invasion and occupation. “**Your Voice is a Revolution”** The **pretense of “saving” Iraqi women** was a dimension of the **neocolonial narrative of democracy building** **leveraged** **by** the **US** administration to invade and occupy Iraq. **“Saving” implies that US imperial domination is superior** and even necessary and inherently good for women. **Iraqi women** are perceived as an ahistorical homogenous object, **portrayed as essentially voiceless victims**. Even 20 years after the destructive and devastating invasion and occupation, the **gendering of the democracy narrative** on the Middle East **remains.** Also read: “The Challenges for Women Working at Iraqi Universities,” from MER issue 266.The 2005 Iraqi Constitution adopted a 25 percent quota for women in parliament. Women have since been visible and present in parliament and on candidate lists in elections. United Nations Women and many non-governmental women’s groups have insisted on the importance of such achievements for women’s political participation. Yet, if the quota has allowed some significant women figures to enter parliament, it has also facilitated the presence of party line women, who follow certain political groups even to the detriment of their gender-related interests. The focus on women’s political participation and visibility is a central dimension of the democracy narrative that has dominated the US discourse on Iraq: the idea that Iraq now runs free elections, has women in its parliament and therefore the country is a democracy. In reality, Iraqis have turned away from the polls—the 2021 elections had the lowest voter turnout in Iraq post-2003—and many have decided to take to the streets to voice their political vision outside of the democratic façade. In the context of the militarization and widespread violence that followed the invasion and occupation, Iraqi intellectuals, writers and activists have been targeted by armed groups, assassinated, threatened or forced into exile. Specific legal mechanisms have also been adopted that limit freedom of expression. For example, a draft of a 2023 “content regulation” law was leaked. If passed, Iraqi activists warn, this law would give the authorities broad control to determine what speech is permissible and shut down speech they oppose. Additionally, a number of Baath-era laws are still used to stifle freedom of expression. These oppressive conditions have led hundreds of intellectuals, journalists, judges and activists—including women’s rights activists—to speak back against the post-2003 political order. On June 3, 2022, they released a “Statement for Freedom of Expression,” which openly criticized the Iraqi regime’s intensification of repression against any form of political dissent. **Since October 2019, at least 540 peaceful protesters have been killed, 20,000 injured and many forcibly disappeared**.[5] The **repression has been carried out by various entities from the state’s security forces**—using stun grenades, anti-riot tanks and military-grade teargas as bullets—as well as by paramilitary groups and mercenaries using live ammunition and machine guns. The Iraqi government has imposed media, internet and telecommunication blackouts as well as curfews. Many protesters have been threatened, intimidated, arrested, beaten, kidnapped and even assassinated. While most of the protesters killed during the uprising were young men on the front lines of confrontation with the Iraqi security forces during protests, women protesters were also targeted. Protesters like Saba Mahdawi and Mari Mohammed were kidnapped. In Basra, Sara Taleb and her husband ‘Adel and Reham Yacoob were killed by armed groups as was Zahraa Ali in Baghdad. The main slogan at the heart of the 2019 uprising, Enrid watan (we want a country), expresses what so many Iraqis have lost: A functioning, livable country with robust infrastructure and services as well as the possibility of living without fear of being killed by a vast network of armed groups affiliated with the Iraqi establishment for simply expressing their demands. The struggle against restrictions on women’s rights, the silencing of their voices and the erosion of their bodily autonomy are poignantly reflected in the protesters’ chants. **“Your voice is not shameful, your voice is a revolution,” is a rallying battle cry for freedom and dignity, especially for women.**

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# Neg

## Link UQ

### A2: General Thumpers

#### US engagement in the ME is generally low

Carafano 23 [Carafano, James Jay, a leading expert in America’s national security and foreign policy challenges, is the Washington-based Heritage Foundation’s vice president for foreign and defence policy studies and director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, 2/2/2023. "U.S. policy adrift in the Middle East." *GIS*, Accessed: 4/27/2023. <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/biden-middle-east-policy/>]

As President Joe Biden’s policies for the Middle East mature, they appear to be largely focused on disengagement. **This is** not surprising, **reflecting continuity with the general policies of** former President Barack **Obama** (2009-2017), since many of the same key officials are serving in the present administration, including the former vice president himself. Israel, the Iran nuclear threat and energy have been the key issues anchoring the United States in the Middle East. The Biden team, like the Obama team, seems interested in downplaying these challenges as issues of vital U.S. interest.

Israel

In part, the administration’s ambivalence toward Israel reflects the deep ideological divisions in his party. Support for Israel is becoming less a bipartisan given, not only due to changes in the Democratic Party, but also in the Jewish population in the U.S.

**Jewish Americans** are a small demographic. Further, American Jews **are increasingly more** liberal and **secular**, more closely aligning with the left **and less concerned with Israel**. This makes it more difficult for traditional Jewish advocacy groups that sought support from both parties in Washington. As a result, in general, leftist politicians at the national level are less anchored in avowedly pro-Israel policies.

For instance, the administration recently launched a public anti-Semitism campaign. This occurred after the White House had ignored growing anti-Semitism and hate crimes against Jews in the U.S. for two years. This may, in part, reflect a desire of the administration to attract Jewish voters for national elections in 2024. It is more likely, however, that the White House embraced this initiative after former President Donald Trump hosted Holocaust denier Nick Fuentes and Kanye West, who has repeatedly made anti-Semitic remarks, for dinner at his home in Mar-a-Lago. The dinner came in November 2022, shortly after Mr. Trump announced his candidacy for president in 2024.

In addition, President Biden shares Mr. Obama’s antipathy toward Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who recently formed a new government. A good indicator of strains in the relationship will be negotiations over renewing the joint Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defense cooperation, which the two countries signed under President Trump in 2018. The administration could try to hold the Netanyahu government hostage over negotiating a new MOU. But Mr. Netanyahu may respond by trying to wait them out, hoping for a more cooperative U.S. president after the national elections in 2024.

Further, while the administration, like the Obama team, seeks to be “evenhanded” in relations with Palestinians, essentially President Biden has returned to the Obama status quo. That is not likely to change. Further, there is general apathy toward the Palestinians in the region. President **Biden is under no pressure to do anything for the Palestinians**.

Iran

While the White House has not formally abandoned hopes of restructuring and reentering the 2015 deal to stop Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, the Biden administration now acknowledges the deal is moribund. Yet, there are no signals that Washington has a backup plan. While ongoing internal protests continue to rock Iran, the Biden administration has done nothing serious to prepare for or foment regime change. Indeed, there are no signs they want such a change, preferring instead the stability of the current regime that they know well.

Regional powers

“**Biden is punting away on the hard issues** while putting a greater burden on regional allies,” argues Heritage Foundation regional expert James Phillips. “Nervous Arab Gulf states are hedging and cultivating closer ties to China and Russia; Iran and Turkey are absorbing parts of Iraq and Syria, two [practically] failed states.”

Elsewhere in the region, the administration has shown little interest. For instance, it continues to neglect the precarious situations in both Tunisia and Libya. In contrast, both Jordan and Egypt have been and remain close U.S. allies. Yet, they are also frustrated that the U.S. seems relatively indifferent to domestic concerns in both countries.

#### US has been disengaging

Yildiz 23 [Yildiz, Guney, contributor with a focus on Turkey, its relations with the EU, US, Russia & the region, 3/27/2023. "Middle East Rapprochements: Who Is Standing To Lose?" *Forbes*, Accessed: 4/27/2023. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/guneyyildiz/2023/03/27/middle-east-rapprochements-who-is-standing-to-lose/?sh=21df90ad5e3d>]

The US loses out. **Washington until recently the dominant force in the Middle East**, now finds itself on the losing end of the Iran-Saudi deal, with China emerging as the victor. Its receding commitment to the Middle East leaves a vacuum that non-Arab powers like Russia, Iran, Turkey, and China are eager to fill. **The declining American influence in the region has prompted** formerly **pro-US regional powers to hedge their bets**, turning towards alternative allies and forming new relationships. This shift represents a significant setback for the United States, which has long been a dominant force in the region.

Neglect has consequences. For years Washington upheld an artificial balance of forces between friends and foes in the Middle East. Years of gradual US disengagement have deprived the region of its main anchor for stabilisation, eroding trust in American commitments, and contributing to current shifts in regional dynamics. The abandonment of allies in Afghanistan and the Syrian Kurds exemplifies this decline. The resulting power vacuum has provided non-Arab powers with an opportunity to assert their influence, further complicating the region's delicate balance of power.

### Perception UQ

#### There will never be *no* engagement in the Middle East – but the broad global and political perception is that the US is disengaging. This *guarantees* that there is broad link uniqueness for negative teams

Alterman, Yahya and Pinkas 22 [Alterman, John, Yahya, Maha and Pinkas, Alon, Alterman is senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy and director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Yahya directs the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut; Pinkas was a senior diplomat working at the top levels of the Israeli government, 4/12/2022. "U.S. in the Middle East: Part Six." *CSIS*, Accessed: 4/27/2023. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-middle-east-part-six>]

Jon Alterman: After two decades of trying to force their will on the Middle East, **U.S. policymakers see the Middle East** of 2022 **in a different light** than their predecessors. Countries in the region are looking at the United States differently, too. The U.S. retrenchment in the Middle East is considered a given in policy circles in Washington, and the feeling is echoed in capitals across the region. Maha Yahya directs the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut:

Maha Yahya: **The power of the U**nited **S**tates **is waning in the region**, chiefly because it is perceived as shifting its attention away. In the last decade, **we've seen very clearly that U.S. priorities moved away from** more **maximalist goals that included democracy promotion and regional transformation** and towards three far more clearly defined priorities: the nuclear deal with Iran, regional stabilization, and combating terrorism that threatens the U.S. homeland.

Jon Alterman: Alon Pinkas was a senior diplomat working at the top levels of the Israeli government.

Alon Pinkas: The United States is disengaging from the Middle East. **It sees no vital interests to protect or to attain and no foreign policy goals to pursue** in the Middle East. All it sees are troubles and pitfalls: Yemen, Syria, Israel, and Palestinians.

Jon Alterman: Nabil Fahmy agrees. He was Cairo’s ambassador to Washington for a decade, and then served as Egypt’s foreign minister.

Nabil Fahmy: In relative terms, your hard assets remain far stronger than anybody else's in the world, whether military or economic. However, there has been a difference in U.S. readiness to engage beyond its traditional domain. Particularly after 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq, U.S. readiness is seen in the Middle East as having diminished. So I see a diminishing trend, rather than a growing one.

Jon Alterman: The United States falls into a bit of a trap. It is still the strongest outside player in the Middle East, but the perception that it’s looking for the exits makes countries discount U.S. power and influence. And **with every announcement that U.S. attention is focused on the Indo-Pacific and** strategic competition with **China**, U.S. **partners in the Middle East doubt that the U**nited **S**tates **will have the resources or** the **will to protect common interests in the Middle East**. For U.S. partners who have come to rely on the United States, that is a disquieting thought. One place where people are growing unsettled is Israel. For more than a half-century, U.S. support for Israel has been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. U.S. policymakers saw Israel as a key strategic partner in a sea of adversaries, and the United States bolstered the partnership. It was Israel’s advocate and protector in a series of diplomatic initiatives and it granted Israel tens of billions of dollars in military assistance. Today, though, some Israelis—like former diplomat Alon Pinkas—don’t think they can take that active role for granted anymore.

#### More perception ev

Cooper 21 [Cooper, Helene, a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent, and was part of the team awarded the 2015 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting, 11/20/2021. "U.S. Tries to Convince Arab Allies It Isn’t Abandoning Them." *New York Times*, Accessed: 4/27/2023. <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/20/us/politics/us-middle-east.html>]

The Biden administration is trying to convince its Arab allies that the United States, despite appearances to the contrary, is not fed up with the region and headed for the doors.

**It is a tough sell**. At a meeting on Saturday in Bahrain that comes on the eve of global talks meant to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III faced tough questions about how Arab allies were supposed to deal with the whiplash of an American national security policy that upends itself every four to eight years with a new president.

With President Biden now trying to undo President Donald J. Trump’s own undoing of President Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal, some **Arab allies expressed frustration that they were caught in the middle** and must go their own way. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, is taking steps to de-escalate its own tensions with Tehran, after years of striking a harsher tone.

**The tumultuous American withdrawal from Afghanistan** in August after 20 years, **the** announced **withdrawal of** American combat **troops from Iraq** by the end of this year, **and the** Biden **administration’s** recent **hyping of China as its biggest** and most serious national security **priority have combined to leave officials in the Middle East**, site of so much American national security angst over the past 20 years, **feeling left out**.

#### Here is more ev

Young 22 [Young, Michael, the editor of Diwan and a senior editor at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, 12/15/2022. "Disengaging From America." *Carnegie*, Accessed: 4/27/2023. <https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/88647>]

The visit last week to Saudi Arabia by Chinese President Xi Jinping was another moment of truth for the United States. Xi was received with considerable fanfare by the Saudis, in contrast, to the more sedate Joe Biden visit to the kingdom last July.\* This was partly a result of the fact that the U.S. president did not want too high-profile a reception in the shadow of Jamal Khashoggi’s murder.

The United States has not been particularly pleased with the widespread impression in the Middle East that it is disengaging from the region. At a summit with Arab leaders last July, Biden hastened to assure his counterparts that Washington would “not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran.” His point, which has been echoed by countless American officials and foreign policy specialists, is that the effort to contain Chinese power cannot be limited to places such as East Asia, but has to be global.

### Iran

#### Good u/q for an Aff about Iran – plenty of “not now but if” statements in solvency advocates!

Wilcox, 23 (John – Reporter for Insider. “Iran isn't worried about the US attacking it, but Biden has other ways to cut a deal with Tehran.” 28th March, 2023. <https://www.businessinsider.com/biden-still-has-ways-to-reach-nuclear-deal-with-tehran-2023-3>.) GMU NR

The **trend lines** in US-Iran relations today make for **grim reading** in Washington. Faced with unrelenting US pressure, Iran's leaders are regularly meeting with **Russian and Chinese** officials and pledging unprecedented levels of cooperation. Iran's nuclear program recently crossed a **key threshold** into production of weapons-grade **uranium**. American policymakers today face a **key inflection point** in the **bilateral relationship**, and the "no nuclear deal, no crisis" dynamic appears increasingly unsustainable.

Hawkish analysts are calling for a **renewed Iran strategy** focused on a formal exit from the dormant — or dead — JCPOA, **increased sanctions** coordination and **interdiction efforts**, and forward deployment of US military assets. But this amounts to little more than a rehash of the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" strategy, which failed to achieve any of its stated objectives and instead led Iran to ramp up its nuclear program and increase its proxy attacks. The ultimate coercive tool for the US would be an act of war — an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities or key military centers.

But Washington's willingness to use the military option is less than credible today. An attack on Iran could not be subcontracted out to Israel; such a major endeavor would require US participation. But would President Joe Biden, or any other US president, be willing to stake a term's worth of political capital on such a tremendous risk?

Amidst the backdrop of the US's **disastrous efforts** in the Middle East over the past two decades, a desire to focus on China, and the long war in Ukraine, the Islamic Republic is probably not immediately fearful of an attack. Additionally, many Israeli and American officials openly admit that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities might do very little to set back its nuclear progress. Indeed, attacks may incentivize Tehran to proceed more quickly with its nuclear program.

If coercive tools fall short of achieving key American objectives, engagement options **could still offer** a better way out of the nuclear **stalemate.** Since the Trump administration's exit from the JCPOA, a diplomatic asymmetry has halted progress in the nuclear talks.

Tehran had no means of **dispute resolution** after the US's **unilateral exit** and no way to recover lost revenues after the US stepped out of compliance with the accord. It remains skeptical of the **credibility and durability** of a US commitment to provide sanctions relief, and its dangerous security environment and rigid revolutionary ideology preclude the possibility of **a first step** towards Washington.

Some tools of engagement are still available to the **Biden** administration which could **change this calculus** and induce Tehran back toward accepting curbs on its nuclear program.

### Palestine

#### Lots of literature about a lack of engagement with the Palestinian Authority now!

ICS, 2022 (International Crisis Group – international organization focusing on crisis management and humanitarian assistance. “Realigning European Policy toward Palestine with Ground Realities.” 23rd August, 2022. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/realigning-european-policy-toward>.) GMU NR

After the May 2021 **Gaza war**, the U.S. and European governments, alarmed by the **growth in Hamas**’s popularity, turned their attention to how to revive the PA and, eventually, restore it to power in Gaza. A European diplomat said: “The U.S. set the tone, as did German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas”. With the Islamist movement riding high in Palestinian opinion at war’s end, Washington and European capitals were keen to strengthen what, in their eyes, is the sole bulwark in the **Palestinian polity** blocking its rise.

Europe, in particular, repeatedly states it wants to shore up the PA. Both before and after the 2021 war, officials regarded the PA as an entity in **deep crisis**. The bilateral relationship had become strained after Mahmoud Abbas **cancelled** Palestinian **elections** at the end of April and Nizar Banat **died in PA custody** in June. Yet no real debate has developed in European capitals over how to stop the PA’s **authoritarian drift**, let alone whether to keep backing the PA, due mainly to the high priority put on West Bank stability and disagreements over the criteria for conditioning European aid. Seeing the confusion, the PA leadership has kept acting on the assumption that it can take continued European support for granted.

Discomfort with the PA’s **Authoritarian Drift**

Its attitude after the war notwithstanding, Europe has been increasingly uncomfortable with its support for the PA in Ramallah. No election for a PA body has taken place since 2006 and Abbas’s term as president was to have **ended in 2009**. Hence European capitals for the most part welcomed Abbas’s January 2021 announcement of three rounds of elections for later that year: legislative contests in May, a presidential election in July and elections for the Palestinian National Council, the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s decision-making organ, in August. The EU issued a statement declaring its support for these steps, offering its assistance and calling on Israel to facilitate the process. It was notably keener on Palestinian elections than the U.S., which had distanced itself from the issue. As a European diplomat put it, Europe considered elections to be “a way to support a more democratic governing authority”.

Europeans thus experienced Abbas’s cancellation of the polls in April “as **a slap in the face**”. It was partly the decision itself that stung, though as discussed below, Europe was more ambivalent about the elections than its public enthusiasm indicated. But another irritant was that the PA leader indirectly blamed Europe for his decision, saying it had applied insufficient pressure on Israel to allow Palestinians in East Jerusalem to vote. He invoked the East Jerusalem issue to justify indefinitely postponing the polls; in reality, he took the decision partly because he had become convinced that his Fatah party, which had fragmented, could not achieve victory. In any case, European relations with Ramallah **suffered.**

The violent death in detention of Banat, an outspoken Palestinian critic of the PA, in June ratcheted up tensions a notch. His death came against the backdrop of increasing political arrests and harassment of civil society organisations by the PA. A European diplomat said the EU and member states assumed a low profile following the incident, still wanting to bolster the PA, but noted that Banat’s death “changed European minds”. It prompted informal discussions among diplomats in Jerusalem and Ramallah, as well as in some European capitals, such as Berlin and Rome, about “if” and “how” to build leverage to seriously hold the PA accountable for rule of law failures and human rights violations. These discussions remained limited in scope, however, and so far have not led to policy changes.

[The Europeans] were too worried about a possible Hamas victory to put serious pressure on [the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas]. The primary reason, again, is fear of the unknown should the PA collapse. The Europeans were well aware that Abbas was more unpopular that ever, following his inactivity during the war and amid the PA’s deepening repression and severe fiscal crisis. But they were too worried about a possible Hamas victory to put serious pressure on him. Putting aside their discontent with the cancelled polls, they focused on how to help the PA overcome its political and economic challenges, including by attempting to give it a firm foothold in Gaza through almost exclusive oversight of reconstruction, replicating the Israeli government’s stance. The Biden administration, for its part and for its own reasons, has adopted a similar policy vis-à-vis the PA, favouring small steps to “fix Ramallah”.

Stability or Better Governance?

Fear of what might happen were the PA to collapse largely explains Europe’s general reluctance to **pressure it**, including through **aid conditionality**, to better serve Palestinians. In principle, Europe would like the PA to exercise better governance and show greater respect for the rule of law. But it is loath to weaken the PA leadership by **withholding** **resources** and international backing when, in its view, it **lacks an alternative**. European governments consider Abbas and his circle, despite their lack of legitimacy among Palestinians, to be Europe’s only “reliable” partners, because they subscribe to the agreed-upon international parameters for resolving the conflict – a two-state solution within the Oslo framework – including the security arrangements that result, which are aligned with Israel’s interests.

Europe is thus heavily focused on what it perceives as stability in the West Bank. The EU and its member states are the PA’s primary donors, well ahead of the U.S. and Gulf Arab states, especially in the last few years. They are afraid that, if they withhold even partial funding, not only would it harm the **Palestinian population**, but it might precipitate the PA’s collapse, contributing further to Palestinian suffering and auguring the end of any hope for the two-state solution. They have a hard time distinguishing the **PA leadership from PA institutions,** mainly because they see no alternative, but also because they believe that the PA’s governance problems are so fundamental that the institutions require substantial reforms, which in turn might also lead the PA to ruin. A European diplomat said, We are aware that the PA has no democratic institutions, that it consists of a small decision-making circle, that it is unreformable. We know that the PA requires major reform, but we are also conscious of the problems that this would raise, namely the risk of destabilisation in the West Bank and beyond. The reality is that we are not ready to support a true renewal of the institutions. Finally, some EU member states underline the difficulty of putting serious pressure on the PA, including through aid conditionality, to respect human rights while taking no concrete steps to hold Israel to its obligations under international law. A European diplomat said, “If we don’t speak out against Israel’s settlement policy, how can we hit the PA [on human rights violations]?”

As a result, European criticism of the PA’s autocratic tendencies has been limited. In turn, Europe, as the PA’s main political and financial backer, faces ever **sharper criticism** from Palestinian civil society **that it is failing in its responsibility** to put an end to the PA’s **authoritarian drift**.

## CP---QPQ

### O/V

#### This is intended to be a core process CP for an constructive engagement topic. It would serve the role of the generic process CP that has enough literature to provide offense for the Affirmative and specific net benefit articulation for the Negative.

#### Net benefits:

#### Internal, Democracy: focused on perception of US support for human rights violators.

#### Internal, Development: good literature about the role conditions on engagement impact development aid.

#### External, Pivot/Deterrence: definitely interacts with this section of the topic, CP could be written as a backroom deal to avoid allied perceptions, etc.

### FAQ

#### Q: What is a Quid Pro Quo?

#### A: “A favor or advantage granted or exchanged in return for something else.” This could look like a lot of different things, including human rights reforms, security commitments, etc.

#### Q: Examples?

#### A: Trump demanding Ukraine investigate Hunter Biden in 2018, and cutting lethal aid until they did so. Or the process by which the European Union makes demands and parameters for membership (human rights, economic alignment, etc..) Another great example is the United States relationship with petro-states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, built upon a “give and receive” relationship of backroom deals.

### Solvency—Generic—Economic

#### QPQ solves entirety of the Affirmative and avoids the net benefit –

Girod, 20 (Desha -- associate professor of government and director of the conflict resolution program at Georgetown University, and author of “Explaining Post-Conflict Reconstruction” “Trump has given quid pro quos a bad rap. Here’s where they actually help.” January 22nd, 2020. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/22/trump-has-given-quid-pro-quos-bad-rap-heres-where-they-actually-help/>.) GMU NR

Not all aid involving quid pro quo is problematic, however. In other areas of foreign aid, quid pro quo agreements can be quite common, legal and helpful at incentivizing development. But we call the quid pro quo by another name: aid conditionality. What is aid conditionality?

Institutions like the World Bank and recipients of their support use the term “conditionality” to describe financial agreements. For example, in December, the World Bank committed $180 million to Senegal for reform of its energy and communications sectors. In return for these funds, Senegal agreed to boost its administration of the sectors and to promote the digital economy.

Donors provide foreign aid expecting to see a specific action — or offer funding in response to an action by the recipient country. For example, a donor might require a country to enact policies to protect human rights or to improve transparency of public finances as a condition of receiving development or military aid. Despite the inclusion of well-intentioned language about such conditions, in reality, donors don’t always enforce the conditions they demanded.

Why not? In a recent article, I show that donors may choose not to enforce conditions for development aid when they view the recipient country as strategically important. What makes a country strategically important? In general, the donor decides the recipient’s political behavior is vital to protect or advance the donor’s national security.

Why the U.S. relaxes aid conditions. Here’s how this played out in Egypt, which has long been strategically important to the United States because it borders the Suez Canal. And Egypt has been a key partner in the peace process with Israel, as well as U.S. counterterrorism efforts. In 2013, the Obama administration wanted Egypt to democratize and protect human rights in exchange for military aid. Egypt, however, refused. According to one senior U.S. official, “We caved” — the United States eased up on human rights demands. Similarly, the United States valued its relationship with Afghanistan during the height of the global war on terrorism in the 2000s. This meant the United States could not credibly threaten to withdraw assistance when the Afghan government did not meet its end of a quid pro quo on political reform that Washington proposed. Why this matters for aid recipients

Studies show conditioning aid on economic reforms can produce rapid economic growth. During the 1990s, foreign aid helped foster nine times as much economic growth in recipient countries than aid to these countries did during the Cold War. But aid effectiveness stalled after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States — the war on terrorism brought back Cold War dynamics. In the 1990s, the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique and Rwanda met Western demands as they emerged from civil war and sought foreign aid to reconstruct their countries. These four countries received Western aid ranging from $3 billion to $17 billion between their respective cease-fires in the 1990s and 9/11. Their aid amounts paled in comparison to the $150 billion that the strategically important countries of Iraq and Afghanistan received, to little effect. Where does this leave U.S. foreign assistance?

Donors want to see their funds foster economic development in recipient countries. This suggests clarifying the strategic value of recipient countries can help donors who want to maximize development. As the war on terrorism declines and the new Great Power rivalry remains unclear, the strategic value of many low-income countries seems uncertain. For example, President Barack Obama argued for a U.S. pivot away from the Middle East, suggesting the region does not now hold the same strategic importance to the United States as it once did.

This suggests it’s now possible for the United States to enforce development conditions in exchange for aid in more countries — with less risk to national security.

For U.S. foreign aid, a threat to withdraw aid may become more credible — recipients who want Washington’s support have greater incentives to comply with aid agreements. This suggests minimizing the number of countries the United States classifies as strategically important on a case-by-case basis might be one way to achieve that goal. Maximizing the number of aid recipients from which it can credibly threaten to withdraw assistance, in turn, would probably incentivize recipient compliance with legitimate quid pro quo agreements — leading to improved aid effectiveness.

#### CP solves economic engagement – states are partial to ratify commitments when faced with material incentives

Nielson et al., 15 (Richard – Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Beth Simmons Professor at Harvard University. “Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?1.” 2015. <https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bsimmons/files/nielsensimmons_rewards_isq_2015.pdf>.) GMU NR

In some accounts, governments seek **blatantly mercenary rewards** when they commit themselves to international human rights standards. Hathaway (2004) describes ratification as motivated by the desire for **material quid pro quos**:

Simply put, states join treaties like the Convention against Torture (CAT) in no small part to make themselves **look good**. In so doing, they may hope to attract more **foreign investment,** **aid donations**, international trade, and other tangible **benefits** (Hathaway 2004:207). Economic benefits are among the “collateral [non- legal] consequences” of human rights treaty ratification, according to Hathaway (2007:595).

Similar propositions abound in the literature. Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006:361) note that norms supporting ratification of the CAT may spread through a “**logic of consequences**” in which “other states and third party actors (corporations and NGOs) reward that state through investment, trade, aid and positive political relationships.” Boockman asserts that international aid could influence the decision to ratify International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions (Boockmann 2001). Posner (2008:1769) lists “pressure from western states that tied aid and other benefits (such as EU membership) to treaty ratification” as the first reason developing states ratify human rights treaties. And Trachtman (2012:886) finds other explanations for treaty ratification “less plausible” than a **quid pro quo logic** of rewards. Moreover, despite recognition that the multilateral aid organizations such as the World Bank do not explicitly link their assistance to human rights treaty ratification, the idea persists in the literature that “International organizations also encourage ratification by linking a treaty with material goals, such as economic aid” (Oberdo€rster 2008:705).

**Many dispute the idea** that human rights policies are enforced by the manipulation of rewards and punishments. Realists assert that governments are generally unwilling to expend significant resources to influence foreign human rights practices (Goldsmith and Posner 2000:668). But even if states are inclined to enforce foreign citizens’ rights, it does not follow that they would **focus** **their efforts** on securing the **ratification** of treaties. Some international legal theorists claim that ratification provides a **critical signal of intent**. Guzman, for example, argues—albeit not specifically in the context of human rights—that treaties involve “the complete pledge of a nation’s reputational capital” (Guzman 2002:1880) and therefore constitute a credible commitment on the part of states to comply with their provisions. But in the absence of reciprocity—notably lacking in the human rights area—it may be difficult for an essentially unenforceable pledge to put much at stake because there is no possibility of tit-for-tat retaliation to motivate compliance. The puzzle deepens if we buy the common observation that treaties do little to persuade the worst rights offenders to improve their policies (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011). Perhaps the type of agreements that states choose to ratify makes some commitments credible without enforcement or reciprocity. Smith-Cannoy argues that during especially hard economic times, states consciously join enforceable human rights agreements, such as the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)—which gives individuals the right to complain of a treaty violation to the Human Rights Committee—and an Article 22 Declaration regarding the CAT—which provides individuals similar standing before the Committee Against Torture (Smith-Cannoy 2012). She argues that ratification of enforceable agreements is an opportunity for states to collect aid from donors that may care about human rights.

We do not doubt that some countries and organizations use economic leverage to encourage states to improve their **human rights** behavior and to encourage the consolidation of **democratic institutions**. The Euro-pean Union and NATO may sometimes employ various forms of c**onditionality** in this way (Sanahuja 2000; Haw- kins 2004; Kelley 2004). However, careful studies of the use of the European Union’s “conditionality clause” reveal not a single instance of its invocation as a result of a state’s refusal to ratify a human rights treaty (Moberg 2009). Furthermore, while there may be very good theoretical reasons to believe that the actual protection of rights in domestic law and practice constitutes a costly signal of governments’ intentions (Farber 2002), it does not follow that states or commercial actors reward ratification for its own sake. Indeed, aid donors typically monitor their recipients. They sometimes reward actual policy changes on human rights (Alston and Crawford 2000:204–205; Nielsen 2013). But little evidence suggests that they alter their behavior in response to treaty ratification. For exam- ple, in 1975, the US Congress passed legislation prohibiting the extension of foreign economic assistance to countries with severe human rights violations. However, instead of relying on the “signal” sent by treaty ratification, Congress commissioned detailed human rights reports for each potential aid recipient. This suggests that donors find it worth their while to collect information on actual human rights practices when they make their aid decisions.

#### Broad meta-analysis goes Neg – QPQ aid agreements build institutional protections that make assistance more effective and reduce corruption

Douch et al., 22 (Mustapha -- The University of Edinburgh, Business School, Edwards -- School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Landman -- Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nottingham, Mallick -- Queen Mary University of London, London. “Aid effectiveness: Human rights as a conditionality measure.” <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X22001681#ak005>.) GMU NR

This paper has re-assessed the ‘**aid conditionality’** arguments in investigating whether development aid is more effective in countries that are more respectful with **human rights protection** than in countries where this is not the case. By including the **potential conditionality** upon non-economic indicators, human rights provision can be seen as underpinning **better institutional structures** in lowering **repression and corruption**. This paper used human rights data for the first time to integrate a non-monetary dimension as a conditionality measure into aid allocations, in the absence of comparable continuous time series data on repression and corruption.

As part of this analysis, we have set up a theoretical model of repression and corruption, where resources – including **aid resources** – are diverted to **oligarchs**’ consumption in the presence of worse level of human rights performance. Following this, we argued that, in low income countries with a poverty trap, the marginal diversion of aid is particularly **likely** to be high where **repression is present**. This is particularly significant as the literature emphasizes that the main potential role for aid in promoting growth is precisely in those countries which are experiencing a poverty trap. To account for this non-income dimension of aid effectiveness, our empirical investigation of the effect of aid on per capita GDP growth was carried out for least developed countries, introducing an **aid-human rights interaction** to capture the **beneficial effect.**

The results have **strongly supported** Sen (2001)’s development as freedom hypothesis, as well as providing a strong, modified variant on Burnside and Dollar (2000)’s **aid conditionality finding.** While initial regressions tended to indicate limited benefit from aid in terms of GDP growth, the interaction with measures of human rights makes our results more meaningful and significant, with remarkably consistent results across regressions, as other socioeconomic variables and even when conflict variables are introduced. Indeed, several robustness checks in Section 6 have confirmed that, while macroeconomic policy variables are important predictors of aid effectiveness, human rights also emerge as a **better predictor** of aid effectiveness in LDCs and even for a broader group including **middle-income countries.**

From our evidence on human rights and corruption **correlation**, we have shown that the indicators of institutional **governance** tend to be positively **correlated** with our human rights index, making it a better indicator of institutional quality. The paper thus concludes that human rights protection is a valid **institutional measure**, given both its intrinsic value and the availability of such data, to be used as a **conditionality variable** in allocating aid.

Aside from the growth outcome, we have also considered other distributional outcomes like **income inequality** and infant **mortality** as a non-monetary measure of development. Despite the small sample size in using income inequality, our main findings have remained consistent, that aid effectiveness due to better human rights produces not only higher income growth but also **lower income inequality** and infant **mortality** as distributional outcomes.

### Solvency—Generic—Security

#### QPQ solves – extracts maximum concessions and incentives reconciliation – otherwise actors co-opt security guarantees

Pfaff, 22 (Anthony -- research professor for strategy, the military profession, and ethics at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. “Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first century.” August 3rd, 2022. <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1948&context=monographs>.) GMU NR

Mutual deterrence has essentially the same structure as an **arms race**. Here, both actors are **challengers** in a two-way relationship.82 Under complete information for both sides, if one actor prefers concession to conflict, then the other actor has no reason to believe the former will carry out its **threat;** as a result, the threat is not credible. If actors prefer conflict to concession, then their threat is credible and the other actor, knowing this fact, is deterred. Thus, rather than cooperation arising out of multiple iterations, it arises due to credible and capable threats.83

Therefore, survival of the status quo depends on both actors possessing highly **credible and capable threats.** The logic of mutual deterrence is straightforward: Actors must **persuade** **each other** of three things. First, each actor has an effective military capability. Second, the actors could use the capability to impose costs an attacker would find unacceptable. Third, if attacked, the actors would carry out the threat.84 Unlike in classical deterrence theory, more capability does not entail greater deterrence. For instance, when an actor for whom conflict is the worst outcome interacts with a player for whom conflict is preferable to losing, then increasing military capability beyond the requirements of deterrence can lead to failed deterrence. This failure occurs because the second actor will rationally interpret the first actor’s threat as noncredible. Because the second actor prefers conflict to losing, the actor rationally responds to any subsequent imbalances that make losing more likely.85

Another characteristic of mutual deterrence is the survival of the status quo depends on how highly actors value it. Even if both actors do not prefer the status quo relative to their own alternatives, it may still be preferable to the consequences of challenging it. As Zagare points out, though this observation may seem obvious, it is largely ignored in classical deterrence theory, which dismisses the importance of diplomatic initiatives to stability. In cases in which both actors only possess “all but incredible” threats, a bluff equilibrium exists in which the status quo can prevail despite each player’s dissatisfaction with it. This outcome results when players assign a higher value to the credibility of a threat—even if the players have doubts—relative to the cost of the conflict that would result from the threats.86

ROT 8: Investing in efforts that increase the value of the status quo for adversaries increases the likelihood of **deterrent success**, even if they do not prefer it. Conversely, lowering the value of the status quo for an adversary can **make a challenge more likely**. One should not increase the value of the status quo for an adversary if doing so would mean lowering the value of the status quo **for oneself**. Generally, one should seek a **quid pro quo** to ensure such measures are not self-defeating.

### Solvency—Generic--Developmental

#### Conditions solves developmental funding and assistance – overcomes structural barriers and promotes growth – perm gets diluted

Shah, 17 (Anwar – Brookings Institute, studies economic development as part of the OECD and European Commission. “Development assistance and conditionality.” <https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regionaldevelopment/Shah-Development-assistance-and-conditionality.pdf>.) GMU NR

Development assistance in this paper is more broadly defined to include grant and loan assistance within and across sovereign territorial limits by governmental and non-governmental actors and agencies. Such assistance is motivated by altruistic, **economic**, **political, military** and humanitarian considerations. It is used to advance wide-ranging objectives such as minimising risks for loan repayment, efficiency, equity of the public sector, overcoming infrastructure deficiencies, promoting growth, facilitating poverty alleviation and good governance, combating terrorism, support for a specific ideology, influence peddling, and economic and political imperialism. The provision of such assistance is more often than not conditional as even unconditional assistance almost always carries some explicit preconditions and implicit conditions. Conditions are **imposed** as part of lending or **grant assistance** unilaterally or by **mutual agreement** of the donor and the recipient. These conditions form contractual terms of such assistance which bind the recipient to expected actions or results as a **quid pro quo** for receiving such **financial assistance.** These conditions can vary from being very vague to extremely clear and precise. They may impose formal binding requirements or simply indicate informal non-binding expectations.

The conditions imposed may be ex ante (pre-requisites), ex post **or both**. Ex ante conditions are imposed to ensure that recipients have conditions in place to make **effective** and incorruptible **use of funds** and to achieve mutually agreed-upon goals. Ex post conditions are imposed to monitor that the interim performance of the assisted programme is consistent with the expectations and to justify continuing assistance. Ex post conditions are also imposed to guide future assistance based upon past performance.

Conditions may be on **consultations**, transparency requirements related to project documents, procurement, **reporting and auditing** requirements and **associated procurement**, accounting and auditing systems (process and financial management conditionality), the use of inputs, or expenditures on authorised functions and objects, intermediate inputs (input conditionality), outputs – service delivery results in terms of quality, quantity and access (output conditionality) – or on outcomes (outcome conditionality) or impacts (impact conditionality). Process- and/or input-based conditionality is frequently practiced – it undermines recipient autonomy but affords greater leverage and control to donors. Output-based conditionality is rarely practiced, but offers a great potential for recipient autonomy with accountability for results. Outcome- and **impact-based conditionality** is occasionally used but **dilutes** recipient **accountability** to donors or citizens as many of the **underlying factors** would be beyond the control of **public managers.**

Conditions may also embody requirements for counterpart recipient funds to be eligible for donor assistance. Conditions may embody **rewards for compliance** and penalties for non-compliance. The conditions may relate to a geographic area, the whole- of-government, a level or branch of government, a sector, programme activity or specific subject area targets (OECD, 2013: 59). The conditions may relate to government processes such as the requirement for public consultation or having a participatory budgeting system or passing laws and regulations, or may be concerned with substantive aspects of government operations.

### Solvency—Afghanistan

#### QPQ solves the Aff and guarantees support for persons seeking to leave Afghanistan

Martin, 21 (Susan -- Donald G. Herzberg Professor Emeritus in International Migration at Georgetown University. “Getting Refugees Out of Afghanistan.” 7th September, 2021. <https://cmsny.org/publications/getting-refugees-out-of-afghanistan-martin-090721/>.) GMU NR

Each of these elements is needed today to protect and **find solutions** for Afghans who are at risk in their own country. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, with the full backing of the Biden administration, should convene an international pledging conference on **Afghan refugees** at risk. Vice President Kamala Harris should chair the conference, as did her predecessor. The United States should come to the table with **generous pledges** of resettlement from within Afghanistan (using the authorities in the Refugee Act of 1980) and neighboring countries of first asylum. The FY 2022 Presidential Determination on Refugees, which the President must submit to Congress by the end of September, should reflect this significant commitment. The US government should use all of its **diplomatic resources** to encourage other countries to come to the conference with their own significant **pledges of resettlement** opportunities. As in 1979, the 2021 conference should seek pledges from neighboring countries to keep their borders open. The conference should also recognize that neighboring countries have legitimate concerns over whether they will bear the brunt of responsibility for caring for these refugees in the absence of more durable solutions. Such concerns may be allayed by significant resettlement pledges as well as commitments of significant financial resources for neighboring countries that allow those fleeing from Afghanistan to find at least temporary protection within their borders.

The international community should use its leverage to convince the Taliban to establish an **Orderly Departure Program** for persons seeking to leave Afghanistan. The Taliban wants to be recognized as a legitimate government and be able to access **humanitarian and development** aid. ODP can be **an avenue for them** to achieve this goal while also establishing an international presence that would monitor the safety of those seeking to leave. The message to the Taliban **should be clear**: recognition and funding will occur only if they adhere to universal **human rights standards**. In particular, the conference should make clear that protection of internally displaced persons, women, and other vulnerable populations is a pre-condition for international support. This **quid pro quo** would serve two significant interests—it would allow safe exit for those who wish to leave Afghanistan and help **protect those who remain**.

This blueprint, which **worked for** many **years** in Southeast Asia, could work in South Asia. This is not to say that the 1979 conference was without risks and presented no problems. Neighboring countries eventually grew tired of the continuing exodus from Vietnam, which they attributed to the lure of resettlement. Destination countries reduced their resettlement allotments below the level of new arrivals, leaving the countries of first asylum with ever-growing populations. Financial resources also diminished over time. Vietnam too often used ODP as a way of ridding itself of unwanted persons rather than providing a safe alternative for those seeking family reunification, as was one of its principal aims. All of these problems led to another conference a decade later that adopted a Comprehensive Plan of Action for reducing departures of those who did not meet the refugee definition while finding solutions for those who lingered in refugee camps. The lesson is not, however, that the 1979 conference failed. Rather, it saved **thousands of lives**, preserved the notion of **non-refoulement**, and provided durable solutions for **hundreds of** **thousands** of refugees. Could it have been implemented more effectively? Of course. Yet it stands out as a **superb model** for **Afghanistan**.

### Solvency—Iran

#### QPQ solves JCPOA re-enactment – only leverage demands create a lasting peace while bridging the incentive gap

ICS, 2022 (International Crisis Group – international organization focusing on crisis management and humanitarian assistance. “Is Restoring the Iran Nuclear Deal Still Possible?.” 12th September, 2022. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/b87-middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/restoring-iran-nuclear-deal-still>.) GMU NR

In a post-JCPOA era, the parties should try to **manage tensions** within the framework of a broadly scoped new deal, a narrower new arrangement or a series of **one-off** **agreements** on specific issues. They could also **seek** to build **confidence** by resolving longstanding **humanitarian issues**. The range of options includes:

More-for-more. Given that both the U.S. and Iran **seek gains** that the other side regards as exceeding JCPOA parameters, they could discuss these **demands** as part of an arrangement that widens the scope of negotiations. The Biden administration’s desire for a “**longer and stronger**” deal that strengthens **non-prolif**eration provisions, including by extending **nuclear restrictions** that under the JCPOA phase out over time (“sunsets”), and more rigorous monitoring is matched by Iran’s wish for a deal that entails more extensive, verifiable and sustainable economic dividends. Even in the current negotiations, Iran asked for relief from U.S. primary sanctions, which apply to U.S. persons and entities.78 The JCPOA did not touch upon these, except in a few minor areas, and present negotiations likewise grapple mainly with secondary sanctions.79 As Crisis Group has suggested in the past, a follow-on agreement to a revived JCPOA or one that is negotiated in the absence of restoration should include both more stringent conditions for withdrawal, enshrined in an exit clause (which the JCPOA lacks), and higher costs for the party that violates the deal.80

Yet shifting to a more substantial set of discussions over a more-for-more arrangement is difficult to envision when talks about reviving the existing baseline understanding (that is, the JCPOA itself) have been so fraught. Iran’s refusal to negotiate directly with the U.S. and the increasingly tense relations between Russia and the West add layers of complexity. Even if accepted in principle by both sides, what is likely to be a prolonged and difficult dialogue would still need to first address immediate non-proliferation concerns, with the entire process remaining at the mercy of regional escalation.

Less-for-less (interim deal). Another option would be to shift talks to a more limited interim agreement focused on the most proliferation-sensitive activities Iran is undertaking (eg, seeking to reduce the level of uranium enrichment), along with the restoration of IAEA monitoring and verification, in return for relief from U.S. sanctions on oil exports and/or the release of frozen assets. Such an approach would have the benefits of capping the growing nuclear crisis and giving the U.S. and Iran the capacity to present to domestic critics that they have conceded little, while bypassing the thorny questions of sanctions relief guarantees or sunsets on nuclear limitations.

There is precedent. Iran and world powers reached an interim agreement in November 2013 that opened breathing space for negotiating the comprehensive accord concluded in July 2015.81 But at the time, the U.S. and Iran negotiated the understanding for the most part through a secret bilateral channel in Oman, and both sides had the political will to freeze the escalatory dynamics. These ingredients are now in short supply, especially in Tehran: indeed, both sides contemplated an interim deal in February-March 2021 before Iran dismissed the idea in favour of pursuing full JCPOA restoration; it was broached again in December, but Iran did not accept.82 The flip side to having conceded less is also having delivered, on the U.S. side, fewer nuclear restrictions than the JCPOA, and on the Iranian side, only partial sanctions relief.

Many diplomats observing the negotiations do not believe a less-for-less deal is realistic under present circumstances. One senior European official said it would be “impossible”, citing the likely complications of finding a mutually acceptable set of commensurate quid pro quos.83 The West would likely demand that Iran freeze enrichment beyond 5 per cent, blend down its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 per cent, refrain from producing and installing additional advanced centrifuges, halt uranium metallurgy work and restore the IAEA’s enhanced monitoring.84 Yet for Iran, these are key sources of leverage that it will want to have to strengthen its hand in negotiations. It is unlikely to give them away for anything short of a price that would in all likelihood be prohibitive for Washington, not least because any resulting deal would be notified to Congress.85

**Single-measure deal**. If the less-for-less option comprises multiple measures in one package, its most modest version would be a single-**measure exchange** that helps manage tensions and keeps the diplomatic path open. For example, Iran could dilute its existing uranium stockpile enriched at 60 per cent, which is near weapons-grade, in return for the **U.S. partly unfreezing** Iran’s **assets abroad;** or Iran could restore the IAEA’s enhanced access as devised in the JCPOA in return for the U.S. **lifting restrictions** on Iran’s oil exports.

Pursuit of this option entails some of the same difficulties as an interim deal, namely lack of face-to-face contacts, mismatched expectations and domestic political pushback; it will be a challenge convincing Iran to roll back what it sees as its key nuclear leverage for limited financial returns. Conceivably, however, its scope would not reach the threshold of the **2015 Iran** Nuclear Agreement Review **Act,** which requires U.S. congressional review of any new deal with Iran.86 If successful, the parties could then pursue a series of **similar single-measure** deals that would eventually bring them to the outcome that a direct attempt at an interim agreement might have produced. Humanitarian deal. There are four U.S.-Iranian dual nationals detained in Iran, while more than a dozen Iranians are in U.S. jails on various charges.87 The terms of a four-for-four prisoner swap are almost complete – it reportedly also includes Iran receiving some access to its frozen assets in South Korea – but deadlock in the JCPOA talks has hindered the parties in carrying it out.88 Iran and the U.S. could revive this understanding and wrap it into any of the abovementioned options. Should they fail with respect to those options, they should consider making the swap anyway given humanitarian exigencies, and because securing at least this one understanding could usher in an atmosphere more conducive to talks on political matters.

### Solvency—Palestine

#### The United States federal government should offer foreign assistance in the form of financial and humanitarian aid if and only if the Palestinian Authority encourages development of domestic democratic institutions

#### QPQ conditionality solves – prevents autocratic co-option of aid and strengthens Palestinian prestige internationally

ICS, 2022 (International Crisis Group – international organization focusing on crisis management and humanitarian assistance. “Realigning European Policy toward Palestine with Ground Realities.” 23rd August, 2022. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/realigning-european-policy-toward>.) GMU NR

After the May 2021 **Gaza war**, the U.S. and European governments, alarmed by the **growth in Hamas**’s popularity, turned their attention to how to revive the PA and, eventually, restore it to power in Gaza. A European diplomat said: “The U.S. set the tone, as did German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas”. With the Islamist movement riding high in Palestinian opinion at war’s end, Washington and European capitals were keen to strengthen what, in their eyes, is the sole bulwark in the **Palestinian polity** blocking its rise.

Europe, in particular, repeatedly states it wants to shore up the PA. Both before and after the 2021 war, officials regarded the PA as an entity in **deep crisis**. The bilateral relationship had become strained after Mahmoud Abbas **cancelled** Palestinian **elections** at the end of April and Nizar Banat **died in PA custody** in June. Yet no real debate has developed in European capitals over how to stop the PA’s **authoritarian drift**, let alone whether to keep backing the PA, due mainly to the high priority put on West Bank stability and disagreements over the criteria for conditioning European aid. Seeing the confusion, the PA leadership has kept acting on the assumption that it can take continued European support for granted.

Discomfort with the PA’s **Authoritarian Drift**

Its attitude after the war notwithstanding, Europe has been increasingly uncomfortable with its support for the PA in Ramallah. No election for a PA body has taken place since 2006 and Abbas’s term as president was to have **ended in 2009**. Hence European capitals for the most part welcomed Abbas’s January 2021 announcement of three rounds of elections for later that year: legislative contests in May, a presidential election in July and elections for the Palestinian National Council, the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s decision-making organ, in August. The EU issued a statement declaring its support for these steps, offering its assistance and calling on Israel to facilitate the process. It was notably keener on Palestinian elections than the U.S., which had distanced itself from the issue. As a European diplomat put it, Europe considered elections to be “a way to support a more democratic governing authority”.

Europeans thus experienced Abbas’s cancellation of the polls in April “as **a slap in the face**”. It was partly the decision itself that stung, though as discussed below, Europe was more ambivalent about the elections than its public enthusiasm indicated. But another irritant was that the PA leader indirectly blamed Europe for his decision, saying it had applied insufficient pressure on Israel to allow Palestinians in East Jerusalem to vote. He invoked the East Jerusalem issue to justify indefinitely postponing the polls; in reality, he took the decision partly because he had become convinced that his Fatah party, which had fragmented, could not achieve victory. In any case, European relations with Ramallah **suffered.**

The violent death in detention of Banat, an outspoken Palestinian critic of the PA, in June ratcheted up tensions a notch. His death came against the backdrop of increasing political arrests and harassment of civil society organisations by the PA. A European diplomat said the EU and member states assumed a low profile following the incident, still wanting to bolster the PA, but noted that Banat’s death “changed European minds”. It prompted informal discussions among diplomats in Jerusalem and Ramallah, as well as in some European capitals, such as Berlin and Rome, about “if” and “how” to build leverage to seriously hold the PA accountable for rule of law failures and human rights violations. These discussions remained limited in scope, however, and so far have not led to policy changes.

[The Europeans] were too worried about a possible Hamas victory to put serious pressure on [the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas]. The primary reason, again, is fear of the unknown should the PA collapse. The Europeans were well aware that Abbas was more unpopular that ever, following his inactivity during the war and amid the PA’s deepening repression and severe fiscal crisis. But they were too worried about a possible Hamas victory to put serious pressure on him. Putting aside their discontent with the cancelled polls, they focused on how to help the PA overcome its political and economic challenges, including by attempting to give it a firm foothold in Gaza through almost exclusive oversight of reconstruction, replicating the Israeli government’s stance. The Biden administration, for its part and for its own reasons, has adopted a similar policy vis-à-vis the PA, favouring small steps to “fix Ramallah”.

Stability or Better Governance?

Fear of what might happen were the PA to collapse largely explains Europe’s general reluctance to **pressure it**, including through **aid conditionality**, to better serve Palestinians. In principle, Europe would like the PA to exercise better governance and show greater respect for the rule of law. But it is loath to weaken the PA leadership by **withholding** **resources** and international backing when, in its view, it **lacks an alternative**. European governments consider Abbas and his circle, despite their lack of legitimacy among Palestinians, to be Europe’s only “reliable” partners, because they subscribe to the agreed-upon international parameters for resolving the conflict – a two-state solution within the Oslo framework – including the security arrangements that result, which are aligned with Israel’s interests.

Europe is thus heavily focused on what it perceives as stability in the West Bank. The EU and its member states are the PA’s primary donors, well ahead of the U.S. and Gulf Arab states, especially in the last few years. They are afraid that, if they withhold even partial funding, not only would it harm the **Palestinian population**, but it might precipitate the PA’s collapse, contributing further to Palestinian suffering and auguring the end of any hope for the two-state solution. They have a hard time distinguishing the **PA leadership from PA institutions,** mainly because they see no alternative, but also because they believe that the PA’s governance problems are so fundamental that the institutions require substantial reforms, which in turn might also lead the PA to ruin. A European diplomat said, We are aware that the PA has no democratic institutions, that it consists of a small decision-making circle, that it is unreformable. We know that the PA requires major reform, but we are also conscious of the problems that this would raise, namely the risk of destabilisation in the West Bank and beyond. The reality is that we are not ready to support a true renewal of the institutions. Finally, some EU member states underline the difficulty of putting serious pressure on the PA, including through aid conditionality, to respect human rights while taking no concrete steps to hold Israel to its obligations under international law. A European diplomat said, “If we don’t speak out against Israel’s settlement policy, how can we hit the PA [on human rights violations]?”

As a result, European criticism of the PA’s autocratic tendencies has been limited. In turn, Europe, as the PA’s main political and financial backer, faces ever **sharper criticism** from Palestinian civil society **that it is failing in its responsibility** to put an end to the PA’s **authoritarian drift**.

### Solvency—Saudi Arabia

#### The United States federal government should offer military aid and assistance if and only if Saudi Arabia commits to raising petroleum production at the next OPEC+ meeting

#### Conditionality solves Aff impacts – provides security assistance and *anchors* an actual alliance

Miller, 22 (Aaron - senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Saudi Arabia Is Not a U.S. Ally. Biden Should Stop Treating It Like One.” 11th October, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/11/biden-saudi-arabia-opec-plus-oil-production-mohammed-bin-salman/>.) GMU NR

Biden has expressed “**disappointment**” in the response to the OPEC+ decision, and a statement by U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and National Economic Council Director Brian Deese termed it “shortsighted” and foreshadowed some additional response.

Having been skeptical all along about the value of the fence-mending trip to Saudi Arabia, one can only imagine Biden’s private reaction to the OPEC+ move. But reaction by U.S. congressional Democrats left little to the imagination. “It’s time for our **foreign policy** to imagine a world **without their alliance**,” Sen. Dick Durbin tweeted, referring to Saudi Arabia. Sen. Bernie Sanders called for an end to **U.S. military support** for the country and to “end its **price-fixing** oil cartel.” Rep. Tom Malinowski along with others introduced legislation to withdraw U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. Others urged passage of the 2021 No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels (NOPEC) bill, which “prohibits a foreign state from engaging in collective action impacting the market, supply, price, or distribution of oil, natural gas, or any other petroleum product in the U.S.” CNBC reports that the bill, which passed a Senate committee in May, “could expose OPEC countries and partners to lawsuits for orchestrating supply cuts that raise global crude prices.” Based on Sullivan and Deese’s statement, the administration may well decide to work with Congress on such an approach.

That U.S. administrations **past and present** had and continue to **have leverage** with Saudi Arabia is beyond question. After all, on the **security and military** dimensions of the relationship alone the numbers speak for themselves. From 2016 to 2020, Saudi Arabia was by far the biggest recipient of U.S. arms sales. And the United States could easily ground the entire **Saudi air force**, dependent as it is on U.S. **spare parts** and **maintenance**. But Washington has been reluctant to use this **leverage,** even though it would take years for Saudi Arabia to reorient its security relationship with Russia or China, and neither could provide the quality or quantity of U.S.-supplied weapons systems. Nor is there any sense that either **Moscow or Beijing** would be willing or able to **come to the defense** of Saudi Arabia in an **exigent situation**.

Yet administrations past and present have been unwilling to **press the Saudis** hard and use the leverage they **clearly have**. The default position seemed to be that, unlike Lehman Brothers, the U.S.-Saudi relationship—driven by oil, countering Iran, intelligence sharing, and peacemaking with Israel—was simply too big and important to fail. In fact, the Biden administration has been one of the first U.S. administrations, in response to the assassination of Khashoggi and Saudi Arabia’s disastrous war in Yemen, to get tough by suspending offensive weapons sales and imposing the “Khashoggi Ban.”

### NB—Human Rights

#### QPQ solves human rights violations – creates accountability rewards and international respect

Nielson et al., 15 (Richard – Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Beth Simmons Professor at Harvard University. “Rewards for Ratification: Payoffs for Participating in the International Human Rights Regime?1.” 2015. <https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bsimmons/files/nielsensimmons_rewards_isq_2015.pdf>.) GMU NR

The “accountability revolution” in **human rights** has been one of the **most significant trends** in international law and international affairs in the past half century (Clark 2001:3–5; Ignatieff 2001:5–7). **More than 45** human rights treaties concluded since the Second World War now **effectively recognize** the legitimacy of external actors’ concerns about domestic rights practices (Simmons 2009). This apparent **concession of sovereignty** by states presents a puzzle. In many issue areas, the mutual bene- fits of cooperation create incentives for **reciprocal respect** of international treaties. But states have relatively little to gain from regulation of human rights abroad and potentially much to lose from international interference in their own domestic practices.

Why should sovereign states agree to subject an **internal issue** to international scrutiny? How can we understand the apparently voluntary decision to ratify international human rights agreements that create legal obligations to protect and provide for the human rights of one’s nationals? Scholars have proposed three kinds of answers. The first downplays the significance of the inter- national human rights regime because it is largely unenforceable (Krasner 1999:105–125). A second approach acknowledges that international treaty commitments are potentially costly because they may create pressures for adjustments in policies and practices. This approach attributes ratification to the desire to attract some kind of material reward as a matter of implicit or even **explicit quid pro quo**. A final approach sees ratification as driven by intangible benefits: belonging, praise, acceptance, respect, or inclusion. Governments ratify human rights agreements, in this last view, because ratification ushers a state into the circles of the most **respected countries** in the world.

### NB—Democracy

#### QPQ conditionality promotes democratic adoption – perm gets co-opted

Souki, 20 (Helen – Research Fellow – International Policy Lab. “FOREIGN AID’S EFFICACY THROUGH CONDITIONALITY.” 17th December, 2020. <https://borgenproject.org/efficacy-through-conditionality/>.) GMU NR

**Aid Conditionality** as a Way to **Improve Democracy**. Foreign aid can influence **democratic development** through three methods. First, promoting democratic institutions and the **balance of power** and empowering civil society organizations. Second, strengthening channels that contribute to democracy, such as the **income per capita** and **education.** And third, **conditionality.**

Aid conditionality is “the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid or actually terminating or reducing it, if **conditions are not met** by the recipient.” Therefore, **donors can perform aid** conditionality in different ways:

Potential donors can require the fulfillment of ex-ante conditions regarding the **requirements of democracy,** governance or **human rights** before coming to a **formal agreement** or forming a relationship with the potential donee country. Donors can impose ex-post conditions in a contractual relationship or **legal instrument** that the donee country should fulfill. Moreover, positive and negative conditionality exists. A positive conditionality means that the aid provider can reduce, suspend or terminate the aid if the government does not follow the conditions, while a negative conditionality consists of provisions that the donor can give as rewards when the government fulfills the requirements. Some provide a general critique accusing negative conditionality as ineffective because sanctions that countries can impose due to conditionality may affect the impoverished more rather than the government it is targeting. Moreover, the government of the recipient country may easily obtain alternative funding sources. In contrast, the application of positive conditionality does not often experience dispute. When Can Aid Conditionality Work? Some argue that the efficacy of aid conditionality relies on the democracy levels of the recipients. Since governments’ primary goals are to maintain power, in an environment of open political competition, the governments must spend the aid they receive to the level that it allows them to comply with donors’ conditions and also stay in power, whereas autocracies can stockpile as much aid as they receive while maintaining power. The European Union, for instance, had set aid conditionality elements when it comes to its provision for sub-Saharan countries. After 1977’s Uganda crisis, the EU decided not to remain neutral in situations where there are massive violations of human rights and democracy. Therefore, it imposed human dignity as a precondition for the provision of aid and, consequently, human development. Moreover, in 1995, the EU decided to declare respect for democratic principles, rule of law and good governance as essential elements and that it could withdraw aid disbursements if recipients did not comply with its parameters. The Case of Niger With the return to power of President Tandja after the coup d’etat of 1999, Niger was able to normalize its relationship with the European Union and establish a relatively successful political situation from 2005 to 2009. During those years, the government’s opposition operated through the official channels and institutions and Niger experienced great levels of political and social stability. Despite this, after President Tandja’s efforts to remain in power caused an escalation of the political and social tensions, the EU-led talks failed and the party in power began to harass the opposition and media. In 2009, the EU decided to withdraw its support, which the coup d’etat of 2010 later followed. The return to a democratically-elected government in 2011 led to the return of the support that the EU gave as aid disbursements and, therefore, the effective use of the donor’s ex-post aid conditionality that later contributed to Niger’s democracy development. After the new political transition, Niger received a consistent rating as a democracy based on the Polity IV scale. Since then, the country’s political situationremains stable although tensions remain palpable. Now, although the country’s most recent president, Mahamadou Issoufou, has had authoritarian tendencies, he is willing to step down from power and allow a new transition of government. The Utility of Aid Conditionality

Studies show foreign aid’s **efficacy through conditionality** regarding producing **democracy development** under certain situations. Regardless, donor countries and organizations should not be so quick to **abandon these policies** as the policies can positively impact a country’s **socia**l and **political** environment. Therefore, all donors must understand in depth the different **ways aid conditionality** could affect policy outcomes in recipient countries based on **highly complex situations** where donors give foreign aid.

## CP---Multilat

### UN Generic—Solvency

#### UN lead solves – creates sustainable diplomacy and brings in regional actors for stability

CEB, 17(Chief Executives Board for Coordination, the diplomatic negotiating service of the United Nations. “United Nations System Leadership Framework.” Published 2017. <https://unsceb.org/united-nations-system-leadership-framework>.) GMU NR

The “who, what and how” of **UN leadership**. The framework establishes that, in today’s challenging international **environment,** UN leadership:

**is norm-based**, promoting, protecting and defending United Nations norms and standards contained in international **treaties, resolutions and declarations**

takes a **principled approach** at all levels, always maintaining **constructive engagement** with all stakeholders on the most sensitive of issues and never discriminating, turning a blind eye to abuses, or **giving in to pressure**

is inclusive and respectful of all personnel and stakeholders, **embracing diversity** and **rejecting discrimination** in all its forms

is **mutually accountable** within the system, to beneficiaries – especially the most vulnerable, excluded or marginalized – and the **public beyond**, for the causes the organization serves and the way it conducts its work

is multidimensional, engaging across **pillars and functions**, connecting knowledge and experience, and **ensuring coherence** in support of the fully integrated SDG framework is transformational at all levels, supporting the overall mission to achieve positive change as well as the significant change effort to implement the 2030 Agenda while leaving no one behind

is collaborative, reflecting the **interdependent imperatives** of the United Nations Charter and the **comprehensive nature** of the 2030 Agenda, seeking collective “as one” thinking, joined-up approaches and solutions, and recognizing that better connecting universal goals to people-centered initiatives requires investment in collective United Nations efforts to achieve them, and is self-applied, so that United Nations principles and norms are exhibited in the behaviour and interactions of all leaders. Four ways of working exemplify these leadership characteristics: focusing on achieving impact for the people the United Nation serves driving transformational change to respond to the demands of the 2030 Agenda employing systems thinking to deal with the complexities of sustainable development, and co-creating solutions through inclusive partnerships.

The path towards **operationalization** deliberately gives organizations **broad flexibility** to define the best **entity-level implementation** roadmap, taking into consideration their **own mandates,** unique value offerings and specific needs. At the heart of implementing the framework is behavourial and organizational change, a long-term process that requires dedicated leadership and a purposeful, sustained effort over time.

### UN Generic—Human Rights

#### UN leadership solves human rights agreements – bridges expert divide and ensures domestic compliance

Hammarskjöld Foundation, 20 (Swedish Foreign Policy think tank focusing on international leadership within institutions. “The Art of Leadership in the United Nations.” Published 2020. <https://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/un_leadership_2020.pdf>.) GMU NR

**Norm-based leadership**. Nowhere has this tension been more evident than in matters of human rights – the promotion of which is one of the three principal purposes **of the organization**, as defined by the Charter. For decades, UN leaders, both those working in **development** or **peacekeeping** at country level and those engaged in diplomacy and advocacy at the **global level**,

were caught between a duty to defend **UN norms** on the one hand, and, on the other, **pressure** from governments (especially host governments) to refrain from critiquing abuses. And the pressure was real. Where governments have resented UN commentary on rights abuses, peace negotiations have been stalled, dialogue has been cut off, development projects have been threatened, humanitarian access restricted, and UN officials declared persona non grata. The result was predictable. Some UN leaders simply avoided engaging directly on human rights issues. Some even remained silent in the face of wide-spread violations. Still others actively discouraged the flow of human rights information between the country level and UN human rights mechanisms in Geneva. Civil society actors were locked out, the pleas of vulnerable communities left unanswered, and the local reputation of the organization sometimes left in tatters.

But there was another story: that of the many others who **held the line,** maintaining principled, **norm-based** and **constructive engagement** with government **counter- parts** even in the **most difficult** of circumstances. These UN leaders honed their skills in human rights diplomacy, brought in support from the UN human rights office3, made use of the independent special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council (and its predecessor, the Commission), used **technical cooperation** as an entry point for human rights dialogue, worked with domestic reform constituencies, and deployed skilled public advocacy. These were the incubators of UN leadership that would lead to several successive waves of leadership reform in the 1990s and early 2000s.

## CP---Consultation

### Consult CP---Israel

#### The US needs to work closely with israel regarding any extension of security guarantees in the Middle East

Saunders and Fearey, 14

(Emily Cura Saunders is a PhD candidate in political science at Claremont Graduate University's School of Politics and Economics, Bryan L. Fearey is Director of the National Security Office, 4/28, “The Least Bad Option? Extending the Nuclear Umbrella to the Middle East”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2014.897117>)

Regional Considerations A fundamental question is: If Iran does develop a nuclear capability, should the U.S. extend nuclear guarantees to other states in the Middle East? As shown from the U.S.–Northeast Asian extension of deterrence, nuclear security guarantees could be a way to stem the tide of proliferation in the region, but is not without costs. If the aforementioned fear and risk of a major nuclear cascade is warranted, it may well be worth it for the U.S. to seriously consider extending deterrence guarantees to prevent and/or limit proliferation and reduce the likelihood of a destabilizing regional arms race. It is also important to try to understand whether such guarantees would even be welcome. The U.S. needs to understand the dynamics and complexities of the Middle East fully before trying to prematurely push such policies. Five countries that are particularly critical to assess in this context are Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. While these countries are just a sampling of regional states to consider, there are other countries that would also need to be consulted. These include the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain. Each of these non-Saudi Gulf States would certainly feel threatened in the event of a demonstrated nuclear capability from Iran. If the U.S. were to seriously consider extending a U.S. umbrella to the Middle East, it would likely need to work with these states to also address their concerns. Turkey would be one of the more interesting cases in the region, as it is already a member of NATO and is thus already extended a nuclear guarantee. That being said, it could, of course, still try to pursue its own independent capability (or, at least, possibly pursue a technical hedging strategy). However, it seems highly unlikely that it would pursue covert actions due to the risk of losing or undermining its NATO alliance (and current U.S. extended deterrence commitments). A major part of deterrence, as laid out by Keith Payne of the National Institute of Public Policy, among other scholars of deterrence theory, is assurance. Not only does the U.S. need to make threat of its deterrent credible to their adversary, it must make the threat of response credible to its ally. Saudi Arabia is another major power in the region. It is generally viewed as being an adversary of Iran, as evidence by its political and military challenges for regional dominance. Also, as pointed out in an article by Eric Edelman et al., “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” major religious and cultural differences between the two states further complicate the relationship. Edelman et al. also point out that the United States is not the only place Saudi Arabia would likely look toward as a potential source for a “nuclear guarantee”; it could look toward Pakistan for some sort of a nuclear umbrella. Such an extension would be seen as very troubling to India, along with Middle Eastern countries, as well as the U.S. and the broader international community. India could see such a move as Pakistan broadening its military reach and solidifying its international alliances. This would likely be seen as threatening by India and could cause increased tensions in India–Pakistan relations. Egypt presents yet another challenge in the region. The political upheaval and general uncertainty could prove problematic for sustaining and strengthening U.S.-Egypt relations. While the relationship between Egypt and Iran is strained, Egypt (similar to Saudi Arabia) supported Iraq in the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s. Egypt has also signed a peace accord with one of Iran's state enemies, Israel, furthering tensions. Thus, there remains a major question of whether Egypt would chose to align with the U.S. in an alliance or if it might break away from the U.S. and try to develop its own independent nuclear deterrent. Jordan is largely seen as a relatively moderate state with a limited nuclear power program, which is under full safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). King Abdullah II has repeatedly given his support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has defended Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology under the treaty. That being said, he is unlikely to be comfortable with a nuclear weapon–capable Iran, as the nature of the Iran–Jordan relationship has been uneven throughout the years. Israel has grave concerns over what it sees as an existential threat drawn from a nuclear Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu emphatically expressed these concerns at the UN in September 2012, by personally drawing an actual red line indicating what level he would find as unacceptable with regards to Iran's level of uranium enrichment. Importantly, Israel has long demonstrated a history of taking on regional matters that it considers a risk to its national security and survival. While Israel certainly does not want Iran, a country that has been belligerent toward it for years, to have a nuclear weapons capability, what would it think of the U.S., a close ally, extending nuclear guarantees to other countries in the region, some of which have been adversarial in the past? The U.S. would need to work closely with Israel to address concerns regarding any potential extension of security guarantees in the Middle East.

## K---Top Level

### Overview

#### When we initially thought about putting this topic paper together, we began under the assumption that the likelihood would be that the community would vote for an IR topic this year. Two years of tepid domestic/legal topics made us pretty confident that the majority lean would be for an IR controversy. With that in mind, we started considering what IR topic would be a good compromise for debaters who prefer talking about issues “at home” and debaters who fall more in the “international relation wonk” camp. We genuinely believe this topic is that.

#### A large swath of cultural and philosophical grappling with the history of US involvement in the Middle East would characterize it as one of blood for soil, oil for security, Orientalism/Islamophobia, genocidal politics, cartographic conquest and colonization, and steeped in legacies of economic and militaristic violence.

#### The Middle East is truly the laboratory for the colonial project – IR analysis should center discussion on the Middle East as the nexus point for global projects of violence

Lorenzo Veracini, Associate Professor of History and Politics at Swinburne University of Technology, Spring 2022, “Settler Colonialism in the Middle East and North Africa: A Protracted History”, <https://merip-org.mutex.gmu.edu/2022/05/settler-colonialism-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-a-protracted-history/?fbclid=IwAR2aKPrGZcLxK7aSCc6XRsp_Z-ZynrpBVq-Rp0kJHAOSEQCpAeGqFlplhF0>, 4-26-23, -PGR

Settler colonialism is not only relevant to the history of the Middle East and North Africa but also to the way the region’s future is imagined. Today, Turkey is considering whether to turn the Kurdish-majority northeast Syrian region of Afrin, which it has occupied since 2018, into a new settlement project, albeit with Syrian Arab refugees instead of Turkish nationals. The proposed resettlement of these refugees, which could build on decades of Turkey’s experience of occupying Northern Cyprus, falls within the parameters of settler colonialism as a distinct mode of domination. If carried out, Afrin would become a new and alternative Syria—permanently separated from the rest of the country and supported by a foreign power. As demonstrated by Britain’s imperial sponsorship of the Zionist colonization of Palestine, a state does not need to be settling its own nationals to pursue a settler-colonial project.

Still, the future of global settler colonialism emanates from the Middle East in other ways. Palestine remains a global laboratory of settler domination through containment, a repressive practice that pursues the logic of elimination by targeting the links that a specific community maintains with the wider world. Increasingly, countries around the globe demand the sophisticated technologies of containment and control that Israel has developed and “battle tested” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip over the last 30 years. The occupation is increasingly marketable around the world. India, for example, has borrowed from Israeli strategies and purchased some of its technologies for its emerging settlement project in occupied Kashmir. The Pegasus spyware has been acquired and used widely by autocrats in the region and beyond. The United States has also provided an eager market; in 2019 the [FBI purchased](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/world/middleeast/israel-pegasus-spyware.html) and tested Pegasus to consider its potentials for domestic use, and a growing body of evidence has pointed to the Israel Defense Force’s contribution to the increased militarization of US policing. In short, we are witnessing the convergence and globalization of technologies of domination and modes of settler-colonial domination. As in the past, the region remains a crucial node in transnational networks of colonialist ideas and repressive practices.

#### In this overview section, this paper wants to outline where we see the topic going when it comes to the “top level” of critical discussions. While we have other sections with carded examples of K arguments, this section is more tailored to showing the overarching controversy areas for critical analysis.

#### In general, we foresee the major philosophical tenets critical analysis would draw from falling under links about empire, sovereignty, and coloniality. While other IR topics can say the same, we believe the mechanism of “increased engagement” “foreign assistance” “constructive engagement” and “security guarantee” centers the controversy much better than other IR topics will. Beyond that, centering conversations around the Middle East, in our opinion, is a unique facet of this topic for critical engagement. There is a legacy of violence behind US occupation and engagement within the Middle East that deserves policy debate engagement. We foresee the discussed posed in this overview as being conversations critical teams may delve into on either side of the topic, depending upon their mechanism.

#### Critical policy debate has seen a huge shift in depth and analysis since the last Middle East focused topic. The fact that an entire decade of debate has passed since we last had engagement with a Middle East focused topic is reason enough for a critical debate revisit. For example, within antiblackness scholarship, over the past several years there has been a nuanced attempt to resituate theories of antiblackness within global analysis – particularly with the Middle East in mind. Critical policy debate deserves an opportunity to delve into this area of the racial theory library:

MERIP 21 [The Editors of Issue #299 "Racial Formations in the Middle East," Middle East Report 299 (Summer 2021)., https://merip.org/2021/08/racial-formations-in-the-middle-east/, poapst]

Across the globe, media report on the prevalence of racism and racial violence. From the horrors of North African migrants perishing in the Mediterranean Sea to the plight of domestic workers in places like Lebanon, the deaths of migrant workers in the Gulf states and police violence targeting Black and brown communities in the United States, these stories highlight the growing recognition that race and state-sanctioned racial violence are global phenomena. But what exactly do these terms of race and racism, so omnipresent in the public realm today, mean in the context of the Middle East and North Africa? This question does not have a single answer. Race and racism may seem like universal categories that unite people globally, but they are instead deeply rooted in particular and regional histories. Racial formations are always historically specific and grounded in forms of economic, political and social power—no one theory of race can encapsulate its varied experiences.[1] Race is a way to naturalize hierarchies, and often—though not always—invoke biological traits. While we are perhaps most accustomed to thinking about race in terms of skin color, other features—such as blood lines, kinship structures, religion, geographical origin and even culture or language—can all become markers of race.[2] Race as an analytic concept must be understood alongside adjacent notions such as ethnicity (which often refers to cultural or linguistic differences) or nation (which is embedded in claims for sovereignty or political representation).[3] Once articulated, racial categories are not stable: They shift over time, and various regimes of power can leave racial sediments in their wake. Despite the chameleon-like nature of racial categories, their effects are excruciatingly real for those who suffer from their sharpest edges. As theorist Ruth Wilson Gilmore writes, race can be understood as “the state-sanctioned and/or legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death.”[4] This issue of Middle East Report, “Race—Legacies and Challenges,” highlights the historical and cultural specificity of racial formation, racialization and racism in the Middle East and North Africa. Histories of Western imperialism across the region, indigenous legacies of enslaved labor and ongoing postcolonial nation-building projects have configured race and racism differently than across the West, where racial ideologies were formed in the crucible of settler colonialism and the transatlantic slave trade. Articles by Nidhi Mahajan and M’hamed Oualdi discuss the distinct forms of slavery that took place in the Indian Ocean and across the Sahara, while Shreya Parikh looks closely at how Tunisian society is grappling with that legacy. Racial categories continue to be shaped and reshaped by contemporary regimes of migration, labor and value creation. They intersect with other categories of social difference including gender, linguistic and cultural difference, nationality and socioeconomic status. This intersectionality is evident in Sumayya Kassamali’s account of the multiple forms of oppression that African and Asian female migrant domestic workers face in Lebanon. It is evident, also, in Neha Vora and Amélie Le Renard’s discussion of the category “Indian” in the Gulf—a term that denotes at once a nationality, racial formation, and in certain contexts, racist slur. Moreover, it is important to recognize, as Ussama Makdisi states in his interview with Alex Lubin, that race, racial ideologies and racism are not always the sole or predominant way in which geopolitical formations are produced and contested. Thus, while there are shared global features of race and racism across geographies, this issue demonstrates the need to analyze race and racism locally. What we see in this approach is the necessity of understanding race as a trace of a particular history of colonialism, imperialism and contemporary geopolitical and economic relationships and not as a transhistorical given. At the same time, it is critical to acknowledge the political currency that anti-racist mobilization and rhetoric anchored in the West holds in the current moment. In tracing the social movements that have arisen in response to racism in the Middle East and North Africa, this issue shows how activists and citizens are making strategic connections across geopolitical borders in their struggle to articulate anti-racist futures. We see this process in Priscillia Kounkou Hoveyda’s account of the Collective for Black Iranians in the interview conducted by Beeta Baghoolizadeh. Kounkou Hoveyda describes the assertion of “Black is beautiful” as one of the central objectives of the Collective, which strives to “write into existence” Black and Afro-Iranians with reference to “transnational Blackness.” Nimrod Ben Zeev recounts the history of a similar conversation in Palestine and Israel, where marginalized Palestinian citizens and Mizrahi Jews drew from W.E.B. Du Bois’ conceptualization of the “global color line” as a frame of reference to expose and oppose the racial underpinnings of Zionist colonization. Connections across borders are not unidirectional. Anti-racist activists in the United States, too, are recognizing the value of linking their experience with movements in other parts of the world. In a recent statement by the Ferguson, Missouri based Congresswoman Cori Bush, for example, she spoke out against a recent wave of Israeli violence against Palestinians in Gaza, Israel and the West Bank. “St. Louis and I today rise in solidarity with the Palestinian people,” she stated. “The fight for Black lives and the fight for Palestinian liberation are interconnected. We oppose our money going to fund militarized policing, occupation, and systems of violent oppression and trauma. We are anti-war. We are anti-occupation. And we are anti-apartheid. Period.” Furthermore, it is not just activist grassroots organizations that are engaging with the Euro-American-based racial justice framework but also political elites. M’hamed Oualdi and Ezgi Güner’s articles bring into view how both the Tunisian and the Turkish governments draw on anti-racist rhetoric to assert their governmental legitimacy, especially in the eyes of their Western interlocutors. Whereas in Tunisia the public commemoration of the abolition of slavery is used to strengthen “the narrative of enlightened reformism” that legitimizes the rule of a Westernized educated elite, the AKP government in Turkey claims Blackness as a racialized metaphor to communicate the historical marginalization of the pious non-elite population that they claim to represent. This “racialized moral regime” then serves as the basis of both the AKP’s populist authoritarianism in the country as well as its geopolitical ambitions in Africa. This issue invites readers to grapple with the multiple forms of racialization that can be located in a global history of anti-Blackness but which are also entangled with other racial projects. The articles offer a historically and regionally specific conceptual toolkit to analyze race and racism locally in the Middle East, while also paying attention to how the seemingly transhistorical and universal frameworks, metaphors and categories that denote the experience of racialization circulate in various platforms across the region.

#### As more and more Palestinians die at the hands of the IDF, as the US defends pulling out of Afghanistan after 20 years of military occupation that destroyed the lives of many in the region without any attempt at a soft transition, as several military weapons producers consider marketing new “LGBT Pride” weapons fleets, as countless women fight for equality in Iran while being murdered for their political dissent, as civil war rages in Saudi Arabia, there is a growing need for a reckoning within policy debate that attunes to questions like “*what then?*” “*why increase US presence?*” “*what about the similarities of those instances of violence to violence in the domestic US?*”

#### Questions like these can be exemplified by reporters on the ground, who isolate issues with the purpose of US involvement, and its justifications:

#### Armstrong describes a process of imperial securitization driving, rather than rectifying instability

Armstrong 17 [William, Empire and its legacy in the Middle East, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/william-armstrong/empire-and-its-legacy-in-the-middle-east-106756]

The order born from Ottoman rubble was midwifed by Western imperialists. There has been a lot of talk about “artificial countries” and arbitrary “lines in the sand” at the root of today’s problems. But as Roger Hardy writes in “The Poisoned Well,” a vivid account of the half-century between 1917 and 1967, those borders are less important than what goes on within them. “If Western powers are at fault,” Hardy suggests, “it is not primarily for the way they drew the borders of the Middle East after the First World War, but because their interaction with the region ... has often served to accentuate the crisis of the state, rather than helping to resolve or mitigate it.” Today, he argues, “Islamism, the Arab Spring, and global jihadism are the products, not of artificial borders, but the long-simmering crisis of the state.”

#### Melhem describes US policy in the Middle East as a constant process of prioritizing state interests over human rights

Melhem 16 [Hisham, Hisham Melhem is a columnist and analyst for Al Arabiya News Channel in Washington, DC, and the author of a weekly column for the Al Arabiya English website., Obama's tarnished legacy in the Middle East, https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/obamas-tarnished-legacy-in-the-middle-east/]

By contrast, the Obama administration never made Iran’s atrocious human rights record and its rapacious activities in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen contentious issues during the long nuclear talks. The recent encounter between the navies of the two countries in the Gulf, when the Iranian navy captured ten American sailors on two small boats after they mistakenly entered Iran’s territorial waters, showed a stunning reversal of roles; Iran acted like a superpower, and the United States acted like a regional power. Iran treated the sailors as “hostiles” and humiliated them publicly by forcing them to kneel with their hands behind their heads, then after feeding them, getting them to thank Iranian “hospitality.” The spectacle, which lasted less than twenty-four hours, was captured on video, and the Iranians were happy to see it played all over the world. Secretary of State John Kerry, who seems to have a mystical belief in the power of diplomacy, was effusive in expressing his “gratitude” for the Iranian government for the quick release of the sailors, stressing “that this issue was resolved peacefully and efficiently is a testament to the critical role diplomacy plays in keeping our country safe, secure, and strong.”

#### Bozarslan explains that the historical shaping of the Middle East rests on an ideological terrain

Bozarslan 20 [Hamit, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, Chapter 6: Coercion and Violence in the Middle East, from Violence Volume IV 1800 to the Present by Louise Edwards, Nigel Penn, and Jay Winter, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-world-history-of-violence/coercion-and-violence-in-the-middle-east/360F1DFADA3BDD59A352FD350A713751, poapst]

This chapter analyses the various forms of coercion and violence that have played a central role in the shaping of the Middle East and that have affected all aspects of social life since the First World War. Notwithstanding its permanence in time and in space, the violence observed in the region is defined by distinct historical cycles. Each of these cycles began as a result of one or more violent disruptions that have a de-structuring and re-structuring impact beyond one country. Each is also determined by a specific ideological and political ‘microclimate’ and bears the mark of a given generation. The first cycle, which began with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the division of its Arab provinces, continued until the foundation of the State of Israel. The second covers a period of thirty years from 1948 to 1979. The third begins in 1979 with the Camp David II Accords and the recognition of the State of Israel by Egypt, the Iranian Revolution, the Islamist insurgency at Mecca and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Army. The last cycle begins with the Arab revolutionary protests of 2011 and their disruptive effects on some societies.

#### \*\*NOTE – there are a decent number of K cards that are in the specific area negs for each country

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Tansel, Cemal Burak; Peck, Jamie ; Theodore, Nik

The South Atlantic quarterly, 2019, Vol.118 (2), p.287-305

## K----Colonialism

### Link---General

#### Colonialism is inherently tied to the way oil shape the Middle East - marking a fruitful ground for critical debates

Jeff D. Colgan, Richard Holbrooke Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Brown University, October 2021, “Oil and Security”, <https://academic.oup.com/book/39203/chapter/338700342>, Oxford Academic, 4-28-23, -PGR

Colonialism was the common heritage of much of today’s global oil system. France controlled Algeria as a colony until the 1950s. Libya was an Italian colony, then an Allied protectorate, and did not gain its independence until 1951. Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Iraq, and Iran were or had been under the British. Thus, seven of the eight future OPEC members in the Middle East and North African region were European colonies or quasi-colonies; only Saudi Arabia was not. In Africa, Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola were also colonies and future OPEC members. Colonialism varied considerably from place to place, of course. In some territo- ries, oil was often not discovered until very late in the colonial period, and in a few cases, like Libya, commercial development did not begin until after indepen- dence. Still, colonial institutions tended to leave a mark, particularly with regard to control over oil production. Figure 5.1 shows the scope of European imperial control in the Middle East and North Africa, ca. 1930.

By the late 1930s, a pattern of international order was emerging. It involved three principal types of actors: Western governments, international oil compa- nies, and elites in oil-rich territories. At this stage, the two subsystems (of oil production and security) overlapped so closely that they did not function sep- arately. The Western governments established the political and legal framework for their companies to operate globally. The companies took the oil in exchange for payments to local elites in the oil-rich territories (initially Iran and Iraq; then Saudi Arabia; later the others, as oil fields were developed). The local elites used these payments to shore up their own political support. If the elites “defected” from this order by demanding too much, the companies and the empires would punish them economically or militarily. Actual punishments were uncommon, however, because the mere threat was generally enough. So long as imperialism was strong, all parties expected that the punishments for noncompliance would be high. That changed as the imperial system began to break down.

One of the seeds of this order’s eventual demise was its own racism. The oil companies set up enclaves within petrostates, often physically separate from the local population. Conservative Islamic governments like the Saudis encouraged this arrangement, to minimize Western cultural influence. Yet a clear racial hi- erarchy developed that placed local, darker-skinned employees in subordina- tion to white, Western managers.12 That hierarchy created social frictions and grievances.13

#### It is overtly tied to engagement mechanisms on this topic

Jeff D. Colgan, Richard Holbrooke Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Brown University, October 2021, “Oil and Security”, <https://academic.oup.com/book/39203/chapter/338700342>, Oxford Academic, 4-28-23, -PGR

First, if an oil security subsystem exists and provides OFS deals, we should see evidence that powerful external states offer military protec- tion to petrostates at pivotal moments. We see evidence of this behavior on multiple occasions. It takes two different forms: active defense deployments and deterrence efforts. In terms of defense deployments, this was most ev- ident in the US defense of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1990–1991. Yet even prior to the 1970s, we see evidence. Britain defended its claim to oil in Iraq in 1941, primarily against internal (Iraqi) enemies. It did so again in Iran in 1946, and again in Kuwait in 1961, both times against external enemies (the Soviet Union and Iraq, respectively). The United States, for its part, actively deterred Egypt from attacking Saudi Arabia in the 1960s. Both the United Kingdom (before 1970) and the United States (increasingly over time) had military bases throughout the region, which served as deterrents to would-be attackers. Some of these were very substantial: Wheelus Air Base in Libya was, at one point in the 1960s, the largest US military facility outside the United States. Last but not least, the 1980 Carter Doctrine is striking evidence of US commitment to defend certain petrostates. The Carter Doctrine can be interpreted as an explicit statement of the OFS deals then in place, designed in part to reassure the Gulf monarchies in the wake of the British withdrawal from the region in 1971.

A second empirical indicator of an oil security subsystem is petrostates of- fering some kind of oil benefits to their protectors. Until the 1970s, before most petrostates nationalized their oil industries, the chief economic benefit for the protectors came in the form of profits to the Anglo-American oil companies.128 The Seven Sisters benefited enormously from the political relationships between their home countries and the petrostates. After nationalization occurred in the 1970s, the benefits provided by petrostates to their protectors changed and shrank. Still, they continued to exist. Petrostates’ willingness to price oil in US dollars, for instance, has the effect of supporting the dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency, which generates significant economic benefits for the United States.129 Also, petrostates offer reliable access to supply with a minimum amount of politically induced price volatility. Tangibly, this means avoiding policies that would disrupt supply and cooperating with their patrons to secure oil transit routes and infrastructure. They have done so, quite consistently, for decades. The 1973 Arab oil embargo is the apparent exception to the rule, but there have been no embargoes since 1973. Even on that one occasion, as chapter 3 explained, the “oil shortages” in the United States were a product of the Nixon administration’s price control policies, rather than petrostates’ policies.130 Overall, the OFS states provide consistent and reliable oil access to their patrons—access that their ex- ternal protectors prize greatly.131

Privileged access to oil is not the only key benefit OFS deals offer to the pa- tron. The “petrodollar recycling” program from Saudi Arabia to the United States, beginning in 1974, is another example (see chapter 3). After the oil shock, US officials wanted money spent on oil returned to the US economy in the form of profits to American companies, investments in the United States, and purchases of American goods. The petrostates’ massive weapons purchases from their patrons became a sizeable part of that benefit. One American military of- ficer commented, “I do not know of anything that is nonnuclear that we would not give the Saudis.”132 Those purchases proved crucial for US defense compa- nies: their profits increased from about 4 percent of the total profits of Fortune 500 companies in the late 1960s to about 10 percent by the late 1980s, making arms exports one of the leading sectors of the US economy.133 Collectively, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait were the United States’ biggest customer for arms exports during 1990–2015 (Saudi Arabia was the second largest on its own).134 Saudi arms purchases, made possible by its oil income, are widely seen as part of a strategy to cement the Kingdom’s international relationships.135

Third, if OFS deals existed as part of empires, decolonization should have been different for petrostates—generally occurring later, and with greater reluctance on the part of the colonizer or colony or both, than in non-petrostates. As shown earlier, this is exactly the pattern we observe. An underlying bond between the colony and the metropole was not easily severed. In light of the other historical evidence, it is reasonable to interpret the decolonization pattern as further in- dication of an oil-for-security deal that was at one time integral to the imperial relationship, and after decolonization had to be reconstituted as a formal or in- formal pact between sovereign states.

In short, there is considerable evidence that OFS deals exist, forming the back- bone of a second subsystem. That does not mean, however, that all OFS deals were destined to last. In three cases—Iraq, Libya, and Iran—the petrostate turned away from its relationship with the Anglo-American powers. It is cer- tainly possible that other petrostates might do the same in the future, or that the United States might turn its back on them.

The final task is to show evidence that order within the subsystem depends significantly on punishments for noncompliance. The strength and proba- bility of those punishments varied over time. In the final stages of imperi- alism, punishments were still strong. Britain and the United States used two instruments of coercion in particular: leadership selection and economic coer- cion. The British intervention in Iraq in 1941 overthrew the regime, making it clear to all that Britain would not tolerate Iraq’s efforts to export oil to British enemies. The removal of Mossadegh’s government in Iran, along with the boycott of Iranian oil during 1951–1953, similarly demonstrated that the United States and the United Kingdom would not tolerate nationalization of their oil assets, which violated the implicit rules of oil at the time.

After Operation Ajax, however, the Anglo-American powers did not impose any more leadership punishments. That created a period of uncertainty through the 1960s about exactly what the petrostates could do without fear of punish- ment. Eventually, Libya and Iran severed their relationships with the United States, as Iraq did in 1958. Most of the oil-for-security deals, however, persisted based on mutual interests (strategic benefits) rather than coercion. When those deals were threatened, both parties tended to cooperate to repair the damage. The US-Saudi arrangements created immediately after the 1973 oil crisis, and the formalization of the US-Kuwaiti alliance after 1991, are cases in point. Thus, the period since the 1970s illustrates that OFS deals are able to persist largely on the basis of strategic benefits alone.

### Link---Palestine

#### Debates about the relationship between subject positions and nation-states can critically interrogate the justifications the United States and Palestinians use for cooperation as rooted in violent logics of settler neo-colonialism.

Mayo 22 [Peter; Professor, speaker, editor, writer, and former head of the Department of Arts, Open Communities and Adult Education at the University of Malta, in Malta, “Antonio Gramsci, Settler-Colonialism and Palestine”, Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies, Volume 21, Issue 2, October, 2022, 21(2), pp. 151–175, (<https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/hlps.2022.0293?role=tab>) // Makinde]

This paper is predicated on the view that **colonialism** and **neo-colonialism** take many forms and comprise issues concerning a ‘heterogeneous set’ of **subaltern** ‘**subject positions’** (Slemon 1995: 45). Drawing on previous work (Mayo 2015), I shall restrict myself, in this contribution, to the following:

(a)

the Gramscian concepts of Hegemony and what I call ‘misplaced alliances’ (Mayo 2007, 2016) and relating them to the Freirean concepts of the ‘oppressor consciousness’ and ‘cultural invasion’, the latter also bringing Edward Said into the reckoning;

(b)

the very complex issue of language in a post-independence, post-colonial situation.

These issues feature prominently in the context under review where direct colonialism, in Edward Said’s terms (Said, 1994, p.8), typified by the presence of an occupying force, neo-colonialism and, to adopt Gramsci’s perspective, ‘internal-colonialism’ (Gramsci 1997)1, makes its presence felt, often in crude and exceedingly violent ways. Gramsci, as with Freire and obviously Said, has also been invoked in an analysis of community action in the specific situation of ‘**settler-colonialism’** (Silwadi and Mayo 2014; Sperlinger 2015), that is to say **the condition in which Palestinians find themselves in their homeland**. Recall that this involves a land declared as **terra nullius** [nobody’s land], i.e. not falling under a sovereign European state, which can be occupied by an **exogenous force**, usually backed by an **imperial power**. This occurs despite the presence of Indigenous people, considered ‘racially/ethnically inferior’. The Indigenous people are to be either displaced or **assimilated** within a colonial set up in a subordinate position with regard to the occupying settlers (see Masalha 2018: 307).

One can argue that **Palestine faces a combination of all three types of colonialism**, namely internal colonisation as a result of its dependence on a colonising force within the country that ‘calls the shots’ in many ways, direct colonialism as a result of the presence of an occupying force and settler colonialism because Palestinians have seen their land taken and settled upon by people coming from outside.

One key text by Gramsci, used by a variety of authors in discussions of colonisation and dependency, is the essay on the Southern Question. It is titled Alcuni temi sulla Quistione2 Meridionale (Some themes from the Southern Question). It refers to the situation of uneven capitalist development in Italy. An industrialised North co-exists with an industrially underdeveloped Southern part and the islands, a situation which persists until the present day. A ‘First World’ northern part of Italy colonises a ‘Third World’ southern part, the latter consisting of the Mezzogiorno (the South) involving the peninsula from Rome downward and the islands, both the small and the large ones — mainly Sicily and Sardinia, in the latter case.

The issue of dependency is prominent in the literature dealing with pedagogy in Southern contexts, under the sway of ‘informal colonialism’ as are, for instance, the Middle East and Latin America. The issue of dependency needs to be analysed in this context, for instance Latin American countries’ dependency on the international capitalism of the multinationals, as propounded by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, later to become Brazil’s President, and Enzo Faletto (Cardoso and Faletto 1979).

The impact was felt and analysed **beyond the economic**. One of the main persons ‘to think with’ in this paper, Paulo Freire, writing from a Latin American perspective, brings the **Catholic Church** into discussions on **colonialism** and dependency calling for a ‘prophetic church’ which is a church that reveals, in Gustavo Gutierrez words, a preferential option for the poor, thus underlining the contrast that lies between what Cornell West calls the ‘Constantinian Church’ (the ‘Church of Empire’) and the grassroots-oriented ‘Prophetic Church’ with its basis in Liberation Theology. The latter is a decidedly decolonising theology born out of the most overtly colonised contexts which have moved from being directly colonised to being informally **colonised by the superpower that is the USA** and multinationals. In an earlier co-authored piece, in this journal (Grech and Mayo 2020), Michael Grech and I posited the relevance of one of the most important Jerusalem narratives, the passion and death of Jesus Christ, celebrated universally within Christendom, and offering numerous archetypal, in the Jungian sense, images of transformation for a Liberation Theology and pedagogy in Palestine itself. This is of course in relation to the popular struggle against settler colonialism. It has resonance for other people in colonial situations elsewhere, especially dispossessed people, as I shall show.

#### The aff is an imposition of Global North sovereignty that fuels the endless replication of coloniality which dispossesses indigenous folks and traps them within a false illusion of inclusion that serves to reinforce its ontological underpinnings

Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal, PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1-27-23, “On Indigenous Refusal against Externally-Imposed Frameworks in Historic Palestine”, Millenium Journal of International Studies, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359>, -PGR, 3-25-23

Anticolonial Resistance Projects and Liberal Politics of Recognition. Recognition Imposed from the Global North

‘Refusal comes with the requirement of having one’s political sovereignty acknowledged and upheld, and raises the question of legitimacy for those who are usually in the position of recognising: What is their authority to do so? Where does it come from? Who are they to do so?’[21](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn21-03058298221131359)

To further understand the inevitability of Indigenous frameworks to comprehend dynamics in and beyond historic Palestine, this section elaborates on one of their central notions, that of refusal. Critical Indigenous Studies invite us to centre the relational approach to settler-colonial power. The colonial relationship is based on – and perpetuated thanks to – material elements of domination and dispossession by force or coercion, but also operates through mechanisms of more implicit violence such as misrecognition and alienation based on hierarchies of race and gender.[22](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn22-03058298221131359) The perspective leads us to explore the link between anticolonial resistance and the study of recognition politics drawing on several Indigenous scholars, among which Glen Coulthard, a member of Yellowknives Dene First Nation, and Audra Simpson, who belongs to the Mohawks of Kahnawake, stand out, in turn inspiring – and inspired by – other authors.[23](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn23-03058298221131359)

Coulthard bases much of his criticism of liberal politics of recognition on the work of Franz Fanon.[24](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn24-03058298221131359) He questions the applicability of the recognition theory to the contexts in which the colonial relationship – or other structural asymmetries of power –still constitute a poignant reality. The hegemonic theory of recognition considers mutual recognition as something positive and desirable when it comes to ending a conflict and achieving reconciliation and even forgetfulness.[25](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn25-03058298221131359) Some of its critics believe that recognition can, however, produce adverse effects and contribute to perpetuating, and in a certain way justify and reproducing, the interconnected and mutually reinforcing modes of colonialism.[26](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn26-03058298221131359) Liberal politics of recognition do not consider the colonial relationship’s incommensurability – and foundational injustice.

An essential danger derives from the colonial binarism: accepting these politics of recognition may mean internalising the colonial narrative, since the Indigenous is recognised by a colonial subject whose existence is illegitimate. Presenting it as a painful concession, the coloniser ‘recognises’ the Indigenous as a subordinate deserving of some carefully selected (not threatening) rights by virtue of his [their] identity and culture, not of his [their] implicit sovereignty and unique bond with the land. When the Indigenous ‘consents’, he [they] accepts the recognition and, simultaneously, the dispossession accompanying it. He [They] becomes a victim of the distraction from the Indigenous struggle co-option consists of.[27](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn27-03058298221131359) Liberal politics of recognition function as a distraction mechanism that forces the colonised to remain on the defensive and reproduce a reactive strategy.[28](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn28-03058298221131359)

Anticolonial resistance that aspires to change but does not denounce the liberal politics of recognition accept, and even demand, recognition by the colonial project. They bet on framing their claims in the structures delimited by the colonial authorities, who agreed to negotiate some fringes of the system, albeit not its legitimacy altogether. The terms of the accommodation might be (re)arranged, but the colonial power will have the last word.[29](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn29-03058298221131359) This type of resistance, as well as the passive attitude towards the colonial project, is considered an internalisation of the colonising language (‘white freedom and justice’, in Fanon’s words) as one of the most treacherous psychological effects of the colonial relationship.[30](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn30-03058298221131359)

This article focuses specifically on the recognition proposed – rather, imposed – by other actors than the colonisers. Critical Indigenous Studies ‘asks the settler, native, and the arrivant each acknowledge their own positions within empire and then reconceptualise space and history to make visible what imperialism and its resultant settler colonialisms and diasporas have sought to obscure’.[31](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn31-03058298221131359) Its scholars help us to understand the way Indigenous realities are ordered not just by the respective settler-colonial authority but also by other interconnected systems of power that structure the global hegemonic structure that the international society is, particularly when it comes to the idea of empire and to normative structures of whiteness that continuously replicate themselves.[32](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn32-03058298221131359)

In a global system shaped by circuits of capital accumulation and imperial asymmetrical flows, recognition can be granted by a colonial entity but also by other states, the international society, or other forces, such as the market. All of them represent the Global North in one way or another.[33](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn33-03058298221131359) Empire and racial capitalism slyly operate to expand uninterruptedly at different levels. Each of those actions becomes entangled with violence to re-centre the foundational requirements of the Global North throughout different geographies. Simultaneously, the international normative framework holds hands with settler colonialism while boasting its liberal values. Most analyses refer to the US as a clear instance of an unsettler state that has the reins of a system built – and still relying – on the colonial legacies of the Global South, but the case of Israel is not an exception. The state is a European colony. Since its establishment, it has resorted to mechanisms developed for centuries by imperial powers to dispossess, subjugate and de-humanise the colonised Palestinians. It has implemented these processes of racialisation and hierarchisation directly when upholding British colonial regulations and, most of the time, indirectly through corporeal and non-corporeal means.

The Global North contributes to the constant replication and perpetuation of whiteness and racialising structures through ‘homogenizing pressures’,[34](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn34-03058298221131359) processes of objectification/subjection’[35](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn35-03058298221131359) and ‘intellectual and political projects that assume the continuation rather than the end of settler colonialism’.[36](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn36-03058298221131359) Western arrangements are imposed mainly through several avenues, building on epistemological presumptions and discursive tactics, creating a network of various sites and processes. It sets a political ontology, biopolitics and racialising assemblages that mirror an overdetermined nature of international advancement and go from the ideological to the material through bodies, institutions and affects.

In the case of historic Palestine and mirroring others, the Global North imposes the terms in which the context must be explained and narrated accordingly: it sets the paradigm regardless of the realities on the ground. Indigenous peoples need to learn to speak the language of the international society and adopt a ‘colonial intelligibility’,[37](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn37-03058298221131359) even if that leaves them with mere ‘illusions of inclusion’.[38](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn38-03058298221131359) This imposition of liberal politics goes hand in hand with the red lines within which contestation is possible, and the resulting expectations imposed on the colonised regarding their behaviour and rights.[39](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn39-03058298221131359) The Global North has also accommodated Indigenous Palestinian rights within existing (post)colonial legal and political frameworks, mainly when it comes to the adoption of Western models in institutional or cultural terms (especially, the creation of a capitalist nation-state), the consequence of full involvement with the neoliberal model[40](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn40-03058298221131359) or the illusion of an ever-bounded sovereignty.[41](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn41-03058298221131359)

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## K---Feminism

### Strategic Silence

#### We should refuse to engage with scholarship that is antithetical to feminist efforts to transform IR.

**Duriesmith**, D **(2020)** [David Duriesmith is a Gender and Politics Professor at the University of Sheffield with over 20 publications in the field “Friends don't let friends cite the malestream: a case for strategic silence in feminist international relations”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 22:1, 26-32, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2019.1700818, GMU JAF)

From its origins, feminist international relations (IR) has been concerned with disciplinary silences. Beginning with Cynthia Enloe’s(1990) clarion call “Where are the women?,” the parameters of feminist IR have been defined as much by certain thinkers’ disinterest in gender as they have by an interest in locating gender in the terrain of global affairs. After more than 25 years of robust aca-demic work on gender, the enduring perception remains that the malestream still “just doesn’t understand”(Tickner1997).1The nature of this “misunderstand-ing” has been the subject of ongoing analysis by both feminist authors and themalestream.2With the intention of adding my voice to these debates, earlier this year I wrote a chapter in Jane Parpart and Swati Parashar’s(2019) edited volume Rethinking Silence, Voice and Agency in Contested Gendered Terrains .In the chapter I aimed to explore the politics behind the disciplinary silences on gender and to consider what feminists might gain by re-evaluating our practices of citing male-stream scholarship. I argued that feminist scholarship should attempt to reclaim citational silences as a powerful and political act within “unloving” disciplines like IR (Soreanu and Hudson2008; Duriesmith2019 ). Here I would like to explore some of the frustrations that motivated the original piece and outline, in part ,what I see as the generative potential of refusing to cite work that is antithetical to feminist efforts to transform IR. In arguing that feminists should refuse to cite the malestream, my hope is not simply that feminists close ranks against those who do not adopt our priorities. Rather, it is that by refusing to show love for unloving scholarship we will create new possibilities for renegotiating how feminist work is positioned in relation to the malestream. The trap of citing gender-unaware IR Like many scholars who publish feminist work within conventional IR outlets, my experience from reviews and editorial evaluations has often been that for research on gender to be seen as being of value it must focus on how it adds to the scholarship of others who do not contribute to scholarship on gender, respond to critiques from feminists, or acknowledge the contributions of women. This is not a new challenge, and feminists have explored different strategies for getting our insights accepted into journals that have a tendency to view gender as a niche topic. This includes suggestions that we must shift our energies away from “unconventional methodologies” and speak to the malestream in its own methodological language (Hudson et al.2009, 29).Others have been sceptical of the idea that “that feminists should adopt social scientific methodologies if they want to be accepted and taken seriously, ”warning that more might be lost from such a move even if it did result in work on gender being published in journals like International Security(Tickner2010, 18). Other scholarship has focused on trying to show the relevance of feminist approaches and theory to subjects central to malestream IR. However, the constant demand to define the value of work in terms of what it can contribute to gender-unaware scholarship has become tiresome. Despite three decades of good-faith engagements from feminists to show the pertinence of gender to all corners of IR, malestream scholarship rarely responds to critiques, adopts gendered contributions, or includes feminist work in their accounts of the discipline. There is also strong evidence to suggest that similar exclusions exist in syllabi: as Phull, Ciflikli, and Meibauer(2019, 399–400) have shown, when feminist work is included, it tends to be “relegated to a section in a later week of the term” and coincides with token efforts to include women in otherwise overwhelmingly male-dominated reading lists. Both the way in which we have practiced IR and the way in which it has been taught have created a trap where feminists are asked to continually affirm the centrality of the malestream without any commensurate requirement that malestream scholars respond to the cri-tiques placed at their door. The failure of malestream scholarship to engage with feminist work–as well as work from the Global South, queer theory, postcolonialism, and many other positions at the “margins”–has led to rich critiques of disciplinary silences (Dingli2015). Most commonly, these silences are explained in terms of the perceived ignorance of the malestream; feminists just need to explain the importance of gender to malestream scholars before they can emerge as reformed gender-sensitive thinkers (Soreanu and Hudson2008).3These accounts of citational silence have been too generous. It is no longer tenable to suggest that IR is simply naively unaware of the presence of gender in world affairs after three decades of feminist scholarship. If this were a result of wide-eyed ignorance, the malestream would not have been so successful in containing feminist work within “gender-specific” conference streams, special issues, and “women’s weeks” on IR courses (Oestreich2007). Some might take these token efforts to indicate that marginalization is INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST JOURNAL OF POLITICS27over. For example, Daniel Drezner (2010) noted when evaluating the International Studies Encyclopedia that “You can’t say that feminist scholarship was neglected or marginalized in this encyclopedia–both J. Ann Tickner and Cynthia Enloe were cited in more entries than either Robert Jervis or John Mearsheimer.” Including citations to a small number of feminist IR’s “big names” in order to show that one appreciates that some gendered work has been done (without engaging with feminist critiques substantially ,or broadly reading feminist work on your topic) might appear like an easy way to avoid feminist critique of citational silences. However, the desire to dispel feminist critiques on citation by genuflecting to the usual suspects before moving on, much like the routine final “women’s week” on IR courses, is also an indication that the current situation is not the result of simple ignorance regarding feminist work. Rather, the pattern increasingly appears to indicate that mainstream IR has consistently refused to engage with feminist scholarship, while continuing to demand that feminist scholars generously cite authors who would never afford them the same level of serious consideration (Squires and Weldes2007). This pernicious equilibrium has resulted in a situation where malestream IR has been able to ghettoize feminist contributions while demanding that we perform the necessary observances to IR convention (read: cite them), without ever being required to account for the critiques that are leveled at their gender unawareness through those citations. I suspect that there are alternatives to pandering to the “center” to signal disciplinary membership (Squires and Weldes2007). I see this in the feminist scholars stretching the boundaries of IR by exploring questions of culture, emotion, queer theory, embodiment, postcolonialism, or narrative (Wibben2010; Sylvester2013; Parashar2014; Wilcox2015; Hagen2016; Weber2016).4The advantage of these works is not that they succeed in convincing the malestream to recognize the importance of gender, but that they (to varying degrees) refuse to engage with the priorities of malestream scholar-ship when it has nothing interesting to say about their chosen topic simply so they can signal disciplinary membership. To do this, we need to become more comfortable with refusing to cite work that does not align with our own priorities

#### **Strategic Silence allows for feminists to show their priorities and reshape political implications of the malestream.**

**Duriesmith**, D **(2020)** [David Duriesmith is a Gender and Politics Professor at the University of Sheffield with over 20 publications in the field “Friends don't let friends cite the malestream: a case for strategic silence in feminist international relations”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 22:1, 26-32, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2019.1700818, GMU JAF)

The need for strategic silence in feminist citation practices Considering feminists’ long-standing efforts to challenge the citational silences of the malestream, it is time for us to shift our efforts away from uninterested and often uninteresting scholarship. As Sophia Dingli (2015) has argued, silences can be productive as well as oppressive. As feminist scholars, we might be better served by actively using silence, refusing to engage with work that has chosen not to take gender and other topics at the“margins”28D. DURIESMITH seriously. When authors write on topics that have rich bodies of gendered literature but refuse to cite feminist scholarship, it would be appropriate to, in turn, refuse citation. This kind of refusal is more than just petty spitefulness; it could prove to be a political act to begin reshaping the field, to tangibly show our priorities. As feminist scholars are having valuable conversations about the engagement with Global South scholarship, the role of interdisciplinary scholarship, and the enduring sexism of the field, it seems clear tome that we should set our priorities not only with regard to whom we do cite but also to whom we refuse to engage with. These kinds of strategic silences have already been seen to be productive outside IR, with scholars like bell hooks (1991) refusing disciplinary conventions when they run against the normative commitments of their work. IR does not need to be shown that gender is relevant, and increasingly cannot be said to simply have overlooked these perspectives when they are excluded. The current conventions of the discipline are such that it is acceptable for malestream scholarship to refuse to engage with the substantial and enduring body of feminist work. At the same time, there remains a pressure for feminist IR to shift its practices in order to become palatable to malestream IR as a pre-condition for entry into many mainstream journals (Tickner 2010, 18). This dynamic has political implications: citations as academic currency reward such a power dynamic, and they entrench the same attitudes that treat work on gender as marginal to rather than constitutive of world affairs. Such a dynamic will not change by kindly asking the malestream to read more feminist work, but maybe it will by refusing to cite mainstream scholar-ship that is poorly versed in feminists’ essential contributions to the field. I am conscious that someone reading my case for strategic silence may conclude that I am advocating for a retreat to the kind of “capacious field of camps” into which Christine Sylvester has previously warned about IR slipping (Sylvester 2010, 608). My hope is not that feminist IR scholars “circle the wagons” against all interlopers who have refused to adopt a feminist approach. Rather, I hope that our strategic silence might gradually shift how feminist work is positioned vis-à-vis the malestream. As feminist scholars now carry considerable clout in a wide range of faculty, journals, and associations, adopting an approach of refusal might shift what is seen as central to the field–not just to fellow disciplinary IR scholars but also to those with an interest in the inter-national more broadly. Such an approach\ would create space to center our endeavors in relation to other bodies of work, other frameworks, and other sites of conversation (globally). It might provide us with breathing space tore-evaluate our citation practices, to invest time and space engaging with voices that remain absent from current feminist work. Refusal is not intended as an attempt to strong-arm the malestream into giving feminist work more serious attention, but as a step in challenging the existing parameters of the discipline itself (which built its house on fundamentally racist, capitalist, and heteropatriarchal ground). This approach may reshape the discipline without convincing the center to acknowledge gender, by refusing to acknowledge the centrality of stale, gender-unaware scholarship.

### Link---Iran

#### Policy analysis over US engagement with Iran is rooted in patriarchal masculinity—the 1AC reduces failed “constructive engagement” with Iran to weakness and femininity and locks in militarized violence.

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The emphasis placed upon dependence on military action is perhaps the most obviously feminine rhetoric available within the larger theme of dependence in general. General Martin E. Dempsey, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the implementation of the Iran Deal, said that the agreement [was] “better than launching a military strike, but I will sustain the military options in case it becomes necessary.” President Obama attempted to mollify concerns about the deal by assuring that Israel would always have military superiority over their neighbors. Senator Marco Rubio called for the United States to instead gain a stable military position in the Middle East “to signal readiness and restore a credible military option.” The King of Saudi Arabia was unhappy with the United State’s approach to Iran, and negotiated a $1 billion arms agreement with the Pentagon to provide weapons for the Saudi Arabian war effort and bolster Saudi forces in order to reassure those with concerns about the shortcomings of the Iran Deal. Saudi Arabia was noted as becoming “increasingly assertive,” signifying that states who choose to use weapons are assertive, while those who choose not to use weapons are the opposite: passive, meek, compliant. The previous discussion of hegemonic masculinity, idealized masculinity, and military masculinity all being relatively synonymous make the relationship between the rhetoric of dependence on the military and lack of masculinity quite palpable. The assertion that the Iran Deal would not be sufficient on its own accord from both the support and the dissent implies that the deal is feminine in nature, and is a strong indication that this form of foreign policy is not seen as entirely legitimate because of that implication. “Weakness is always considered a danger when issues of national security are at stake,” states Tickner (1992, emphasis my own). The frequent portrayal of the Iran Deal as dependent in any form did more than just link the deal to ideas of weakness because it was also consistently paired with phrases that codified the deal as dangerous. This is significant because it further allowed the option of using military force to seem like the safe alternative, even though the use of military troops puts the livelihood of American soldiers in direct risk. Classifying the Iran Deal as a dangerous, unstable, or volatile policy solution that could only be made credible through the use of a hard power solution created a dichotomy in which the feminized Iran Deal existed in direct opposition to the masculinized military. This hierarchy inherently places hard power solutions above soft power solutions, and therefore allowed the Iran Deal to be depicted as a less legitimate response than the use of military force.

### Link---Palestine

#### Western imperialism currently shapes the past and present processes of Palestinian knowledge production. The universalized cultured and religion informed understandings of Gender have favored Western understandings which are used to justify U.S. Military engagement. Debates can call into question this ‘Rescue Rhetoric’ as it is to be challenged for its reproduction of Orientalism and feminist exclusion at the level of epistemology.

Andersson 23 [Tanetta; Professor in the Sociology Department at Trinity College, “‘Knowing’ Palestinian Women: Interrogating Western International Feminist Assumptions, Governance, and Social Science Discourses”, Critical Sociology, (<https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205231154616>) // Makinde]

The **dynamics of empire stubbornly persist in the Palestinian Occupied Territories**; the political and social conditions cannot be described as ‘**post’-colonial**. Despite these political and colonial realities for many peoples, sociological thought has not come to terms with the **Western imperialism** encoded in both **past** and **present processes** of its **knowledge production** (Connell, 2007; Go, 2020; Jafar, 2017). To confront sociology’s evasion of colonial relations, a focus on sociology of knowledge and discourse construction is a critical intervening point at which thinking in an ‘ambivalently disciplined’ manner is required. Thus, I draw from postcolonial studies in sociology and Middle Eastern Women’s Studies to push against disciplinary conventions and omissions in sociology (Soukarieh, 2009). Howard Winant (2001), Raewyn Connell (2007), and Julian Go (2016) represent important starting points in sociological viewpoints informed by postcolonial criticism. For example, Go (2016) illustrates that the early works of postcolonial theory ‘challenged deep systems of knowledge, identity, and culture that had enabled colonialism’, while the second wave contests Marxist economic determinism of the initial wave of postcolonial influence because it overlooks, ‘the racialized, gendered, psychological, cultural, and semiotic dimensions and legacies of imperial power’ (Go, 2016: 6).

Edward Said’s Orientalism expands the narrow legitimating role of ideology within Marxist approaches of Postcolonial studies. Said’s theory of interpretation is an ‘apparatus of knowledge’ which is productive – power is built through representation at the same time as epistemology when understood through Said’s extension of Foucault’s power/knowledge conceptualizations (Yegenoglu, 1998: 15). In Orientalist discourse, **binary oppositions locate the Orient in the inferior position to that of the superior West** and are linked to projects of domination which draw on scholarly knowledge: ‘we are implicated in the projects that establish **Western authority** and **cultural difference’** (Abu-Lughod, 2001: 105). One example illustrating the ongoing politics of Orientalism is Said’s (2001, 2003 [1978]) corrective of Samuel Huntington’s ‘**clash of civilizations’** thesis. Said characterizes it instead as ‘clash of ignorance’, with the West on one side of the binary and Islam on the other in which complex historical currents and countercurrents are reduced and over-simplified into Popeye and Bluto ‘cartoonlike’ adversaries. Although Said does not center women or gender in his work specifically, Women’s studies and anthropologist scholar, Sondra Hale (2005: 1) describes Said as an ‘accidental feminist’. She points out that in later work like ‘Orientalism reconsidered’, he addresses methodological questions within a wider ‘circle of issues’ (Said, 1985). Gurminder Bhambra (2007) argues convincingly that, like the missing engagements with gender and **sexuality of sociology’s past** which overlooked such realms as **constitutive of structural relations within societies**, our **limited engagement with postcolonial thought represents** a ‘**missing revolution’** in the field of **sociology**.

At the crossroads of sociological knowledge on gender relations for Middle Eastern women, sociologist Marnia Lazreg (1988: 86) presses forceful questions: ‘**Why hasn’t academic feminism exposed the weaknesses of the prevailing discourse on women in the Middle East** and North Africa?’ An intellectual born in a Muslim country and to Muslim parents, her works include The Eloquence of Silence: Algerian Women in Question (1994), Questioning the Veil: Open Letters to Muslim Women (2009), and most recently, Islamic Feminism and the Discourse of Post-Liberation: The Cultural Turn in Algeria (2021). Across this corpus, her keen eye for tracing discursive power in academia and media representations stands out. In ‘Feminism and Difference: The Perils of Writing as a Woman on Women in Algeria’ appearing in the journal, Feminist Studies, Lazreg (1988: 101) argues ‘To think of feminism in the singular is sociologically inappropriate’. Similar to U.S. multiracial feminist approaches to the ‘**politics of difference’**, she refutes universalizing claims present in Western feminist discourses on women in the Middle East, which understand women through monolithic, totalizing frames of religion, tradition, and victimization (Connell, 2007). In essence, when Islamic and Middle Eastern women are subsumed under practices like **veiling** and **seclusion**, they are abstracted out of ‘**historical specificity’** and political contexts, precluding **any structural explanations beyond religion, tradition, or possibility of change** (Hale, 2005; Mohanty, 2003). Lazreg (1988: 88) continues:

The one-sidedness of this discourse on difference becomes grotesque if we reverse the terms and suggest, for example, that women in contemporary Europe and North America should be studied as Christian women! Similarly, the label ‘**Middle Eastern women’**, when counterposed with the label ‘European women’, reveals its unwarranted generality. The Middle East is a geographical area covering no less than twenty countries (if it is confined to the ‘Arab East’) that display a few similarities and many differences.

Lazreg (2000) denounces **International women’s studies for its ‘tourist feminism’** and thus conveys her deep skepticism regarding superficial attempts at understanding women from the Global south which are often anchored in analytical **universal assumptions**. In ‘The triumphant discourse of global feminism: should other women be known?’ she weighs these points against the professionalization of gender studies, identifying insidious effects like ‘**theatrical indigenization’** and ‘**distanciation’**, produced by some Western feminists’ colonial gaze. In the former case, institutional contexts like academic conferences, speaking events, and texts, Lazreg observes frequent foregrounding of sensationalized speakers or textbook images of **Othered women for Western audiences**. In the latter, distanciation comprehends Othered women solely as objects of data for Western intellectuals and students who assume they are entitled to have access and ‘know’ (Lazreg, 2000; Soukarieh, 2009). These types of **colonial ways of seeing** and **engaging perpetuate the one-sidedness of knowledge formation** by which **Western women ‘define the terms of the reception of Othered women’s intellectual production and translatability’** (Lazreg, 2000: 30). Indeed, it is true that many prominent liberal feminists like Robin Morgan suppress Palestinian women’s voices in the feminist movement (Jarmakani, 2011: 233). In their writings and public commentary, Betty Freidan and Andrea Dworkin, mobilize a cultural frame over a structural one through their focus on the political martyrdom of militant Palestinian women. Consequently, they totalize Palestinian women through the narrow lens of tradition, religion, and culture, on the one hand, while omitting the necropolitical and structural violence of Israeli occupation Palestinian women often witness throughout their lives (Abdulhadi, 2007; Amireh, 2011; Elia, 2011).

Domination Through Culturizing Palestinian Women in International Feminist and Social Science Frameworks

Overt expressions of global feminist discourse silencing Palestinian women through writings are many, but some Palestinian women scholars argue the VAW human rights legal framework represents a covert yet powerful form of global feminist discourse universalistic assumptions. In her history of Gender in Islam, Leila Ahmed (1992) argues that British and French colonial powers mobilized feminism to legitimate their oppressive regimes. Western Colonial officials, for instance, engaged in contradictory positions on women’s oppression: Lord Comer voiced criticism about the ‘oppressive’ veiling practices of Egyptian women, on the one hand, while speaking against British women’s suffrage rights, on the other hand.

A contemporary derivative of such colonial feminism has come to the fore: a ‘**rescue rhetoric’**, which justifies **Western military interventions** on behalf of women in formerly colonized nations. Lila Abu-Lughod (2002) analyzes the ‘political work’ done by such discursive framing in the name of women’s rights and equality. In place of the ‘colonial feminism’ espoused by British leaders like Lord Comer, First Lady Laura Bush and Cherie Blair, wife of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, recycle the same old Orientalist binary imaginary in their public comments supporting Western intervention: ‘Tradition and Modernity. Harems and Freedom. Veiling and Unveiling’ (Abu-Lughod, 2001: 105). Feminist admirers of Abu-Lughod’s ‘Do Muslim Women Need Saving’ remark that it remains as relevant now as in 2002, when the originating article was published (Scott, 2015: 108). More recently, Abu-Lughod (2013) has turned this gendered orientalism lens on ‘circuits’ of human rights discourse. Like the savior rhetoric highlighted above justifying armed conflict through calls to rescue or ‘**save’ Afghan women**, Abu-Lughod argues human rights discourses also situate **Muslim women at the center of reformulated moral crusades**. These circuits function to authorize two mutually reinforcing narratives between **public imaginations** and **human rights discourse**, working hand-in-glove to deepen **gendered orientalist oppositions of Muslim women in Western audiences and minds**. Here, she samples textual evidence ranging from faulty journalistic ethnographies (i.e. Half the Sky by Nicolas Kristoff and Sheryl WuDann) to ‘pulp nonfiction’ memoirs genres. Two such sensationalist pulp nonfiction ‘memoirs’ reflect Muslim women in Jordan and Palestine, for example, and are mass-published in the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Both focus on honor; however, after greater scrutiny, one was found to be problematic because the author had not lived in Jordan since she was 3 years of age! Abu-Lughod’s findings indicate these works represent Muslim women to Western audiences like mirror opposites of Western women’ and, crucially, Muslim women’s lives are articulated in terms of ‘culturized category of violence’ – seclusion, veiling, honor crimes – for Western imaginations and appetites. Similarly, in another chapter, Abu-Lughod explains how honor crimes are produced and read through the unidimensional lens of tradition, producing the ‘tradition effect’ (Koğacioğlu, 2004).

In feminist international **human rights frameworks**, Karen Engle (2019) detects this pattern of **culturized understandings of gender** being subsumed with a singular focus on private sphere violations, especially **sexual rights** and **freedoms** (i.e. sexual trafficking, prostitution, honor deaths, wife battery, and sexual violence). After the 1993 Global Tribunal on Violations of Women’s Human Rights at the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, for example, the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action document attempts to integrate postcolonial critiques by articulating what Engle terms ‘culturally sensitive universalism’. By contrast, Engle frames Western radical feminists as representing the ‘structural bias’ perspective, challenging human rights legal theory for its limited ability to address violations and abuse in private spheres between citizens (Engle, 2019). Post-Vienna, the impetus behind this latter ‘structural bias’ framing consolidated around the realm of women’s sexual domination, or VAW including during conflict, as central to women’s rights as human rights platforms. However, **this focus point** also acts to **dislodge** and **marginalize** Third World **women’s more radical questions** regarding **exploitative relations** of **Global capitalism** between Global North and South (Bunch and Reilly, 1994; Engle, 2019). To illustrate the coalesce of these differing strands in this final section, I draw on the case of the ‘VAW’ agenda contouring domestic violence as a social problem in the context of Palestinian Occupied territories.

### Link---Saudi Arabia

#### Taking a moral stance against Saudi Arabia asserts the backwardness of Saudi Arabia and positions Western nations as enlightened nations that “treat their women properly” which erases agency from women in Saudi Arabia, reproduces dichotomies of us and them, and re-entrenches racist and sexist distinctions

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As Charlotte Hooper has argued, masculinity is an incredibly resilient concept in terms of how it legitimizes the behaviour of both male and female actors. Masculinity, she argues, appears to have ‘no stable ingredients and therefore its power depends entirely on certain quali- ties constantly being associated with men’ (Hooper, 2001: 230). On this view, what is required is an approach ethics that does not rely upon gendered binaries, but instead has the resources to challenge them. To illustrate this argument, the second part of the article addresses the recent dip- lomatic crises faced by Sweden and Canada in their relationships with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. While there are many other nation-states which might warrant atten- tion here, Saudi Arabia represents, in many ways, a test case for feminist foreign policy. Saudi Arabia is well known in the West as a flagrant denier of women’s rights; despite the recent overturning of the decades-long ban on driving for women, women remain subject to a system of male guardianship and women’s and human rights activ- ists in the country are imprisoned, and can be sentenced to death, for their actions. And yet, Saudi Arabia remains an ‘ally’ of the West – an importer of arms from many Western countries and a fellow fighter in the war against Islamic terrorism. Not sur- prisingly, many observers regard the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia as existing in out- right contradiction to the aims of feminist foreign policy. While not denying this, I suggest that our attention should shift away from this contradiction – which again relies on binary logics and assumptions of essential difference between Saudi Arabia (authoritarian, backward and violent) and Sweden/Canada (democratic, progressive and peaceful). Policymakers and diplomats must aim to build understanding by rec- ognizing the material and discursive factors that have constructed, over time, the relationships between Saudi Arabia and Sweden/Canada, as well as the ways in which patriarchal institutions and structures – across the globe and at multiple scales – hin- der the possibility of attentive listening and connection across national borders and cultural/religious difference. It is only through the prism of this relationship – where difference takes on meaning – that the more complex role of Western states in the contemporary system of transnational militarism is revealed. Furthermore, countries such as Sweden and Canada must recognize that progressive change on women’s and human rights in a country like Saudi Arabia can never be imposed by ethical or femi- nist Western governments. Countries espousing feminist foreign policies must refuse to buy in to an order of living that ‘splits humans into the superior and the inferior’ (Gilligan and Snider, 2017: 174). The final part of the article sketches out the ways in which a feminist ethic of care can offer a different, and potentially more transformative, way of thinking about feminist foreign policy. Care ethics now includes a wide-ranging literature in a diverse array of disciplines, including IR.3 While there are a number of key authors who are widely rec- ognized as the central figures in care ethics, my reading relies specifically on the work of Carol Gilligan on moral psychology, ethics and politics. In contrast to much of the (very valuable) research which focuses on the concept of care and its application to women’s labour, social policy and migration, Gilligan’s approach focuses on the epistemic, psy- chological and political structure of patriarchy. This approach is committed to revealing the harms caused by absolutist, dualistic categories of all kinds, and emphasizes the relationality of moral agents, as well as the importance of contextual and revisable moral judgement. It sees all people as embodied and vulnerable and mutually interdependent. A feminist ethic of care is not something that must be rationally willed or imposed on others; rather, it is a feature of the human need for relationship that flows when men and women resist the grip of patriarchy. Only then do both men and women feel free to respond to others with careful attention, attentive listening and responsiveness, and to do so without losing or sacrificing themselves. Insofar as it is committed to disrupting the binaries and dichotomies of patriarchy, it could be argued that a care ethics perspective challenges not only a particular view of foreign policy but also the very idea foreign policy itself. While I am sympathetic to this possibility, I will not pursue it here. This is because, I would argue that there is currently some discursive, political and ethical momentum behind the idea of feminist foreign policy, and that it is emerging at a time where the need for feminist mobilization – against the forces of patriarchy and populism – is more urgent than ever. Instead, I argue that feminist foreign policy is an idea that can be mobilized strategically and which can be tied to an understanding of ethics. I will argue, however, that what makes feminist for- eign policy ‘ethical’ is not its commitment to acting decisively and with epistemological certainty on already-agreed-upon rational principles of human rights and universal jus- tice; rather, ethical foreign policy that is feminist is about seeing global actors as consti- tuted and sustained through relationships in specific times and places, and tracing how power, in its various forms, makes those relationships – in various, ever-changing con- texts – oppressive or enabling. Feminist foreign policy as ethical foreign policy When the Swedish Social Democratic Party and Green Party formed a coalition govern- ment after the 2014 elections, they called themselves the world’s first feminist govern- ment and have since then intensified Sweden’s domestic gender mainstreaming. In October of the same year, Sweden became the first nation-state ever to adopt, publicly and explicitly, a feminist foreign policy. According to Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, Sweden’s feminist foreign policy is about systematically and holistically implementing policies that contribute to gender equality and the full enjoyment of human rights of all women and girls (Wallström, 2015). This is achieved through a focus on the so-called three ‘Rs’ – rights, representation and resources (Government of Sweden, 2016: 3). The six focus areas for 2016 were as follows: 1. To strengthen women and girls’ human rights in humanitarian situations; 2. To fight and prevent gender-based and sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations; 3. To promote women’s participation as actors in peace processes and peace pro- moting measures; 4. To promote women and girls’ participation in the work for economic, social and environmental sustainable development; 5. To strengthen women and girls’ economic independence and their access to eco- nomic resources, including though productive work under decent living conditions; 6. To strengthen sexual and reproductive rights for girls and young people (Wallström, 2015). These goals are reiterated in the new Handbook: Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy (Government of Sweden, 2018). The Handbook also outlines methods for norm change and mobilization, as well as working methods within subsidiary areas of foreign policy – including peace and security, disarmament and non-proliferation, international devel- opment and trade. Sweden’s feminist foreign policy is framed as a natural extension of the work of a feminist government and a continuation of many years of national gender equality policy (Government of Sweden, 2018: 16). The general approach emphasizes gender equality and human rights; the Handbook states explicitly that ‘those countries that have made reservations infringing women’s and girls’ rights should repeal these, as they contravene the purposes and intentions of the conventions’ and that ‘(r)eligion, culture, customs or traditions can never legitimise infringements of women’s and girls’ human rights’ (Government of Sweden, 2018: 21). While the policy covers many sub- areas of foreign policy, working to ensure representative and inclusive peace and secu- rity is a cornerstone of Sweden’s feminist foreign policy (Government of Sweden, 2018: 63). To this end, a new national action plan on women, peace and security, the third since 2006, was adopted in spring 2016. It is aimed at 3 ministries and 11 agen- cies and has been drawn up in broad consultation with relevant actors in Sweden and with five conflict and post-conflict nations: Afghanistan, Colombia, DR Congo, Liberia and Palestine (Government of Sweden, 2018: 41). Disarmament and non-pro- liferation are a central pillar of the policy; in the Handbook, Sweden relies specifically on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in order to ensure that it is not contributing to gender- based violence around the world: One important aspect of this work is the strict control exercised over the export of military equipment from Sweden. This takes place, for example, through Sweden applying article 7.4 of the ATT. The article was included in the treaty with the strong support of countries including Sweden, and requires state parties to take into account the risk of exported materials being used for – or facilitating – serious gender-based violence or serious violence against women or children. (Government of Sweden, 2018: 73) Canada, under the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau, has become the second country to make an explicit commitment to feminism – in both domestic and foreign policy. Trudeau famously began his work as Prime Minister by forming Canada’s first- ever gender-balanced Cabinet, providing the now well-known justification of ‘because its 2015!’ when asked why he chose to do so. Trudeau himself is a self-described femi- nist, provoking roughly equal measures of delight and disdain from observers both in Canada and around the world. In terms of foreign policy, the key document so far is Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, announced on 9 June 2017. This followed an extensive public review and consultations on the renewal of Canada’s international assistance policy and funding framework. In her foreword to the policy, Marie-Claude Bibeau, Minister of International Development, states that ‘we need to make sure that women and girls are empowered to reach their full potential so they can earn their own livelihoods, which will benefit fami- lies as well as the economic growth of their communities and countries’. Taking a human rights–based approach, the government has pledged that, by 2022, 95% of our interna- tional assistance budget will be directed towards gender equality and women’s empower- ment (Government of Canada, 2017). While the policy has been generally welcomed by Canada’s development community, a number of questions have been posed about what this will mean in practice. Many of these questions were motivated by the announcement that there would be marginal (if any) new funding allocated to this policy. This was particularly difficult for some observ- ers to accept, given that Canada continues to fall below the United Nations (UN) recom- mendation of 0.7% of GDP for foreign aid, and given the announcement, just 2days earlier, of a 70% increase in defence spending. And while there have been some promising moves on behalf of the government regarding funding for local women’s groups and pro- grammes promoting reproductive rights and access to family planning, including safe, legal abortion, there are still concerns about the ultimate effectiveness of so-called ‘top- down feminism’ in the context of development and its ability to engender real change. In a 2018 speech, Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland stated that ‘women’s rights are human rights, and they are at the core of our foreign policy. It is why, she con- tinued, we are committed to an ambitious feminist foreign policy’ (Government of Canada, 2018). She also described the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, launched by Canada at the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference in November 2017. The initiative aims at ensuring women can fully participate in peace operations around the world, but also that the right conditions are put in place for their sustainable involvement. Throughout the speech, Freeland emphasized the link between feminist foreign policy, democratic values and human rights. It is clear that while the emphasis in feminist foreign policy for both countries is the inclusion and equality of women, in both cases, the notion of a feminist foreign policy is discursively constructed as ‘ethical’. As Wallström noted in a speech at the United States Institute of Peace, a feminist foreign policy seeks the same goals as any visionary foreign policy: peace, justice, human rights and human development. It simply acknowledges that we will not get there without adjusting existing policies, down to their nuts and bolts, to correct the particular (and often invisible) discrimination, exclusion and violence still inflicted on the female half of us (Wallström, 2015). Thus, women and ‘the feminine’ are positioned as the key to the realization of ethical or ‘visionary’ foreign policy goals – peace, justice, human rights and human development. Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman-Rosamond (2016) support this view in their timely 2016 article, Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy in the Making: Ethics, Politics and Gender, in which they write that ‘(t)he declaration of a distinct feminist foreign policy signals a departure from traditional elite-oriented foreign policy practices and discourses toward a policy framework that is guided by normative and ethical principles’ (2016: 327). The authors rely on the ‘solidarist branch of the English School’ to conceptualize efforts to pursue an ethically informed feminist foreign policy (2016: 331). They argue that the relevant credentials of this approach are based on its provision of a ‘progressive account of global relations and for normative considerations in global politics’, because it ‘takes account of states’ endeavours to overcome the constraints of anarchy in a fash- ion conducive to both international order and justice’ (2016: 331). Despite its status as an ‘ethical’ IR theory, the authors note that the ES is ‘entirely void’ of feminist insights about the gendered lives and stories of women in international society (2016: 332). Their aim, then, is to insert gender into this framework, so that it can then serve as an ethical foundation on which to build a feminist foreign policy. The English School of International Relations Theory offers a critique of realism; against neo-realism, ES argues that there is a society of states at the international level and that the relations among states – including ‘ideational’ relations of an historical and or legal nature – shape conduct of international politics. The ES is generally understood to have two ‘branches’ – a ‘pluralist’ branch and a ‘solidarist’ branch. The former argues that, given the diversity in the world, a pluralist, tolerant, difference-preserving interna- tional society is the best that we can hope for (and the best model for sustaining order and achieving justice). By contrast, ‘solidarists’ follow Kant to argue for the possibility and desirability of a cosmopolitan global community guided by the principles and practices of international human rights, humanitarian intervention. How does this approach fare as an ethical basis for a feminist foreign policy? Most glaring, of course, is the blindness of the solidarist branch of the ES to the constitutive and causal effects of gender in international politics. Its merit lies in its liberal cosmo- politanism, which can support what they describe as the ‘broad cosmopolitan underpin- nings of feminist foreign policy’ (Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond, 2016: 332). They cite feminist international ethicist Kimberly Hutchings who explains, in a textbook chap- ter, that ‘feminist justice ethicists seek to make the universal terms of traditional moral theory genuinely inclusive and universal’ (Hutchings, 2010: 68, cited in Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond, 2016: 331). But as Hutchings’ extensive corpus of work critiquing moral rationalism (including ‘feminist justice ethics’) shows, rationalist international ethical and political theory works because it tells us (White liberal citizens of Western states) so much of what we already know about moral agency and situations; moreover, what it accomplishes is to institutionalize hierarchical relations and patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the practice of ethical theorizing (Hutchings, 2013: 36). The discursive and normative positioning of feminist foreign policy as ‘ethical’ foreign policy is not a difficult move to make. Gender binaries are constitutive of the language and practices of international politics. Because of the pervasiveness of gender binaries in Western thought, any association of foreign policy with ‘morality’ or ‘ethics’ is regularly – whether or not it is explicitly labelled ‘feminist’ – constructed as feminine. Paradoxically, however, at a different level, even ostensibly ‘ethical’ foreign policy – that elevates the importance of human rights over, for example, trade, or which subordinates direct material gains to the need to ‘save’ strangers caught in humanitarian emergencies – is regularly constructed discursively through a protective, paternal masculinity. Thus, femi- nist foreign policy sits in tension with the gendered binaries that constitute foreign policy – while it is ethical and ‘soft’, and hence feminine, it is simultaneously protective and paternal – and hence masculine. These constructions are not essential or fixed but are instead fluid and open to rewriting and re-enactment.Human rights, arms deals and feminist foreign policy As ‘ethical’, feminist governments, Sweden and Canada have been outspoken critics of the unethical or barbaric acts of other states - to condemn, criticize or rebuke any policy or regime - that appears to contradict their own commitment to `justice and human rights’. This emerged clearly in the diplomatic crises with Saudi Arabia, faced by Sweden in 2015, and more recently, with Canada, in 2018. On 11 February 2015, Foreign Minister Wallström, speaking before the Swedish parliament, criticized Saudi Arabia’s human rights record; specifically, she criticized the public flogging of the blogger Raif Badawi and later described it as ‘medieval’. Wallström, whose government recognized the State of Palestine in 2014, had been asked to deliver a speech at an Arab League summit in Cairo in late March, but Saudi Arabia intervened, and Wallström was disinvited. On 9 March, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador to Sweden, saying that Wallström had ‘unacceptably interfered’ in the country’s internal affairs. The United Arab Emirates fol- lowed suit a week later. Wallström was also condemned by the Gulf Cooperation Council (which consists of Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE), The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which includes 57 countries, and the Arab League itself (Nordberg, 2015). Complicating these matters is the fact that Sweden is one of Europe’s largest per- capita arms exporters. The day after Wallström was supposed to have appeared in Cairo, on 10 March, the government announced its decision not to renew a bilateral arms agree- ment with Saudi Arabia. This has been described as Wallström’s ‘feminist foreign policy’ in practice; not surprisingly, the move did not sit well with some of Sweden’s most pow- erful industrialists, who stood to lose significant income from a break in relations with Saudi Arabia (Nordberg, 2015). In an effort to reduce tensions and mitigate damage, 1 week later, a delegation of Swedish officials travelled to Riyadh, carrying letters from Prime Minister Stefan Löfven and King Carl XVI Gustaf, explaining that Wallström had not intended to criticize Islam and offering official regrets for any misunderstanding. The Saudi ambassador to Sweden is now reinstated. As Jenny Nordberg describes in The New Yorker, Wallström’s political opponents came down hard on what they saw as a clumsy performance. Still, the Swedish foreign minister refused to back down, referring only to a misunderstanding, and stressing that no apology for her specific remarks had been, or would be, issued (Nordberg, 2015). The diplomatic crisis with Canada was more severe and, at the time of writing, is ongoing. On 1 August 2018, Amnesty International announced that the Saudi govern- ment had arrested several female activists. One of these women was Saudi activist Samar Badawi, who is, in fact, the sister of Raif Badawi, the activist at the heart of the Swedish affair, who has been detained since 2012 for ‘insulting Islam’. Raif Bawadi’s wife and children were made Canadian citizens in 2018. On 2 August, Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s foreign minister, tweeted that she was ‘very alarmed’ to learn of the arrest and that Canada ‘stands together with the Badawi family’. The next day, Canada’s foreign minis- try weighed in, writing on Twitter that Saudi Arabia should ‘immediately release’ Badawi and ‘all other peaceful #humanrights activists’. On 5 August, in a string of 10 tweets, Saudi Arabia accused Canada of ‘an overt and blatant interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom’ and said its tweet broke the ‘most basic international norms’ of diplo- macy. Within hours, the Canadian ambassador was expelled, and it was announced that Saudi Arabia was suspending ‘all new trade and investment transactions’ with Canada. On 7 August, Saudi Arabia was planning to withdraw all Saudi students it has been spon- soring at Canadian universities, colleges and schools – more than 15,000 people. On 21 August, following a few weeks of relative calm, when both countries grappled with the fallout, human rights groups said that Saudi Arabia was on the cusp of executing a female political activist for the first time (Baker, 2018). Many have applauded Sweden and Canada for ‘taking an ethical stand’ on the policies of Saudi Arabia. Some are more critical, pointing out the inconsistencies between Canada’s rhetoric – on Twitter and elsewhere – on women’s rights and their continuation of trade relations with the kingdom. When Trudeau came to power in 2015, he failed to cancel a US$15 billion deal, negotiated by the previous Conservative government, to sell light armoured vehicles (LAVs) to Saudi Arabia. The Liberals rapidly understood that because it was costly for a government seeking to brand itself as progressive and feminist to support selling weapons to a dictatorship, it was better to avoid bringing any attention to relations with Saudi Arabia (Juneau, 2018). As a result, the deeper trade relations expected by the kingdom never materialized, and relations have deteriorated ever since. Arms deals have proven to be a thorn in the side of feminist governments – as they have in the past for all governments – in which leaders simultaneously support progres- sive foreign policy goals and export-oriented defence industries (Vucetic, 2017: 505). Indeed, this is the conundrum of post–Cold War liberal internationalism, where ‘good governance’ is oriented towards both individual (civil and politics) rights and trade. But the tension is particularly acute for feminist governments, given the potential for arms to be used to perpetuate gender-based violence. Vucetic (2017) articulates the received wis- dom on this tension: ‘if the Canadian government truly wishes to help build gender- equitable societies around the world, then a good place to start would be nixing massive arms sales to countries with lousy records on women’s rights’ (2017: 517). In response to the increasingly evident human costs of the regulated and illicit global trade in arms, the UN ATT was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2013. It came into force in December 2014. In June 2013, more than 60 states signed the ATT. While Canada voted for the treaty in April 2013, it chose not to sign the treaty at the UN in June. In April 2017, a bill was introduced in the House of Commons that Canada would join the international ATT. Upon accession to the global agreement, which now involves 130 countries, Canada will be required to implement brokering controls on arms sales. The international standard on export assessment is set out in two articles in the ATT. First, the ATT obligates states to prevent the export of arms to another country if the transfer would be contrary to an arms embargo, other international law, or if the item would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Convention. Second, the ATT provides that states shall carry out export assess- ments and refuse to export if there is an overriding risk of undermining peace and secu- rity, commit serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law or transnational crimes. States are expressly required to take into account serious violations of gender-based violence or acts of violence against women when making the assessment (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), 2016). While many in the international community applaud the ATT, others are more scepti- cal. Problems of implementation, a lack of transparency, lack of enforcement and the general weakness of the treaty itself are often cited. Of course, this is coupled with the fact some of the world’s largest arms exporters – including Russia and China – have not signed the treaty. Others, such as the United States and Israel – have signed, but not yet ratified. Worse than this, however, is the possibility that the whole premise of the treaty is fatally flawed: specifically, the basic premise that only some weapons are ‘bad’, and others are either neutral or, possibly, good. Thus, paradoxically, the ATT could actually be used to justify increases in arms sales, if adequate evidence that they are being used ‘in the right way’ can be provided. Once this is understood, it becomes clear that a key effect of the ATT could be the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major Western states (Stavrianakis, 2016: 841). In seeking to distinguish between ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ weaponry, we fail to recognize the wider structural effects of militarism (Wibben, 2018). As Paul Kirby has put it, ‘is there ever a conflict where arms flows could not be said to facilitate serious acts of gender- based violence – harms strongly correlated with, but not necessarily inflicted by, the deployment of weaponry?’ (Kirby, quoted in Stavrianakis, in press: 25). Much like ‘just war theory’, which can be used to justify ‘ethical warfare’, the ATT diverts our attention from the structural nature of militarism, and its complex relationship with the structures and institutions of global capitalism, transnational structures of racism and with the liberal international order. Rather than pitting a feminist foreign policy – as a set of pre-formed moral principles – against ‘arms deals’ – immoral, self-interested policies on the part of states – feminist governments should interrogate the role of states – including their own – in supporting liberal milita- rism,4 and thereby contributing to its gendered effects. I argue that the tweets and pronouncements of the Canadian and Swedish governments were misguided. The neglect of context and relational positioning, as well as the hubris of certainty and moral necessity, are in conflict with the general methods and aims of feminist ethics. To assert the backwardness and morally corrupt nature of Saudi Arabia is to position Sweden and Canada as superior, enlightened nations that ‘treat’ their women properly. This kind of framing contributes to the erasure of Saudi women’s agency. As Victoria Heath argues in relation to the Swedish case, it is crucial for Sweden to understand the compli- cated and nuanced situation of women within the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and recognize the indigenous women’s rights movements and the ‘renegotiations’ of gendered power relations that currently exist. Indeed, Heath points out that women’s rights movements in Saudi Arabia are framed by a number of contextual factors: •• Women’s rights as indicated by Islamic religious texts; •• Gender segregation and spatial allowances; •• Notions of ‘female nature’ and femininity; •• Saudi national identity and the Saudi state; •• Disentangling cultural tradition and the Islamic religion; •• Maintaining family as the ‘core’ of the community; •• The importance of promoting an ‘indigenous’ movement (not Western) (Heath, 2016). Blindness to this context, and to the agency and diversity of women within Saudi Arabia, reveals both racist logics and a tendency towards ‘culture-blaming’ that depoliti- cizes social problems and diverts attention away from the ways in which practices are supported and sustained by the structure of the global economy. To imagine ‘culture’ as an isolated realm of values and practices, separate from other kinds of social relations, is inevitably to reproduce the dichotomies of ‘us’ and ‘them’, is blind to both historical and current relations and ultimately will hinder our ability to create a foreign policy that helps to create the conditions for long-term transformations in gender relations. Ethical stances which pit ‘barbaric’ cultures against enlightened Western morality are thick with neo-colonial logics and racial hierarchies that perpetuate, rather than transform, global inequalities. Rather than pitting ‘culture’ against ‘women’s human rights’, a feminist ethic of care would situate practices and traditions in a broader, relational geopolitical and geo-economic context. As Alison Jaggar (2005) argues, topics on the agenda of ‘intercultural dialogue’ about global justice for women (and men) in ‘non-Western coun- tries’ must be questions about the basic structure of the global political economy, as well as the economic policies of those Western governments that directly and indirectly affect poor women’s lives (2005: 71). My argument here should not be misunderstood as a defence of the Saudi regime or of their practices. Wallström’s mistake was not the withdrawal from the arms agreement, but rather the framing of this move within a wider critique of the ‘medieval’ and ‘barbaric’ practices of non-Western, non-liberal societies, and the tying of this to a general appeal to ‘ethics’ and justice, that is inherently linked to ‘feminism’. Likewise, Freeland’s demand of the ‘immediate release’ of political detainees in Saudi Arabia demonstrates a selectivity and targeting that uses moral judgement as punishment and which invites charges of hypoc- risy. As a result, these actions, while ‘progressive’, are unlikely to be transformative in the direction of long-term feminist goals. As I will argue below, a more potentially transforma- tive approach would have been to use the arms trade agreement to highlight a series of relationships, networking the global arms trade, transnational business interests, liberal militarism, systemic transnational racism and the structural causes of women’s oppression around the globe. In so doing, it would become possible to reveal the effects of patriarchy – not just in Saudi Arabia but in Western states as well – as a system of hierarchy that divides people and thwarts the possibility of empathy and connection.

### References

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## K---Western IR

### Sovereignty Link

#### Their theory of IR is wrong and racist – it relies on Western conceptions of sovereignty, and assumes a White, rational neoliberal subject at the core of decision making – this propagates both instability and imperialism through the cloak of liberal restraint.

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Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose1: Racism as shapeshifter – The polymorphous cycles of racism in everyday life and world politics

While liberal conceptions construct a progressive-evolutionary vision of world politics wherein racism gradually evaporates as the bright sunlight of modernity intensifies, nevertheless, numerous critical race scholars point to a recurring dark cycle of racial control that marks the long history of modernity (e.g. Alexander, 2012: 20–58; Bonilla-Silva, 2018: 17–52; Omi and Winant, 2014: 84–91; Perry, 2007). Focusing on the United States, Michelle Alexander (2012: 21) asserts that

racial history . . . is highly adaptable [or polymorphous]. The rules and reasons the political system employs to enforce status relations of any kind, including racial hierarchy, evolve and change as they are challenged. The valiant efforts to abolish slavery and Jim Crow and to achieve greater racial equality have brought about significant changes in the legal framework of American society – new ‘rules of the game,’ so to speak. These new rules have been justified by new rhetoric, new language, and a new social consensus, while producing many of the same results. This dynamic, which legal scholar Reva Siegel has dubbed ‘[racist] preservation through transformation,’ is the process through which white privilege is maintained, though the rules and rhetoric change.

This ‘Groundhog Day’ cycle entails pyrrhic moments of black victory being subsequently rolled back by a white backlash whereby white racial control is reasserted once more, albeit in a new guise, thereby rendering the liberal conception of a temporal movement of linear progress towards black liberation/justice as but a Whiggish construct. For racism is a polymorphous shapeshifter, crystallizing in different guises over time but retaining its oppressive properties. Accordingly, it is not that racism is progressively undermined over time but that its outward appearance becomes progressively more hidden, camouflaged or sublimated – at least in the eyes of white people.

In the United States, the era of Reconstruction entailed the end of slavery in 1865, together with the 14th Amendment (prohibition of states from denying due process and equal protection under the law), the 15th Amendment (the right to vote regardless of race) and the Ku Klux Klan Acts (which declared interference with voting regardless of race as a federal offence). But these progressive initiatives led on directly to a white backlash. In particular, the Southern states sought to circumvent these progressive initiatives while the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) backed up the states’ reactionary activities through the organization’s sustained campaign of racist terrorism. Woodrow Wilson (1901: 11) typified this racist episteme when he argued that ‘the first practical result of the Reconstruction under the Acts of 1867 was the disenfranchisement . . . of the better whites and the consequent giving over of the Southern governments into the hands of the negroes’. Moreover, he dog-whistled to the KKK when he asserted that ‘the white men of the South were aroused by the mere instinct of self-preservation to rid themselves, by fair means or foul, of the intolerable burdens of governments sustained by the votes of ignorant negroes and conducted in the interests of [Negro] adventurers’ (Wilson, 1902: 58).

It was not long before the North retreated from the South to leave black people at the mercy of the white backlash via the Jim Crow era of racial segregation. Nothing changed until after World War II, with the next transformational-moment-cum-pyrrhic-victory coming exactly 100 years after the 13th Amendment (the abolition of black slavery) through the Voting Rights Act of 1965. But the death of Jim Crow was followed by a renewed white backlash that forged a New Jim Crow era that has remained up to the present (Alexander, 2012; Bonilla-Silva, 2018). And this ‘new’ era gained its legitimacy by dressing racism in more neutral cultural clothing while maintaining racial oppression. Thus, in this New Jim Crow era, the matrix of white power ensured that the black man would be held back not because of his inferior genes but by his inferior culture, though the ‘invisible empire’ of the KKK remained intact, albeit much diminished.

This American racial cycle comprises a microcosm of the wider cycle that has played out across the West. Thus, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the entwined discourses of scientific racism and manifest cultural racism underpinned the identity of the West, with both developing during and especially after the Atlantic slave trade. Liberal visions emphasize the ‘benign’ Western humanitarian drive, with the British termination of the slave trade in 1807 constituting the inception of a long, progressive process of black liberation from racial oppression. But this is problematic because Britain is celebrated for in effect putting out a fire that the British and other Europeans had started. Even so, the British did not put out the fire, because the ensuing white backlash saw racism and racist imperialism deepen after the end of the British slave trade, while the latter morphed into the highly oppressive indentured labour trade.

For many liberals at the time (e.g. Mitrany, 1933), the Paris Peace Conference and the creation of the League of Nations Mandate System was viewed as another turning point in the progressive liberation of black and brown people. However, in addition to Woodrow Wilson’s well-known rejection of the Japanese delegation’s proposal for a racial-equality clause, his prior enunciation of the principle of sovereignty in his (1918) Fourteen Points speech that triggered emancipatory hopes in the hearts of the colonized peoples turns out to have applied only to Eastern Europe and Wilson was categorically opposed to awarding sovereignty to non-Western polities. Surely, though, Wilson stood behind the ‘humanitarian’ Mandate system? Indeed he did, but only because the system was founded on the racist-imperial idea of ‘trusteeship’ that had first been explicitly conceived at the 1884 Berlin conference as the guiding principle of European imperialism in Africa. For this conception rested on the paternalist-racist assumption that the uncivilized races were not yet ready to rule themselves and therefore must be held under imperial trusteeship until they had ‘grown up’ (i.e. become Western). Once again, the Western mandate of racial-imperial oppression remained fully intact during the interwar period.

The next key ‘turning point’ occurs in the 1945–1960 period, when decolonization was allegedly bequeathed by the gracious hand of the benign West. Apart from the fact that decolonization was won by the nationalist movements against the resistance of the colonial powers, the subsequent postcolonial era has witnessed a continuation of racist practices, albeit in the camouflaged guise of subliminal cultural-racist concepts such as US hegemony and Western humanitarian intervention. But while one might anticipate that the task of (orthodox) international relations/international political economy scholars should be to deconstruct such subliminal cultural racism, it turns out that they have, albeit unwittingly, given it succour, as the next two sections explain.

Cycles of racism in orthodox international relations theory

The core point is that racism is a shapeshifter in that its outward expression or modality changes over time while its underlying structure remains the same. Before 1945 both scientific racism and ‘manifest’ cultural racism focused explicitly on race as a core category, while after 1945 race disappears from international relations theory’s gaze and its conceptual repertoire. In particular, 1945 is conventionally viewed as the watershed moment when international relations jettisoned scientific and manifest cultural racism. In this narrative, the West’s ensuing ‘colonial racist guilt syndrome’ prompted the social sciences to ‘make amends’ by replacing the dark old racist Weltanschauung with a bright new non-racist worldview in which the post-1945 international relations discipline came to embrace a value-free, positivistic posture through which the pernicious phenomena of racial hatred and imperialism are thought to have been finally and mercifully exorcized**. But the reality saw the creation of a** **brave new worldview in which explicit racism** (scientific and manifest cultural racism) indeed died out in the halls of the academy and **were replaced** not by ‘non-racist cultural pluralism’ but **by subliminal cultural-racist monism** that appears on first blush as socially acceptable given that it no longer talks about race and its associated tropes (Hobson, 2012: 185186, 319–322). Thus, **in subliminal cultural racism, Western academics did indeed distance themselves from the old explicit racist tropes but reaffirmed them in whitewashed terms that dare not speak their name.**

Thus, ‘white supremacism’ was replaced by the core modus operandi of Western universalism (a.k.a. ‘Western superiority’) and, albeit implicitly, white normality; racial hierarchy alongside the racial standard of civilization were replaced by the proxies of cultural-institutional hierarchy and the Western market standard of civilization; ‘civilization versus barbarism/savagery’ was replaced by ‘tradition versus modernity’ or ‘developed versus undeveloped economies’; ‘barbaric Oriental despotisms’ morphed into the tropes of ‘rogue states’ and the ‘axis of evil’ on the basis that such states would not reciprocate according to the ‘civilized norms’ of (Western) international law and (Western-based) ‘international society’, while ‘savage anarchies’ morphed into ‘failed states’ on the basis that they could not reciprocate. And last, but not least, the old colonial denial of non-Western state sovereignty was replaced by the construct of ‘conditional sovereignty’ in the postcolonial era, while imperial intervention was replaced by (the ‘civilizing mission’ of) US hegemony, intervention by international financial institutions and humanitarian intervention.

Accordingly, orthodox international relations scholars have mistaken the shift from explicit racism to subliminal cultural racism for one that marks the transition from racism to non-racist, value free ‘scientific positivism’. Critical race theorists view this transition as one in which cultural difference masquerades as tolerant cultural pluralism but that, in reality, is ‘racism in disguise’ (Balibar, 1991; Barker, 1981; Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Henderson, 2013; Hunt, 1987; McCarthy, 2009; Miles, 1993; Omi and Winant, 2014; Perry, 2007; Salter, 2002; Vitalis, 2000, 2015). Thus, speaking of the post-1945 substitution of cultural difference for racial difference, Richard Perry (2007: 216) concludes that **‘the terms may change, perhaps giving the impression that the old [racial] problems have disappeared, when in fact they have merely acquired protective coloration through semantic camouflage’.** Or, again**, ‘the demise of scientific racism in its evolutionary-biological form did not mean the end of racist thinking in scholarly discourse** altogether. **A new, post-biological modality of neo-racism is now widespread in social science’** (McCarthy, 2009: 91). This cultural modality has also been termed ‘racism lite’ or ‘colour-blind racism’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2018).

Thus, the evolution of international relations theory has mirrored the generic shifts in the practice of racism in everyday life and in world politics given that the discipline’s racism has been hidden behind a non-racist mask after 1945. Unmasking modern international relations theory reveals its emphasis on cultural difference as a proxy for non-white racial inferiority and white Western superiority. Thus, **white international relations theorists often wear a ‘non-racist mask’ in order to make their cultural-racist theories appear socially palatable** in the so-called cultural-pluralist postcolonial era. Accordingly, **all that has** really **changed** since 1945 **is that the old racist Jim Crow laws that international theory originally conceptualized became sublimated or ‘hidden in plain sight’** (Henderson, 2013; Rutazibwa, 2020; Vitalis, 2000), **having morphed into the ‘New (subliminal) Jim Crow laws’ of modern analyses of the global economy/interstate system.** Uncovering this long temporal passage that links the past with the present means that **the discipline has a fabricated detachment with the racist ghosts of its past** (as Bryony Vince put it to me in private conversation). What, then, of the racist double move that modern orthodox international relations theories perform when analysing world politics/global political economy?

Revealing the racist double move of orthodox international relations theory

**The giveaway concerning the racist foundations of modern international relations theory lies not simply in what it does say but as much in what it does not.** Thus, to postcolonialism’s rhetorical question as to whether racism has played an important role in structuring world politics past and present, the orthodox reply is simply ‘nothing to see here’. **This first racist move, which** evacuates and **whitewashes the presence of racism in world politics** past and present, **is complemented by the second, in which international relations theory advances a racist analysis of world politics/global political economy but in subliminal cultural language that appears as value-free and ‘racially neutral’.** To illustrate this double move, I shall draw on examples from my current research (Hobson and Odijie, forthcoming) and from elsewhere.

The neorealist vision of the Cold War comprises a Western zone of relative peace and stability that ensues from bipolarity or US hegemony or the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). But such ‘peace and stability’ was only rendered possible because of the racist decision by the superpowers to outsource war to the ‘inferior’ and expendable ‘wastelands’ of the Global South, which constituted a safety valve that could prevent direct nuclear conflict from erupting between the USA and the USSR. Thus, ‘it appears that cold war history has a concentric conceptual organization, consisting of a “formal” history of relative peace in the center and “informal” violence in the periphery’ (Kwon, 2010: 155; see also Persaud, 2016). Moreover, ‘in a historical sense – and especially when seen from the South – the Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through slightly different means. . . For the Third World, the continuum of which the Cold War forms a part did not start in 1945, or even 1917, but in 1878 – with the [Congress] of Berlin that divided Africa between European imperialist powers’ (Westad, 2007: 396). This Western neo-imperialism also takes us back to the future of America’s racist-colonial drive in the 19th and early 20th centuries (see Go, 2011; Hunt, 1987). **But all of this necessarily flies under neorealism’s ontological radar scanner given its evacuation of social process through its reification of the structural logic of anarchy that is coupled with the deployment of the Eurocentric/racist method of ‘analytical bifurcation’, wherein racist-imperial processes are bracketed out and silenced in favour of focusing solely on intra-Western white activities** (Go, 2016: 89–92, 104–110).

This first move is complemented by neorealism’s second, wherein a subliminal cultural-racist theory is applied to analysing world politics. Notable here is that European empires constituted subsystems hierarchies in which the dominant hyper-sovereign colonial power stood atop of the colonies that were denied sovereignty. But Waltz’s **reification of international anarchy is triply problematic, first** because **this conception replicates the old scientific-racist conception of ‘tropical anarchy’ (**Henderson, 2013; Sampson, 2002; compare Lynch, 2019: 277); **second,** because Waltz **sanitizes or evacuates hierarchy from world politics, thereby conjuring Western colonialism and its practices of genocide, the Atlantic slave trade, land appropriation and labour exploitation together with its neo-imperialist successor into thin air** (Hobson, 2012: 203–208; Sabaratnam, 2020); **and, third,** Waltz’s **claim that sovereign states are the dominant form of polity under modern anarchy is undermined by the presence of colonial hierarchy** before the very recent era of decolonization **wherein the only sovereign states that existed were Western.** Accordingly, Waltz’s move **serves to let Western imperialism off the moral hook, thereby reflecting an ‘epistemology of ignorance’ (Sabaratnam, 2020**: 20–21; see also Mills, 2007). Interestingly, we find an evacuation and naturalization of Western empire in the classical realist work of Hans Morgenthau (Hobson, 2012: 188–190; Salter, 2002: 117) and other realists, which leads Nicolas Guilhot (2014) to talk of ‘imperial realism’.

By contrast, Robert Gilpin’s neorealist hegemonic stability theory embraces a normative (direct) imperialism that is dressed up in terms that dare not speak its name (Hobson, 2012: 193–203). Gilpin (1987) differentiates hegemons from empires, where the latter exploit non-Western states while the former help them through the hegemon’s self-sacrificial provision of global public goods. But the paternalist sign of US hierarchical hegemony is that it supposedly uplifts states around the world, with East Asian states singled out as the most egregious and ungrateful free riders that benefit most from hegemonic largesse. Thus, what Gilpin misses is that the conception of uplift reconvenes Britain’s paternalist-imperial civilizing mission of the 19th century, though this elision is inevitable given that he re-visions the British Empire as a benign liberal hegemon. Significantly, Niall Ferguson (2004) effectively reconvenes Gilpin’s argument, though he talks explicitly about the benign liberal imperialism of Britain and America. Moreover, **this benign conception that reflects an epistemology of ignorance effectively boils off the coercive side of empire in the subliminal cultural-racist distillation process, thereby providing an apologia for Anglo-Saxon imperialism.**

Similar cultural racist logics play out in liberalism (see Hobson, 2012: 216–222, 285–310). While the normative (direct) imperialist posture that is found in John Rawls’s (1999) The Law of Peoples is a very obvious example (Hobson, 2012: 292–295), nevertheless the hard test-case here is that of neoliberal institutionalism. The received wisdom is that neoliberal institutionalism presents a genuinely ‘universal’ picture or flattened ontology of all states learning to cooperate in order to enhance their gains. But it turns out that, in After Hegemony, Keohane (1984) confines this process to Western states (as did Norman Angell before him). Moreover, absent here is a historical sociological analysis that would reveal the hierarchical-imperial contexts that have driven both Western unity (Sabaratnam, 2020: 25) and the global process by which unequal gains accrue to the West at the expense of the non-West. Paradoxically, constructivists critique neoliberal institutionalism for its rational actor model by asserting that interests are not a priori but are formed through socialization. However, a close reading of Keohane’s book reveals that it is Western norms and identity that socialize Western states into cooperating (Keohane, 1984: 5–7, 43, 182). Accordingly, Keohane not only looks specifically at Western states as the successful actors, but argues that they take specifically Western cultural values such as democracy and liberal capitalism to the table before they enter iterated prisoner’s dilemma games (Keohane, 1984: 182).

One of several (direct) neo-imperialist cues in Keohane’s work emerges from his approval of US hegemonic intervention and intervention by international financial institutions in the Global South as a means of extending complex interdependence across the world. But here the international financial institutions act as paternalist neo-imperial vehicles for the cultural conversion of non-Western states along Western neoliberal capitalist lines via the imposition of neoliberal conditionality and structural adjustment programmes. Moreover, the notorious resentment that these programmes have invoked in many non-Western states, all of which disappears in Keohane’s analysis, takes us back to the future of the ‘unequal treaties’ that emerged under Britain’s informal imperialism in the 19th century, much as the paternalist role of the international financial institutions finds its historical parallel with the League of Nations Mandate System (Anghie, 2005: 245272). And, finally, Keohane’s approval of Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the 19th and 20th centuries returns us to the problems that I discussed above vis-a-vis hegemonic stability theory (see also Sabaratnam, 2020: 18–19).

A notable example of an indirect imperialist approach is found in the neoliberal theory of globalization, which rehabilitates the classical liberalism of Adam Smith and his aversion to empire (e.g. Friedman, 2000). But there are three subliminal neo-imperialist cues here, the first comprising Friedman’s (2000: 101–111) argument that non-Western states have no choice but to ‘don the golden straitjacket’, which requires them to adopt Western neoliberal-capitalist architectures. Having to become Western means that the theory smuggles informal imperialism in through the backdoor of its Western universalism. Second, by subscribing to the ontological proposition that ‘the world is flat’ (Friedman, 2007), the neoliberal theory of globalization conjures Western imperial/neo-imperial hierarchy and racial capitalism into thin air, thereby naturalizing rather than problematizing these phenomena via the epistemology of white ignorance. And, third, because Friedman focuses on rational individuals whose interests are a priori and whose social identity is irrelevant to individual behaviour, racism and racialized capitalism are whitewashed from the global economy.

Surely constructivism fares much better given its ability to highlight international racial norms? Not only has much of it ignored racism in world politics but the few constructivists who have considered it argue that racism was left behind in world politics after 1945 (Finnemore, 2003; Klotz, 1995), much as imperialism was supposedly outlawed by the UN in 1960. This whitewashing of racism and imperialism from modern world politics not only reflects the illusion that subliminal cultural racism projects but is also a vital move because it allows liberal constructivists to portray Western humanitarian interventionism and liberal peacebuilding/state-building as a non-racist/ non-imperial project that saves oppressed non-Western peoples. It is here that we encounter a subliminal cultural-racist paternalism that presents the West as the white saviour of the inferior non-Western societies – thereby rehabilitating the 19th-century conception of the white man’s burden and the civilizing mission – and where the West is (re)presented as the altruistic paternalist father of the non-West (Hobson, 2012: 302–305). Moreover, in this liberal imaginary of ignorance, the notion that peacebuilding/state-building is initiated as a means of eradicating the threat of the deviant non-Western Other disappears from view, as does the legacy of Western empire that created some of the core problems in non-Western states that prompted intervention in the first place (for further postcolonial critiques of liberal constructivism, see Sabaratnam, 2020; Sampson, 2002; Vitalis, 2000).

Liberal constructivism buys into the cultural-racist idea that all progressive actions in the world are initiated by the universal West ‘on behalf of global humanity’. For example, it is the benign West that has single-handedly brought human rights to the world via the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Here international relations’ ‘non-racist mask’ slips conspicuously, given that the Western great powers did their utmost at the United Nations to keep human rights off the global agenda for fear of diluting white supremacy and white normality in world politics and within Western societies. For it was various non-Western delegates at the UN that pursued human rights most fervently while their Western counterparts mobilized the defensive prerogative of sovereign independence to insulate their states from future criticism given that human rights were denied to minorities within their constituent societies, particularly native Americans and black African Americans in the United States. Thus, Western racist motivations and the progressive role of nonWestern agency in advancing the cause of human rights in world politics have been airbrushed out of the liberal-constructivist picture. And, in turn, this serves to retain the chimera of the purely progressive non-racist West and the regressive non-West. Equally as egregious is that the role of the West in the denial of human rights to non-Western peoples in the first place is somehow written out of the narrative. Still, much of this is perhaps unavoidable given that liberal-constructivist international relations tends ontologically to divorce power from norms in world politics and epistemologically segregates power from knowledge.

Are orthodox scholars intentionally racist? Racist impact over intention

The case for intentionality is that it is no coincidence that the shift from scientific racism to subliminal cultural racism in orthodox international relations/international political economy theory mirrored the trajectory of racism in everyday life and world politics. My hunch, though, is that international relations theory’s racism is unintentional given that the overwhelming majority of orthodox international relations scholars are most probably non-racist (but not anti-racist) in their private lives. But orthodox **international relations scholars have mistaken a critique of their implication in structural racism for an allegation of interpersonal racism. This epistemology of, or move to, innocence links directly to the self-deluded heart of the orthodoxy. For there are all manner of built-in cloaking devices that mask the racism and whiteness of** orthodox **international relations theories from the eyes of their advocates. International relations’ ‘non-racist mask’ has at least four mystificatory layers.**

The first layer (or cloaking device) is that racism in orthodox international relations/international political economy theory is manifested in cultural rather than biological terms, thereby appearing as outwardly non-racist (given the mistaken popular belief that racism is inherently biological). The second layer of mystification is that cultural racism takes on a hidden or subliminal guise (which exorcizes race as an ontological category from world politics), thereby making such racism much harder to detect. Aggregating these two layers together leads white international relations/international political economy scholars to buy into the self-deluded rhetoric that their theories are racist-free. Pertinent here is Blaut’s (1992: 296) characterization of the social sciences since 1950 as ‘so much [subliminal cultural] racism yet so few racists’ (see also Memmi, [1982] 2000: 3).

This mystification is ultimately secured by the third layer of the mask that constitutes the problem of blindness to white privilege. For not being on the end of racism’s pernicious effects means that, unlike non-whites, many white academics tend quite naturally to downplay its existence (see Lake, 2016). An obvious example of this lies with the everyday performance of driving from A to B. For the vast majority of white drivers are able to travel safe in the knowledge that they will not be stopped by the police unless they have been unlucky enough to have been caught breaking the speed limit. By contrast, many black drivers consider themselves lucky if they are not stopped by the police when they have respected the speed limit. Such blindness to white privilege feeds directly into the unreflexive propensity to deny the presence of whiteness and racism in both the theory and practice of orthodox international relations/international political economy (Peterson, 2021; Sabaratnam, 2020: 5). For the ingeniousness of white privilege is that it renders such privilege invisible. Thus, **white people are effectively taught not to notice racism and their role in reproducing it** (McIntosh, 2020). **Which, in turn, fuels the tendency of the privileged to reject, if not protest vehemently, the accusation of racism in the social sciences** – as in the aforementioned spat between Pankaj Mishra and Niall Ferguson (see Mishra, 2011). **All of which undermines the prospect of addressing, let alone redressing, the problem at stake.**

Thus, while a fifth great debate concerning the Eurocentric racism of orthodox international relations/international political economy is long overdue, unfortunately the chances of it occurring are slim to zero. This is partly because intradisciplinary dialogue between international relations’ orthodox and critical wings has completely broken down (De Carvalho et al., 2011), **and partly because a simmering ‘white silence’ of denial is the most likely ‘response’** (see, Ryde, 2019; Saad, 2020). Strikingly, it is now some two decades since Robert Vitalis (2000) wrote his seminal article, but still **the tumbleweed of white silence blows** deafeningly **past my window.** However, were an explicit response to be forthcoming, two entwined paradoxes might emerge here, the first being that it would most likely accuse my argument of being angry, hysterical and outlandish, wherein ‘Eurocentrism’ is deemed to be the calm/rational ‘standard of common sense’ – the paradox being that rather than engaging with the substance of my critique, such a response would likely comprise an angry ad hominem attack on the accuser and the journal for publishing such an article. And the second paradox is that while most orthodox scholars abhor ‘cancel culture’, it turns out that engaging in an ad hominem attack serves merely to shut down debate on this vital issue. That is, an ad hominem attack on the accuser is merely another form of cancel culture. Still, both such ‘responses’ would reinforce my argument given that **‘white silence’, ‘white rage’ and ‘white denial’ are manifestations of white privilege** (see Ryde, 2019; Saad, 2020: 40–45; Sabaratnam, 2020; Peterson, 2021).

A fourth cloaking device is that pre-1945 orthodox international theory has been put through an ahistorical deracination laundering process to reappear in whitewashed form, fit for consumption in the ‘cultural pluralist’ post-1945 era. And because post-1945 international relations theory is (re)presented as non-racist so the laundering of its pre-1945 predecessor means that international theory in the last three centuries is (re)presented as universally racist-free. In this sleight-of-hand manoeuvre, **the racist underpinnings of** pre-1945 **liberal and realist theories are filtered out or conjured away, leaving only their claims about states or geopolitics or interdependence that are transmogrified into ‘objective universalist’ propositions**. In the liberal pantheon, two examples are pertinent. First is Norman Angell, who is (re)presented as a key theorist of liberal interdependence and the peaceful benefits it provides rather than as the paternalist-Eurocentric/cultural racist that he was, given his fundamental belief in international hierarchy and the positive need for the British Empire to promote harmonious global interdependence by acting as the civilizer of the barbaric and savage East (see Hobson, 2012: 40–45). Second is the reconstruction of Woodrow Wilson, who is recast as the founding father of 20th-century progressive liberal internationalism, based as ‘it is’ on anti-imperialism, sovereignty and self-determination for all states rather than on what ‘it was’ – a Lamarckian racist vision comprising a pro-Western imperialist stance and a denial of nonWestern state sovereignty that was coupled with strong racial immigration controls and anti-black initiatives at home (see Hobson, 2012: 167–175). Similarly, pre-1945 realists typically mentioned in international relations textbooks include Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder and occasionally Nicholas Spykman, all of whom are (re)presented as geopolitical-realist thinkers that analysed spatial conceptions of world power rather than as Lamarckian scientific racists who advocated Western imperialism to contain the marauding ‘barbaric’ non-Western peril and whose mentor was the scientific-racist thinker Friedrich Ratzel (see Hobson, 2012: 123–130, 156–158).

Critically, this laundering process extends across all aspects of pre-1945 international relations. Thus, it becomes (but should no longer be) a revelation to learn that early international relations was primarily concerned about inter-racial relations; that the claim that international relations emerged formally in 1919 with the noble desire to solve the problem of war elides its earlier origins, which revolved around maintaining white Western global supremacy and racist empire together with the normative study of ‘effective’ colonial administration; that the journal Foreign Affairs was originally called the Journal of Race Development; and that the International Studies Conference at the League of Nations, which set up the subject matter of international relations in the 1930s under the leadership of Alfred Zimmern, grounded its syllabi in normative Western imperialism and racism (see Acharya and Buzan, 2019; Ashworth, 2014; Bell, 2016; De Carvalho et al., 2011; Henderson, 2013; Hobson, 2012; Kristensen, 2021; Long and Schmidt, 2005; Lynch, 2019; Schmidt, 1998; Schmidt and Guilhot, 2019; Thakur and Vale, 2019; Vitalis, 2000, 2005, 2015). That orthodox international relations scholars persist in ignoring these arguments in the face of a now substantial body of literature that has emerged over the last two decades means that this pervading silence can no longer be excused as the product of an innocent ‘historical amnesia’**. Rather, this silence points clearly to the white denial of international relations’ racist origins wherein the non-racist mask slips most conspicuously, thereby constituting an actual example of** orthodox **international relations’ version of cancel culture.**

However, except for in the above context, ‘intentionality’ is not the issue that the racist charge hinges upon given that most international relations/international political economy theorists are unintentionally racist. **What matters**, therefore, **is racist impact regardless of intention.** And to conclude this article more generally, it would be folly to presume that if only the Eurocentric rather than the racist charge were levied against the orthodox mainstream then ‘all would not be lost’. For the E-word cannot be used as a ‘get out of racist jail free’ card.

### Security Link

#### Security discussions surrounding the Middle East reframe into inevitable partisanship that reentrench violence – your discussion here doesn’t change how it is framed out there

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The reality is that foreign policy has always been contested — and, more often than not, linked to questions of identity and ideology. But debates about war are so interwoven with our larger culture-war politics now that most questions of how to handle military conflict have been largely reduced to partisan scoring. And that’s a problem — not because we need to get back to some bygone bipartisan era, but because real dissension is vital in a democracy, especially in matters of foreign policy.

The seeds of war politics’ merging with culture-war politics arguably date back to the late 1960s, when anti-Vietnam War protests overlapped with civil rights protests and other social movements that challenged the existing social order. Over time, conservatives and liberals diverged in their attitudes toward the war, especially as liberal elites began to criticize it. Starting with the 1968 presidential election, being anti-war became more closely associated with being a liberal Democrat. And the accusation that George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee, was all for “acid, amnesty1 and abortion” helped solidify this cultural connection.

And this larger cultural split between the two parties came to a head during the Iraq War. In many ways, it’s connected to the political discourse we’re seeing with Russia and Ukraine now. Unlike now, though, the discourse during the Iraq War — in the beginning at least — exemplified the idea that politics stops at the water’s edge. Critics of then-President George W. Bush rallied behind him after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and public opinion on the war was initially quite favorable, even though Democrats were far more split than Republicans.

That national unity turned out to be short-lived, though. As political communications scholar Mary Stuckey has observed, it was during the Iraq War that the two parties began to make very distinct arguments about what it meant to be an American in relation to the war. Bush, for instance, often framed the war on terror, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in terms of good and evil as he tried to establish the GOP as the party of faith and strength. Democrats, meanwhile, in their 2004 party platform accused Bush and the Republicans of having an “insufficient understanding of our enemy” and a failure to comprehend the complexity of the situation in the Middle East.

While the Iraq War was not directly related to Bush’s religious faith, both supporters and opponents alike depicted his approach to war as reflective of his overall philosophical approach: The president relied on gut and instinct, not expertise, to make decisions. Likewise, Bush’s 2004 presidential campaign portrayed his Democratic opponent, then-Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, as a waffling intellectual who lacked conviction and patriotic dedication.

In other words, the debate over the Iraq War quickly became an extension of the debates Democrats and Republicans were already having in the 2000 presidential election — and even earlier — about religion, culture and Bush’s intellect and qualifications.

Ultimately, the Bush administration’s justification for the Iraq War became the subject of widespread criticism across the ideological spectrum since the rationale for invasion was shaky at best. But the narratives Democrats and Republicans employed during the invasion of Iraq and the war on terror were still powerful for the ways in which they preyed on domestic and cultural disagreements and anxieties.

These arguments also had important implications for debates over presidential war powers. While many Republicans embraced an expansive role for the president — a strong leader asserting U.S. dominance on the world stage — Democrats said in their 2008 presidential platform that they “reject[ed] the sweeping claims of ‘inherent’ presidential power,” and that their candidate, then-Sen. Barack Obama of Illinois, would better grasp intercultural nuance and policy detail.

But as president, Obama struggled with questions of war and war powers as well. Although his administration was committed to a less interventionist approach, world events still demanded attention. There were new questions to answer about American intervention in the Middle East and North Africa, as civil wars broke out in Libya and Syria. And like Bush, Obama often found himself the subject of criticism — first for going too far in Libya and then for not going far enough in Syria.

In other words, the debate around the Iraq War didn’t help either Democrats or Republicans create a coherent set of ideas about how to engage with foreign conflict, how to prepare for the aftermath of one, or when it makes the most sense to avoid getting involved at all. Obama was different from Bush, but the foreign-policy questions he faced were still difficult — and domestic culture-war disputes were not especially useful in resolving them. Yet, because of the Iraq War, the country was now set on a political course that undermined the goal of meaningful, reasoned dissent on foreign policy.

Figuring out the role the U.S. should play following the Russian invasion of Ukraine requires answering a completely different set of questions than the global war on terror or the U.S. response to the war in Syria required, but as we saw in Vietnam, Iraq and elsewhere, culture-war politics are once again overshadowing the discussion of what to do. Instead of debating the extent to which Americans should intervene in Ukraine, Republicans have attacked Biden as a weak leader — and that’s the PG-rated stuff: Many attacks from the far right have veered into even uglier culture-war territory and praise for the Russian president.

So far, most rank-and-file Republicans have unfavorable views of the Russian invasion, not sympathy toward Putin. (Instead, a partisan divide is emerging over whether the U.S. should be “doing more.”) Still, it’s not hard to figure out why the discussion of whether and how America gets involved in armed conflict has devolved into partisan point-scoring. Nearly everything has. But this has a real cost, and the answer isn’t for politics to stop at the water’s edge.

Dissenting viewpoints and serious debate are crucial in a democracy, and foreign policy is not an exception. Politics can and should be a place for real debate and multiple viewpoints. It is imperative to hold public officials accountable for their decisions. When we treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic cultural politics, we lose almost as much as we do when we act as though it’s not up for debate at all.

### Hegemony Link

#### US hegemony is an inherently unstable a global project of white supremacy – the foreign echoes the domestic – military brutality abroad and police brutality at home cannot be separated from massive violence against black and brown people cloaked in a language of “security” and “stability”

Kizer 20 - MA in Democracy & Governance from Georgetown University, BA in Middle Eastern & North African Studies from UCLA [Kate, “US HEGEMONY RELIES ON DEHUMANIZATION AND WHITE SUPREMACY,” 6/10/2020, <https://inkstickmedia.com/us-hegemony-relies-on-dehumanization-and-white-supremacy/>, DKP]

When I began writing this column, Black Hawk helicopters were still circling over Washington, DC, flying low to intimidate and disperse protestors demanding justice for yet another murder of an unarmed Black person, this time George Floyd by Minneapolis police.

While the spread of popular uprisings against police brutality across the United States feels like an unprecedented tipping point, the impunity with which police and military forces operate is not new. Nor is it isolated to domestic policing. The willingness to weaponize state power against those expressing their discontent and calls for change has long been a part of both US domestic and foreign policy.

Some Washington national security professionals have made laudable statements committing to do better to address the structural inequities that keep the profession majority-white and cis-male in the face of this repression. Yet these efforts have not addressed the fundamental problem at hand: the state violence taking place in streets across the United States is a natural outgrowth of decades, if not centuries of domestic and foreign policy that first and foremost relies on the dehumanization of Black and brown people to pursue hegemony at home and abroad. Until we reckon with this fundamental truth, we will continue to fail to actually address the institutionalized and structural racism that has led to decade after decade of state violence against Black people in this country and people of color around the world.

In the United States, this dehumanization has its roots in the founding of our country. The prosperity the white majority in the United States enjoys today cannot be divorced from the genocide of Indigenous people and the enslavement of Africans, all for the economic benefit of white colonizers. The violent domination of the white colonial project and its basis in exploitation and white saviorism not only defined the foundations of early US society, but is echoed today here at home, and in US foreign policy.

For decades, the United States military has used many of the same tactics abroad that are used against Black and brown people by police in the United States. The use of force is never a last resort, but instead the preferred tool to ensure submission. Local conditions, individual experiences, and other drivers to violence, dissent, or crime – often rooted in governance failure, human rights abuses, and economic and/or political disenfranchisement – are ignored. Instead, a more pernicious, dangerous motive is assigned to all members of subjugated groups once one individual decides to resort to violence or commit a crime.

A violent response is then justified in cloaked language about patriotism, security, and saviorism. The United States military is undertaking dangerous missions against “extremists” to “save” the Afghan people, to “secure freedom” for Iraqis; just as in the United States police are keeping the streets of the US “safe,” tracking “extremists” that threaten the status quo and private property. As the experience of the past several weeks has shown, however, violence from the oppressive force ultimately begets more defiance. The idea that violence can quell dissension is ultimately rooted in the orientalist, racist belief that non-white people are inherently threats that must ultimately be silenced in order for stability to take hold.

The US government’s use of force is continuously justified by its stated intention to create safety — but safety for whom? Surely not the countless innocents killed in endless wars abroad, the diaspora communities surveilled, or the Black people murdered by police here at home. The Trump administration’s current militarized response to the popular uprisings sweeping the country is merely an outgrowth of long-standing policies that have devalued Black and brown lives, and ignored the unique injustices and inequities these communities face in achieving safety, well-being, and liberation. The post-9/11 police state and outdated slavery-era laws merely provide useful levers for Trump to pull in the face of this new challenge to his power.

If people in power continue to see these latest instances of violence and repression as isolated, unfortunate instances that “don’t reflect who we are as a nation,” then we will have failed to truly challenge and disrupt the forces and systems at play that have allowed white supremacy to infiltrate every aspect of US public life, including foreign policy.

The solution is not merely to end the transfer of US military weaponry and equipment to police departments, even though this is an incredibly important, short-term reform. The solution lies in a larger awakening in this country and a willingness to confront the systemic racism and white supremacy that drives our government’s engagement domestically and abroad. It means accepting that our current policies empower and export white supremacist violence. It starts with divesting from the institutions whose primary purpose is to terrorize people of color at home and abroad to maintain white supremacy – the Pentagon, CBP and ICE, state and municipal police. It begins with investment in restorative and community solutions to conflict and violence that seek to uplift individuals from poverty, ensure and value the rights and dignity of every human being, and make amends for past injustices.

### IR Theory Link

#### IR studies is intrinsically tied to hegemonic institutions, dictating the roles of war and security despite its lack of explanatory power — the denial of imperialism, climate change, racism, gendered violence, and nuclear war is only made possible through corrosive nihilism that engineers new terrains to make US imperialism more insidious and lethal.

\*\*\* CONTENT WARNING: Mention of rape.

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//eleanor

Because I wanted this book to inspire curiosity beyond the boundaries of international relations (ir), I considered ignoring the field altogether, removing all mentions of ir or ir theory. However, upon closer reflection, I have decided to keep these references as I think they are relevant for those outside the discipline and for those who, like myself, often feel alienated within its disciplinary boundaries. In the former case, it is important to know that, unlike some more humble fields, ir has always held itself to be a kind of royal science. Scholarship in ir, particularly in the United States, is half research, and half biding time until you have the prince’s ear. The hallowed names in the mainstream of the field are still known because they somehow changed the behavior of their intended clients—those being states, militaries, and international organizations. Therefore, some attention to ir is necessary because it has an all-too-casual relationship with institutional power that directly impacts the lives of real people, and ir is all too often lethal theory.39 As an American discipline, the political economy of the field is impossible without Department of Defense money, and its semiotic economy would be equally dwarfed without contributory figures like Woodrow Wilson, Henry Kissinger, and Samuel Huntington. The ubiquity of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and Kissinger’s particular brand of realpolitik are undeniable throughout the field, as well as the world.40 Each, in their own way, has saturated the watchwords and nomenclature of geopolitics from an American perspective so thoroughly that both political parties in the United States fight over who gets to claim the heritage of each. Although many other fields such as anthropology and even comparative literature have found themselves in the gravitational pull of geopolitics, international relations is meant to be scholarship as statecraft by other means.41 That is, ir was meant to improve the global order and ensure the place of its guarantor, the United States of America.42 Having spent the better part of a decade listening to national security analysts and diplomats from the United States, South Korea, Japan, Europe, China, Brazil, and Russia, as well as military strategists around the planet, I found their vocabulary and worldview strikingly homogeneous. If this seems too general a claim, one should take a peek at John Mearsheimer’s essay “Benign Hegemony,” which defends the Americanness of the ir field.43 What is most telling in this essay is not a defense of the U.S. as a benign hegemonic power, which Mearsheimer has done at length elsewhere. Rather, it is his vigorous defense that as a field, ir theory has done well by the world in setting the intellectual agenda for global challenges, and for creating useful theoretical approaches to addressing those problems. For Mearsheimer, the proof that American scholarly hegemony has been benign is that there is nothing important that has been left out. A quick scan of the last ten or twenty International Studies Association conferences would suggest otherwise. That issues like rape as a weapon of war, postcolonial violence, global racism, and climate change are not squarely in the main of ir demonstrates just how benign American scholarly hegemony is not. As one prominent anthropologist said to me at dinner after touring the isa conference in 2014, “it was surreal, like a tour through the Cold War. People were giving papers and arguing as if nothing had ever changed.” These same provincial scholars aspire and succeed at filling the advisory roles of each successive American presidency. One cannot help but see a connection between the history of the ir field, and the catastrophes of U.S. foreign policy during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. One could repeat the words of the anthropologist I mentioned to describe the 2016 presidential campaign debates over the future of U.S. foreign policy: it is as if “nothing had ever changed.” And yet these old white men still strut around the halls of America’s “best” institutions as if they saved us from the Cold War, even as the planet crumbles under the weight of their failed imperial dreams. If international relations was meant to be the science of making the world something other than what it would be if we were all left to our own worst devices, then it has failed monumentally. The United States is once again in fierce nuclear competition with Russia. We are no closer to any significant action on climate change. We have not met any of the Millennium Development Goals determined by the United Nations on eradicating poverty. War and security are the most significant financial, creative, social, cultural, technological, and political investments of almost every nation-state on Earth. The general intellect is a martial intellect. Despite all this failure, pessimism does not exist in international relations, at least not on paper. The seething doom of our current predicament thrives at the conference bar and in hushed office conversations but not in our research. In public, the darkness disavowed possesses and inflames the petty cynicisms and hatreds that are often turned outward at tired and predictable scapegoats. After the fury of three decades of critique, most ir scholars still camp out either on the hill of liberal internationalism or in the dark woods of political realism. Neither offers much that is new by way of answers or even explanations, and each dominant school has failed to account for our current apocalyptic condition. One is left wondering what it is exactly that they think they do. Despite the seeming opposition between the two, one idealistic about the future of international order (liberals) and the other self-satisfied with the tragedy of cycles of war and dominance (realists), both positions are optimists of the positivist variety. For both warring parties, ir optimism is expressed through a romantic empiricism. For all those who toil away looking for the next theory of international politics, order is out there somewhere, and dutifully recording reality will find it—or at least bring us closer to its discovery. For liberal internationalism, this will bring the long-heralded maturity of Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace. For second-order sociopaths known as offensive realists, crumbs of “useful strategic insight” and the endless details that amplify their epistemophilia for force projection and violence capability represent a potential “advantage,” that is, the possibility to move one step forward on the global political board game of snakes and ladders. Still, the cynicism of ir always creeps back in because the world never quite lives up to the empirical findings it is commanded to obey. Disappointment here is not without reason, but we cynically continue to make the same policy recommendations, catastrophe after catastrophe. I have an idea about where ir’s recent malaise comes from. I think it is a moment, just before the awareness of the Anthropocene, after the Cold War and before September 11, when the end of everything was only a hypothetical problem for those of a certain coddled and privileged modern form of life. The catastrophe of the human predicament was that there was no catastrophe, no reason, no generation-defining challenge or war. Now the fate of this form of life is actually imperiled, and it is too much to bear. The weird denial of sexism, racism, climate change, the sixth extinction, and loose nukes, all by a field of scholars tasked with studying geopolitics, is more than irrationalism or ignorance.44 This animosity toward reality is a deep and corrosive nihilism, a denial of the world. Thus ir as a strategic field is demonstrative of a civilization with nothing left to do, nothing left to destroy. All that is left is to make meaning out of being incapable of undoing the world that EuroAmerican geopolitics created. Emo geopolitics is not pretty, but it is real. The letdown, the failure, the apocalypse-that-was-not finally arrived, and we are too late. Still, the United States of America continues to follow the advice of “the best and the brightest,” testing the imperial waters, not quite ready to commit out loud to empire but completely unwilling to abandon it. Stuck in between, contemporary geopolitics—as curated by the United States—is in a permanent beta phase. Neuro-torture, algorithmic warfare, drone strikes, and cybernetic nation-building are not means or ends but rather are tests. Can a polis be engineered? Can the human operating system be reformatted? Can violence be modulated until legally invisible while all the more lethal? Each incursion, each new actor or actant, and new terrains from brains to transatlantic cables—all find themselves part of a grand experiment to see if a benign or at least sustainable empire is possible. There is no seeming regard for the fact that each experiment directly competes with Thomas Jefferson’s democratic experiment. One wonders if freedom can even exist anywhere other than temporarily on the fringe of some neglected order. Is this some metaphysical condition of freedom, or is the world so supersaturated with martial orders that the ragged edges between imperial orders are all that we have left? It feels like freedom’s remains persist only in the ruins of everything else. No space is left that can be truly indifferent to the law, security, or economy. Such is the new life of a human in debt. The social contract has been refinanced as what is owed and nothing more: politics without equity. Inequity without equality. What about the impending collapse of the post–World War II order, the self-destruction of the United States, the rise of China and a new world order? If humanity lasts long enough for China to put its stamp on the human apocalypse, I will write a new introduction. Until then, we live in the death rattle of Pax Americana. While I think the totality of this claim is true, I do not want to rule out that many of us throughout the world still make lives otherwise. Many of us even thrive in spite of it all. And yet, no form of life can be made that escapes the fact that everything can come to a sudden and arbitrary end thanks to the whim of an American drone operator, nuclear catastrophe, or macroeconomic manipulation like sanctions. There are other ways to die and other organized forms of killing outside the control of the United States; however, no other single apparatus can make everyone or anyone die irrespective of citizenship or geographic location. For me, this is the most inescapable philosophical provocation of our moment in time. The haphazard and seemingly limitless nature of U.S. violence means that even the core principles of the great political realist concepts like order and national interest are being displaced by subterranean violence entrepreneurs that populate transversal battlefields, security corridors, and border zones.45 Mercenaries, drug lords, chief executive officers, presidents, and sports commissioners are more alike than ever.46 Doomsayers like Paul Virilio, Lewis Mumford, and Martin Heidegger foretold a kind of terminal and selfannihilating velocity for geopolitics’ technological saturation, but even their lack of imagination appears optimistic. American geopolitics does not know totality or finality; it bleeds, mutates, and reforms. Furthermore, the peril of biopolitics seems now almost romantic. To make life live? Perchance to dream. The care and concern for life’s productivity is increasingly subsumed by plasticity—forming and reforming without regard to the telos of productivity, division, or normative order. There are, of course, still orders in our geoplastic age, but they are almost unrecognizable as such. When so many citizens and states are directly invested in sabotaging publicly stated strategic ends, then concepts like national interest seem equally quaint. We are witnessing creative and horrifying experiments in the affirmative production of dying, which also deprive those targeted and in some cases whole populations from the relief of death. To follow Rucker, I want to try to see the world for what it is. We can only say that tragedy is no longer a genre of geopolitics. Tragedy redeems. The occluded character of contemporary geopolitics shoehorned into experience produces the feeling that there is no relief, no reason, no victory, no defeats, and no exit within the confines of national security’s constricted world. This is not tragedy: it is horror. We live in an age of horror that, like the victims of gore movies who never quite die so that they can be tortured more, furthers our practice of collective violence and goes on for decades as a kind of sustainable warfare.

#### International relations erases the history of violence and exploitation which informed the making for the global order.

Sen 22 [Somdeep Sen is Associate Professor in International Development Studies at Roskilde University, Denmark, 1-28-2022, Race, Racism, and the Teaching of International Relations, https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666] Eric

International relations tends to valorize and fetishize abstraction—in terms of both research and teaching. As the disciplinary discourse goes, international relations prioritizes “theory-building” over “descriptive or historical analysis” (Krishna, [2001](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0058), p. 401). As noted previously, this manner of abstract theorization erases the history of violence and exploitation that has informed the makings of the global order. It also creates a hierarchy among the various methodological and theoretical approaches within international relations. Herein, those that propose “easily quantifiable” and generalizable frames of understanding the world are considered to be more scientific (Sen, [2021](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0073)). In comparison, approaches that refrain from notions of grand truths and instead point to the multiplicity of lived experiences of politics and society are seen as less capable of replicating the theoretical and methodological veracity of the natural sciences (Jackson, [2011](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0055), pp. 2–3; see also Flyvbjerg, [2001](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0040); Steinmetz, [2005](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0079)). This disciplinary hierarchy then explains why realism and liberalism—approaches considered best suited to formulate grand theory—live upstairs in Agathangelou and Ling’s ([2004](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0013)) “House of IR [international relations]” or occupy prime real estate in Weber’s ([2015](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0092)) visualization of a gentrified discipline. It also explains why discussions of race, gender, sexuality, and class are compelled to live outside the house or relegated to poorer neighborhoods in a gentrified international relations. This is not to say that those outside the house or in poor neighborhoods do not aspire to “theorize grandly about the world.” On the contrary—and much like Weber’s claim with regard to queer international relations—they too are concerned with “classic IR themes such as war, security, sovereignty, intervention, hegemony, nationalism, empire, colonialism, and the general practice of foreign policy” (Weber, [2015](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0092), p. 28). Yet, their intellectual “starting point” is the particular positioned histories and experiences of international politics.

However, this disciplinary antagonism toward “the issue of positionality” does not mean we can simply ignore its role in international relations. Anthropologists have long argued that a discussion on positionality is integral to any critical scholarly engagement with the process of knowledge production. In fact, they would question the very possibility of achieving (natural) scientific objectivity in the social sciences (Abu-Lughod, [1991](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0009); Geertz, [1959](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0041); Gupta & Ferguson, [1997](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0045); Hage, [2009](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0046); Powdermaker, [1966](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0065)). Within international relations, feminist scholars have been at the forefront of discussions on positionality. This concern with the positioned and gendered nature of knowledge production in international relations is evident, for instance, in the claim by Christine Sylvester ([1994](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0080)) that “the trouble with IR” is that even though the discipline claims to be “gender blind” and “a realm of objective human knowledge,” it is largely a subjective retelling of men’s perspectives on politics. This is not to say women are absent. They appear as “visitors” of the discipline and as companions of men. However, men have a secure home in the discipline, whereas women are viewed as “suited for other places” (Sylvester, [1994](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0080), p. 4). V. Spike Peterson ([2004](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0064)) argues that the discipline has an overwhelming focus on “masculinist constructs such as sovereignty, national security, and military strength.” Although “the main story” is often concerned with “what men do,” she proposes a shift in the disciplinary focus toward the positioned histories and lived experiences of women as a way of broadening the (overly masculine) conception of the global order (Peterson, [2004](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0064), p. 37). It is then in this sense that, in their introduction to Feminist Methodologies of International Relations, Ackerly et al. ([2010](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0012)) underline that “feminist ontologies” lead to a much self-reflective approach to the discipline. They make us rethink our theoretical and methodological assumptions and include “personal and previously invisible spheres” as locations rife with knowledge on international relations (Ackerly et al., [2010](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0012), p. 7).

Evidently, an effort to formulate a feminist retelling of the main story motivated Carol Cohn ([2006](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0030)) as she explored the deeply gendered U.S. national security discourses with regard to “nuclear weaponry and strategy.” And, while describing the encounter between her particular positioned perspective as a feminist international relations scholar and these discourses, she wrote,

The manufacture and stockpiling of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, the quest for more “useable nukes” and more “survivable” weapons delivery systems—all of it seemed so wildly irrational to me that I was consumed by the questions: “How can they do this? How can they even think this way?” Initially, those questions were more expressions of moral anguish and political despair than anything I might have ever thought of as “a good research question.” However, the intensity of my concern led me to take an opportunity to learn about nuclear weapons from some of the men who make their living thinking about nuclear weaponry and strategy. (p. 91)

The urge to broaden the conception of the global order through the positioned realities of women was equally visible in Cynthia Enloe’s ([1989](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0036)) iconic Bananas, Beaches and Bases as the very purpose of the text—that is, to articulate a feminist view of international relations. Here, Enloe reveals the varied positioned presence/absence of women as she deliberates the implications of a European woman holidaying in Jamaica, the reality that “governments look like men’s clubs,” and the absence of women in the congressional hearings on the Iran-Contra Affair (p. 8).

The introduction of race in the teaching of international relations is also elaborative of the positioned nature of knowledge production in the discipline. Undoubtedly, the writings of the (White) founding members were rooted in the perspectives of the White nations and were explicit in their support for (White) imperial domination in international relations. It was then as a critique of this positioned (i.e., White) character of the discipline’s intellectual foundations that the revisionist founders of international relations sought to reconsider the rationale of imperial domination and reveal the impact of imperially formed racialized hierarchies on the lives of the darker races. In this sense, they sought to elucidate the darker races’ experiences of and perspectives on a hierarchical international relations—perspectives that are otherwise missing in the discipline’s conception of the world. The color line plays an equally pertinent role in the present-day workings of international relations, determining the (racialized) positionality of knowledge production. Siba N. Grovogui ([2001](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0044)) argues this is most visible in the discipline’s internalization of certain discourses regarding the hierarchies that exist among “civilizations, cultures and races.” While elaborating this existing hierarchy, in view of the West’s relation with Africa, he then asks, How did the “‘West’ become ‘white’” and, with it, a personification of “cultural adaptability, political competency, and ethical versatility”? Similarly, how did “‘Africa’ become ‘black’ and the symbol of international dysfunction”? As an answer, Grovogui elaborates that this distinction functions as a means to position African as a “counterpoint to the European trajectory” and, in doing so, justify Western authority in determining the rules and norms of international politics (p. 427). Meera Sabaratnam ([2020](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0070)) was thus right to argue that the positionality of international relations was that of a White discipline, premised on a “set of epistemological tropes, locations, assumptions, and commitments that naturalise racialised accounts” of the global order (p. 3).

Of course, in any discussion of racialized positionalities in international relations, it seems instinctive to treat disciplinary Whiteness as an outgrowth of individual identities and a reflection of an author’s “skin colour, conscious intentions or places of origin.” But although the individual is not irrelevant in this discussion, the concern here is rather the way in which the individual is embedded in the racialized “hierarchies of the human” and embodies an intellectual “‘standpoint’ rooted in structural power” (Sabaratnam, [2020](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0070), p. 3). David Lake ([2016](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0059)) further elaborates this correlation between the hierarchies of humans and one’s racialized intellectual standpoint in view his own positionality—namely as a White man, implicated in the development of a White discipline. He argues that all theories are based on an implicit expectation “about how the universe, social life, or politics ‘works’” (p. 1113). As Lake then goes on to explain, this intuitive understanding of the world is based on lived experiences. But because the overwhelming majority of the international relations scholars are White men, the discipline’s mainstream includes theoretical approaches that primarily encapsulate the White, male lived experience (pp. 1113–1114). Of course, in effect, this also excludes approaches that illuminate the non-White lived experience of the ways in which race and racism continue to order the discipline and global politics. Bringing this discussion to the classroom then, Vitalis ([2015](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0090)) proposes that this White, male-ness of the discipline’s core has become codified as international relations’ “origin story,” which is then passed on to (White) graduate students as they are socialized into the discipline through the various “rituals of PhD programs.” Afterwards, as “freshly minted PhDs and new assistant professors,” they are keen on remaining within the bounds of the discipline’s mainstream. So, they too pass on the same “story”—along with a White, male intuitive understanding of how the world works—to “generations of undergraduates who will become public intellectuals, politicians, and policymakers” (p. 6).

With such a display of disciplinary Whiteness in view—rooted not least in a particular understanding of hierarchies of human—it is not surprising that, for example, the Howard School is missing in international relations’ origin story. It is for the same reasons that international relations has entirely ignored Native American perspectives on politics and Indigenous communities’ critique of settler colonial conceptions of democracy, sovereignty, “rule of law,” and “American exceptionalism” (Ferguson, [2016](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0039), p. 1029); or that even when discussions of race and racism were momentarily revived in international relations in the 1970s, they appeared in the works of African American and Afro-Caribbean scholars rather those of their White counterparts (Vitalis, [2015](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0090), p. 13). Who we are, and how we are positioned in racialized hierarchies that order global politics and society, evidently positions that nature of the knowledge that we produce. And, for the teaching of the field, this discussion of positionality reveals that the foundational scholarly norms and assumptions in international relations are hardly a given; they are deeply contested (Isaac, [2016](https://oxfordre-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-666?rskey=rPTCRk#acrefore-9780190846626-e-666-bibItem-0054), pp. 943-948).

### Government to Government Link

#### Mainstream IR’s state-centric paradigm fails to recognize developments beyond Westphalian abstractions. That guarantees extinction.

Chengxin Pan 20, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2020, “Enfolding wholes in parts: quantum holography and International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2020, Vol. 26(S1) 14–38

According to the holographic worldview, the universe is “an undivided and unbroken whole” which is enfolded into parts. Thus, the division within as well as between society and nature is “a crude abstraction and approximation” (Bohm, 1980: 158, emphasis in original; see also Barad, 2007: 24–25). In his book Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Bohm expressed a pressing concern with the tendency to divide and subdivide the world into essentially different units or groupings: IR scholars are no stranger to the tendency described by Bohm. The world, apparently organized into sovereign states, appears to be as fragmented as ever, further compounded today by the rise of nationalism, populism, and identity politics, as well as by the socalled return to geopolitics or even the Cold War. All these fragmentations and conflicts in IR seem to conform with the Newtonian ontology of things. However, what is revealed in this orthodox ontology is merely the explicate order of IR, whose implicate order and implicate relations have yet to be adequately understood and theorized. Bohm’s insights into holographic relationality lay an important foundation for such theorizing in IR. As will be illustrated below, the Bohmian holographic theory can give IR, among other things, a stronger ontological commitment to whole and wholeness, a more holographic relational conception of parts such as states, and a novel account of differences as contingent and spatio-temporally situated unfoldments of holographic parts. Wholeness and the study of IR The concept of wholeness is central to Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum theory (Bohm, 1980; Bohm and Hiley, 1993; Zinkin, 1987: 6). Despite a growing effort to include a wider array of issues and factors, IR still has a rather “weak sense of a social whole” (Albert and Buzan, 2013: 121). Even as IR scholars focus on “macrolevel” factors such as international political systems, international structures, international societies, world systems, and global networks, these systemic factors are at best particular structural abstractions of world politics, such as anarchy, the distribution of capabilities, and international norms and rules. While these systemic or structural features are part and parcel of the whole, ontologically they are often seen as either mere external and causal determinants of state behavior, or ultimately reducible to parts (e.g. states, material resources, or ideas),15 rather than as the whole in the holographic sense of the word. By whole we mean the entirety of space, time, and the information, relations, structures, processes, movements, and parts/agents contained within that all-encompassing space-time. In the IR context, the whole goes well beyond states and the totality of their interactions. It embodies the whole social and ecological systems as well as their explicate and implicate relations both between and embedded within their constituent “parts.” Such “parts” may include regions, states, societies, cultures, religions, peoples, economies, markets, goods, histories, ideas, emotions, materials, creatures, and natural phenomena. Of course, what exactly makes up the whole for IR cannot be exhaustively tallied a priori, because by definition such a task is impossible in any given space-time. But the point is that wholeness should be given a higher ontological priority in IR. Just as trees do not grow as assemblages of previously separate branches, leaves, and roots, the world does not start off with merely fragmented parts and preexisting sovereign states which then come together to form a global system; it is the other way round: the whole permeates through the parts and forms the essential relational conditions under which parts emerge and exist. This approach makes it imperative for IR to look for relations in much broader contexts which otherwise have been invisible, understudied, or artificially carved up by mainstream IR. To advocate for wholeness does not mean always privileging “macro-level” issues at the global level. In any case, whole-part or macro-micro issues are always already entangled and co-emergent (Wendt, 2015: 257). Micro parts and issues, precisely because they are microscopic, may be particularly prone to be diffusely spread and enfolded into various parts of the whole. As a result, micro parts simultaneously develop an emergent, holographic property of the whole. The fact that the tiny coronavirus can be quickly enfolded into almost every corner of the whole world and turn global life upside down illustrates the part-whole entanglement, and we dismiss its holographically holistic nature and impact at our own peril. To further illustrate, often traditionally considered outside the purview of IR, micro issues or events such as music (Gienow-Hecht, 2015), sports (e.g. ping-pong diplomacy), the Chernobyl disaster (e.g. the collapse of the Soviet Union, van der Veen, 2013), a flight school in Florida (e.g. 9/11), US subprime mortgage crisis, Fukushima, Wikileaks, melting polar ice caps, a Tunisian street vendor (e.g. the Arab Spring and the Syria conflict) and now even COVID-19 may be all in various ways “localized” holographic instantiations of the wholes. As such, they can and do play an important part in both reflecting and shaping the whole, especially in the form of some unexpected events and surprising turns, such as the end of the Cold War, 9/11, the global financial crisis, the rise of Donald Trump, and the current global pandemic. True, some of those “micropolitical” issues have begun to attract IR’s attention (Kertzer, 2017; Solomon and Steele, 2017), but overall the discipline lacks an explicit and holographic ontological and conceptual foundation for a more systematic engagement with the duality of whole-part. Of course, we cannot deal with “the whole of reality all at once” (Bohm, 1980: 2; see also Wendt, 1999: 14). Often it is necessary to take things “apart” and analyze them as if they were separable units. But it is important to always remember the “as if” caveat, lest we reify them as something objectively autonomous. It is also worth remembering that ontologically international relations are always a holographic part of bigger wholes, not closed or autonomous systems or units in and of themselves. In this context, a quantum holographic perspective becomes imperative especially in the face, for example, of the increasingly apparent human-nature holographic entanglement as evidenced by mounting “local” environmental crises and their implications for economic development, international conflict, and planetary survival. Contrary to the prevailing IR approaches that continue to subordinate environmental issues to a state-centric framework and a “national economic” imperative (Saurin, 1996), a quantum holographic approach has the potential to bridge the ontological and conceptual division between the parts and the wholes.

## K---Queer Theory

### General IR Link

#### IR theory fails to do anything. Embrace the Queer theory of failure to better understand the flaws of IR, otherwise IR continues to perpetuate idea of successful and unsuccessful which is dependent on heteronormative logics. The idea of queer failure is a tool of political resistance of a failed logic.

**Barkin and Sjoberg 2020** (J. Samuel Barken is a professor for conflict and resolution at the University of Massachusetts and Laura Sjoberg is British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London and Head of the Department of Politics, International Relations, and Philosophy, “*The Queer Art of Failed IR?*” Alternatives, 45(4), 167-183, GMU JAF]

In the wake of the enduring popularity of the argument that there might be an “end of IR theory” (Dunne et al., 2013), we see a world in which IR theorizing is alive, even if only in repetitive fantasy, and key to disciplinary identification for whatever “IR” is. Some of the responses to the “end of IR theory” argue for a retreat from grand theory to middle-level theory (e.g., Lake, 2013); others warn of a “cacophony” that needs categorization to be comprehensible (Jackson & Nexon, 2013, p. 543); still others call for either re-terming schools of IR (Michelson, 2020) or combining analytic approaches (Grieco, 2019). While we see theory’s continued importance even in scholars’ confusion about its appropriate role, we recognize, with those who declare theory’s end in the discipline, that something has changed in the structure and function of theorizing among scholars interested in global politics. That something, we argue, is the simultaneous recognition of and denial of the failure of IR theorizing. We contend that IR theorizing is both failing and necessarily failed, but that does not make it over. Instead, we argue, drawing on queer theory, that failure in/of grand IR theory is something to be celebrated and actively participated in. With many queer theorists (e.g., Halberstam, 2011), we argue that failure, rather than a normative bad, can be a necessary corrective to the intellectual and disciplinary stagnation implied by and implicated in practiced and accepted standards of success. We argue that overwrought debates about the state of IR theorizing could learn from queer methodology (e.g., Weber, 2014a) and queer theorizing (e.g., Weber, 2016a) not only about global politics but also about the nature of knowledge and disciplinary politics. Queer IR has asked how cultural ideas about gender and sexuality shape global politics, and how heteronormative, homonormative, and cisnormative frameworks have shaped the ways the world works (Richter-Montpetit, 2018). It has also turned its lenses inward, asking why queer scholarship has had as little influence on IR theorizing as it has (Weber, 2016b), and how queering IR could change IR’s methodological (Weber, 2014a) and theoretical (Weber, 2014b) landscapes. This article looks at a small but in our view important piece of that puzzle—how taking queer work seriously might provide insight about the (sometimes endless) state-of-the-field debates. We see these state-of-the-field assertions, arguments, and debates as first and foremost recursive. Sometimes they are romances, explaining the breaking developments that provide hopeful next steps for a blooming field (e.g., Acharya, 2014; Berenskotter, 2017). Sometimes they are tragedies, spelling gloom and doom for IR as an enterprise (if not academia as a whole) or even global politics itself (e.g., Aistrope & Fishel, 2020; Stevens & Michelsen, 2020). Other times, they are dramas with various players and various arguments taking various starring roles in sparring matches (e.g., Jackson & Nexon, 2009; Parashar, 2013). Sometimes they are histories, tracing the past into the present or the present into the past (Alekseyeva, 2016; Schmidt & Guilhot, 2019). Sometimes they are sociologies, explaining how this and that theory relates to this and that other theory (Aris, 2020; Barkin & Sjoberg, 2019). Sometimes they are serials, explaining how particular approaches ebb and flow or evolve (e.g., Epstein, 2013; Guzzini, 2013). Sometimes they are sports reports, talking about which side wins what when (e.g., Acharya, 2005; Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). Most state-of-the-field evaluations make the various protagonists and antagonists (theories or theorists) seem so at odds, so different, and the stakes of the debates so dire. We argue that, with few exceptions, these stories, despite their different forms, different characters, and different plotlines, are all the same. They are more often than not the product of gender, sex, race, sexuality, national origin, education, and employment privilege that produce a narrow view of what is and what should be, based on the practices that have provided the success from which the privileged writer writes. As Weber (2014b, p. 29) argues, “disciplinary IR’s commitments and standards are as much the performative result of the so-called ‘mainstream’ agendas of learned societies, universities, independent funding agencies, and governments…as they are the performative outcome of so-called ‘dissident’ practices” (citing Ashley &Walker, 1990; Soreanu, 2010). In fact,Weber suggests that the radical critical edge of IR and its mainstream “foes” are really “intricately intertwined positions” which “produce a disciplinary IR that claims to speak for the whole of the discipline” out of power rather than legitimacy (Weber, 2014b, p. 29). In concrete terms, we argue that the current “state” of state-of-the-field stories and debates is intimately and necessarily tied not only to heteronormative, traditionalized rules and norms of scholarly practice but also to heteronormative, traditionalized understandings of success, failure, and their value. In this article, we argue that the things that the state-of-the-field literature agrees on betray a narrow and problematic approach to what knowledge is, how it works, who has it, and how it can be. We suggest that IR on these terms is always and already a failed enterprise, no matter what spin the stateof- the-field literature puts on it. IR fails to reach any expected or desired end of the enterprise of IR theorizing. It fails to achieve coherence or fails to approximate some measure (citations, downloads, and publisher quality) socially understood as failure’s opposite. It fails to find clarity or directions. It fails because it must—its idealized goals are unachievable and require it to be something that it cannot be, and remain its seductive unquestioned/unquestionable ends, despite an obvious need for reevaluation and, possibly, the embrace of failure (Baudrillard, 1991 [1979]; Halberstam, 2011). Rather than arguing that IR’s success and failure need to be redefined, we contend that IR’s success and failure need to be normatively reinterpreted.We argue that seeing IR as a failure, and embracing its failings, provides a realistic and intellectually grounded path for IR’s “futures,” putting to rest the state-of-the-field fairy tales and encyclopedias once and for all. The need for success and the denial of failure depend on two things: first, both success and failure existing and being identifiable; and second, presuming a particular normative relationship between success and failure. In IR, as we discussed above, scholars are thought of as successes or failures according to a complicated metric of disciplinary prestige based on publication outlet, “scientific standards,” and perception of the change that they have caused in the discipline. Work is characterized as successful or failed based on whether it contributes to knowledge cumulation. The discipline itself is understood as successful or failed based on the aggregation of those measures. On these terms, the emptiness of disciplinary standards and the impossibility of knowledge cumulation make every piece of scholarship and every scholar in IR a failure and the discipline along with them.13 To us, the identification of success/failure is impossible. Still, we focus our approach to “disciplinary IR” around questioning the second assumption, that the normative relationship between success and failure is such that success is good and desirable and failure is bad. Failure has been insufficiently explored in disciplinary IR, both in thinking about the disciplinary enterprise and in thinking about the world “out there” which we purport to study.14 Here, we look to theorize the “upside” of the failure of the disciplinary enterprise of IR. It is, after all, failure that Baudrillard called for, in different words—a willingness to drop commitment to and passion for a certain end in the recognition that both that end and its opposite are empty signifiers. Queer theorists have suggested that this sort of failure—failure to live up to expectations which were messy, detached, or a priori untenable—might be worth celebrating (Halberstam, 2011). We build on these two understandings to embrace failure in IR. Often failure is thought about as either a final end (something has failed), as a stumbling block on a path to success (if at first you do not succeed, try, try again), or as a miscalibration (we thought this was success, but really it is failure instead). With Jack Halberstam, we suggest a normative reinterpretation. Rather than seeing failure as an end point, or as a stopping point on the way to success, it can be seen as itself a politics, “a category levied by the winners against the losers” and “a set of standards that ensure all future radical ventures will be measured as cost-ineffective” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 184). Halberstam uses the example of reproductive success. Inherited wisdom has suggested for a significant amount of time that people should have children—that a heterosexual marriage with biological offspring is the ideal of success in one’s personal life. That could be taken at face value: success (measured in biological offspring to still-married heterosexual, cissexual parents) is to be valued, and failure (measured in some other reproductive result) is to be devalued. Or the very normative value attached to reproductive success is itself a weapon, where associating failure with non-reproduction is a category levied against the losers by the winners. Redefining all reproductive results as successful or changing which reproductive results are measured as successful does not change the weaponized, normalizing character of the concept of success. This is a metaphor for IR’s disciplinary sociology, but it is also directly applicable to IR’s epistemological and methodological engagement with non-heteronormativity. Applied to IR, the normalization of “success” as the thing to which all (researchers) should aspire reifies membership in the categories of “successful” and “failed” and provides the “successful” with a powerful weapon to continue to exclude, put down, and delegitimize the “unsuccessful.” The “winners” are by definition in a normatively superior position compared to the “losers” despite the emptiness of the signification of each category. Understanding individual pieces of work, individual scholars, or research paradigms as failed (a foil to successful) is a categorization wielded by those who have already been classified as successful to achieve and perpetuate the exclusion of those whom they can constitute as inferior. In this way, research success is a category IR’s winners wield against its losers to perpetuate their position as winners, consciously or unconsciously, against a background of a disciplinary IR where the standards for research were created largely by white, heterosexual cis-men and remain largely undisturbed despite the intellectual and representational diversification of IR research and IR scholars. Failure as a category in IR scholarship serves to “reinscribe and renormalize standards of ‘research success’ which remain unchanged, unchangeable, and regressive” (Halberstam, 2011). The scholarship that makes unconventional claims to knowledge cumulation (or no claim to knowledge cumulation) not only fails but constitutes its researchers as failures—which becomes recursive when “we tend to blame each other or ourselves for the failures of the social structure we inhabit, rather than critiquing the structures… themselves” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 35, citing Kipnes, 2004). In Halberstam’s view, it is the system that privileges success, that is, the problem, and failing within it is an emancipatory possibility which “dismantles the logics of success and failure with which we currently live” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 2). Realizing the caging nature of the boundaries of disciplinary success, it is possible to think that failure might be perceived as something to celebrate and strive toward rather than something which should inspire shame. Halberstam suggests that “under certain circumstances, failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, and more surprising ways of being in the world” (Halberstam, 2011, pp. 2–3). InHalberstam’s view, it is only when the norms and metrics by which we aspire to success become both politicized and problematized that freedom becomes possible. It is not failing that we as scholars or as people need to learn to do—we fail all the time.AsHalberstamnotes, failure is endemic in life and work as “to live is to fail, to bungle, to disappoint, and ultimately die,” despite denial, resistance, and constructs of success (Halberstam, 2011, pp. 186–187). Instead of needing to learn to fail, we argue, we need to learn to embrace failure, particularly the collective failure of the enterprise of “disciplinary IR” to achieve or approximate “knowledge cumulation” generally or the aspirations of particular research programs specifically. “Rather than searching for ways around death and disappointment,” Halberstam contends that it is important to recognize, embrace, incorporate, and legitimize failure (Halberstam, 2011, pp. 186–187). Lee Edelman suggests that pretenses of success and the “failure to succeed” that is their foil are actually both on the same side—“committed to futurism’s unquestioned good,” aspirational to success, and committed to a perceived normative value of success (Edelman, 2004). Edelman envisions another “side”—“the ‘side’ where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of vitalization ceaselessly turn against themselves; the ‘side’ outside of all political sides” (Edelman, 2004, loc. 97).We argue that it is in this ambivalent “side” that IR scholars should see, experience, and live IR as such. Halberstam’s account of this “side” (or “anti-side”) is “the queer art of failure.” Halberstam explains that “the queer art of failure involves the acceptance of the finite, the embrace of the absurd, the silly, and the hopelessly goofy” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 187). If “winning has become a byword for greed, arrogance, profiting from others, and conformity” (Halberstam, 2012), losing can be the art of rejecting those things, and, with them, the normative value of the win itself. The queer art of failure wields negative affect and anti-futurity as a tool of political resistance (Ruberg, 2015, p. 114), suggesting that active rejection of not only the standards but also the idea of success constitutes the space of failure as habitable. In this view, “every experience of annoyance, anger, sadness, and hurt comes with its own value, its own message, and its own transformative potential” (Ruberg, 2015, p. 115). As Ruberg urges, there is space in the willingness to “see willful self-destruction not as pathological behavior from which queer subjects need rescuing but as an ecstatic rejection of mainstream power structures” (Ruberg, 2015, p. 115). Embracing disciplinary IR’s failures, then, has two potential advantages: recognition and resistance.

#### Knowledge production within IR revels in success or failure, the number of clicks you get to peer review in elite journals yet they lead to the same failures we see everyday. We need to look to deconstruct IR’s logics of success and failure.

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And they lived happily ever after. The end. No, really. If IR’s state-of-the-field debates are alternatively narrativized fairy tales, we have a replacement. We suggest that the fairy tales’ idealized end can be found not in success but in failure; not in agreement but in controversy; not in aggrandized claims but in careful thought; not in stability but in liminality.15 It is hitching our wagon to a failure of a discipline and acknowledging that failure that constitutes and creates the possibility of a happily ever after for IR theory. We see the answers to many of these questions bound up in a disciplinary IR that has racist, sexist, heterosexist, and cissexist intellectual orientations and remains silent about them and often the assumptions that prop them up. But even work which decenters or critiques these exclusions in IR, in our view, is positioned compared to or in opposition to the discipline’s existing structure. Rather than being disappointed that IR theories are exclusive, cannot be reduced to a single theory, cannot account for global politics as a whole, and cannot present grand narratives of their competitive advantages visa- vis other approaches, we suggest highlighting and inhabiting these failures. Questioning the terms of disciplinary success as lying in a tightly choreographed dance (peer review in elite journals) or a popularity contest (citation count), or even in the “science” of knowledge cumulation, we ask why empty signifiers continue to dictate value in a wide variety of channels in IR. But we do not think redefining success will “solve” this “problem,” no matter how well-intended or radical the redefinition is. Note that we are not denying the existence or importance of significant transgressive work within IR, work that rejects grand narrativizing, or other explicit or implicit attempts to embrace failure. We are under the impression that authors critiqued here might actually agree with our critiques, either placing themselves within them or taking exception to them. We are not looking to signal virtue or to exclude, simply to suggest an explicit alternative approach. Instead of looking for an alternative, emphasizing some of the “good” transgressions, finding another way to succeed, or recasting success, we look to deconstruct IR’s logics of success and failure, and, with them, its mimicry of reified standards and its fantasies of knowledge cumulation. We see rewards in embraing IR theory’s failure to live up to IR theorists’ expectations of it.With Halberstam, “perhaps most obviously, failure…disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between…winners and losers” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3). Declaring, and embracing, knowledge cumulation failure (and thus, IR’s intellectual failure) “allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3). The relevant norms in IR are the fetishization of science, the fetishization of progression and progress, and the establishment and reification of boundaries of what ideas matter to the field. In embracing failure and escaping those punishing norms that are as violent in their inclusion (e.g., Haritaworn et al., 2014) as they are in their exclusion, “queer studies offer us one method for imagining, not some fantasy of an elsewhere, but existing alternatives to hegemonic systems” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 89). It “can be a potent form of critique,…a refusal of the norm, an indifference to assimilation, and a route to other ways of being in the world” (Halberstam, 2012). Here, the alternative to the hegemonic system of claims of knowledge cumulation is the queer, understood as both liminal and anti-heteronormative, as a foundation for theorizing more nuanced understandings of knowledge than success or failure at cumulation. If scholars find their affirmation in (hollow) confirmations of their claims to knowledge cumulation, a queer politics of failure suggests a different direction. As Halberstam recommends, “rather than resisting endings and limits, let us instead revel in…all of our own inevitable fantastic failures” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 187). Reveling in fantastic failures, in terms of a queer critique of the fantasy of progressive knowledge cumulation, has two elements: celebrating research as failure and confronting the future given that embrace. Queer theory suggests guidelines for embracing failure; “failing is something queers do well”—not (only) in the self-deprecating sense of laughing at (one’s own) flaws, but also in the more fruitful sense of exposing the ridiculousness of norms by failing to live up to them. In this sense, queer failure is “a map of the path not taken” (Weber, 2014a, 2014b). As such, “queerness offers the promise of failure as a way of life,…but it is up to us whether we choose to make good on that promise in a way that makes a detour around the usual markers of accomplishment and satisfaction” (Halberstam, 2011, loc 3281). “Failing” to meet expectations and being fine repudiates the salvation narrative that accompanies the “right” rules and norms and lifts the often terrible consequences of falling outside “the norm” while removing the privileges of “belonging” to the category of success. The exposure and analysis of queer failure denaturalizes the coherence of knowledge-production performances to show the vapidity inside. We see the replacement of “all-encompassing global theories” with those “subjugated knowledges” which have been “buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systemization” as a key first step but insufficient by itself (Halberstam, 2011). Turning IR’s “losers” into its “winners” would both serve social justice and unsettle the binary itself, but rejecting the categories writ large would both upset the politics of exclusion in those categories and discourage the win-seeking behavior that makes state-of-the-field debates. Celebrating failure instead “provides the opportunity to use [failure’s] negative effects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life” where “the negative thinker can use the experience of failure to confront the gross inequalities of everyday life” (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3, 4). The “toxic positivity” in IR theorizing is the attachment to the utility of grand theory that cumulates knowledge which makes the inequalities in the discipline appear to be organized by some sense of objective quality, where “success happens to good people” and good research while failure happens to bad work or bad people (Halberstam, 2011, p. 3). Instead, we see those inequalities as structural and standards of success in IR as political. IR’s happily ever after, then, if it is to have one, must be in the failure, in the mess, and in rejecting both inherited interpretations of success and of the normative relationship between success and failure. It must be not only in not meeting expectations of any given state-of-the-discipline proselytizing but also in instead realizing that IR cannot and should not approximate those expectations. It is not a progressive discipline with a singular end or an exercise in progressive knowledge cumulation. It is instead necessarily undisciplined—it must put aside the straightjackets of research standards, the ego-stroking of aggrandized claims, and the authorial voice of the telling of the discipline’s past, present, and future—to embrace liminality and the necessity (and beauty) of failure. The irony of this argument is not lost on us. Halberstam, making the queer theory case for celebrating failure, has become a very successful academic by many of the traditional disciplinary standards, and The Queer Art of Failure is a successful academic text. Many of the critics and supporters cited here have built on academic success by their engagement with the argument. We are bringing the case to IR, publishing it in a academic journal, through the traditional mechanism of peer review, from the comfort of secure and permanent academic employment.We poke holes where those holes can be seen by those who would police the boundaries between winners and losers. This article does not “practice” as it “preaches,” to itself upend the “winners” and “losers” in disciplinary IR—it is couched in both necessary and unnecessary hypocrisy. But positionally at the very least, our celebration of failure is itself a failure—implicated in our interest in and disciplinary IR’s promotion of success.We are not arguing that failure can be made pure or that it should be—only that it cannot and should not be escaped, especially for the glorification of success as its perceived opposite. As we fail at failure to demonstrate the fantasy of success, we envision a happily ever after of failing, un-discipline, and diversity rather than a faux idealism of synthesis, aggrandizement, “science,” and disciplining.

### Link---Palestine

#### Debates can center the ‘Pinkwashing’ and the violent dichotomization of “Gay-Friendly” vs. the “Not-Gay Friendly” as the constitutive foundation for the discursively destructive relationship between how U.S. Settler Colonial logics are parasitic on the homonationalist nature of Israel as imposing a discipline on Palestinian queers into legible subjects for neoliberal and militaristic consumption.

Puar 17 [Jasbir, Professor and Graduate Director of Women's and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, “The Right to Maim : Debility, Capacity, Disability” Duke University Press, Chapter 3, (<https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-right-to-maim>), November 2017 // Makinde]

This piece of **advertising**, created by the pro-Israel organization Size Doesn’t Matter as part of an ad campaign focused on promoting the virtues of Israel to Canadians, can be hailed as an example of “**pinkwashing**,” a piece of propaganda highlighting the **lgbt rights record of Israel** as a function of **obscuring** or **legitimating** its **occupation of Palestine**.2 Repurposed in 2009 from campaigns to critique facile medical corporate support of **breast cancer research**, **pinkwashing** has been redefined as the Israeli state’s use of its admittedly **stellar lgbt rights record** to **deflect attention from**, and in some instances to **justify** or **legitimate**, its **occupation of Palestine**. Resonating within a receptive field of globalized Islamophobia significantly amplified since September 11, 2001, this messaging is reliant on a civilizational narrative about the modernity of the Israelis juxtaposed against the backward homophobia of the Palestinians. As such, **pinkwashing has become a commonly used tag for the cynical promotion of lgbt bodies as representative of Israeli democracy**. More generally, it is the **erasure of hierarchies of power** through the favoring of the “**gay-friendly nation” imagery**. It is a discourse about civilizational superiority that relies on a transparent and uninterrogated construction of “Palestinian homophobia” contingent upon the foreclosure of any questioning about “Israeli homophobia.” Besides making **Zionism** more appealing to (**Euro-American) gays**, part of the mechanism at work that **benefits Israel** is a **disciplining of Palestinian queers** into **legible subjects**. At the same time, as Haneen Maikey has noted, the most relevant and damning effect of pinkwashing is its contribution to the processes of **internal colonization**: the naturalization of Israeli superiority by Palestinians themselves. The most important targets of pinkwashing therefore are not actually Euro-American gay tourists but (**queer and gay) Palestinians** themselves.3 As such, I would argue that it functions dually, as a form of **discursive preemptive securitization** that marshals **neo-orientalist** fears of **Palestinians** as backward, **sexually repressed terrorists**, and as an intense mode of **subjugation** of **Palestinians** under **settler colonial rule.**

For whom is pinkwashing legible and persuasive as a political discourse, and why? First of all, **a neoliberal accommodationist** **economic structure** engenders the niche marketing of various ethnic and **minoritized groups** and has normalized the production of a gay and lesbian tourism industry built on the **discursive distinction** between **gay-friendly** and **not-gay friendly destinations**.4 The claims of **pinkwashing** are often seen as plausible when rendered through an **lgbt rights discourse** that resonates within **North America** and Europe as a dominant **measurement of teleological progress**.5 These claims make far less sense in the “Middle East,” for example, where there is a healthy skepticism about the universalizing of lgbt rights discourses and where knowledge of the complexities of sexualities in the region is far more nuanced. Additionally, in some senses Israel is a pioneer of homonationalism, as its particular position at the crosshairs of settler colonialism, occupation, and neoliberalist accommodationism creates the perfect storm for the normalization of homosexuality through national belonging. The **homonationalist history of Israel** illuminates a burgeoning of lgbt rights and increased mobility for gays and lesbians during the concomitant increased segregation and decreased mobility of Palestinian populations, especially post-Oslo. I have detailed this point at greater length elsewhere, but to quickly summarize: the advent of gay rights in Israel begins around the same time as the first intifada, with the 1990s known as Israel’s “gay decade” brought on by the legalization of homosexuality in the Israeli Defense Forces, workplace antidiscrimination provisions, and numerous other legislative changes.6 The idf becomes a notable site of homonationalist distinction in relation to other countries in the “Middle East,” as “Only in Israel” can “Gay Officers Serve Their Country.”

The **financial, military, affective**, and **ideological entwinement of U.S**. and Israeli **settler colonialisms**, and the role of the **United States** more generally, **should also not be minimized** when evaluating why pinkwashing appears to be an **effective discursive strategy**.7 **The United States** and Israel are the greatest **beneficiaries** of **homonationalism** in the current global **geopolitical order**, as homonationalism operates to manage difference on the **scalar registers** of the **internal, territorial**, and **global**. Moreover, pinkwashing is an **ideological** and **economic solicitation** directed to the **United States**—Israel’s greatest financial supporter internationally—and to Euro American gays who have the political capital and financial resources to invest in Israel. Thus, pinkwashing’s unconscious appeal to U.S. gays is produced through the erasure of **U.S. settler colonialism** enacted in the tacit endorsement of Israel’s occupation of Palestine.8

But pinkwashing has many antecedents; **it is one more justification of colonial rule in the long history of imperial, racial, and national violence**. How has “the homosexual question” come to supplement “the woman question” of the colonial era to modulate arbitration between modernity and tradition, citizen and terrorist, homonational and queer? As elaborated by Partha Chatterjee, this question arose with some force in the decolonization movements in South Asia, whereby the capacity for an emerging postcolonial government to protect native women from oppressive patriarchal cultural practices, marked as tradition, became the barometer by which colonizers arbitrated political concessions made to the colonized.9 Here echoes Gayatri Spivak’s famous dictum regarding the colonial project: “white men saving brown women from brown men.”10 Over time the terms of the woman question have been redictated, from the nineteenthcentury formulation of white women’s relation to colonial women as the, white woman’s burden” to present-day liberal feminist scholars who have become the arbiters of other women’s modernity, or the modernity of the Other Woman. To reinvoke Spivak for the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, then: white women saving brown women from brown men. The white woman’s burden from the nineteenth century is regenerated for contemporary deployment through liberal feminist frames within human rights discourses

### Link---Israel

#### Any engagement within Israel that does not first breakdown the power structures of homonationalism will allow for pinkwashing to run rampant. U.S engagement further entwines the ties between Israel and the U.S which continues complicity within the homonationalist structure.

**Puar 2013** [Jasbir K. Puar, Puar is Professor and Graduate Director of Women’s and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, “*Rethinking homonationalism*” . International Journal of Middle East Studies, 45(2), 336-339, GMU JAF]

At times the “viral” travels of the concept of homonationalism, as it has been taken up in North America, various European states, Palestine/Israel, and India, have found reductive applications in activist organizing platforms. Instead of thinking of homonationalism as an accusation, an identity, a bad politics, I have been thinking about it as an analytic to apprehend state formation and a structure of modernity: as an assemblage of geopolitical and historical forces, neoliberal interests in capitalist accumulation both cultural and material, biopolitical state practices of population control, and affective investments in discourses of freedom, liberation, and rights. Homonationalism, thus, is not simply a synonym for gay racism, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries; it is not another identity politics, not another way of distinguishing good queers from bad queers, not an accusation, and not a position. It is rather a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and sexuality. To say that this historical moment is homonational, where homonationalism is understood as an analytics of power, then, means that one must engage it in the first place as the condition of possibility for national and transnational politics. Part of the increased recourse to domestication and privatization of neoliberal economies and within queer communities, homonationalism is fundamentally a deep critique of lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses and how those rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to citizenship—cultural and legal—at the expense of the delimitation and expulsion of other populations. The narrative of progress for gay rights is thus built on the back of racialized others, for whom such progress was once achieved, but is now backsliding or has yet to arrive. I have thus theorized homonationalism as an assemblage of de- and reterritorializing forces, affects, energies, and movements. While the project arose within the post 9/11 political era of the United States, homonationalism is also an ongoing process, one that in some sense progresses from the civil rights era and does not cohere only through 9/11 as a solitary temporal moment. The following brief discussion of homonationalism in relation to pinkwashing and Palestine may help demonstrate the complex ways I see homonationalism as neither identity nor political position. Homonationalism and pinkwashing should not be seen as parallel phenomena. Rather, pinkwashing is one manifestation and practice made possible within and because of homonationalism. Unlike pinkwashing, homonationalism is not a state practice per se. It is instead the historical convergence of state practices, transnational circuits of queer commodity culture and human rights paradigms, and broader global phenomena such as the increasing entrenchment of Islamophobia. These are just some of the circumstances through which nation-states are now vested with the status of “gay-friendly” versus “homophobic.” The conflation of homonationalism and pinkwashing can result in well-intentioned critiques or political stances that end up reproducing the queer exceptionalism of homonationalism in various ways.4 It is thus important to map out the relations between pinkwashing and homonationalism, or, more precisely, the global conditions of homonationalism that make a practicesuch as Israeli pinkwashing possible and legible in the first place. In connecting Israeli pinkwashing to a broader global system of power networks, I am demonstrating the myriad of actors that converge to enable such a practice. Pinkwashing has become a commonly used tag for the cynical promotion of LGBT bodies as representative of Israeli democracy. As its use as a shorthand proliferates, it must be situated within its wider geopolitical context. That is to say, pinkwashing works because both history and global international relations matter. So while it is crucial to challenge the Israeli state, it must be done in a manner that acknowledges the range of complicit actors. Historically speaking, settler colonialism has a long history of articulating its violence through the protection of serviceable figures such as women and children, and now the homosexual. Pinkwashing is only one more justification for imperial/racial/national violence within this long tradition of intimate rhetorics around “victim” populations. Further, Islamophobia has proliferated since the beginning of the “war on terror,” but it also predates 9/11 in various forms (see, for example, Edward Said’s periodization of Islamophobia as heralded during the end of the cold war). Pinkwashing works in part by tapping into the discursive and structural circuits produced by U.S. and European crusades against the spectral threat of “radical Islam” or “Islamo-fascism.” Then there is the function of capitalism. The neoliberal accommodationist economic structure engenders niche marketing of various ethnic and minoritized groups, normalizing the production of, for example, a gay and lesbian tourism industry built on the discursive distinction between gay-friendly and not-gay-friendly destinations. Not unlinked to this is what I call the “human rights industrial complex.” The gay and lesbian human rights industry continues to proliferate Euro-American constructs of identity (not to mention the notion of a sexual identity itself) that privilege identity politics, “coming out,” public visibility, and legislative measures as the dominant barometers of social progress. Within this nexus of history and economy, Israel appears as a pioneer of homonationalism, being perfectly situated to encourage the normalization of some homosexual bodies in relation to an increasingly violent occupation of Palestine. This homonationalist history of Israel, or the rise of LGBT rights in Israel, parallels the concomitant increasing segregation of Palestinian populations, especially post-Oslo. Moreover, the United States is in no small part culpable for the effectiveness of Israeli pinkwashing, as it is to a large extent directed toward citizens of the United States, Israel’s greatest financial supporter, and more generally to Euro-American gays who have the political capital and financial resources to invest in Israel. U.S. settler colonialism is inextricably intertwined with Israeli settler colonialism. Through their financial, military, affective, and ideological entwinement, it seems to me that the United States and Israel are the largest benefactors of homonationalism in the current geopolitical configuration, as it operates on three scalar registers: internal, territorial, and global.

#### The securitized narrative of Israeli existential threats is a product of US empire and the aff’s rhetoric of human rights is rooted in the logic of American exceptionalism.

Puar 07 (Jasbir K., PhD ethnic studies, *Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times*. Duke University Press. 2007)

With the United States currently positioning itself as the technologically exceptional global counterterrorism expert, American exceptionalism feeds off of other exceptionalisms, particularly that of **Israel**, its close ally in the Middle East. The exceptional national security issues of Israel, and the long term ‘‘**existential’’ threat** it faces because of its sense of being ‘‘entangled in a conflict of unparalleled dimensions,’’ for example, proceeds thus: ‘‘**exceptional vulnerability**’’ results in ‘‘exceptional security needs,’’ the risks of which are then alleviated and purportedly conquered by ‘‘exceptional counterterrorism technologies.’’∞π In this **collusion** of American and Israeli state interests, defined through a joint oppositional posture toward Muslims, narratives of **victimhood** ironically **suture** rather than deflate, contradict, or nullify claims to exceptionalism. In other words, the Israeli nation-state finds itself continuously embroiled in a cycle of perceived exceptional 8 introduction threats of violence that demand exceptional uses of force against the Palestinian population, which is currently mirrored by U.S. government o≈cials’ public declarations of possible terror risks that are used to compel U.S. citizens to support the war on terror. Reflecting upon contemporary debates about the United States as empire, Amy Kaplan notes, ‘‘The idea of empire has always paradoxically entailed a sense of spatial and temporal limits, a narrative of rising and falling, which U.S. exceptionalism has long kept at bay.’’ Later, she states, ‘‘The **denial** and **disavowal** of empire has long served as the ideological cornerstone of U.S. imperialism and a key component of American exceptionalism.’’∞∫ Thus, for Kaplan the distancing of exceptionalism from empire achieves somewhat contradictory twofold results: the superior United States is not subject to empire’s shortcomings, as the apparatus of empire is unstable and ultimately empires fall; and the United States creates the impression that empire is beyond the pale of its own morally upright behavior, such that all violences of the state are seen, in some moral, cultural, or political fashion as anything but the violence of empire. U.S. exceptionalism hangs on a narrative of transcendence, which places the United States above empire in these two respects, a project that is aided by what Domenico Losurdo names as ‘‘the fundamental tendency to transform the Judeo-Christian tradition into a sort of national religion that consecrates the exceptionalism of American people and the sacred mission with which they are entrusted (‘Manifest Destiny’).’’∞Ω Kaplan, claiming that current narratives of empire ‘‘take American exceptionalism to new heights,’’ argues that a concurrent ‘‘paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality’’ are coterminous in that ‘‘they share a teleological narrative of inevitability’’ that posits America as the arbiter of appropriate ethics, human rights, and democratic behavior while exempting itself without hesitation from such universalizing mandates.≤≠

## DA---Appeasement

### Security Guarantee---Generic Links

#### Creating new security guarantees emboldens illiberal actors and risks conflict.

\*\*Also has some good dip cap args

Hoffman and Whitson, 3-28-23

(Jon Hoffman is the research director at Democracy for the Arab World Now, Sarah Leah Whitson is the executive director of Democracy for the Arab World Now, “Breaking Away From Secret Concessions in the Middle East”, <https://prospect.org/world/2023-03-28-secret-concessions-middle-east/>)

Emboldening Illiberal Behavior The potential Saudi-Israel normalization is designed to appeal to those in Washington who have adopted the Abraham Accords framework as the new guiding rod for Middle East policy, including the Biden administration and leading voices on both sides of the political aisle in Congress. But there has been virtually no public discussion about the extension of these accords, nor even a basic inquiry about whether they require U.S. concessions to achieve what Israel and the Arab states already want and could bargain for on their own. There’s been even less transparency about what kind of commitment the unprecedented security guarantees to Saudi Arabia would entail—including potentially U.S. troops—and the circumstances under which Saudi Arabia could demand the U.S. exercise them. A security commitment to Saudi Arabia or other illiberal actors in the region would formalize and further solidify U.S. support for a top-down, reactionary axis, designed to maintain through fierce repression the regional status quo of autocratic and apartheid governance. Previous normalizations between Israel and other Arab states have been rooted in advancing the strategic interests of political elites within these countries, preserving the prevailing illiberal order that continues to dominate the Middle East, and assuring that the United States remains deeply enmeshed in the region as their security guarantor. Such a security commitment would also encourage erratic and aggressive foreign policies by these actors, secure in their knowledge that the U.S. would be obliged to come to their defense. The record to date shows that U.S. military, political, and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia and the UAE has not only emboldened, but enabled, their reckless, belligerent behavior, most prominently in their nearly eight-year war in Yemen that has resulted in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. When U.S. support has been absent, such as in its opposition to the Saudi/Emirati plan to invade Qatar or the lack of response to the likely-Iranian attack on Saudi’s oil facilities in Abqaiq in 2019, it has encouraged peace and reconciliation. New security guarantees would risk new conflicts, effectively sacrificing U.S. lives to preserve the illiberal status quo that dominates the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been quite open about its purely mercantile relationship with the United States, willing to oppose the U.S. whenever it serves their interests or the whims of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Saudi Arabia refused to support sanctions on Russia or to increase oil output in the wake of spiraling oil prices last fall, despite President Biden’s humiliating journey to Jeddah to kiss his ring and plead his case. Indeed, MBS capped off the insult by hosting President Xi for a lavish, formal state visit immediately after Biden left, and announcing billions in new deals with China. Today, Saudi Arabia continues to pour financial and military resources into supporting allied authoritarian actors engaged in gross abuses, and continues its ham-handed campaigns of transnational repression and surveillance targeting activists and dissidents around the world, including inside the United States. Meanwhile, domestic repression has reached Kafkaesque new heights. Multiple women have been sentenced to decades in prison for innocuous tweets. A prosecutor is seeking the death penalty against ten former judges for “being too lenient.” MBS even sentenced 72-year-old American-Saudi engineer Saad Almadi to 19 years in prison, also for a few critical tweets, at exactly the same time the crown prince was demanding recognition of immunity in a lawsuit against him for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Saudi authorities released Almadi last week, announcing without explanation they had dropped all charges, apparently a chit offered up as they haggle for the security guarantees. But he remains travel-banned in the country. It’s almost as if MBS, even as he doubles down on his lawless, cruel rule, is trying to prove that he can still bring the U.S. to its knees, palms open, eyes looking the other way. This is what our support makes possible. If the security deal proceeds, the lesson Saudi Arabia and other regional autocrats will learn is that bad behavior is actually rewarded by Washington, paving the way for other regional actors to pressure the United States into providing more formal commitments. So long as the United States continues backing such actors, it will further exacerbate the region’s greatest divide, between long‐​standing autocratic regimes and the people they rule over. The United States already maintains a vast network of security commitments in Europe and Asia, and extending such guarantees to the Middle East would represent a counterproductive distraction and draining of critical resources. We’ve been told by multiple administrations that the U.S. wants to disengage from the region and its conflicts. Yet here we are actually considering expanding them? It makes no sense.

#### Security Guarantees are appeasement tactics that bolster credibility of authoritarianism – destroys democracy

Hoffman and Whitson, 3-28-23

(Jon Hoffman is the research director at Democracy for the Arab World Now, Sarah Leah Whitson is the executive director of Democracy for the Arab World Now, “Breaking Away From Secret Concessions in the Middle East”, <https://prospect.org/world/2023-03-28-secret-concessions-middle-east/>)

A Threat to U.S. Democracy Least appreciated is how the prospects of such commitments represent a unique threat to U.S. democracy. The Biden administration has pursued discussions about potential security guarantees with Saudi Arabia and the UAE in near-total secrecy, with no transparency or public debate on the risks they would entail, or even why they are necessary for U.S. interests. The lack of such consultation on such a major foreign-policy undertaking significantly undermines our own democratic processes, with results as disastrous as other foreign-policy commitments that did not have congressional approval, like the war in Yemen. In addition, such a security agreement on the heels of growing evidence of Saudi government and defense industry infiltration in Congress and the executive branch, not only from lobbying influence but from promises of future employment for administration officials, undermines confidence in the integrity of the administration’s decision-making. While it has long been U.S. practice to meddle in the elections and governments of foreign countries, we now face the unprecedented reality of foreign states meddling in our elections and government decision-making, primarily through financial rewards for candidates and former politicians alike. The Biden administration may see Israel-Saudi normalization as a diplomatic “victory” leading up to the 2024 presidential election. But U.S.-Middle East policy is in desperate need of a fundamental overhaul. Washington’s approach to the region is not rooted in the advancement of U.S. interests or values, but **rather the protection of illiberal actors and the enrichment of the defense industry.** Enmeshing the country in more security guarantees is ill-advised. It is imperative that the Biden administration change course, and engage openly with Congress and the public about the possibility of further commitments to Middle East autocrats.

#### Security Guarantee appeasement strategies bolster authoritarianism

Hoffman, 22

(Jon Hoffman is the research director at Democracy for the Arab World Now, 7/11, “The United States Doesn’t Need to Recommit to the Middle East”, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/us-uae-defense-agreement-saudi-biden-israel-security/>)

Current levels of U.S. security assistance to both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are already in direct contradiction with a number of U.S. laws. First, the U.S. government is prohibited from providing security assistance or guarantees to actors engaged in gross human rights abuses. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act states that “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” and emphasizes the United States’ duty to “promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” This is echoed by the Leahy law, two statutory provisions which, in the State Department’s own description, prohibit “the U.S. Government from using funds for assistance to units of foreign security forces where there is credible information implicating that unit in the commission of gross violations of human rights.” Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are among the most autocratic governments in the world, both being rated below Russia by Freedom House. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are engaged in widespread human rights abuses at home and support a wide array of autocratic actors throughout the region engaged in similar abuses. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also declined to criticize China for the persecution of its Uyghur Muslim minority and remain engaged in a military offensive in Yemen that has resulted in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. A recent investigation examining indiscriminate bombings by the Saudi-UAE coalition found that, since 2015, more than 300 airstrikes have “violated or appeared to violate international law.” Critical too are the ways these actors have violated U.S. law within the country itself to advance their own agendas. Beginning with Saudi Arabia, two former Twitter employees were charged in 2019 for spying on behalf of the Saudi government within the United States. Additionally, it was just recently revealed that a federal court in New York has charged a Saudi individual for harassing and threatening dissidents and regime critics in the United States and Canada. U.S. Rep. Tom Malinowski spearheaded a letter this year to Comptroller General Gene Dodaro, arguing that Washington is not adequately monitoring violations by its Middle East partners under Title 22 of U.S. Code Section 2756, which bars Washington from providing security assistance to countries engaged in a “consistent pattern of acts of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the United States.” The letter discussed Saudi Arabia specifically, highlighting several previous instances of such behavior. Regarding the UAE, in 2021, Thomas Barrack, the chairperson of former U.S. President Donald Trump’s inaugural committee, was indicted for acting as an unregistered foreign agent who attempted to influence the Trump administration’s foreign-policy positions. U.S. prosecutors allege Barrack was directed by Emirati officials at the highest levels—including Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan—and Barrack pushed UAE-preferred candidates for cabinet-level positions in the new administration. Later that year, three former U.S. intelligence operatives admitted to working as cyber spies for the United Arab Emirates and hacking into various computer networks in the United States. A formal security guarantee to such actors would serve to cement the existing illegalities already embedded in U.S. Middle East policy and the unlawful activities of our so-called partners within the United States. Despite these legal issues, many experts have argued that the policies Biden is pursuing are ultimately rooted in “pragmatism” and “realism” designed to advance U.S. national interests. However, after closer inspection, doubling down on Washington’s existing approach to the region is strategically counterproductive. From a strategic perspective, the move risks cementing Washington’s commitment to the primary underlying structural problem in the Middle East—the authoritarian status quo—while yielding virtually zero benefits for the United States, particularly as it pertains to high oil prices. Autocracies are inherently unstable due to the illegitimate nature of their rule, and there is a great deal of academic literature demonstrating that authoritarian states build less reliable and durable alliances. Rules, treaties, and laws do not mean much when the authority of rulers is absolute. Concerned solely with regime preservation and power projection (often used as a mechanism to buttress the former), the authoritarian governments in the Middle East are responsible for the region’s political, economic, and social underdevelopment due to the fact that they manipulate resources and institutions to further the interests of a narrow elite. Staunch support from the United States is what enables these governments to act with impunity both at home and abroad. Such a security guarantee would only serve to formalize the United States’ commitment to the actors and structures that create widespread grievances and unrest. The move would likely embolden Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and other regional autocrats, demonstrating that bad behavior contrary to the interests and principles of the United States is actually rewarded by Washington, paving the way for other regional actors to pressure the United States into providing more formal commitments to the region.

## DA---Entanglement

### Security Guarantee----Generic Links

#### Security guarantee affirmatives cave to reverse leverage sentiments and overstretches the US

Hoffman and Whitson, 3-28-23

(Jon Hoffman is the research director at Democracy for the Arab World Now, Sarah Leah Whitson is the executive director of Democracy for the Arab World Now, “Breaking Away From Secret Concessions in the Middle East”, <https://prospect.org/world/2023-03-28-secret-concessions-middle-east/>)

Reverse Leverage The parallel news of a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered with Chinese assistance, was designed in part to project an image that Beijing is filling a U.S. “void” in the Middle East. This is despite the fact that regional-led efforts to bring together the two countries, primarily by Iraq and Oman, had been ongoing since 2021. Beijing was able to capitalize on this relatively low-hanging fruit. For Saudi Arabia, the sealing of such an agreement under the veneer of Chinese diplomacy allows Riyadh to further pressure the United States into believing that it is losing regional influence. Saudi officials have themselves admitted this: According to The Wall Street Journal, “in private, Saudi officials said, the crown prince has said he expects that by playing major powers against each other, Saudi Arabia can eventually pressure Washington to concede to its demands for better access to U.S. weapons and nuclear technology.” As the United States is increasingly drawn to other regional theaters, U.S. partners in the Middle East have sought to manipulate Washington’s anxiety about losing its position relative to Russia or China through a form of “reverse leverage,” designed to keep America deeply engaged in the region as the guarantor of the prevailing status quo. Such maneuvering has accelerated dramatically following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE clashing repeatedly with Washington over oil prices, sanctions on Moscow, U.N. resolutions condemning the invasion, and more. Over the past year, they have increasingly pushed for a formal, bilateral U.S. security guarantee under the auspices of repairing such relations. Many in Washington have begun to embrace this narrative and push for greater U.S. regional commitments, lest these ostensible “partners” continue to turn to Moscow or Beijing. As the United States increasingly perceives its interests in the Middle East through the lens of great-power politics and the Abraham Accords framework, so too have regional states sought to exploit such frameworks to advance their own interests. The foundation for increased U.S. security commitments may already be in motion. In June 2022, former Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz confirmed that Israel is building a U.S.-sponsored regional air defense network called the Middle East Air Defense Alliance (MEAD). Not much is known about MEAD, but news of the “alliance” comes after reports of high-level cooperation between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, and there have been efforts to bring in Saudi Arabia as well. Recently, officials from the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Morocco, and Bahrain convened in Manama, Bahrain, to push forward with the establishment of the Negev Forum, designed to further integrate security cooperation in the region. In January 2023, the Negev Forum was convened again, with the second annual Negev Summit set to be held this spring. Israeli officials told Axios that this is “the beginning of a regional alliance” designed to build off of the foundation established by the Abraham Accords. While it is unlikely Moscow or Beijing possess the ability or desire to project force in the Middle East, even if Russia or China expanded their regional footprint in the wake of a drawdown by the United States, this would not be detrimental to U.S. strategic interests. As the world enters into a new period of multipolarity, core U.S. interests have shifted away from the Middle East. The only way the Middle East poses a threat to core U.S. interests is if Washington continues to double down on failed policies that have effectively substituted the interests of regional autocrats for our own. Additionally, though some may point to the loss of regional arms sales as a negative ramification, when compared to the costs of maintaining U.S. primacy in the Middle East—estimated to be around $65–$70 billion annually, not to mention the trillions of dollars spent on U.S. wars—such “profits” are dwarfed in comparison. Not to mention the fact that this money only serves to enrich arms manufacturers. The expanded presence of Russia and China in the Middle East should not trigger knee-jerk panic about lost U.S. primacy, but be seen as an opportunity to do what successive administrations have promised is a priority: withdraw from our military entanglements in the region. A better strategy would consider replacing our military influence with broader economic, education, and cultural investments, while reducing our reliance on fossil fuel to thwart politically motivated squeezes on supply.

#### There could be good debates on whether or not US engagement is effective at all – here is a neg card

Saab 16 [Saab, Bilal Y, Senior Fellow and Director, Middle East Peace and Security Initiative; Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, 09/2016. "Exploring US Engagement in the Middle East: A Crisis Simulation." This card was taken by the preface, *Atlantic Council*, Accessed: 4/26/2023. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03470>]

Would a more engaged US policy in Libya or Syria, for example, have made things better or worse for regional security and US strategic interests? Any serious and comprehensive evaluation of US engagement in the Middle East will run into methodological and analytical hurdles. **However, one thing is clear**: Regardless how one defines and measures engagement, US engagement is not the deciding factor when it comes to stability in that complex part of the world. Somewhere between the extremes of over-involvement and inaction lies the United States’ future role in the Middle East. How the United States will achieve that happy medium without alienating friends and waging costly wars against foes will be an enormous undertaking for the next administration.

## DA---Alliances

### Security Guarantee Link

#### Expansion of security guarantees to the Middle East stokes abandonment fears in allies around the world

Saunders and Fearey, 14

(Emily Cura Saunders is a PhD candidate in political science at Claremont Graduate University's School of Politics and Economics, Bryan L. Fearey is Director of the National Security Office, 4/28, “The Least Bad Option? Extending the Nuclear Umbrella to the Middle East”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2014.897117>)

P-5 Considerations The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, specifically China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States, also known as the Permanent Five or P-5 countries, will all also have specific concerns regarding the potential of U.S. offers of extended deterrence into the Middle East. We examine each in turn. Both the United Kingdom and France are part of the NATO construct originally designed to counter Soviet threats during the Cold War. As discussed earlier, the 2012 NATO Defense Deterrence Posture Review reaffirmed its commitment to remaining nuclear alliance. As such, The UK would likely be amenable to the possibility of U.S. offers of extended deterrence in the Middle East. While France is within the NATO alliance and a close U.S. ally, it might well have a different view. France has a long history of close alliances with certain Middle East countries (e.g., Algeria), and has shown increased interest, such as the recent agreement with the UAE to place a French military base there. It seems to have more involvement in the region than some of the other NATO states. Nevertheless, through close consultations with France, the extension of security guarantees into the Middle East would likely be seen positively. Russia and China are, however, likely to be very displeased with such an extension. They have continually blocked sanctions and resolutions toward Iran. The fact remains that China is Iran's biggest trading partner, so the U.S. interfering in the regional affairs is likely to be seen as unfavorable to China's economic ambitions and energy needs. Russia, however, is no stranger to U.S. nuclear guarantees, as NATO was ostensibly founded to counter the Soviet nuclear threat. While Russia may object to the extension, it may be more likely to understand it. That being said, for the U.S. to extend a nuclear guarantee, it would not need the blessing of the P-5, although it should consider the reactions of Russia and China. Another thing that would need to be taken into account when considering nuclear security arrangements with Middle Eastern states is the concerns of those already under the U.S. nuclear guarantee. France and the UK, along with the rest of NATO and America's Asian allies, would need to feel that they were not being passed over or ignored with regard to U.S. security guarantees with each of them. Further, the U.S. would also need to clarify that such commitments would not mean that NATO would be expected to be engaged in a conflict in the event of an attack on a Middle Eastern state covered by the U.S. umbrella. The U.S. would also be tasked with assuring both their NATO and Northeast Asian allies that the U.S. extended deterrence commitments and capabilities remain sufficient to meet their security concerns.

## DA---Politics

### Security Guarantee---Floor Time Link

#### Floor time link for politics

Saunders and Fearey, 14

(Emily Cura Saunders is a PhD candidate in political science at Claremont Graduate University's School of Politics and Economics, Bryan L. Fearey is Director of the National Security Office, 4/28, “The Least Bad Option? Extending the Nuclear Umbrella to the Middle East”, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2014.897117>)

Domestic Issues Lastly, it should be noted that there is a domestic political dimension within the U.S. government when considering whether or not to extend the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Not only would there be international concerns as discussed earlier, there would also be numerous U.S. domestic issues. Congress has been critical in providing previous extended deterrence agreements and could need to be engaged early to ensure positive outcomes. Should the U.S. need to formalize such agreements, the U.S. Senate would have to ratify these agreements and could be central to assuring the credibility of the U.S. commitments. As noted earlier, informal discussions could be a place to start broaching the topic of extended deterrence in the Middle East, but these informal commitments would likely be seen as a step toward more formalized agreements. The question remains of whether this would be politically tenable.

## DA---Diplomatic Capital

### Generic Links

#### Generic capital link

Pollack, 16

(Kenneth, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, “Fight or Flight: America’s Choice in the Middle East”, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43948180>)

Moreover, it is unlikely to abate anytime soon. No matter how many times Americans insist that the people of the Middle East will come to their senses and resolve their differences if left to their own devices, they never do. Absent external involvement, the region's lead- ers consistently opt for strategies that exacerbate conflict and feed perpetual instability. Civil wars are particularly stubborn problems, and without decisive outside intervention, they usually last decades. The Congolese civil war is entering its 22nd year, the Peruvian its 36th, and the Afghan its 37th. There is no reason to expect the Middle East's conflicts to burn out on their own either. As a consequence, the next U.S. president is going to face a choice in the Middle East: do much more to stabilize it, or disengage from it much more. But given how tempestuous the region has become, both options - stepping up and stepping back - will cost the United States far more than is typically imagined. Stabilizing the region would almost certainly require more resources, energy, attention, and political capital than most advocates of a forward-leaning U.S. posture recognize. Similarly, giving up more control and abandoning more commitments in the region would require accepting much greater risks than most in this camp acknowledge. The costs of stepping up are more manageable than the risks of stepping back, but either option would be better than muddling through.

#### Resources are finite and trade off

Wasser et al., 22

(Becca Wasser, Senior Fellow for the Defense Program at CNAS, Howard Shatz, Senior Economist; Professor of Policy Analysis, John Drennan, senior program officer in USIP's Center for Russia and Europe, Andrew Scobell, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Brian Carlson, head of the Global Security Team of the Think Tank at the Center for Security Studies, Yvonne Crane, Communications Analyst, “Crossroads of Competition: China, Russia, and the United States in the Middle East”, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA325-1.html>)

The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) both feature the concept of strategic competition, defined as a new era of interstate rivalry characterized by “growing political, economic, and military competitions.”1 These iterations of the NSS and NDS prioritize long-term strategic competition with great powers over longstanding threats (notably terrorism), a switch from previous strategic guidance.2 The strategies cite China and Russia as the biggest threats to the United States because of their desires to export their authoritarian models and erode the U.S.-led international order to gain economic, political, and military influence over other countries.3 In many respects, the NSS and NDS herald the return of great-power competition (a peacetime competition between strong states) and of a multipolar environment for the first time since the Cold War—a paradigm shift from the low-intensity conflicts against nonstate actors that the United States had been fighting since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Emerging from those documents are new efforts to define what strategic competition actually entails and how the United States can best compete with China and Russia.4 Although strategic competition is theoretically global in nature, the majority of recent U.S. efforts have concentrated on Asia and Europe.5 The logic in that approach is that strategic competition is likely to play out in the backyards of both China and Russia, given their greater interests in these regions and concerns over U.S. involvement in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The concentration on these two regions also reflects another common theme of the NDS and NSS: that the United States has finite resources and therefore must prioritize its activities. However, in much the same way that the Cold War was fought in peripheral states outside the United States’ and Soviet Union’s respective spheres of influence, the periphery—such geographic locations as the Middle East—could once again play an essential role in this new stage of competition.6

## DA---Russia

### General

#### There is good neg ground on the viability of single country approaches compared to a broad regional strategy. This card shows how negative teams could read arguments about how the aff detracts from a coherent regional strategy that counters Russia’s growing influence in the region.

Bick 20 [Bick, Alexander, former Associate Director and Research Scholar at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS; he served as Syria director at the National Security Council; he also served at the State Department, 2020. "A New Cold War in the Middle East?" Book Title: Re-engaging the Middle East: A New Vision for U.S. Policy; *Brookings Institute*, Accessed: 4/27/2023. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7864/j.ctvbkk588.13.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A80ffdffa5fca810a6d3a2e6db8ac545d&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1>]

In Syria—as in Libya, Iraq, and Turkey—**the Obama administration’s policy vis-à-vis Russia in the Middle East** largely was determined by country-specific considerations and objectives **rather than a coherent regional strategy** designed **to address increased Russian activity** and influence as a distinct challenge in its own right. Obama’s October 2, 2015, statement that Syria was “not some superpower chessboard contest” reveals the extent to which the administration underestimated Putin’s ability to play a bad hand and failed to anticipate the ways that Russia would leverage its military intervention in Syria to advance its larger geopolitical objectives.

Although the Trump administration has placed great power competition at the center of its national security policy, at least on paper, the administration’s single-minded focus on Iran appears to have delayed the development of a strategy for Russia (or China) in the Middle East.22 The administration argues that “maximum pressure” on Iran has weakened Russia’s key regional partner, but it also appears to have pushed Moscow and Tehran closer together, while undermining trust between the United States and its European allies. More broadly, the breakdown of U.S. diplomacy with Iran has enabled Russia to credibly claim it is the only actor who talks to everyone in the Middle East—an important factor in its diplomatic resurgence.

A new U.S. approach must be based on a clear understanding of Russia’s regional objectives and their implications for the United States. **Russia’s objectives include**:

O restoring Russia’s regional and international prestige;

O reducing Russia’s and its neighbors’ exposure to Islamist terrorism;

O preserving regional stability;

O maintaining a Russian military presence;

O increasing trade and investment; and

O coordinating energy policy.23

This is a less ambitious agenda than during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union sought to create a unified regional bloc hostile to the United States. But in practice, the first objective—**restoring Russia’s regional and international prestige**—has meant working to undermine U.S. leadership, including by engaging or supporting U.S. adversaries, creating fissures in U.S. alliances, spreading disinformation, and blocking U.S. initiatives in the region and in the UN Security Council.

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## DA---China

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## Area Neg---Iraq

### DA---Entanglement/Pivot

#### Iraq security guarantee bad for a bunch of reasons

Larison, 14

(Daniel Larison is a former senior editor at TAC and holds a PhD in History from the University of Chicago, 11/20, “The Terrible Idea of an Alliance with Iraq”, <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-terrible-idea-of-an-alliance-with-iraq/>)

It will come as no surprise that Michael O’Hanlon has come up with another terrible idea: At this crucial juncture in the Middle East, the United States should propose to Baghdad the creation of a formal, treaty-based alliance. It could be modeled after America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia, and include a clause like that of Article V in the NATO and U.S.-Japan charters that commits the two countries to the defense of each other [bold mine-DL]. What O’Hanlon means is that the U.S. should be obligated to guarantee the security of yet another country that couldn’t possibly do anything to make America more secure. O’Hanlon wants the U.S. to have another useless “ally” that depends entirely on the U.S. for protection. The U.S. would be poorly-served by taking on a semi-authoritarian, sectarian would-be client as a permanent ally. This proposal would extend a security guarantee to a state that cannot even control its own territory, and would burden the U.S. with a new major security commitment that it doesn’t need. A formal alliance with Iraq wouldn’t make the U.S. or the region more secure, but would in all likelihood compel the U.S. to fight against the Iraqi government’s enemies in perpetuity. This would lock in the current bad policy of propping up the Iraqi government, and it would serve as a permanent distraction from the alliances in Europe and East Asia that actually matter. A formal alliance with Iraq would add nothing to U.S. security or the security of other treaty allies, but would ensure that the U.S. will be entangled in Iraqi affairs for decades to come with no chance of extrication. According to O’Hanlon’s plan, it would also mean the more or less permanent presence of U.S. forces in the country. Once the U.S. extends formal security guarantees through mutual defense agreements, it doesn’t normally take them back later on. Taking Iraq on as an ally would be a serious blunder, and one that the U.S. wouldn’t be able to undo easily. It’s an extraordinarily bad and irresponsible idea, and one that we can only hope will be rejected out of hand.

## Area Neg---Iran

### DA---Prolif

#### Trying to coerce the Iranian government into giving up its nuclear program backfires and causes them to proliferate

Larison, 3-31-23

(Daniel Larison is a regular columnist at Responsible Statecraft, contributing editor at Antiwar.com, and a former senior editor at The American Conservative magazine, “Centrist DC think tank: US should threaten war, regime change in Iran”, <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/03/31/centrist-dc-think-tank-us-should-threaten-war-regime-change-in-iran/>)

We also need to pay attention to how the Iranian government has responded to other coercive measures and threats before now. Before the U.S. reneged on the nuclear deal and began its “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign, Iran was in full compliance with the nuclear deal and remained in compliance for a full year after the U.S. quit. Then, in response to sustained economic warfare and Israeli assassination and sabotage attacks, the Iranian government significantly expanded its nuclear program. Economic pressure and physical attacks on Iranian facilities have succeeded only in driving Iran to escalate in response. Why would direct threats against Iran’s top leadership lead to different results? The Iranian leadership would have no guarantee that the U.S. wouldn’t turn around and attack them after they complied. The demand to make concessions under threat of attack would be taken as an insult. Depending on what is meant by abandoning “the nuclear program,” the demand itself is probably so far-reaching that it is a non-starter for their government. The Iranian government has invested too much time, effort, and prestige in its nuclear program to give it up entirely. Threatening weaker states with attack is a despicable practice, and it is also one that usually inspires angry resistance rather than submission. The report admits at the very end that military action against Iran “risks an Iranian military response and an escalation into war,” but even this minimizes the danger. It is obvious that taking military action for the express purpose of removing the existing leadership from power is already a war. It guarantees that Iranian forces and proxies will fight back. This would not only fail to resolve the nuclear issue in a satisfactory way, but it would plunge the U.S. and the wider region into a new and completely unnecessary conflagration of our making. The CNAS report has nothing to say about international law, but it needs to be emphasized that launching a military attack on Iranian territory, whether it is aimed at nuclear facilities or at a wider range of targets, is nothing less than criminal aggression. The U.S. has no legal right to use force against Iran, and if our government did as this report recommended it would be flagrantly violating the U.N. Charter. After all, Article 2(4) of the Charter says, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” It is not only the use of force that violates the Charter, but the threat to use it as well. Using force against Iran in an attempt to compel it to give up some or all of its nuclear program would be the illegal act of a rogue state. What makes all this talk of war and regime change in Iran even more maddening is that it is absolutely not necessary for the security of the United States or any other state. Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program, and according to our government, it has not had one for the last 20 years. It would be better if Iran’s nuclear program were under the tighter limits of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but even if it is not, Iran is still a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran is not currently seeking to build nuclear weapons. Despite the reckless and provocative actions of the U.S. and Israel that have given the Iranian government additional incentives to pursue weaponization, Iran has not yet crossed that line. Judging from the past 20 years, the Iranian government doesn’t seem to want to cross that line unless it is given no other choice. If the U.S. started to threaten them directly with regime change, Iran’s leadership might decide that it is their only remaining option. Regime change is a morally and strategically bankrupt idea, and it is a disgrace for the U.S. that it is bandied about Washington as if it were a serious policy option. If Americans want to have a saner and more peaceful foreign policy, one of the first things that needs to happen is to banish regime change from the policy discussion once and for all.

### K---Fem IR

#### Policy analysis over US engagement with Iran is rooted in patriarchal masculinity—the 1AC reduces failed “constructive engagement” with Iran to weakness and femininity and locks in militarized violence.

Emond 18 (Rachel Emond, Rachel Emond is a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. She works on issues related to nuclear policy with a special emphasis on the history and future of women in the field. As her first major introduction to nuclear policy, Rachel completed an undergraduate thesis, titled “American Foreign Policy has a Masculinity Problem,” on the gendered discourse surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, “American foreign policy has a masculinity problem: a discourse analysis of the Iran deal,” University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, August 2018, pg. 40)///PSC

The emphasis placed upon dependence on military action is perhaps the most obviously feminine rhetoric available within the larger theme of dependence in general. General Martin E. Dempsey, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the implementation of the Iran Deal, said that the agreement [was] “better than launching a military strike, but I will sustain the military options in case it becomes necessary.” President Obama attempted to mollify concerns about the deal by assuring that Israel would always have military superiority over their neighbors. Senator Marco Rubio called for the United States to instead gain a stable military position in the Middle East “to signal readiness and restore a credible military option.” The King of Saudi Arabia was unhappy with the United State’s approach to Iran, and negotiated a $1 billion arms agreement with the Pentagon to provide weapons for the Saudi Arabian war effort and bolster Saudi forces in order to reassure those with concerns about the shortcomings of the Iran Deal. Saudi Arabia was noted as becoming “increasingly assertive,” signifying that states who choose to use weapons are assertive, while those who choose not to use weapons are the opposite: passive, meek, compliant. The previous discussion of hegemonic masculinity, idealized masculinity, and military masculinity all being relatively synonymous make the relationship between the rhetoric of dependence on the military and lack of masculinity quite palpable. The assertion that the Iran Deal would not be sufficient on its own accord from both the support and the dissent implies that the deal is feminine in nature, and is a strong indication that this form of foreign policy is not seen as entirely legitimate because of that implication. “Weakness is always considered a danger when issues of national security are at stake,” states Tickner (1992, emphasis my own). The frequent portrayal of the Iran Deal as dependent in any form did more than just link the deal to ideas of weakness because it was also consistently paired with phrases that codified the deal as dangerous. This is significant because it further allowed the option of using military force to seem like the safe alternative, even though the use of military troops puts the livelihood of American soldiers in direct risk. Classifying the Iran Deal as a dangerous, unstable, or volatile policy solution that could only be made credible through the use of a hard power solution created a dichotomy in which the feminized Iran Deal existed in direct opposition to the masculinized military. This hierarchy inherently places hard power solutions above soft power solutions, and therefore allowed the Iran Deal to be depicted as a less legitimate response than the use of military force.

## Area Neg---Afghanistan

### DA---Corruption

#### Foreign aid to Afghanistan crushes their economy and greenlights corruption

Samim, 16

(Mohammad Samim worked for the Afghan government for six years, 5/19, “Afghanistan’s Addiction to Foreign Aid”, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/afghanistans-addiction-to-foreign-aid/>)

The international community, led by the United States, has appropriated more than $100 billion in aid in the last decade to reconstruct Afghanistan and rebuild its unbalanced economy. While there have been some improvements in GDP growth, life expectancy, poverty reduction, child and maternal health, education, and infrastructure, these improvements are relatively modest in relation to the amount of dollars poured into the country as aid. Moreover, this rate of improvement is too slow for Afghanistan to catch up with the rest of the developing world. Fifteen years have passed and things don’t seem to have improved much. Afghanistan still ranks third in the world in corruption according to Transparency International, which contributes to its extreme poverty. Although education is more widely available, the quality does not meet world standards. The teaching profession is not attractive because of the low pay. Despite improvements in the health sector, health indicators still remain below the average for low income countries. Agriculture—the second largest contributor to GDP growth after services—declined by a projected 2 percent in 2015. Conflicts and a lack of economic opportunities have caused people to flee the country, leading to both capital flight and brain drain. As China, India, and other developing countries are advancing at a rapid rate, Afghanistan, despite the world’s military and financial investment, is being left behind. Perhaps, for Afghanistan, as a post conflict country, the aid is “too little too soon.” With the government institutions fragile and incapable of handling foreign aid, and with the weak technical capacity, the country is not as yet ready to absorb and spend aid money wisely. Aid to Afghanistan could have been more useful had it been phased over a decade rather than dumped in a rush, and had it followed the intended pattern of aid leading to investment, investment leading to growth and growth leading to poverty reduction, as was the case with Marshall Plan of the U.S. giving aid money to the Western Europe after World War II. In Afghanistan, unlike the Marshall Plan, foreign money is mainly converted into expenses and no significant amount is invested in the economy, leaving a negative impact on country. Among the many side effects of aid is the “Dutch Disease” effect: flooding U.S. dollars in billions into Afghanistan, a small open economy, adversely affects the country’s economy in terms of inflation and exports. Foreign currency inflows appreciate Afghan currency, making domestic goods less price competitive on the export market, and preventing exporters from competing. It also kills off domestic demand for Afghan goods, as the goods become more expensive. This causes businesses to close and people to lose their jobs, resulting in increasing poverty. With more poverty, Afghanistan gets more aid money, ending up in a vicious cycle. Furthermore, diverting dollars into the construction sector also draws labor from other productive sectors, such as agriculture, leaving those sectors lagging behind. Most farmers left their farms and moved to cities to work for construction companies as gatekeepers or cooks and thus contributed to the country’s dependency on neighbors for food staples. Much of the corruption in Afghanistan also stems from an inflow of aid money, giving the country one of the worst reputations in the world—British Prime Minister David Cameron recently called the country “fantastically corrupt.” Aid is flowing in without question and mostly goes into the pockets of corrupt officials in a system that lacks accountability. As Peter Bauer, the famed development economist, has rightly said, foreign aid is “an excellent method for transferring money from poor people in rich countries to rich people in poor countries.” Corruption is especially prevalent in construction and logistics, where most of the aid money is diverted. This doesn’t mean that other sectors are safe; corruption in procurement contracts in the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Education’s “ghost schools” are also striking. Beyond fostering corruption, free money coming into the country in the form of aid kills entrepreneurship. According to World Bank, Afghanistan ranks 177th in terms of regulation quality and efficiency for investment, with no improvements during the past year. The number of new firm registrations in 2015 remains well below that of 2012-13. This shows the difficulties in launching new businesses in Afghanistan. The fact that the country has made no improvements over the past 15 years shows that the government is not interested in creating jobs—or creating systems for entrepreneurships. The reason is that government officials do not rely on taxes to stay in office—they rely on aid. Taxation can help put pressure on government and only then will people be able to hold officials accountable for the loss of their taxes. Foreign aid also causes the Afghan government to underperform. Even in the best case scenario, when there is no corruption, aid money is spent in providing public goods including healthcare, infrastructure, security, and education. Afghans elect their leaders in a democratic process to provide public goods for them; there is no point in elections if these goods are provided by foreign money. Furthermore, mismanaged aid, hinders democracy in Afghanistan. Because they are so dependent on foreign aid, politicians in Afghanistan spend much of their time courting and catering to international donors, rather than to their constituents. Donors, not citizens, determine the future direction of the country, as the conditionality of aid gives donors the control over the use and direction of their funds. Afghanistan’s aid dependency is having negative consequences not only economically, but politically too. Most of the aid money is only flowing into the country at the state level, where it is converted to expenses rather than savings. There is no burgeoning private sector where people can accumulate wealth or simply find jobs. As a result, there are constantly factions, most of them from the previous administration, trying to overthrow the government so that they can sit in power and capture the wealth which is coming into Afghanistan in the form of aid. This contributes to political uncertainty and finally to insecurity which, in turn, undermines private sector confidence and adversely affects economic activities in the country. No single country in history has achieved long term economic growth by aid, yet Kabul still insists on asking for more aid money. China, for example, pulled more than 680 million people out of poverty in from 1981 to 2010, without asking for foreign aid. Although there is scientific debate in economic literature on whether aid does more harm than good to poor countries, in the case of Afghanistan it is clear that aid won’t help in achieving long-term sustainable economic development. There is very little work done with foreign aid money for the poor; the main beneficiaries are development workers and top-ranking government officials roaming the city capitals with their armored SUVs. There’s little tangible impact of their work on the ground.

### DA---Conditions

#### Conditioning aid to Afghanistan locks in inequality

Mishra, 21

(Saaransh Mishra was a Research Assistant with the ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme, 6/13, “Why conditional aid to Afghanistan is counterproductive”, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/why-conditional-aid-to-afghanistan-is-counterproductive/)

As the US troops begin withdrawal from Afghanistan, there remain various vulnerable groups that face an immediate threat from the Taliban. Firstly, women and young girls, because the Taliban’s ideology towards women remains regressive, orthodox, and downright extremist. This apprehension has been adequately validated recently with the Taliban having targetted women in the media, female judges, and even schoolgirls. Secondly, the human rights of various ethnic groups such as the Shia Hazaras, Ismaili Shias, Hindus and Sikhs remain in question and need to be protected. These communities have been historically persecuted and dominated by the Sunni majorities and according to the 2020 International Religious Freedom Report, terrorist groups in Afghanistan continue to target specific religious and ethno-religious minorities. Recent attacks in March 2021 by Islamic militants claimed the lives of seven factory workers from the Hazara community. In March 2020, a major attack occurred when an Islamic militant stormed a Sikh religious complex in Kabul leaving 25 worshippers dead and eight wounded, prompting a US Congress resolution supporting refugee protection for Sikhs and Hindus in Afghanistan from systematic religious persecution. Recognising the urgency to protect vulnerable groups in Afghanistan, Senators Dianne Feinstein and Senator Joni Ernst have introduced a bipartisan “Protect Women’s and Girls’ Rights in Afghanistan Act” on 14 May 2021. The legislation promulgates that economic aid will not be provided to the Afghan government if minimum standards of treatment for women and girls are not met, mandating a bi-yearly assessment of how women and girls are treated, and monitoring the Taliban’s actions to secure the rights of women and girls. Apart from the US drafting legislation to protect human rights, international allies of Afghanistan have been working to collaborate in their efforts to protect human rights. At an international donor conference in November 2020, representatives from 70 countries, including Germany, (US $510 million), Norway (US $72 million), the United Kingdom (US $227 million), and a number of humanitarian organisations pledged conditional aid of US $12 billion over the next four years, emphasising the importance that Western nations have placed on the protection of human rights. The Afghan economy’s overwhelming dependence on aid has made this approach an easy method for donor countries to do more for human rights in Afghanistan. However, such conditional aid could prove to be more dangerous by exacerbating poverty and worsening the deteriorating security situation. and make no impact on the current and future government (should it be a power-sharing government with the Taliban) to continuously strive to uphold human rights. The Afghan economy’s overwhelming dependence on aid has made this approach an easy method for donor countries to do more for human rights in Afghanistan. However, such conditional aid could prove to be more dangerous by exacerbating poverty and worsening the deteriorating security situation and make no impact on the current and future government (should it be a power-sharing government with the Taliban) to continuously strive to uphold human rights Growing global concern The Taliban’s actions are concerning to the international community, that is growing increasingly anxious regarding the future of human rights in the war-torn country. Despite the militant group’s promise to reduce violence following the February 2020 US-Taliban agreement in Doha, more than 3,000 civilians were killed and 5,800 others were injured in Afghanistan in 2020. A string of attacks have continued in 2021 too, the latest of them being on June 2 when bombings on two transport buses killed 12 and wounded 10 in Kabul, with at least 90 casualties in the first five days of June itself. A report by the UN monitoring team recently concluded that the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda remain closely aligned and show no indication of breaking ties, which is contradictory to the promises the group made under the Doha agreement. The Taliban delegation also refused to show up for the Istanbul talks amid escalating violence, highlighting its disregard for a peaceful political settlement. The US and other NATO powers are understandably eager to utilise their economic leverage to ensure a stable future, devoid of excesses in human rights violations. However, the billions of dollars sent to restructure the devastated economy since the fall of the Taliban regime has meant that the Afghan economy is heavily characterised by civil aid dependence to sustain its most basic services. Notably, the country’s US $11 billion public expenditure each year is much higher than its modest revenues, which even after significant improvements recently, barely reach even US $2.5 billion. The difference of about 75 percent of the expenses is funded by international grants. When aid has been cut off in the past, it has been detrimental to the lives of Afghans. In 2013/14, when the US reduced civil aid, there was a three percent increase in the overall poverty rate, the unemployment rate for Afghan men tripled and 76 percent of the rural jobs that were created in 2007/2008 were lost. The number of people living below poverty line grew from 38.3 percent in 2012 to 55 percent in 2017, an increase of five million. This increase in poverty coincided with the gradual reduction in aid flows from around 100 percent of the GDP in 2009 to less than 42.9 of the GDP in 2020, which led to the contraction of the service sector, leading to an associated deterioration in employment and income. The service sector is crucial in Afghanistan because an annual growth averaging a robust 9.4 percent between 2003 and 2012 was mainly driven by a booming, aid-driven service sector. Despite other factors such as growing insurgency and political instability contributing to this slump, since the flow of aid started reducing, the Afghan economy grew only by a meagre 2.5 percent per annum between 2015-2020. Therefore, civilian aid is evidently instrumental to the normal functioning of Afghan lives and must continue unhindered after American withdrawal. The service sector is crucial in Afghanistan because an annual growth averaging a robust 9.4 percent between 2003 and 2012 was mainly driven by a booming, aid-driven service sector. Despite other factors such as growing insurgency and political instability contributing to this slump, since the flow of aid started reducing, the Afghan economy grew only by a meagre 2.5 percent per annum between 2015-2020 Afghanistan is also substantially reliant on military aid for its security forces that are embroiled in an intensifying war with the Taliban. Compared to the low-income country average of around three percent of GDP, security expenditure in Afghanistan stood at around 28 percent of the GDP in 2019 and most of this expenditure comes from foreign assistance, especially from the US. The US Congress appropriated at least US $86.4 billion for Afghan security assistance between fiscal years 2002 and 2019. Additionally, around 57 percent of total US assistance has gone to the Afghan Security Forces Fund and the US military spends about US $36 billion annually (roughly US $100 million a day) in Afghanistan. The Afghan forces could also lose out on the single-most important military advantage of airpower when private contractors and the US troops leave. The security forces majorly rely on US-funded contractors to repair and maintain their dozens of fighter planes, cargo aircrafts, helicopters, etc. Over 18,000 contractors are due to depart soon along with a majority of the US military contingent. Thus, reduction in aid would be extremely detrimental to the already fragile security situation in Afghanistan because without on-ground US troops, an aid-dependent Afghan force with reduced capabilities, would be the only line of defence against the Taliban’s incessantly violent tactics. A financially sound Taliban The NATO has warned that the Taliban “has achieved or is close to achieving, financial and military independence”. In the fiscal year ending in March 2020, the Taliban brought in US $1.6 billion, according to Mullah Yaqoob, the son of the late Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The Taliban has a plethora of financial inlets, the most prominent of them being the opium trade, amounting to approximately US $416 million yearly. Mining of rare-earth minerals such as iron ore, marble, copper, gold, zinc, etc. lucratively earns the Taliban approximately US $400 million to US $464 million a year. The Taliban earns approximately US $160 million annually by extortions and taxing territories under its control. They also make around US $200 million from covert financial donations from charities and private trusts located in Persian Gulf countries, US $240 million net income from import and export of consumer goods, US $80 million per annum from real estate in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and lastly, the governments of Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are all believed to bankroll the Taliban, with these funds amounting to about US $500 million. While this financial independence could make the Taliban impervious to any international economic pressure, a lot of their assets and leaders are tied up under economic sanctions. However, Taliban has requested the cancellation of United Nations sanctions in exchange for the US asking for a three to six-month extension for troop withdrawal, which could not take place before the pre-set deadline of 1 May 2021. Considering that these pre-existing economic sanctions have failed to deter the Taliban from violating human rights, it is unlikely that any kind of economic pressure by withholding US or NATO aid would make an impact. In fact, if the US obliges to the request, it would loosen the Taliban’s purse strings further and they would continue with violence. Resultantly, lives will continue to be at stake, necessitating the flow of international aid for the Afghan security forces to safeguard human rights. Taliban’s prospects of gaining back power and their continued human rights transgressions warrants international pressure as has been appropriately identified by these Western countries. Yet, the effects of economic cutbacks possibly falling on aid-sustained Afghan lives leading to an inflammation in the pre-existing problems of acute poverty and unemployment, paired with the Taliban’s immunity to financial pressures and its recurrent tendencies to flout agreements, merit questioning of the efficacy of providing conditional aid.

### DA---Terror Funding

#### Foreign aid to Afghanistan gets funneled to the Taliban’s organized crime efforts, undermine sanction regimes, and fund terrorism

O’Donnell, 22

(Lynne O’Donnell is a columnist at Foreign Policy and an Australian journalist and author, 12/30, “The Taliban Are Abusing Western Aid”, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/30/taliban-western-aid-misogyny-women-rights/>)

The Taliban’s shocking treatment of women and girls in Afghanistan has been capturing global headlines since the Islamists regained power and began winding the clock back to the last time they controlled the country. As outrage at the latest abuses reverberates around the world, their extreme misogyny may be masking the misuse of millions of dollars in aid that is meant to ease terrible human suffering. Tens of millions of dollars are flown into Kabul every week by the United States and the United Nations for distribution across the country as humanitarian catastrophe grips tighter with winter closing in. Sources inside and outside the country say much of the money never reaches those who need it. Instead, they say, unknown quantities are stolen by the Taliban and diverted to their own causes, keeping supporters onside with handouts of cash and food and funding the private operations of senior leaders. Some sources in the security and charity sectors say the Taliban use the informal hawala money transfer system to benefit from a global shortage of dollars. The allegations are fueling concerns that the Taliban, who for decades have controlled global heroin production and supply, are still engaged in organized crime. The cash deliveries are deposited in the central bank, which is controlled by the Taliban, and the privately owned Afghanistan International Bank, where U.N. agencies hold accounts. There is no accountability for where any of the money ultimately ends up. After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, conditions for the population of around 40 million, already among the poorest people in the world, got even worse. International sanctions on the finance sector mean people with bank accounts cannot access their savings. A shortage of cash means there’s not enough liquidity for the simplest of transactions, such as buying bread. So the United States and the United Nations, while castigating the Taliban for their brutality toward women and other groups, have provided billions of dollars in an effort to stave off mass starvation. The U.N. launched its biggest single-country appeal in January 2022, for $4.4 billion, and has just put out its hand for $4.6 billion for 2023. A large percentage goes to cover the world body’s own overheads. U.S. bilateral aid to Afghanistan since the collapse of the republic topped $1.1 billion by September. But the lack of accountability for where the money goes has led to concerns inside and outside the country that the group is using U.S. taxpayers’ money to fund its own worldwide criminal activity and to support sanctioned regimes such as those in Russia and Iran—and others that helped them to power—by paying for imports of fuel, food, and power with dollars. International sanctions on the banking system mean that financial transitions must go through the hawala network of money service providers, an informal system often criticized for a lack of transparency of the source and destination of funds that move around the world, often in huge quantities. The previous government introduced regulations, under international pressure, as many hawalas in Afghanistan were allegedly facilitating the movement of money earned from drugs and other illicit activities. With the Taliban in control, there is no way of knowing where the money that moves through the money exchanges comes from or where it is going. The head of the Sarai Shahzada money market in Kabul, Mohammad Mirza Katawazai, said $12 million to $13 million a week passes through the hawalas to pay for imported commodities and fund aid programs nationwide. He said the Taliban are less corrupt than the U.S.-backed republic, under which billions of dollars were stolen by officials and their cronies, according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. As challenges mount, from economic meltdown, poverty, and hunger to an increasingly bold armed opposition, the Taliban have good reason to divert aid to underpin their authority. A former Afghan intelligence and military officer, who spoke on the condition that he not be named, said food and cash distributed under U.N. supervision in some regions is taken back by local Taliban commanders for their own families and supporters. In other areas, the Taliban control the distribution lists, he and an Afghan charity source said. “The Taliban are observing and managing the money, deciding where it must go, to what people, in which parts of the country,” the former officer said. “The people have no choice. The [Taliban] have no support, especially in the Hazara and Tajik environments in Ghor and Badghis provinces and other remote areas. The U.N. people are Afghans. They have no power to object—they face danger, intimidation, and so do their families. And no one checks later.” In other regions, such as southern provinces where the population is predominantly Sunni Pashtun, like the Taliban, aid goes directly to Taliban families and supporters, he said. Many Afghans believe the constant cash infusions are enabling the Taliban as they entrench their power. The group, led by religious fanatics and sanctioned terrorists, has used the presence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan as the basis of cash-for-intel counterterrorism cooperation with the Biden administration. The Islamic State-Khorasan, the local branch of the Islamic State, is a major threat to Taliban autonomy, so they’re seeking to stem defections among grassroots commanders and supporters who are increasingly disillusioned with the practices, and failings, of the country’s new rulers. The theft of aid is largely happening under the radar while abuses the Taliban are well known for garner all the attention. The Taliban began restricting women’s rights as soon as they regained power, contradicting those who said they were no longer the unreconstructed misogynists who ruled from 1996 to 2001. But the so-called “Taliban 2.0” sent women home from work and forced them to wear head-to-toe coverings, and girls were banned from high school. The announcement this month that women are also now locked out of university was no surprise, nor was the edict issued days later ordering local and international NGOs to fire all female staff. Some NGOs, including the Norwegian Refugee Council and Care International, have suspended operations in Afghanistan, saying that without female workers they cannot reach the people who need their help. The U.N. Security Council said it was “deeply alarmed,” and U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres called for the restrictions to be reversed. The Afghan head of a local charity said the limited suspensions were an empty gesture that “would only work if the entire NGO community unanimously decides to do that, which is never going to happen here.” “The order to sack women is purely a political decision and thus requires political pushback. We can’t react to a political decision with humanitarian ways,” he said, speaking anonymously for his own security. It’s time for the international community to “step in and take practical measures—like stop sending in $40 million every week or establish mechanisms that could help them track their money,” he said. With no consequences, there will be no change, said an Afghan political activist who deals with the Taliban leadership. The headline-grabbing abuses are masking the theft of humanitarian funds, expanded production of heroin and other drugs, and ties with terrorists including al Qaeda. “No one is against these rules for women. This is what all Taliban want, including leaders like [Interior Minister Sirajuddin] Haqqani, whom the United States likes to think of as a moderate being swept away by the conservatives,” he said. The United States should follow Canada’s lead, the activist said, and list the Taliban as a terrorist organization, rather than as individuals, with bans on travel, government financial transactions, and participation in international institutions. “Nothing will change until action is taken against them,” he said.

### DA---Legitimacy

#### The US directly engaging in Afghanistan only serves to legitimize the Taliban – causes laundry list of impacts

Tantravahi 22 [Tantravahi, Adityamohan, a Research Specialist in the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at Princeton University, 1/24/2022. "An Exercise in Futility: U.S. Engagement of the Taliban." *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, Accessed: 4/26/2023. <https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/an-exercise-in-futility-us-engagement-of-the-taliban>]

In the wake of the botched U.S. occupation of Afghanistan and the ensuing Taliban takeover, one thing is clear: continuing **direct engagement with the Taliban is a colossal mistake.**

As the United States prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan, it struck a deal with Taliban forces in February 2020. In exchange for a permanent ceasefire, withdrawal, and the release of Taliban prisoners, the Taliban promised Afghanistan would prevent any terrorist organization from using Afghan soil to harm the United States.[1] The Taliban also promised to begin a dialogue with the various factions and government in Afghanistan to achieve a political settlement reflective of the Afghan people's desires.[2] Now, three months after the U.S. withdrawal, the nature of the United States’ relationship with the Taliban is undefined, and its direction remains unclear. The United States can offer the group legitimacy and assistance beyond what is available on humanitarian grounds in exchange for a quasi-inclusive government, or it can go the smarter route: support a coalition to negotiate with the Taliban and shape a government that checks the Taliban's power and forces it to contend with the Afghan people’s wishes.

**The Taliban has already reneged on its end of the withdrawal deal**, showing itself to be a recalcitrant and violent political group that continues to force its ideologies upon those it rules. Despite repeated promises to moderate itself, it has persisted in following its 1990s playbook: suppressing women’s rights, almost immediately banning girls from school, and limiting press freedoms, and torturing journalists covering protests.[3] By directly engaging the Taliban and only securing symbolic concessions, the United States legitimizes the Taliban government—a legitimacy that the Afghan people alone can grant—while making America and its allies less safe.

The stakes are high, not only for Afghans, but also for U.S. security interests. To begin with, **a powerful Taliban contributes to regional instability in South Asia**. Nuclear tensions between India and Pakistan, already high, could further rise if Pakistan continues to use Taliban fighters for ‘strategic depth’ in the contested Kashmir region.[4] **By offering international legitimacy to Taliban through engagement, the U**nited **S**tates also **risks encouraging Pakistan’s strategy of** repeatedly protecting and **sponsoring terror groups and extremists**, as it did with the Taliban.[5]

The United States faces increased risks of an emboldened Taliban re-enabling and protecting terrorist groups based in Afghanistan. In particular, the threat of the return of al-Qaeda is genuine, and **U.S. intel**ligence **reports predict it could rebuild to threatening levels** within the next two years.[6] While the Taliban has repeatedly assured the United States that it will work to stamp out terrorist groups, such promises ignore fundamental cultural realities on the ground. Al-Qaeda fighters, Taliban fighters, and other Islamist groups are connected through three decades of partnership and even intermarriage.[7] Although the Taliban finds itself in open conflict with terrorist groups such as ISIS-K, it is mainly an ideological conflict that doesn’t concern the use of terrorism as a tactic. Broadly indifferent to their method, the Taliban may again choose to harbor terrorists.

### Foreign Assistance Fails

#### There is a good say no debate on foreign assistance

Miller 22 [Miller, Laurel, Director of the Asia Program at the International Crisis Group. From 2013 to 2017, she was deputy and then acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the US State Department, 4/1/2022. "Protecting US Interests in Afghanistan." *Global Politics and Strategy Vol 64(2)*, Accessed: 4/26/2023. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2022.2055820?journalCode=tsur20>]

Lifting the sanctions and asset freezes would make the US less complicit in Afghanistan's economic hardship and mitigate the risk of growing anti-Western sentiment. But it would not solve the problem of the country's lack of economic self-sufficiency. The government and economy have historically been dependent on externally provided resources. Although preventing the state's degeneration into utter dysfunctionality is crucial for Afghans, who need an effective public sector, and would increase regional stability, **it is politically implausible for the US to allocate** large-scale **foreign assistance directly to the Taliban-led government**. The crisis in Europe may have imperilled even funding for the UN's humanitarian appeal for 2022, which should not be subject to political considerations.

There is also the problem of aid conditionality. **Policymakers** in Washington and other capitals who are focused on Afghanistan **appreciate that humanitarian aid alone provides a bandage but cannot staunch an** increasingly **impoverished population's bleeding**.Footnote8 Donor governments have considered the idea of formulating a conditionality framework in restoring some aid beyond basic needs to shore up the public sector and boost economic activity. Donors have not yet determined what they would expect from the Taliban in exchange for broader aid programmes, however, and they are unlikely to be able to establish a mutually satisfactory formula. **The Taliban are highly reluctant to be seen as** wanting or **needing foreign support and** simply **assume Western governments will help the Afghan people to the extent they care about** the population's **welfare**, **so any conditions they might agree to would** likely **be unacceptably minimal to those governments**.

### Circumvention

#### The Afghanistan area would lead for good circumvention debates where there is both solid affirmative and negative evidence. Here is a neg card

Byrd 22 [Byrd, William, senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where he focuses on Afghanistan, 10/24/2022. "Let’s Not Kid Ourselves: Afghanistan’s Taliban Regime Will Not Become More Inclusive." *Lawfare*, Accessed: 4/27/2023. <https://www.lawfareblog.com/lets-not-kid-ourselves-afghanistans-taliban-regime-will-not-become-more-inclusive>]

What explains these apparent departures from authoritarian good practice? There are several, not mutually exclusive, possibilities here: The Taliban are learning the ropes of running an authoritarian state, and perhaps they understandably are making some miscalculations; behind-the-scenes political economy dynamics, not fully apparent from the outside, may be influencing some of their actions; they may not focus on or care about certain issues; or the Taliban may be prisoners of their own ideology and rhetoric, which could outweigh considerations of narrower self-interest for the authoritarian regime and its leadership. (The opium ban, for example, went out of its way to be comprehensive and strongly stated, probably unnecessarily so.)

And the Taliban seem almost congenitally unable to make even minor gestures to the international community that would not compromise the regime’s power, authority, or core ideological principles, **and would not make their regime more inclusive** in any meaningful sense. An example is reaffirming the nominal autonomy of Afghanistan’s central bank (which is enshrined in current Afghan law), appointing non-Taliban technocrats to leadership positions there, and bringing in technical assistance where needed.

More generally, many **authoritarian regimes** that brutally repress their people **maintain decent diplomatic and economic relations** with the outside world—not least by putting forward distorted narratives and making announcements and commitments they don’t plan to adhere to but that superficially assuage international concerns. The Taliban have not succeeded in doing so.

What Can Foreigners Do—If Anything?

Informed by historical experience with other victorious insurgencies and authoritarian regimes, how should the U.S. and other countries approach and try to influence the Taliban? **This is a major challenge, as little that has been tried** over the past 14 months **has worked** in meaningfully influencing Taliban behavior and actions.

Unfortunately, what has not worked and will not work in the future is clearer than what might work. In particular, **preaching international laws and norms, the need to form an inclusive government, and the like**—even when incentivized by the possibility of recognition and implicit or explicit offers of aid—has not made much of a difference and **is unlikely to change the Taliban in the future**.

#### This card could act as both a circumvention card and a link for the legitimacy DA since it says the Taliban are unlikely to engage *but* if they were to do so would only say yes for international recognition

Rubin 22 [Rubin, Barnett, a distinguished fellow at the China Program of the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. From 2000 to 2020 he was a senior fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, where he directed the Afghanistan Pakistan Regional Program, 10/31/2022. "Afghanistan after U.S. Withdrawal: Five Conclusions." *Carnegie*, Accessed: 4/27/2023. <https://www.carnegie.org/our-work/article/afghanistan-after-us-withdrawal-five-conclusions/>]

The Taliban will not respond to more sanctions and boycotts after they have, in their view, defeated the United States after more than 20 years of war.

The Taliban are equally unlikely to respond to engagement that is unaccompanied by a credible, even if conditional, offer of recognition. **They would be more likely to respond** to it **if the offer were made by a coalition led by the U.S., but such** an offer by such a coalition **is now virtually impossible.**

If the sole goal of U.S. foreign policy were to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, the best policy would be to engage with China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, India, and the UN to seek a common platform for engagement with the Taliban on the basis of a road map for recognition. For obvious reasons, it is now completely impossible for the U.S. to engage or cooperate with Russia and Iran, and only slightly less difficult with China and Pakistan. India is already performing a delicate balancing act between the U.S. and Russia on Ukraine and is unlikely to want to complicate it further.

## Area Neg---UAE

### DA---Entanglement

#### Security guarantees to the United Arab Emirates would embolden the UAE to create new conflicts and escalate old ones and entangle the US in them

Armbruster, 22

(Natalie Armbruster is a research associate at Defense Priorities, 6/14, “Biden shouldn't put American lives on the line to defend the United Arab Emirates”, <https://www.businessinsider.com/biden-shouldnt-give-united-arab-emirates-a-us-security-guarantee-2022-6>)

Recently, Brett McGurk, a White House representative, traveled to Abu Dhabi to reportedly discuss a "Strategic Framework Agreement" which would offer the UAE "US security guarantees," among other things. It is clear why the UAE wants such an agreement. After a series of aerial attacks was launched against the UAE by Yemen's Houthi rebel group, an Iranian proxy, the UAE would be eager for the US to do more to defend their small country, embroiled in Yemen's civil war. What remains unclear is what exactly the US is offering the UAE and why it would consider such an agreement in the first place. A security guarantee would entail the US committing to defend the UAE if it were attacked, similar to the agreement the US has made to NATO for its collective defense. Thus, this agreement could require the US to potentially send American servicemen and women to fight and die to defend the UAE. However, the UAE's problems are not for the US to solve. The UAE may be a profitable buyer of US arms but, to make a defense commitment could pull the US into the UAE's trouble. On the other hand, providing the illusion of such backing might embolden the UAE to engage in reckless behavior — the repercussions of which it would believe itself to be protected from. Either way, such an agreement would be harmful to Washington and Abu Dhabi both. For all the US has done, mostly foolishly in the Middle East, it has never extended security guarantees as it does for its NATO allies. And since the Obama Administration, the US has tried, in fits and starts, to disentangle itself from the region's wars. If the US learned anything from its time in the Middle East, it should have been that getting out of wars is exponentially more difficult than getting into them. Getting entangled in the UAE's issues is a dangerous reversal of years of progress. For seven years, the UAE-Saudi coalition's air campaign in Yemen has been brutal — every "defensive" strike disproportionate and escalatory. Yet in recent years the UAE has pulled back its involvement, and in early June, Saudi Arabia has extended its eight-week ceasefire for another two months. While the UAE may frame this security guarantee as a means to deter aggression, these guarantees can also lead to expansion or escalation. Therefore, it is illogical to open the door to further US entrapment if the UAE is still involved in the war in Yemen. Arms buyers are commonly mischaracterized as allies because arms sales are often used to incentivize alignment and reflect continued cooperation. However, while these arms allow the US to support the UAE's defense capabilities and may be meant to tip the scale of comparative regional military capabilities, they are chiefly used to show limited support while avoiding any culpability for how they are used or obligation to defend those we sell arms to. Promising US involvement beyond arms sales, when the US can encourage alignment with arms alone and without a defense commitment, would essentially obligate the United States to act against its self-interest. Further, in August 2021, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Ukrainian Minister of Defence Andrii Taran signed the US-Ukraine Strategic Defense Framework. Despite the reiterations of commitment and reaffirmations of support, the agreement did not provide Ukraine with a US defense commitment. Instead, the agreement was a statement of intention for the two countries to have greater cooperation, increased arms sales, and increased training exercises. The deal with the UAE may be similarly filled with rhetoric yet remain substantively empty. If the reported agreement is not a guarantee and is instead a commitment to more arms sales or deeper cooperation, then the US may avoid entrapment but risk serious moral hazard. This false security could lead to a belligerent Abu Dhabi, willing to take risks, deepen its involvement in Yemen, and potentially refuse to make the necessary concessions to avoid potential conflict — or potentially end its involvement in and prolongment of the war in Yemen. With the façade of a defense commitment, the US is putting the UAE in a more precarious position than it was before and inadvertently making conflict more likely. A potential security commitment with the UAE is a lose-lose situation for the United States. Either the US weaves a web of its own design, needlessly entrapping itself in whatever war comes next, or the UAE potentially puts too much stock in empty words, leaving the country unable to correctly calculate the risks and costs of its actions. The US should not want to risk American lives for the UAE. But further, the US should not pretend to be willing to do so, without a single reason to believe this agreement would bolster, protect, or defend US interests in the Middle East.

#### Security guarantees with UAE would be an endorsement of human rights violations and entangle them in the war in Yemen.

Cohen and Allen, 22

(Jordan Cohen, Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, and Jonathan Ellis Allen, Research Associate at the Cato Institute, 4/12, “Unreliable Partners Make Even More Unreliable Allies”, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/unreliable-partners-make-even-more-unreliable-allies>)

It is important to note that neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE want a potential trilateral treaty to require them to come to the United States’ defense. Reports suggest that the Gulf countries want to use the UAE’s security agreement with France as a guide to a new security agreement between Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Washington. The French president notes that the Franco‐​Saudi‐​Emirati agreement states that the two countries “would jointly decide of specific and tailored responses, including military ones, if the security, the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the independence of the UAE was threatened.” A similar arrangement should be a non‐​starter for the United States for three reasons. First, the agreement is certainly vague enough to allow France to skirt its military commitments; however, it also fails to provide the French with any political leverage. Despite Abu Dhabi’s calls on Paris to respond to the Houthi attack on the UAE in January, the latter opposed France during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. An alliance commitment to Saudi Arabia and the UAE will result in long‐​term, unavoidable costs to U.S. security and global human rights. Washington already provides a large security commitment to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, making them the first and fourth largest U.S. weapons purchasers since the start of the Obama administration. American officials and defense companies justified these sales with claims of gaining leverage over two key players in the Gulf. The record, however, shows that the coalition has simply used U.S. weapons to commit more atrocities in Yemen, creating a “reverse leverage,” in which Washington feels required to send additional equipment to clean up the client’s mess. A security guarantee will simply increase the degree of American entanglement in the Middle East, which is a region that the Biden administration wants to leave, not stay. Second, attempts to end alliances by Congress are nearly impossible. The legislature’s ability to force America to leave a treaty is, at best, unclear and it has never been successful in doing so. One example of Congress’s inability to stop treaties is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It was not until former President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, despite earlier, repeated Congressional votes to do so. Recent reports suggest it is nearly impossible for Congress to successfully stop the executive’s ability to sign and enforce treaties. Enacting this treaty would go beyond the tacit support for human rights abuses already provided to these countries through by U.S. weapons sales. In fact, the proposed treaty would require not only providing U.S. defense to countries that frequently abuse human rights, but it would also associate the United States with these actions. Washington would suddenly find itself backing policies detrimental to American security and global human rights. Third, beyond long‐​term consequences to U.S. security, deepening ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE threatens to drag the United States into the war in Yemen. Washington has already played a role in extending the violence against the Yeminis by selling the coalition weapons used in attacks against civilians and air refueling support that helped the Saudis more easily execute air raids. It would be unheard of in recent history for Washington to extend such a guarantee to a country engaged in ongoing hostilities. Ukraine could not join NATO because of fears that its ongoing conflict would entrap the United States. In this case, though, the Ukrainians are the victims in the attack on their country, whereas Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been the primary perpetrators in the war on Yemen from beginning — despite the UAE ending involvement a few years ago. Forming a treaty alliance with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would all but guarantee that Washington ends up directly involved in this conflict. In essence, if a Houthi rebel attacks Saudi Arabia, the United States would technically need to defend Saudi Arabia. The United States is a good ally, honoring commitments where it carries most of the burden. This is, in part, the nature of being a superpower. More powerful alliance partners will always pay higher costs in defense agreements because they can. With that in mind, policymakers in Washington need to avoid burdensome alliances, even if the goal is simply short‐​term support. Once signed, an alliance commitment to Saudi Arabia and the UAE will result in long‐​term, unavoidable costs to U.S. security and global human rights.

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#### More evidence

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## Area Neg---Saudi Arabia

### DA---China

#### Agreeing to give Saudi Arabia security diverts resources that are necessary to deter China in Asia.

Saab, 3-21-23

(Bilal Y. Saab is a senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute and a former senior advisor in the U.S. Defense Department focusing on security cooperation in the broader Middle East, “Why Washington Should Say No to Riyadh”, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/21/saudi-mbs-biden-israel-security-washington-riyadh/>)

Now that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has clarified what he expects from Washington in return for normalizing ties with Israel—mainly U.S. security guarantees—the question is: Should U.S. decision-makers accept his price? But first, consider the oddity of the proposed quid pro quo. Saudi Arabia is asking the U.S. government to formally commit to Saudi security—something the United States does only with treaty allies, including NATO members—as compensation for embracing Israel. Again, the kingdom wants protection in exchange for something it would do not for Washington, but for a U.S. partner. Officials in Riyadh recognize how deep the United States’ bond with Israel is, and they are unashamedly trying to capitalize on it. The Saudis have learned from Arab countries friendly to the United States that if they treat the Jewish state right, they could get handsomely compensated by Washington. Saudi Arabia is not looking for financial assistance from the United States. Rather, it wants protection from the threat of Iran. The crown prince’s Saudi-first policy, I learned on a recent trip to the kingdom when I met with senior Saudi officials, has a two-pronged security strategy. Instead of choosing between Beijing and Washington to develop stronger defenses against Iran, he is relying on both, but in different capacities. The monarch-in-waiting will test whether China, which brokered a Saudi-Iran rapprochement last week, can rein in Iranian aggression. It’s a low-risk and shrewd move. Beijing has leverage over Tehran, given the latter’s reliance on the former’s economic investments and purchase of Iranian oil. But Mohammed bin Salman knows that diplomacy with no teeth (Chinese or otherwise) has its limits. After all, Beijing has no ability, or desire, to deter or punish Iran should it renege on its promises and resume its violence against Saudi Arabia, either directly or through its sub-state allies in Yemen and Iraq. Hence, the second leg of the Saudi strategy is necessary—a defense pact with Washington. But as much as the United States cares about Israel—though less so these days given the current Israeli slide away from democracy thanks to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s autocratic policies, which could increase the already higher percentage of U.S. Democrats showing affinity toward the Palestinians, according to the latest Gallup poll—the Saudi proposal should be a non-starter for Washington. The conversation must be grounded, first and foremost, in the United States’ national interests, not Israel’s. Saudi Arabia is a large and rapidly rising power that will play an increasingly important role not just in the Middle East but in global energy markets and geopolitics. Washington benefits from having a power with this much clout and this many resources firmly in its corner. Saudi Arabia looks to the United States to provide it with security because without it the crown prince cannot effectively pursue his grand plan of socioeconomic transformation—his top priority. Indeed, no country can successfully pursue holistic reforms and attract foreign investment if it’s being hit with missiles and drones, as has often been the case with Saudi Arabia. Yet despite the strategic significance of the Saudi relationship, the United States is unable to upgrade security ties to a full-fledged alliance. It also shouldn’t. It’s unable because there’s no political consensus in Washington about the bilateral relationship, which remains a politically toxic issue in the United States. A treaty alliance with any foreign country requires ratification and the “advice and consent” of the U.S. Senate, which isn’t likely to happen. In addition to the divisive U.S. domestic politics, the strategic case for an official defense pact with Saudi Arabia is flimsy. The United States cannot afford to establish an alliance with Saudi Arabia or any other country in the Middle East (apart from Turkey, which is already a NATO member) and commit significantly more military resources to the region at a time when it is laser-focused on stopping China from becoming a hegemon in Asia. That would be strategically unwise and inconsistent with the United States’ new foreign policy priorities.

### DA---Entanglement

#### Security guarantees with Saudi Arabia would be an endorsement of human rights violations and entangle them in the war in Yemen.

Cohen and Allen, 22

(Jordan Cohen, Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, and Jonathan Ellis Allen, Research Associate at the Cato Institute, 4/12, “Unreliable Partners Make Even More Unreliable Allies”, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/unreliable-partners-make-even-more-unreliable-allies>)

It is important to note that neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE want a potential trilateral treaty to require them to come to the United States’ defense. Reports suggest that the Gulf countries want to use the UAE’s security agreement with France as a guide to a new security agreement between Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and Washington. The French president notes that the Franco‐​Saudi‐​Emirati agreement states that the two countries “would jointly decide of specific and tailored responses, including military ones, if the security, the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the independence of the UAE was threatened.” A similar arrangement should be a non‐​starter for the United States for three reasons. First, the agreement is certainly vague enough to allow France to skirt its military commitments; however, it also fails to provide the French with any political leverage. Despite Abu Dhabi’s calls on Paris to respond to the Houthi attack on the UAE in January, the latter opposed France during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. An alliance commitment to Saudi Arabia and the UAE will result in long‐​term, unavoidable costs to U.S. security and global human rights. Washington already provides a large security commitment to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, making them the first and fourth largest U.S. weapons purchasers since the start of the Obama administration. American officials and defense companies justified these sales with claims of gaining leverage over two key players in the Gulf. The record, however, shows that the coalition has simply used U.S. weapons to commit more atrocities in Yemen, creating a “reverse leverage,” in which Washington feels required to send additional equipment to clean up the client’s mess. A security guarantee will simply increase the degree of American entanglement in the Middle East, which is a region that the Biden administration wants to leave, not stay. Second, attempts to end alliances by Congress are nearly impossible. The legislature’s ability to force America to leave a treaty is, at best, unclear and it has never been successful in doing so. One example of Congress’s inability to stop treaties is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It was not until former President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, despite earlier, repeated Congressional votes to do so. Recent reports suggest it is nearly impossible for Congress to successfully stop the executive’s ability to sign and enforce treaties. Enacting this treaty would go beyond the tacit support for human rights abuses already provided to these countries through by U.S. weapons sales. In fact, the proposed treaty would require not only providing U.S. defense to countries that frequently abuse human rights, but it would also associate the United States with these actions. Washington would suddenly find itself backing policies detrimental to American security and global human rights. Third, beyond long‐​term consequences to U.S. security, deepening ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE threatens to drag the United States into the war in Yemen. Washington has already played a role in extending the violence against the Yeminis by selling the coalition weapons used in attacks against civilians and air refueling support that helped the Saudis more easily execute air raids. It would be unheard of in recent history for Washington to extend such a guarantee to a country engaged in ongoing hostilities. Ukraine could not join NATO because of fears that its ongoing conflict would entrap the United States. In this case, though, the Ukrainians are the victims in the attack on their country, whereas Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been the primary perpetrators in the war on Yemen from beginning — despite the UAE ending involvement a few years ago. Forming a treaty alliance with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would all but guarantee that Washington ends up directly involved in this conflict. In essence, if a Houthi rebel attacks Saudi Arabia, the United States would technically need to defend Saudi Arabia. The United States is a good ally, honoring commitments where it carries most of the burden. This is, in part, the nature of being a superpower. More powerful alliance partners will always pay higher costs in defense agreements because they can. With that in mind, policymakers in Washington need to avoid burdensome alliances, even if the goal is simply short‐​term support. Once signed, an alliance commitment to Saudi Arabia and the UAE will result in long‐​term, unavoidable costs to U.S. security and global human rights.

### DA---Pivot

#### Attempting to maintain the peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia diverts from China containment in Asia.

Kuo, 3-27-23

(Mercy Kuo is Executive Vice President at Pamir Consulting, “China in Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations: Impact on Israel”, <https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/china-in-iran-saudi-arabia-relations-impact-on-israel/>)

Assess the implications of this agreement on U.S. leaderships and interests in the Middle East and in China-U.S. strategic competition. While the deal may have temporarily damaged some of the U.S. leaderships and interests in the Middle East, the upside could significantly outweigh the downside, in both the short and the long terms. On the negative side, U.S. leadership and interests are not served by deeper cooperation between three autocracies – China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia – with Russia, fully supportive in the background. Second, the Iran-Saudi Arabia pact boost China’s image as a promoter of peace and stability in the Middle East. Since the Biden administration has framed U.S.-Chinese relations as competitive, a win for Beijing in the Middle East is seen as a loss for Washington. Third, China has bolstered its role as the leader of global authoritarianism – a signal to the rest of the world that liberal democracy is fading, while illiberal dictatorship is the future. The accord also strengthens Iran’s autocratic regime, which hurts U.S. national interests, weakens Iran’s democratic movement, and allows a more stable Iran to assist Russia in its war in Ukraine. Finally, if implemented, the accord might dampen the possibilities of further Arab-Israeli rapprochement. On the positive side, first and most importantly, the resumption of Saudi-Iranian relations will help solidify the truce in Yemen, a horrific proxy war in which the two rivals have been involved. Washington wants a stable Middle East, and the new accord is a positive step toward this goal. Of course, no one should have any illusions that the resumption of diplomatic relations will end all conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Still, more and better communication between Iran and Saudi Arabia might avoid greater conflict, and that is also in U.S. national interest. Second, it remains to be seen whether the deal’s benefits for Iran will translate into long-term economic or strategic gains. Third, Washington need not and should not try to contain Chinese power on every issue everywhere in the world. The U.S. no longer has the resources to pursue total global containment, instead, Washington must selectively contain China. More importantly, China’s attempts to expand its influence in the Middle East invariably invite risks and dangers. The Iran-Saudi Arabia pact allows China to take some of the burdens of keeping the peace in the Middle East. This is not an easy assignment, as Americans have learned bitterly over the decades. The agreement could easily fail. For example, the joint statement does not clarify how the signing parties or China will respond to violations. Will China be able to enforce its diplomatic breakthrough without getting pulled more deeply into the region’s complex politics? This will expose China’s limitations as a superpower in the Middle East. Fourth, the Saudis will continue to rely on Washington for security and weapons systems in the following decades. The Saudis are deeply intertwined with the U.S. economy; just recently the kingdom signed one of the biggest-ever aircraft orders with Boeing, which is worth about $37 billion. In the end, in a new era of great power competition, the Biden administration must choose its fights with China carefully. Maintaining the peace between Iran-Saudi Arabia should not be a top priority. Washington has more important interests to pursue and defend, especially in Asia.

### DA---MBS Cred

#### MBS power on the brink now.

Dieck, 19 [Hélène Dieck is Qatar foundation migrant welfare specialist and RAND corporation visiting researcher, 2-25-2019, Literal Magazine, "The Rise and Fall of the Saudi Prince," <http://literalmagazine.com/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-saudi-prince/>, accessed 6-29-2019, AS]

Despite this close relationship with the White House, one of the Crown Prince’s close advisers recently admitted that his future is now unclear. The assassination of a journalist has caused foreign investments to drop, leading the Saudi royal family to voice concerns over the Crown Prince’s fitness for his role. King Salman heeded these concerns and admonished his Heir. The country is under a lot of pressure from the international community for leading a war in Yemen that created the world’s worst humanitarian crisis and in which thousands of civilians have died, including from U.S.-made bombs. Another reason for the international community to have turned its back on the young Prince is his 18 month old blockade of Qatar, which has failed to produce any positive outcome. At the G20 last December, the journalist’s murder was at the center of the attention and many world leaders voiced their concerns directly to him.

There is no more doubt that the new Saudi Crown Prince is likely to continue Saudi’s tradition of authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the U.S. Administration is still betting that MBS will remain in power. As such, they believe there is no need to sever relations with an important trade partner. This relationship is the only one preventing a more forceful international reaction against MBS’s human rights violations.

#### Continued US support is key to MBS keeping power.

Tabatabai and Wasser, 18 [Ariane Tabatabai associate political scientist and Becca Wasser RAND corporation policy analyst, 11-15-2018, Newsweek, "Saudi Arabia needs America. Now May Be the Time for Trump to Use That Leverage," , <https://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabia-needs-america-now-may-be-time-trump-use-leverage-1217864> , accessed 6-29-2019, AS]

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has become more reliant on the United States than when President Obama was in office. Riyadh's contentious policies—like the war in Yemen and the rift with its neighbors—have constrained its options and inadvertently reinforced Saudi Arabia's need for U.S. military and political support, including security cooperation and intelligence sharing. Prince Mohammed's legacy and perhaps even power is presently tied to two initiatives: The Yemen war and Vision 2030—an ambitious program of social and economic reforms that Riyadh plans to institute to diversify its economy. Neither objective is apparently proceeding as the crown prince had hoped. And to succeed, they will likely require continued U.S. support.

#### [INSERT MBS BAD IMPACT SCENARIO]

### K---Fem IR

#### Taking a moral stance against Saudi Arabia asserts the backwardness of Saudi Arabia and positions Western nations as enlightened nations that “treat their women properly” which erases agency from women in Saudi Arabia, reproduces dichotomies of us and them, and re-entrenches racist and sexist distinctions

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As Charlotte Hooper has argued, masculinity is an incredibly resilient concept in terms of how it legitimizes the behaviour of both male and female actors. Masculinity, she argues, appears to have ‘no stable ingredients and therefore its power depends entirely on certain quali- ties constantly being associated with men’ (Hooper, 2001: 230). On this view, what is required is an approach ethics that does not rely upon gendered binaries, but instead has the resources to challenge them. To illustrate this argument, the second part of the article addresses the recent dip- lomatic crises faced by Sweden and Canada in their relationships with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. While there are many other nation-states which might warrant atten- tion here, Saudi Arabia represents, in many ways, a test case for feminist foreign policy. Saudi Arabia is well known in the West as a flagrant denier of women’s rights; despite the recent overturning of the decades-long ban on driving for women, women remain subject to a system of male guardianship and women’s and human rights activ- ists in the country are imprisoned, and can be sentenced to death, for their actions. And yet, Saudi Arabia remains an ‘ally’ of the West – an importer of arms from many Western countries and a fellow fighter in the war against Islamic terrorism. Not sur- prisingly, many observers regard the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia as existing in out- right contradiction to the aims of feminist foreign policy. While not denying this, I suggest that our attention should shift away from this contradiction – which again relies on binary logics and assumptions of essential difference between Saudi Arabia (authoritarian, backward and violent) and Sweden/Canada (democratic, progressive and peaceful). Policymakers and diplomats must aim to build understanding by rec- ognizing the material and discursive factors that have constructed, over time, the relationships between Saudi Arabia and Sweden/Canada, as well as the ways in which patriarchal institutions and structures – across the globe and at multiple scales – hin- der the possibility of attentive listening and connection across national borders and cultural/religious difference. It is only through the prism of this relationship – where difference takes on meaning – that the more complex role of Western states in the contemporary system of transnational militarism is revealed. Furthermore, countries such as Sweden and Canada must recognize that progressive change on women’s and human rights in a country like Saudi Arabia can never be imposed by ethical or femi- nist Western governments. Countries espousing feminist foreign policies must refuse to buy in to an order of living that ‘splits humans into the superior and the inferior’ (Gilligan and Snider, 2017: 174). The final part of the article sketches out the ways in which a feminist ethic of care can offer a different, and potentially more transformative, way of thinking about feminist foreign policy. Care ethics now includes a wide-ranging literature in a diverse array of disciplines, including IR.3 While there are a number of key authors who are widely rec- ognized as the central figures in care ethics, my reading relies specifically on the work of Carol Gilligan on moral psychology, ethics and politics. In contrast to much of the (very valuable) research which focuses on the concept of care and its application to women’s labour, social policy and migration, Gilligan’s approach focuses on the epistemic, psy- chological and political structure of patriarchy. This approach is committed to revealing the harms caused by absolutist, dualistic categories of all kinds, and emphasizes the relationality of moral agents, as well as the importance of contextual and revisable moral judgement. It sees all people as embodied and vulnerable and mutually interdependent. A feminist ethic of care is not something that must be rationally willed or imposed on others; rather, it is a feature of the human need for relationship that flows when men and women resist the grip of patriarchy. Only then do both men and women feel free to respond to others with careful attention, attentive listening and responsiveness, and to do so without losing or sacrificing themselves. Insofar as it is committed to disrupting the binaries and dichotomies of patriarchy, it could be argued that a care ethics perspective challenges not only a particular view of foreign policy but also the very idea foreign policy itself. While I am sympathetic to this possibility, I will not pursue it here. This is because, I would argue that there is currently some discursive, political and ethical momentum behind the idea of feminist foreign policy, and that it is emerging at a time where the need for feminist mobilization – against the forces of patriarchy and populism – is more urgent than ever. Instead, I argue that feminist foreign policy is an idea that can be mobilized strategically and which can be tied to an understanding of ethics. I will argue, however, that what makes feminist for- eign policy ‘ethical’ is not its commitment to acting decisively and with epistemological certainty on already-agreed-upon rational principles of human rights and universal jus- tice; rather, ethical foreign policy that is feminist is about seeing global actors as consti- tuted and sustained through relationships in specific times and places, and tracing how power, in its various forms, makes those relationships – in various, ever-changing con- texts – oppressive or enabling. Feminist foreign policy as ethical foreign policy When the Swedish Social Democratic Party and Green Party formed a coalition govern- ment after the 2014 elections, they called themselves the world’s first feminist govern- ment and have since then intensified Sweden’s domestic gender mainstreaming. In October of the same year, Sweden became the first nation-state ever to adopt, publicly and explicitly, a feminist foreign policy. According to Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, Sweden’s feminist foreign policy is about systematically and holistically implementing policies that contribute to gender equality and the full enjoyment of human rights of all women and girls (Wallström, 2015). This is achieved through a focus on the so-called three ‘Rs’ – rights, representation and resources (Government of Sweden, 2016: 3). The six focus areas for 2016 were as follows: 1. To strengthen women and girls’ human rights in humanitarian situations; 2. To fight and prevent gender-based and sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations; 3. To promote women’s participation as actors in peace processes and peace pro- moting measures; 4. To promote women and girls’ participation in the work for economic, social and environmental sustainable development; 5. To strengthen women and girls’ economic independence and their access to eco- nomic resources, including though productive work under decent living conditions; 6. To strengthen sexual and reproductive rights for girls and young people (Wallström, 2015). These goals are reiterated in the new Handbook: Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy (Government of Sweden, 2018). The Handbook also outlines methods for norm change and mobilization, as well as working methods within subsidiary areas of foreign policy – including peace and security, disarmament and non-proliferation, international devel- opment and trade. Sweden’s feminist foreign policy is framed as a natural extension of the work of a feminist government and a continuation of many years of national gender equality policy (Government of Sweden, 2018: 16). The general approach emphasizes gender equality and human rights; the Handbook states explicitly that ‘those countries that have made reservations infringing women’s and girls’ rights should repeal these, as they contravene the purposes and intentions of the conventions’ and that ‘(r)eligion, culture, customs or traditions can never legitimise infringements of women’s and girls’ human rights’ (Government of Sweden, 2018: 21). While the policy covers many sub- areas of foreign policy, working to ensure representative and inclusive peace and secu- rity is a cornerstone of Sweden’s feminist foreign policy (Government of Sweden, 2018: 63). To this end, a new national action plan on women, peace and security, the third since 2006, was adopted in spring 2016. It is aimed at 3 ministries and 11 agen- cies and has been drawn up in broad consultation with relevant actors in Sweden and with five conflict and post-conflict nations: Afghanistan, Colombia, DR Congo, Liberia and Palestine (Government of Sweden, 2018: 41). Disarmament and non-pro- liferation are a central pillar of the policy; in the Handbook, Sweden relies specifically on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in order to ensure that it is not contributing to gender- based violence around the world: One important aspect of this work is the strict control exercised over the export of military equipment from Sweden. This takes place, for example, through Sweden applying article 7.4 of the ATT. The article was included in the treaty with the strong support of countries including Sweden, and requires state parties to take into account the risk of exported materials being used for – or facilitating – serious gender-based violence or serious violence against women or children. (Government of Sweden, 2018: 73) Canada, under the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau, has become the second country to make an explicit commitment to feminism – in both domestic and foreign policy. Trudeau famously began his work as Prime Minister by forming Canada’s first- ever gender-balanced Cabinet, providing the now well-known justification of ‘because its 2015!’ when asked why he chose to do so. Trudeau himself is a self-described femi- nist, provoking roughly equal measures of delight and disdain from observers both in Canada and around the world. In terms of foreign policy, the key document so far is Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, announced on 9 June 2017. This followed an extensive public review and consultations on the renewal of Canada’s international assistance policy and funding framework. In her foreword to the policy, Marie-Claude Bibeau, Minister of International Development, states that ‘we need to make sure that women and girls are empowered to reach their full potential so they can earn their own livelihoods, which will benefit fami- lies as well as the economic growth of their communities and countries’. Taking a human rights–based approach, the government has pledged that, by 2022, 95% of our interna- tional assistance budget will be directed towards gender equality and women’s empower- ment (Government of Canada, 2017). While the policy has been generally welcomed by Canada’s development community, a number of questions have been posed about what this will mean in practice. Many of these questions were motivated by the announcement that there would be marginal (if any) new funding allocated to this policy. This was particularly difficult for some observ- ers to accept, given that Canada continues to fall below the United Nations (UN) recom- mendation of 0.7% of GDP for foreign aid, and given the announcement, just 2days earlier, of a 70% increase in defence spending. And while there have been some promising moves on behalf of the government regarding funding for local women’s groups and pro- grammes promoting reproductive rights and access to family planning, including safe, legal abortion, there are still concerns about the ultimate effectiveness of so-called ‘top- down feminism’ in the context of development and its ability to engender real change. In a 2018 speech, Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland stated that ‘women’s rights are human rights, and they are at the core of our foreign policy. It is why, she con- tinued, we are committed to an ambitious feminist foreign policy’ (Government of Canada, 2018). She also described the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, launched by Canada at the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference in November 2017. The initiative aims at ensuring women can fully participate in peace operations around the world, but also that the right conditions are put in place for their sustainable involvement. Throughout the speech, Freeland emphasized the link between feminist foreign policy, democratic values and human rights. It is clear that while the emphasis in feminist foreign policy for both countries is the inclusion and equality of women, in both cases, the notion of a feminist foreign policy is discursively constructed as ‘ethical’. As Wallström noted in a speech at the United States Institute of Peace, a feminist foreign policy seeks the same goals as any visionary foreign policy: peace, justice, human rights and human development. It simply acknowledges that we will not get there without adjusting existing policies, down to their nuts and bolts, to correct the particular (and often invisible) discrimination, exclusion and violence still inflicted on the female half of us (Wallström, 2015). Thus, women and ‘the feminine’ are positioned as the key to the realization of ethical or ‘visionary’ foreign policy goals – peace, justice, human rights and human development. Karin Aggestam and Annika Bergman-Rosamond (2016) support this view in their timely 2016 article, Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy in the Making: Ethics, Politics and Gender, in which they write that ‘(t)he declaration of a distinct feminist foreign policy signals a departure from traditional elite-oriented foreign policy practices and discourses toward a policy framework that is guided by normative and ethical principles’ (2016: 327). The authors rely on the ‘solidarist branch of the English School’ to conceptualize efforts to pursue an ethically informed feminist foreign policy (2016: 331). They argue that the relevant credentials of this approach are based on its provision of a ‘progressive account of global relations and for normative considerations in global politics’, because it ‘takes account of states’ endeavours to overcome the constraints of anarchy in a fash- ion conducive to both international order and justice’ (2016: 331). Despite its status as an ‘ethical’ IR theory, the authors note that the ES is ‘entirely void’ of feminist insights about the gendered lives and stories of women in international society (2016: 332). Their aim, then, is to insert gender into this framework, so that it can then serve as an ethical foundation on which to build a feminist foreign policy. The English School of International Relations Theory offers a critique of realism; against neo-realism, ES argues that there is a society of states at the international level and that the relations among states – including ‘ideational’ relations of an historical and or legal nature – shape conduct of international politics. The ES is generally understood to have two ‘branches’ – a ‘pluralist’ branch and a ‘solidarist’ branch. The former argues that, given the diversity in the world, a pluralist, tolerant, difference-preserving interna- tional society is the best that we can hope for (and the best model for sustaining order and achieving justice). By contrast, ‘solidarists’ follow Kant to argue for the possibility and desirability of a cosmopolitan global community guided by the principles and practices of international human rights, humanitarian intervention. How does this approach fare as an ethical basis for a feminist foreign policy? Most glaring, of course, is the blindness of the solidarist branch of the ES to the constitutive and causal effects of gender in international politics. Its merit lies in its liberal cosmo- politanism, which can support what they describe as the ‘broad cosmopolitan underpin- nings of feminist foreign policy’ (Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond, 2016: 332). They cite feminist international ethicist Kimberly Hutchings who explains, in a textbook chap- ter, that ‘feminist justice ethicists seek to make the universal terms of traditional moral theory genuinely inclusive and universal’ (Hutchings, 2010: 68, cited in Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamond, 2016: 331). But as Hutchings’ extensive corpus of work critiquing moral rationalism (including ‘feminist justice ethics’) shows, rationalist international ethical and political theory works because it tells us (White liberal citizens of Western states) so much of what we already know about moral agency and situations; moreover, what it accomplishes is to institutionalize hierarchical relations and patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the practice of ethical theorizing (Hutchings, 2013: 36). The discursive and normative positioning of feminist foreign policy as ‘ethical’ foreign policy is not a difficult move to make. Gender binaries are constitutive of the language and practices of international politics. Because of the pervasiveness of gender binaries in Western thought, any association of foreign policy with ‘morality’ or ‘ethics’ is regularly – whether or not it is explicitly labelled ‘feminist’ – constructed as feminine. Paradoxically, however, at a different level, even ostensibly ‘ethical’ foreign policy – that elevates the importance of human rights over, for example, trade, or which subordinates direct material gains to the need to ‘save’ strangers caught in humanitarian emergencies – is regularly constructed discursively through a protective, paternal masculinity. Thus, femi- nist foreign policy sits in tension with the gendered binaries that constitute foreign policy – while it is ethical and ‘soft’, and hence feminine, it is simultaneously protective and paternal – and hence masculine. These constructions are not essential or fixed but are instead fluid and open to rewriting and re-enactment.Human rights, arms deals and feminist foreign policy As ‘ethical’, feminist governments, Sweden and Canada have been outspoken critics of the unethical or barbaric acts of other states - to condemn, criticize or rebuke any policy or regime - that appears to contradict their own commitment to `justice and human rights’. This emerged clearly in the diplomatic crises with Saudi Arabia, faced by Sweden in 2015, and more recently, with Canada, in 2018. On 11 February 2015, Foreign Minister Wallström, speaking before the Swedish parliament, criticized Saudi Arabia’s human rights record; specifically, she criticized the public flogging of the blogger Raif Badawi and later described it as ‘medieval’. Wallström, whose government recognized the State of Palestine in 2014, had been asked to deliver a speech at an Arab League summit in Cairo in late March, but Saudi Arabia intervened, and Wallström was disinvited. On 9 March, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador to Sweden, saying that Wallström had ‘unacceptably interfered’ in the country’s internal affairs. The United Arab Emirates fol- lowed suit a week later. Wallström was also condemned by the Gulf Cooperation Council (which consists of Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE), The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which includes 57 countries, and the Arab League itself (Nordberg, 2015). Complicating these matters is the fact that Sweden is one of Europe’s largest per- capita arms exporters. The day after Wallström was supposed to have appeared in Cairo, on 10 March, the government announced its decision not to renew a bilateral arms agree- ment with Saudi Arabia. This has been described as Wallström’s ‘feminist foreign policy’ in practice; not surprisingly, the move did not sit well with some of Sweden’s most pow- erful industrialists, who stood to lose significant income from a break in relations with Saudi Arabia (Nordberg, 2015). In an effort to reduce tensions and mitigate damage, 1 week later, a delegation of Swedish officials travelled to Riyadh, carrying letters from Prime Minister Stefan Löfven and King Carl XVI Gustaf, explaining that Wallström had not intended to criticize Islam and offering official regrets for any misunderstanding. The Saudi ambassador to Sweden is now reinstated. As Jenny Nordberg describes in The New Yorker, Wallström’s political opponents came down hard on what they saw as a clumsy performance. Still, the Swedish foreign minister refused to back down, referring only to a misunderstanding, and stressing that no apology for her specific remarks had been, or would be, issued (Nordberg, 2015). The diplomatic crisis with Canada was more severe and, at the time of writing, is ongoing. On 1 August 2018, Amnesty International announced that the Saudi govern- ment had arrested several female activists. One of these women was Saudi activist Samar Badawi, who is, in fact, the sister of Raif Badawi, the activist at the heart of the Swedish affair, who has been detained since 2012 for ‘insulting Islam’. Raif Bawadi’s wife and children were made Canadian citizens in 2018. On 2 August, Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s foreign minister, tweeted that she was ‘very alarmed’ to learn of the arrest and that Canada ‘stands together with the Badawi family’. The next day, Canada’s foreign minis- try weighed in, writing on Twitter that Saudi Arabia should ‘immediately release’ Badawi and ‘all other peaceful #humanrights activists’. On 5 August, in a string of 10 tweets, Saudi Arabia accused Canada of ‘an overt and blatant interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom’ and said its tweet broke the ‘most basic international norms’ of diplo- macy. Within hours, the Canadian ambassador was expelled, and it was announced that Saudi Arabia was suspending ‘all new trade and investment transactions’ with Canada. On 7 August, Saudi Arabia was planning to withdraw all Saudi students it has been spon- soring at Canadian universities, colleges and schools – more than 15,000 people. On 21 August, following a few weeks of relative calm, when both countries grappled with the fallout, human rights groups said that Saudi Arabia was on the cusp of executing a female political activist for the first time (Baker, 2018). Many have applauded Sweden and Canada for ‘taking an ethical stand’ on the policies of Saudi Arabia. Some are more critical, pointing out the inconsistencies between Canada’s rhetoric – on Twitter and elsewhere – on women’s rights and their continuation of trade relations with the kingdom. When Trudeau came to power in 2015, he failed to cancel a US$15 billion deal, negotiated by the previous Conservative government, to sell light armoured vehicles (LAVs) to Saudi Arabia. The Liberals rapidly understood that because it was costly for a government seeking to brand itself as progressive and feminist to support selling weapons to a dictatorship, it was better to avoid bringing any attention to relations with Saudi Arabia (Juneau, 2018). As a result, the deeper trade relations expected by the kingdom never materialized, and relations have deteriorated ever since. Arms deals have proven to be a thorn in the side of feminist governments – as they have in the past for all governments – in which leaders simultaneously support progres- sive foreign policy goals and export-oriented defence industries (Vucetic, 2017: 505). Indeed, this is the conundrum of post–Cold War liberal internationalism, where ‘good governance’ is oriented towards both individual (civil and politics) rights and trade. But the tension is particularly acute for feminist governments, given the potential for arms to be used to perpetuate gender-based violence. Vucetic (2017) articulates the received wis- dom on this tension: ‘if the Canadian government truly wishes to help build gender- equitable societies around the world, then a good place to start would be nixing massive arms sales to countries with lousy records on women’s rights’ (2017: 517). In response to the increasingly evident human costs of the regulated and illicit global trade in arms, the UN ATT was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2013. It came into force in December 2014. In June 2013, more than 60 states signed the ATT. While Canada voted for the treaty in April 2013, it chose not to sign the treaty at the UN in June. In April 2017, a bill was introduced in the House of Commons that Canada would join the international ATT. Upon accession to the global agreement, which now involves 130 countries, Canada will be required to implement brokering controls on arms sales. The international standard on export assessment is set out in two articles in the ATT. First, the ATT obligates states to prevent the export of arms to another country if the transfer would be contrary to an arms embargo, other international law, or if the item would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Convention. Second, the ATT provides that states shall carry out export assess- ments and refuse to export if there is an overriding risk of undermining peace and secu- rity, commit serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law or transnational crimes. States are expressly required to take into account serious violations of gender-based violence or acts of violence against women when making the assessment (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), 2016). While many in the international community applaud the ATT, others are more scepti- cal. Problems of implementation, a lack of transparency, lack of enforcement and the general weakness of the treaty itself are often cited. Of course, this is coupled with the fact some of the world’s largest arms exporters – including Russia and China – have not signed the treaty. Others, such as the United States and Israel – have signed, but not yet ratified. Worse than this, however, is the possibility that the whole premise of the treaty is fatally flawed: specifically, the basic premise that only some weapons are ‘bad’, and others are either neutral or, possibly, good. Thus, paradoxically, the ATT could actually be used to justify increases in arms sales, if adequate evidence that they are being used ‘in the right way’ can be provided. Once this is understood, it becomes clear that a key effect of the ATT could be the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major Western states (Stavrianakis, 2016: 841). In seeking to distinguish between ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ weaponry, we fail to recognize the wider structural effects of militarism (Wibben, 2018). As Paul Kirby has put it, ‘is there ever a conflict where arms flows could not be said to facilitate serious acts of gender- based violence – harms strongly correlated with, but not necessarily inflicted by, the deployment of weaponry?’ (Kirby, quoted in Stavrianakis, in press: 25). Much like ‘just war theory’, which can be used to justify ‘ethical warfare’, the ATT diverts our attention from the structural nature of militarism, and its complex relationship with the structures and institutions of global capitalism, transnational structures of racism and with the liberal international order. Rather than pitting a feminist foreign policy – as a set of pre-formed moral principles – against ‘arms deals’ – immoral, self-interested policies on the part of states – feminist governments should interrogate the role of states – including their own – in supporting liberal milita- rism,4 and thereby contributing to its gendered effects. I argue that the tweets and pronouncements of the Canadian and Swedish governments were misguided. The neglect of context and relational positioning, as well as the hubris of certainty and moral necessity, are in conflict with the general methods and aims of feminist ethics. To assert the backwardness and morally corrupt nature of Saudi Arabia is to position Sweden and Canada as superior, enlightened nations that ‘treat’ their women properly. This kind of framing contributes to the erasure of Saudi women’s agency. As Victoria Heath argues in relation to the Swedish case, it is crucial for Sweden to understand the compli- cated and nuanced situation of women within the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and recognize the indigenous women’s rights movements and the ‘renegotiations’ of gendered power relations that currently exist. Indeed, Heath points out that women’s rights movements in Saudi Arabia are framed by a number of contextual factors: •• Women’s rights as indicated by Islamic religious texts; •• Gender segregation and spatial allowances; •• Notions of ‘female nature’ and femininity; •• Saudi national identity and the Saudi state; •• Disentangling cultural tradition and the Islamic religion; •• Maintaining family as the ‘core’ of the community; •• The importance of promoting an ‘indigenous’ movement (not Western) (Heath, 2016). Blindness to this context, and to the agency and diversity of women within Saudi Arabia, reveals both racist logics and a tendency towards ‘culture-blaming’ that depoliti- cizes social problems and diverts attention away from the ways in which practices are supported and sustained by the structure of the global economy. To imagine ‘culture’ as an isolated realm of values and practices, separate from other kinds of social relations, is inevitably to reproduce the dichotomies of ‘us’ and ‘them’, is blind to both historical and current relations and ultimately will hinder our ability to create a foreign policy that helps to create the conditions for long-term transformations in gender relations. Ethical stances which pit ‘barbaric’ cultures against enlightened Western morality are thick with neo-colonial logics and racial hierarchies that perpetuate, rather than transform, global inequalities. Rather than pitting ‘culture’ against ‘women’s human rights’, a feminist ethic of care would situate practices and traditions in a broader, relational geopolitical and geo-economic context. As Alison Jaggar (2005) argues, topics on the agenda of ‘intercultural dialogue’ about global justice for women (and men) in ‘non-Western coun- tries’ must be questions about the basic structure of the global political economy, as well as the economic policies of those Western governments that directly and indirectly affect poor women’s lives (2005: 71). My argument here should not be misunderstood as a defence of the Saudi regime or of their practices. Wallström’s mistake was not the withdrawal from the arms agreement, but rather the framing of this move within a wider critique of the ‘medieval’ and ‘barbaric’ practices of non-Western, non-liberal societies, and the tying of this to a general appeal to ‘ethics’ and justice, that is inherently linked to ‘feminism’. Likewise, Freeland’s demand of the ‘immediate release’ of political detainees in Saudi Arabia demonstrates a selectivity and targeting that uses moral judgement as punishment and which invites charges of hypoc- risy. As a result, these actions, while ‘progressive’, are unlikely to be transformative in the direction of long-term feminist goals. As I will argue below, a more potentially transforma- tive approach would have been to use the arms trade agreement to highlight a series of relationships, networking the global arms trade, transnational business interests, liberal militarism, systemic transnational racism and the structural causes of women’s oppression around the globe. In so doing, it would become possible to reveal the effects of patriarchy – not just in Saudi Arabia but in Western states as well – as a system of hierarchy that divides people and thwarts the possibility of empathy and connection.

### References

#### Lots of articles to pull from – here are some more

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## Area Neg---Palestine

### DA---Dependency

#### Foreign aid to Palestine creates dependency and distracts from Israeli colonialism

Hijab, 12

(Nadia Hijab is Director of Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, 8/3, “Rethinking aid to Palestine”, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/03/rethinking-aid-to-palestine/>)

Foreign aid to Palestine is desperately in need of rethinking. Wittingly or not, external aid facilitates Israel’s occupation, enables an inept Palestinian leadership to survive, and subverts much of Palestinian civil society. The extent of the dependency on aid means the Palestinian Authority (PA) must spend considerable energy begging for handouts from Arab governments, the European Union, and the United States. Facing a severe cash shortage — which is not unusual — the PA was recently unable to pay the salaries on which an estimated one million bureaucrats and their families rely. One of the major problems with external aid was illustrated by the beatings a month ago of young, peaceful Palestinian protesters by PA security forces. The protesters were initially demonstrating against a planned visit to Ramallah by former Israeli Vice-Premier Shaul Mofaz, who has faced travel bans to other countries due to accusations of war crimes during Israel’s attacks on Palestinian cities in 2002. But after the PA security forces assaulted them, protestors organized demonstrations against police brutality. Israeli forces had destroyed Palestinian security forces in 2002 at the height of the second Intifada. But since 2005 U.S. and EU financial and technical support has not only rebuilt them but also promoted tight coordination between Israeli and Palestinian security services — a coordination only slightly ruffled by Palestinian officials’ meek complaints about continued Israeli incursions into the few areas supposedly under direct Palestinian control (i.e. Area A, a mere 18 percent of the West Bank). Unsurprisingly, Palestinian critics of the PA refer to it as "Israel’s policeman." Much has been written about the problems of Israeli-PA security coordination (e.g., Squaring the Circle and Our Man in Palestine), but donors still turn a blind eye. Earlier this month — just a few days after the assaults — European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso was proudly escorted by the PA to a college for "police sciences" in the occupied West Bank. He should have taken a moment out of his busy schedule to speak to Mona (not her real name) who told me, "I felt humiliated when I saw the trucks carrying furious police equipped with batons who didn’t hesitate to beat us. And angry that the PA is wasting our collective energy instead of fighting the real enemy." Instead, Barroso signed a $25 million agreement that included eight more police stations and a prison, with some funds thrown in to strengthen civil society’s monitoring of the security sector. The question of exactly how civil society would exercise such control remained unanswered. The support to the Palestinian security services is just one problem in the foreign donor-recipient relationship in the occupied Palestinian territories. Another major issue is the way donor aid relieves Israel of its obligation under international law to ensure the welfare of the population under its occupation. A tragicomic episode best illustrates how useful donor aid to the PA is to Israel. Last year, when pro-Israel members of the U.S. Congress rushed to cut off aid to the PA as punishment for seeking full membership at the United Nations, the Israeli government spoke out strongly in defense of that aid. And earlier this month the Israeli government gave the cash-strapped PA an "advance" on the tax money it collects on the PA’s behalf — an arrangement that is just one way the poorly negotiated Oslo Accords have proved disastrous to Palestinian sovereignty. Not only do donors end up paying for the Palestinians’ basic needs, their funds are often only allowed to go to projects approved by the occupying Israeli forces, actively promoting Israel’s colonization plans. For example, USAID-funded roads in no way challenge Israel’s system of segregated roads or the vast tracts of land grabbed along the way. Such "facilitation" actually violates international law: The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Israel’s Separation Wall, issued eight years ago last month, says that third party states are precluded from accommodating illegalities. Moreover, Israel has a history of destroying donor-funded projects, most recently in Area C of the West Bank where it has full security control, and which it is emptying of Palestinians. An estimated 62 EU-funded structures have been destroyed and another 110 are at risk of demolition. EU foreign ministers finally issued an unusually harsh criticism of Israeli actions, saying pointedly that they would not only continue to invest in Area C but expected "such investment to be protected for future use." However, EU protests ring hollow considering it has just enhanced EU-Israeli economic cooperation. Then there’s the money donors pour into "institution-building" — without actually adding much to what was done during the late Yasser Arafat’s era, according to an authoritative analysis. This partly stems from the mistaken belief that sustainable development is possible under prolonged occupation, even though major aid agencies such as the World Bank produce one report after another highlighting the insurmountable obstacles. Aid has also had a very negative impact on Palestinian civil society. Non-violent civil resistance was the hallmark of the First Intifada in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since 1993 and the Oslo Accords, non-governmental organizations have, with some notable exceptions, tailored programs to donor agendas rather than to the quest for freedom. There have been many Palestinian critiques of donor aid and their voices are getting louder. The same Palestinian youth who organized the late June early July demonstrations — Palestinians with Dignity — issued a declaration July 30 slamming the EU for its hypocrisy, warning it to reverse course or they would "challenge its presence and operations in Palestine." A satirical play on donor aid was recently produced in the West Bank, with a clear call for greater accountability. Yet this has not been forthcoming. The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, which transfers EU and U.S. aid to the PA was reportedly unable to arrange a meeting with donors for the Ramallah-based Dalia Association to discuss its findings about how aid could be violating Palestinian human rights. Clearly, an urgent review of aid policies in the OPT is long overdue. No one is arguing that all aid be terminated; Palestinians need to survive on their land and fulfill such basic rights as education, work, and health. However, in the absence of a political framework, aid to Palestine is doing far more harm than good. Why do donors ignore the harm their aid does? Partly because it suits some donors, particularly the United States to have a mechanism to keep the PA in line. And partly because there is not yet enough internal or external pressure on Europe and North America to counter Israel’s strong lobbies and push those countries’ governments to uphold international law and end Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. Absent such pressure, it is much easier for Western governments to live with the status quo, salving their conscience through aid. There are ways to help Palestinians stay on their land without doing harm that should be seriously considered. But the bottom line is this: What Palestinians need is the European and American political will to stop Israel’s colonization and end discrimination. Without it, they face continued dispossession and exclusion, and no amount of aid will help.

### K---Antiblackness

#### Debates over the ongoing nature of the settler colonial, slave state America has generated forming the basis for intimate relationalities between structures of antiblackness and Palestinian violence that necessitate constructive engagement will produce potent critical discussions over the ‘gendered Palestinian body’ and ‘Racialized politics of the womb’.

Ihmoud 21 [Sarah; Postdoctoral Associate in Anthropology and Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies, Duke University Press, “BORN PALESTINIAN, BORN BLACK: ANTIBLACKNESS AND THE WOMB OF ZIONIST SETTLER COLONIALISM”, Antiblackness, pp. 297-308, (https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1grbbwr.17) 3-1 // Makinde]

In this chapter, I place **Black** and **Indigenous feminist scholarship** in conversation to consider the **racialized politics of the womb**, a project grounded in a political moment that has given birth to a resurgence of movement building and intellectual production centered on an analysis that highlights similarities (and dissonances) between structures of racial violence that devalue **Black and Palestinian** **life** across **white settler states**.1 Ironically, the (much deserved) attention to the **hypervisible** forms of violence that form the basis for contemporary practices of **solidarity**— from **blatant legal discrimination**, **police killing**s in the street, and **mass incarceration** to the walls (both literal and figurative) that ghettoize communities into territories of **dispossession**—has left fundamental questions concerning the nature of the relationship between **antiblackness** and **Indigenous erasure** in the **Israeli settler colony** as structures of violence largelyunattended. In fact, the tendency of such politics has been an implicit erasure of antiblackness as a foundational logic animating Zionist settler colonialism, a collapsing of racialized positionalities in liberatory projects, and an elision of the gendered character of structures of violence. 2

This chapter offers a more **intimate scale** from which to examine the **relationality** between structures of **antiblackness** and **Palestinian erasure**. Drawing on **Black** and **Indigenous feminist** scholarship on the spatial politics of the body, and building on Joy James’s (2016) **theorization** **of the womb** and concept of the “**captive maternal**,” it argues for an acknowledgment of the interplay between **logics of antiblackness** and **Palestinian** dispossession in the **Israeli settler colony** through an **examination** of the **racialized politics** of **national reproduction**, or the politics of the **womb**. Zionist **settler colonial epistemologies** and **technologies** of **governance** that fuel contemporary exercises of violence against **Palestinians** in occupied territory, it argues, are energized by an **antiblack logic** that seeks to **purify** and **secure** the Jewish body—and hence, the **national body**—from the imagined threat of **racial contamination.**

In order to do so, it examines Zionism’s historical project of increasing Jewish demographic presence in Palestine through **pronatalist policies** that situate women’s bodies as symbolic national **peripheries**. Beyond encouraging birth and expanding Jewish families to fight in what national leaders have referred to as a “demographic war,” pronatalist policies continue to labor towards purifying the Jewish nation in the image of European (**white) supremacy**, and maintaining the racial exclusivity of the “**chosen people.**” It proceeds by examining how these essentially eugenicist politics are instrumental in fomenting growing racial panics concerning a Palestinian demographic “threat” and Israel’s internal racial others, fueling violent policies of **antiblackness** and **Indigenous** **erasure** within the colony.

I conclude by sharing some reflections on the question of transnational feminist struggles against racialized gendered violence within the context of white settler nation-states. Drawing on Tiffany King’s (2016, 1026) theorization of Black fungibility as a “spatial methodology,” I suggest that a centering of the gendered **Palestinian body** as territory or geography opens space for what Shanya Cordis (2019) calls a praxis of “**relational difference**” between the entangled logics of “**gendered anti-blackness**” (Vargas 2012) and “**racial Palestinianization**” (Goldberg 2008). Examining Israel as a white settler colony invested in the colonial body politics to which **antiblackness** is foundational forces consideration of critical theories and activist praxes invested in dismantling the settler-spatial order that fall outside of the **liberal humanist frame**.

### K---Disability

#### Liberation conversations and Palestine provide nuance areas for discussion about the overlapping parameters of racialization, disablement narrative, and necropolitics

Gorman 16 (Rachel Gorman - Associate Professor, Graduate Program Director in Critical Disability Studies; PhD, University of Toronto. “Disablement In and For Itself: Toward a ‘Global’ Idea of Disability” *Somatechnics* ([Volume 6, Issue 2)](https://www.euppublishing.com/toc/soma/6/2) <https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/soma.2016.0194>, DOA: 4/16/19, liz)

Attempts to theorise ‘the global’ in disability studies have been hampered by an inattention to political economies of colonisation (Grech 2011; Meekosha 2011) and by the ongoing imperialist expansion of disability studies (Meekosha and Soldatic 2011; Singal 2010). The combined character of colonialisms, including settler colonialism, imperialism, and the logics of raciality, requires that we develop specific theoretical and methodological tools. Over the last two decades, scholars like Aeysha Vernon (1997) and Parin Dossa (2009) have articulated reflexive, intersectional, anti-racist research methodologies that have the potential to reveal the role of state policy and services in producing disability as a white identity. Based on these problematics of disability studies – the dominance of white identities and the lack of engagement with imperialism – I have called for a relational/reflexive methodology to reveal the social relations of disability beyond the immediate narrative that the subject evokes; one which can attend to both the social organisation of disablement and the situated knowledges of and resistance to these social relations (Gorman 2005). In the brief text that follows, I propose that a focus on the dialectic of disability–disablement may provide a way out of the closure of context and the collapsing of social relations that occurs in current formulations of disability identity. In their work on the ‘eugenic Atlantic’, disability studies scholars David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder (2003) argue that the transnational traffic in eugenics discourse and techniques targeted, and continue to target, disabled people. In a sweeping gesture of revisionism, they argue that the notion of ‘eugenic Atlantic’ encompasses and supersedes Paul Gilroy’s ‘Black Atlantic’, despite the discrepancy between their 150-year timeline (2003: 844) and Gilroy’s (1995) centring of a 500-year history of European slave trade and subsequent Black cultural networks of resistance. Underpinning this historiographic claim is their framing of ‘disability as master trope of human disqualification’ (Mitchell and Snyder 2003: 859). This startling declaration marks an endpoint in a US-based disability studies project to make eugenics the foundational narrative of disability oppression, from which liberal rights claims for disabled people might be launched. This ‘global’ idea of disability is ideological both in its aim to elevate a white-defined disabled subjectivity to master status, and in its function of providing an alibi for the reproduction of race/class exploitation and oppression. In the end, they posit that embodied difference drives global inequality, not the violence of global labour and property relations, set in motion through European slave-trade-colonialism and imperialism-capitalism (Rodney 1972). I propose a divergence from recent theorisations of disability and race which centre eugenics as defining both racialised and disabled people through inherent inability and/or deviance. Instead, I ask how eugenics and genocide are evoked by disability studies scholars, and to what end? Nadia Kanani notes that ‘a prevailing, and problematic, trend in contemporary disability studies scholarship has been to frame disability as the foundational principle in the construction of race, as constitutive of race, thereby subsuming race under the category of disability’ (Kanani 2012). Indeed, some recent attempts to think disability and race together contradict the work of historians and theorists of race, and point to a project of ‘ablenationalism’, parallel to Jasbir Puar’s (2006) articulation of ‘homonationalism’ as a liberal white project through which disabled identities are bolstered through a disavowal of disabled people of colour (McRuer 2010). Rather, we can trace a critical history of ways in which certain disabled subjectivities have leveraged whiteness – for example, Sleeter’s ([1987] 2010) study of how the learning disability category ‘was created by white middle class parents in an effort to differentiate their children from low-achieving low-income and minority children’ (2010: para. 1); or my discussion of the reproduction of race/class privileged through mad identity politics and higher educational policies around disability accommodation (Gorman 2013a). In 1984, Deborah Stone argued that gaining disability status through state-sponsored programmes signalled a category of privilege in that only certain disabled citizens, with certain medically documented impairments, could qualify for disability pensions and health-care supports. In the growing context of economic apartheid (Galabuzi 2006) achieved through differential and decreasing access to citizenship status for many of Canada’s workers, it is a good time to revisit questions of disability rights – rights that Canada’s ‘exalted subjects’ (Thobani 2007) may claim, while migrants and Indigenous people are criminalised. The precaritisation of work means more disablement for workers; the precaritisation of migration means that workers cannot afford to claim disability without jeopardising their immigration application or work permit. Whether we claim disability as an identity, then, is complicated by the realities of racialisation and precarious status. At the same time, exploitation and violence are deeply connected to processes of disablement. I argue for the necessity of conceptualising a disability–disablement dialectic at this juncture in order to move beyond the erasure of Black, Indigenous, and racialised people with disabilities. As we will see below, this move opens the door to ask more fundamental questions about the significance of ‘self-determining’ and ‘outer-determined’ subjectivities. As activists and community organisers, we find ourselves in a new landscape, littered with the failure or closure of community-based initiatives intended to meet needs defined by the communities being served. Mental-health service paradigms and rhetoric continue to gain dominance in both mainstream and equity-focused health discourse, even as community services which provide fundamental supports to well-being are under increased pressure to comply with e-reporting and neoliberal rationalisation. Colleagues working in shelter, mental health, and settlement sectors are bracing for the crisis, as supports for refugee claimants are cut, migration is further criminalised, and citizenship status/non-status takes on increasingly Apartheid-like dimensions. For people without status, and for people struggling for family reunification, the shift in accessing supports from community-based services like drop-ins to medicalised mental-health programmes is fraught with difficulties, as immigrants with disabilities are denied citizenship on the grounds of ‘excessive demand’, and as e-records create increased risk for people without papers. Through the consolidation and rationalisation of health care, people are cut off from accessing more than one service and cannot meet their basic needs for survival. Meanwhile, the ever expanding mental-health discourse overwrites these basic determinants of health. The ongoing violence of psychiatric systems in concert with forensic and educational systems have continuously organised racist and colonial violence against Indigenous and racialised people, from the founding of the Canadian state through to the present. These include the legal and medical violence of treatment regimes, the increased channelling of people labelled with mental illness through the forensic processes, the increased risk of detention and deportation, and the increasing criminalisation of poverty, homelessness, and distress. As smaller agencies are systematically being merged or eliminated, large psychiatric institutions exponentially expand their ‘outreach’ projects, staffed by peer-counsellors. This ‘practice to recruit workers with “lived experiences” of oppression’ occurs in a context where ‘white supremacy continues to sustain and reproduce through the historical operationalisation of a mission of care’ (Udegbe and Vo 2012). We are left with questions about how to grow and sustain an anti-racist disability movement when there seems to be no space between our critical efforts to subvert the system and the system’s incorporation of our efforts into its own reproduction – these micro-inclusions of our experience-as-labour power proceed alongside micro-exclusions of racialised people from mad movement organising (Gorman et al. 2013). The struggle of Black, Indigenous, and activists of colour to re-articulate the disabled subject continues against this ongoing re-constitution of the disabled subject as a white subject. Most immediately at stake are the contours of disabled identity in a context where immigration and federal temporary foreign worker programmes mean that disabled people either never arrive, or are disappeared, deported, or detained when a disability is acquired. Increasingly, ‘the disabled’ are those whose formal relationship to the state enables them to claim benefits, while others with similar embodied experiences continue to work through injury and illness, or languish without benefits or status. In settler colonial contexts, both the articulation of disabled subjects as a reserve army (Russell 2002), and the disqualification of racialised populations as disabled subjects, are organised by/through the nation state. How can we account for this contradiction, in which the same social-embodied characteristic can both affirm citizenship and guarantee non-citizenship? In fact, precisely because we have to ask whether and how we identify and dis-identify with disability, we see that ‘disability’ itself functions ideologically as a cover for other social relations. Put another way, how could such a social-embodied characteristic be a master category of human exclusion? Can there be a ‘global’ idea of disability? It has been clear in our discussions that it is impossible for a coherent disabled identity to apply across these contradictions. Nor can we understand ‘disability’ as universal social-embodied relations. Jasbir Puar (2009) hints at something similar in her conceptualisation of a debility/capacity dialectic that toggles between the biopolitical folding into life and the necropolitical leaving to die. Robert McRuer has also called for an awareness in disability studies ‘of uneven biopolitical incorporation ... of disabled subjects who in certain times and places are made representative and ‘targeted for life’ even as others are disabled in different ways ... or targeted for death’ (McRuer 2010: 171). Indeed, Sherene Razack’s (2013) analysis of how police treat Indigenous bodies as ‘already dead’ is an example of the analytic power of this kind of awareness. In his articulation of necropolitics, Achille Mbembe asks, ‘Is the notion of biopower sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political, under the guise of war, of resistance, or of the fight against terror, makes the murder of the enemy its primary and absolute objective?’ (Mbembe 2003: 12). To admit necropolitics into theorisations of disability is to move away from a focus on disabled subjectivities. It is also a move away from the inclusion/exclusion framework that has been central to disability studies and politics. In fact, to admit necropolitics into theorisations of disability is to acknowledge that racial violence might be internal to liberal projects of disability rights. For example, in their articulation of how the ‘hate’ in LGBT hate crimes functions as a racialised ‘psy’ discourse, Jin Haritaworn shows that through applying ‘formulations of queer necropolitics that go beyond a happy inclusion framework of sexual citizenship, the paradox of who must die so that “we” can live ... is clearly brought to the fore’ (Haritaworn 2013: 78). And in her investigation of the structural locations of, and potential solidarities between, Black and Indigenous people in the Americas, Tiffany King asks, ‘how do our respective deaths make other people’s processes of self-actualization possible?’ (King 2013: 263). Denise Ferreira da Silva finds that appeals to a universal humanity always/already posit a racialised other: The deployment of the tools of raciality has instituted globality as a modern onto-epistemological horizon. Unlike historicity, the preferred ontological descriptor that writes modern subjects as self-determined (interior/temporal) things, the political-symbolic arsenal that confectioned globality institutes post-Enlightenment modern subjects as racial things, universal entities that signify necessitas, thus establishing an unresolvable distinction between the self-determined I and its affectable others (Silva 2009: 234). In this way, we might think of disability identity as indexing the mobilisation of both state entitlements and state violence. The juridical, ethical, and political processes of folding people into disability does not negate the fundamental dynamics of racial violence – rather, disability can function as a social-embodied characteristic that provides the self-determining ‘I’ with selfdetermination through accessing rights, or renders the affectable ‘other’ more affected. I argued above that it is productive to pay attention to ways in which the state organises categories of disability in coordination with other aspects of citizenship (non)-status. We may find that contradictions around disability policy can be more clearly grasped when they are understood in the context of the totality of state policies related to national race/class formation. Further, if we consider state policy in relation to the geopolitical dialectics of uneven and combined development (Desai 2013), disability might be grasped as a contradictory set of social relations, which are mobilised both between and within national state contexts. But this political economy approach only touches on disability as it is mobilised and defined through policy. How do we attend to widespread experiences of disablement through violence, war, and genocide? Does disablement then become a marker of global positioning? Da Silva’s framing of the ‘global’ points to a fundamental spatial knowledge that has emerged through modernity’s projects of European colonialism-slavetrade and capitalism-imperialism. Katherine McKittrick describes a spatial necropolitics in which ‘those who continue to inhabit the uninhabitable are so perversely outside the Western bourgeois conception of what it means to be human that their geographies are rendered – or come to be – inhuman, dead, and dying’ (McKittrick 2013: 7). In previous work, I have tried to uncover ways in which representations of disabled subjects in disability rights and culture movements have disallowed a focus on disablement caused by war, imperialism, and environmental destruction (Gorman 2005). What can we learn through representations of disablement in anti-colonial and national liberation struggles? It is clear that anti-colonial articulations of disablement are not intelligible through the framework of disability rights. Da Silva argues that because the human in modernity is founded on the racial, racial violence is always/already internal to humanising discourses: Racial violence ... does not require stripping off signifiers of humanity. On the contrary, this collapsing is already inscribed in raciality, which produces humanity, the self-determined political (ethical-juridical) figure that thrives in ethical life, only because it institutes it in a relationship ... with another political figure (the affectable I) that stands before the horizon of death (Silva 2009: 234). To take one example, in the context of Palestine, struggles waged in civil society for liberation, and even survival, include ongoing attempts to draw attention to a population under siege – the duress of checkpoints; the psychological effects of torture; the impact of daily bombardment on children; the cutting of electricity to hospitals and essential services; the blockade of construction materials to rebuild bombed roads and buildings; and the blockade of medicines and medical supplies. Despite the fact that all of these violations are about disablement, political claims are made in the context of the UN General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court, not the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Disablement exposes the ‘horizon of death’ in contemporary disability theory. The crisis of disability representation, and the contradiction between disability-as-identity and disablement-that-is disappeared, flows from this fundamental contradiction in Western representations of the human in modernity. The opposing aspects of this dialectical contradiction are the always/already racially constituted ‘transparent I’ and the ‘affectable other’ at the horizon of death; or Man and its human others. If, then, what I am calling disablement is poised at the horizon of death, its representation is short-circuited in a kind of ‘ethnographic entrapment’ (Smith 2014), wherein the affectable other must be known, but cannot be self-knowing. Audra Simpson outlines her arrival at ‘ethnographic refusal’ in academic representation at the point ‘when the data would not contribute to our sovereignty or complicate the deeply simplified, atrophied representations of Iroquois and other Indigenous people’ (Simpson 2007: 78). Instead of searching for the racialised disabled subject, we must continue the work of uncovering specific genealogies of disability that have been co-constitutive of racialisation in the context of the production of the nation state (some examples focusing on the Canadian racial/settler-colonial state include Chadha 2008; Kanani 2011; Million 2013; Razack 2013; Roman et al. 2009; Tam 2014; and Wong 2012). It is this imperative to turn away from an ethnographic project that prompts me to engage post-colonial and Indigenous literary studies and curatorial strategies as methods for moving past the representation of disabled subjectivities and toward contextual social-political narratives (see Gorman and Udegbe 2010; Gorman 2011, 2013b, 2014; Pickens 2014). Dina Georgis (2013) proposes an engagement with aesthetic archives of post-colonial cultural production in order to uncover ‘the better story’ about the constitution of gendered-racialised identities through war, migration, and cultural dislocation. This project is different from the move to ‘diversify’ disability arts. It is a project that poses many questions: What strategies are available to curators and theorists to contextualise disablement as an assemblage of political-cultural-economic processes? What frameworks can we mobilise to analyse the ways in which disablement appears in the work? What archival resources can we mobilise in order to historicise narratives of disablement that emerge from the work? When does disability emerge as identity, and what kinds of assemblages do these identities reference? What aesthetic strategies do artists engage to frame disablement? And what would it mean for disability studies if we started to engage some of these strategies in our politics and in our theorising?

### K---Gender

#### Western imperialism currently shapes the past and present processes of Palestinian knowledge production. The universalized cultured and religion informed understandings of Gender have favored Western understandings which are used to justify U.S. Military engagement. Debates can call into question this ‘Rescue Rhetoric’ as it is to be challenged for its reproduction of Orientalism and feminist exclusion at the level of epistemology.

Andersson 23 [Tanetta; Professor in the Sociology Department at Trinity College, “‘Knowing’ Palestinian Women: Interrogating Western International Feminist Assumptions, Governance, and Social Science Discourses”, Critical Sociology, (<https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205231154616>) // Makinde]

The **dynamics of empire stubbornly persist in the Palestinian Occupied Territories**; the political and social conditions cannot be described as ‘**post’-colonial**. Despite these political and colonial realities for many peoples, sociological thought has not come to terms with the **Western imperialism** encoded in both **past** and **present processes** of its **knowledge production** (Connell, 2007; Go, 2020; Jafar, 2017). To confront sociology’s evasion of colonial relations, a focus on sociology of knowledge and discourse construction is a critical intervening point at which thinking in an ‘ambivalently disciplined’ manner is required. Thus, I draw from postcolonial studies in sociology and Middle Eastern Women’s Studies to push against disciplinary conventions and omissions in sociology (Soukarieh, 2009). Howard Winant (2001), Raewyn Connell (2007), and Julian Go (2016) represent important starting points in sociological viewpoints informed by postcolonial criticism. For example, Go (2016) illustrates that the early works of postcolonial theory ‘challenged deep systems of knowledge, identity, and culture that had enabled colonialism’, while the second wave contests Marxist economic determinism of the initial wave of postcolonial influence because it overlooks, ‘the racialized, gendered, psychological, cultural, and semiotic dimensions and legacies of imperial power’ (Go, 2016: 6).

Edward Said’s Orientalism expands the narrow legitimating role of ideology within Marxist approaches of Postcolonial studies. Said’s theory of interpretation is an ‘apparatus of knowledge’ which is productive – power is built through representation at the same time as epistemology when understood through Said’s extension of Foucault’s power/knowledge conceptualizations (Yegenoglu, 1998: 15). In Orientalist discourse, **binary oppositions locate the Orient in the inferior position to that of the superior West** and are linked to projects of domination which draw on scholarly knowledge: ‘we are implicated in the projects that establish **Western authority** and **cultural difference’** (Abu-Lughod, 2001: 105). One example illustrating the ongoing politics of Orientalism is Said’s (2001, 2003 [1978]) corrective of Samuel Huntington’s ‘**clash of civilizations’** thesis. Said characterizes it instead as ‘clash of ignorance’, with the West on one side of the binary and Islam on the other in which complex historical currents and countercurrents are reduced and over-simplified into Popeye and Bluto ‘cartoonlike’ adversaries. Although Said does not center women or gender in his work specifically, Women’s studies and anthropologist scholar, Sondra Hale (2005: 1) describes Said as an ‘accidental feminist’. She points out that in later work like ‘Orientalism reconsidered’, he addresses methodological questions within a wider ‘circle of issues’ (Said, 1985). Gurminder Bhambra (2007) argues convincingly that, like the missing engagements with gender and **sexuality of sociology’s past** which overlooked such realms as **constitutive of structural relations within societies**, our **limited engagement with postcolonial thought represents** a ‘**missing revolution’** in the field of **sociology**.

At the crossroads of sociological knowledge on gender relations for Middle Eastern women, sociologist Marnia Lazreg (1988: 86) presses forceful questions: ‘**Why hasn’t academic feminism exposed the weaknesses of the prevailing discourse on women in the Middle East** and North Africa?’ An intellectual born in a Muslim country and to Muslim parents, her works include The Eloquence of Silence: Algerian Women in Question (1994), Questioning the Veil: Open Letters to Muslim Women (2009), and most recently, Islamic Feminism and the Discourse of Post-Liberation: The Cultural Turn in Algeria (2021). Across this corpus, her keen eye for tracing discursive power in academia and media representations stands out. In ‘Feminism and Difference: The Perils of Writing as a Woman on Women in Algeria’ appearing in the journal, Feminist Studies, Lazreg (1988: 101) argues ‘To think of feminism in the singular is sociologically inappropriate’. Similar to U.S. multiracial feminist approaches to the ‘**politics of difference’**, she refutes universalizing claims present in Western feminist discourses on women in the Middle East, which understand women through monolithic, totalizing frames of religion, tradition, and victimization (Connell, 2007). In essence, when Islamic and Middle Eastern women are subsumed under practices like **veiling** and **seclusion**, they are abstracted out of ‘**historical specificity’** and political contexts, precluding **any structural explanations beyond religion, tradition, or possibility of change** (Hale, 2005; Mohanty, 2003). Lazreg (1988: 88) continues:

The one-sidedness of this discourse on difference becomes grotesque if we reverse the terms and suggest, for example, that women in contemporary Europe and North America should be studied as Christian women! Similarly, the label ‘**Middle Eastern women’**, when counterposed with the label ‘European women’, reveals its unwarranted generality. The Middle East is a geographical area covering no less than twenty countries (if it is confined to the ‘Arab East’) that display a few similarities and many differences.

Lazreg (2000) denounces **International women’s studies for its ‘tourist feminism’** and thus conveys her deep skepticism regarding superficial attempts at understanding women from the Global south which are often anchored in analytical **universal assumptions**. In ‘The triumphant discourse of global feminism: should other women be known?’ she weighs these points against the professionalization of gender studies, identifying insidious effects like ‘**theatrical indigenization’** and ‘**distanciation’**, produced by some Western feminists’ colonial gaze. In the former case, institutional contexts like academic conferences, speaking events, and texts, Lazreg observes frequent foregrounding of sensationalized speakers or textbook images of **Othered women for Western audiences**. In the latter, distanciation comprehends Othered women solely as objects of data for Western intellectuals and students who assume they are entitled to have access and ‘know’ (Lazreg, 2000; Soukarieh, 2009). These types of **colonial ways of seeing** and **engaging perpetuate the one-sidedness of knowledge formation** by which **Western women ‘define the terms of the reception of Othered women’s intellectual production and translatability’** (Lazreg, 2000: 30). Indeed, it is true that many prominent liberal feminists like Robin Morgan suppress Palestinian women’s voices in the feminist movement (Jarmakani, 2011: 233). In their writings and public commentary, Betty Freidan and Andrea Dworkin, mobilize a cultural frame over a structural one through their focus on the political martyrdom of militant Palestinian women. Consequently, they totalize Palestinian women through the narrow lens of tradition, religion, and culture, on the one hand, while omitting the necropolitical and structural violence of Israeli occupation Palestinian women often witness throughout their lives (Abdulhadi, 2007; Amireh, 2011; Elia, 2011).

Domination Through Culturizing Palestinian Women in International Feminist and Social Science Frameworks

Overt expressions of global feminist discourse silencing Palestinian women through writings are many, but some Palestinian women scholars argue the VAW human rights legal framework represents a covert yet powerful form of global feminist discourse universalistic assumptions. In her history of Gender in Islam, Leila Ahmed (1992) argues that British and French colonial powers mobilized feminism to legitimate their oppressive regimes. Western Colonial officials, for instance, engaged in contradictory positions on women’s oppression: Lord Comer voiced criticism about the ‘oppressive’ veiling practices of Egyptian women, on the one hand, while speaking against British women’s suffrage rights, on the other hand.

A contemporary derivative of such colonial feminism has come to the fore: a ‘**rescue rhetoric’**, which justifies **Western military interventions** on behalf of women in formerly colonized nations. Lila Abu-Lughod (2002) analyzes the ‘political work’ done by such discursive framing in the name of women’s rights and equality. In place of the ‘colonial feminism’ espoused by British leaders like Lord Comer, First Lady Laura Bush and Cherie Blair, wife of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, recycle the same old Orientalist binary imaginary in their public comments supporting Western intervention: ‘Tradition and Modernity. Harems and Freedom. Veiling and Unveiling’ (Abu-Lughod, 2001: 105). Feminist admirers of Abu-Lughod’s ‘Do Muslim Women Need Saving’ remark that it remains as relevant now as in 2002, when the originating article was published (Scott, 2015: 108). More recently, Abu-Lughod (2013) has turned this gendered orientalism lens on ‘circuits’ of human rights discourse. Like the savior rhetoric highlighted above justifying armed conflict through calls to rescue or ‘**save’ Afghan women**, Abu-Lughod argues human rights discourses also situate **Muslim women at the center of reformulated moral crusades**. These circuits function to authorize two mutually reinforcing narratives between **public imaginations** and **human rights discourse**, working hand-in-glove to deepen **gendered orientalist oppositions of Muslim women in Western audiences and minds**. Here, she samples textual evidence ranging from faulty journalistic ethnographies (i.e. Half the Sky by Nicolas Kristoff and Sheryl WuDann) to ‘pulp nonfiction’ memoirs genres. Two such sensationalist pulp nonfiction ‘memoirs’ reflect Muslim women in Jordan and Palestine, for example, and are mass-published in the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Both focus on honor; however, after greater scrutiny, one was found to be problematic because the author had not lived in Jordan since she was 3 years of age! Abu-Lughod’s findings indicate these works represent Muslim women to Western audiences like mirror opposites of Western women’ and, crucially, Muslim women’s lives are articulated in terms of ‘culturized category of violence’ – seclusion, veiling, honor crimes – for Western imaginations and appetites. Similarly, in another chapter, Abu-Lughod explains how honor crimes are produced and read through the unidimensional lens of tradition, producing the ‘tradition effect’ (Koğacioğlu, 2004).

In feminist international **human rights frameworks**, Karen Engle (2019) detects this pattern of **culturized understandings of gender** being subsumed with a singular focus on private sphere violations, especially **sexual rights** and **freedoms** (i.e. sexual trafficking, prostitution, honor deaths, wife battery, and sexual violence). After the 1993 Global Tribunal on Violations of Women’s Human Rights at the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, for example, the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action document attempts to integrate postcolonial critiques by articulating what Engle terms ‘culturally sensitive universalism’. By contrast, Engle frames Western radical feminists as representing the ‘structural bias’ perspective, challenging human rights legal theory for its limited ability to address violations and abuse in private spheres between citizens (Engle, 2019). Post-Vienna, the impetus behind this latter ‘structural bias’ framing consolidated around the realm of women’s sexual domination, or VAW including during conflict, as central to women’s rights as human rights platforms. However, **this focus point** also acts to **dislodge** and **marginalize** Third World **women’s more radical questions** regarding **exploitative relations** of **Global capitalism** between Global North and South (Bunch and Reilly, 1994; Engle, 2019). To illustrate the coalesce of these differing strands in this final section, I draw on the case of the ‘VAW’ agenda contouring domestic violence as a social problem in the context of Palestinian Occupied territories.

### K---Queer Theory

#### Debates can center the ‘Pinkwashing’ and the violent dichotomization of “Gay-Friendly” vs. the “Not-Gay Friendly” as the constitutive foundation for the discursively destructive relationship between how U.S. Settler Colonial logics are parasitic on the homonationalist nature of Israel as imposing a discipline on Palestinian queers into legible subjects for neoliberal and militaristic consumption.

Puar 17 [Jasbir, Professor and Graduate Director of Women's and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, “The Right to Maim : Debility, Capacity, Disability” Duke University Press, Chapter 3, (<https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-right-to-maim>), November 2017 // Makinde]

This piece of **advertising**, created by the pro-Israel organization Size Doesn’t Matter as part of an ad campaign focused on promoting the virtues of Israel to Canadians, can be hailed as an example of “**pinkwashing**,” a piece of propaganda highlighting the **lgbt rights record of Israel** as a function of **obscuring** or **legitimating** its **occupation of Palestine**.2 Repurposed in 2009 from campaigns to critique facile medical corporate support of **breast cancer research**, **pinkwashing** has been redefined as the Israeli state’s use of its admittedly **stellar lgbt rights record** to **deflect attention from**, and in some instances to **justify** or **legitimate**, its **occupation of Palestine**. Resonating within a receptive field of globalized Islamophobia significantly amplified since September 11, 2001, this messaging is reliant on a civilizational narrative about the modernity of the Israelis juxtaposed against the backward homophobia of the Palestinians. As such, **pinkwashing has become a commonly used tag for the cynical promotion of lgbt bodies as representative of Israeli democracy**. More generally, it is the **erasure of hierarchies of power** through the favoring of the “**gay-friendly nation” imagery**. It is a discourse about civilizational superiority that relies on a transparent and uninterrogated construction of “Palestinian homophobia” contingent upon the foreclosure of any questioning about “Israeli homophobia.” Besides making **Zionism** more appealing to (**Euro-American) gays**, part of the mechanism at work that **benefits Israel** is a **disciplining of Palestinian queers** into **legible subjects**. At the same time, as Haneen Maikey has noted, the most relevant and damning effect of pinkwashing is its contribution to the processes of **internal colonization**: the naturalization of Israeli superiority by Palestinians themselves. The most important targets of pinkwashing therefore are not actually Euro-American gay tourists but (**queer and gay) Palestinians** themselves.3 As such, I would argue that it functions dually, as a form of **discursive preemptive securitization** that marshals **neo-orientalist** fears of **Palestinians** as backward, **sexually repressed terrorists**, and as an intense mode of **subjugation** of **Palestinians** under **settler colonial rule.**

For whom is pinkwashing legible and persuasive as a political discourse, and why? First of all, **a neoliberal accommodationist** **economic structure** engenders the niche marketing of various ethnic and **minoritized groups** and has normalized the production of a gay and lesbian tourism industry built on the **discursive distinction** between **gay-friendly** and **not-gay friendly destinations**.4 The claims of **pinkwashing** are often seen as plausible when rendered through an **lgbt rights discourse** that resonates within **North America** and Europe as a dominant **measurement of teleological progress**.5 These claims make far less sense in the “Middle East,” for example, where there is a healthy skepticism about the universalizing of lgbt rights discourses and where knowledge of the complexities of sexualities in the region is far more nuanced. Additionally, in some senses Israel is a pioneer of homonationalism, as its particular position at the crosshairs of settler colonialism, occupation, and neoliberalist accommodationism creates the perfect storm for the normalization of homosexuality through national belonging. The **homonationalist history of Israel** illuminates a burgeoning of lgbt rights and increased mobility for gays and lesbians during the concomitant increased segregation and decreased mobility of Palestinian populations, especially post-Oslo. I have detailed this point at greater length elsewhere, but to quickly summarize: the advent of gay rights in Israel begins around the same time as the first intifada, with the 1990s known as Israel’s “gay decade” brought on by the legalization of homosexuality in the Israeli Defense Forces, workplace antidiscrimination provisions, and numerous other legislative changes.6 The idf becomes a notable site of homonationalist distinction in relation to other countries in the “Middle East,” as “Only in Israel” can “Gay Officers Serve Their Country.”

The **financial, military, affective**, and **ideological entwinement of U.S**. and Israeli **settler colonialisms**, and the role of the **United States** more generally, **should also not be minimized** when evaluating why pinkwashing appears to be an **effective discursive strategy**.7 **The United States** and Israel are the greatest **beneficiaries** of **homonationalism** in the current global **geopolitical order**, as homonationalism operates to manage difference on the **scalar registers** of the **internal, territorial**, and **global**. Moreover, pinkwashing is an **ideological** and **economic solicitation** directed to the **United States**—Israel’s greatest financial supporter internationally—and to Euro American gays who have the political capital and financial resources to invest in Israel. Thus, pinkwashing’s unconscious appeal to U.S. gays is produced through the erasure of **U.S. settler colonialism** enacted in the tacit endorsement of Israel’s occupation of Palestine.8

But pinkwashing has many antecedents; **it is one more justification of colonial rule in the long history of imperial, racial, and national violence**. How has “the homosexual question” come to supplement “the woman question” of the colonial era to modulate arbitration between modernity and tradition, citizen and terrorist, homonational and queer? As elaborated by Partha Chatterjee, this question arose with some force in the decolonization movements in South Asia, whereby the capacity for an emerging postcolonial government to protect native women from oppressive patriarchal cultural practices, marked as tradition, became the barometer by which colonizers arbitrated political concessions made to the colonized.9 Here echoes Gayatri Spivak’s famous dictum regarding the colonial project: “white men saving brown women from brown men.”10 Over time the terms of the woman question have been redictated, from the nineteenthcentury formulation of white women’s relation to colonial women as the, white woman’s burden” to present-day liberal feminist scholars who have become the arbiters of other women’s modernity, or the modernity of the Other Woman. To reinvoke Spivak for the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, then: white women saving brown women from brown men. The white woman’s burden from the nineteenth century is regenerated for contemporary deployment through liberal feminist frames within human rights discourses

### K---Colonialism

#### Debates about the relationship between subject positions and nation-states can critically interrogate the justifications the United States and Palestinians use for cooperation as rooted in violent logics of settler neo-colonialism.

Mayo 22 [Peter; Professor, speaker, editor, writer, and former head of the Department of Arts, Open Communities and Adult Education at the University of Malta, in Malta, “Antonio Gramsci, Settler-Colonialism and Palestine”, Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies, Volume 21, Issue 2, October, 2022, 21(2), pp. 151–175, (<https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/hlps.2022.0293?role=tab>) // Makinde]

This paper is predicated on the view that **colonialism** and **neo-colonialism** take many forms and comprise issues concerning a ‘heterogeneous set’ of **subaltern** ‘**subject positions’** (Slemon 1995: 45). Drawing on previous work (Mayo 2015), I shall restrict myself, in this contribution, to the following:

(a)

the Gramscian concepts of Hegemony and what I call ‘misplaced alliances’ (Mayo 2007, 2016) and relating them to the Freirean concepts of the ‘oppressor consciousness’ and ‘cultural invasion’, the latter also bringing Edward Said into the reckoning;

(b)

the very complex issue of language in a post-independence, post-colonial situation.

These issues feature prominently in the context under review where direct colonialism, in Edward Said’s terms (Said, 1994, p.8), typified by the presence of an occupying force, neo-colonialism and, to adopt Gramsci’s perspective, ‘internal-colonialism’ (Gramsci 1997)1, makes its presence felt, often in crude and exceedingly violent ways. Gramsci, as with Freire and obviously Said, has also been invoked in an analysis of community action in the specific situation of ‘**settler-colonialism’** (Silwadi and Mayo 2014; Sperlinger 2015), that is to say **the condition in which Palestinians find themselves in their homeland**. Recall that this involves a land declared as **terra nullius** [nobody’s land], i.e. not falling under a sovereign European state, which can be occupied by an **exogenous force**, usually backed by an **imperial power**. This occurs despite the presence of Indigenous people, considered ‘racially/ethnically inferior’. The Indigenous people are to be either displaced or **assimilated** within a colonial set up in a subordinate position with regard to the occupying settlers (see Masalha 2018: 307).

One can argue that **Palestine faces a combination of all three types of colonialism**, namely internal colonisation as a result of its dependence on a colonising force within the country that ‘calls the shots’ in many ways, direct colonialism as a result of the presence of an occupying force and settler colonialism because Palestinians have seen their land taken and settled upon by people coming from outside.

One key text by Gramsci, used by a variety of authors in discussions of colonisation and dependency, is the essay on the Southern Question. It is titled Alcuni temi sulla Quistione2 Meridionale (Some themes from the Southern Question). It refers to the situation of uneven capitalist development in Italy. An industrialised North co-exists with an industrially underdeveloped Southern part and the islands, a situation which persists until the present day. A ‘First World’ northern part of Italy colonises a ‘Third World’ southern part, the latter consisting of the Mezzogiorno (the South) involving the peninsula from Rome downward and the islands, both the small and the large ones — mainly Sicily and Sardinia, in the latter case.

The issue of dependency is prominent in the literature dealing with pedagogy in Southern contexts, under the sway of ‘informal colonialism’ as are, for instance, the Middle East and Latin America. The issue of dependency needs to be analysed in this context, for instance Latin American countries’ dependency on the international capitalism of the multinationals, as propounded by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, later to become Brazil’s President, and Enzo Faletto (Cardoso and Faletto 1979).

The impact was felt and analysed **beyond the economic**. One of the main persons ‘to think with’ in this paper, Paulo Freire, writing from a Latin American perspective, brings the **Catholic Church** into discussions on **colonialism** and dependency calling for a ‘prophetic church’ which is a church that reveals, in Gustavo Gutierrez words, a preferential option for the poor, thus underlining the contrast that lies between what Cornell West calls the ‘Constantinian Church’ (the ‘Church of Empire’) and the grassroots-oriented ‘Prophetic Church’ with its basis in Liberation Theology. The latter is a decidedly decolonising theology born out of the most overtly colonised contexts which have moved from being directly colonised to being informally **colonised by the superpower that is the USA** and multinationals. In an earlier co-authored piece, in this journal (Grech and Mayo 2020), Michael Grech and I posited the relevance of one of the most important Jerusalem narratives, the passion and death of Jesus Christ, celebrated universally within Christendom, and offering numerous archetypal, in the Jungian sense, images of transformation for a Liberation Theology and pedagogy in Palestine itself. This is of course in relation to the popular struggle against settler colonialism. It has resonance for other people in colonial situations elsewhere, especially dispossessed people, as I shall show.

#### The aff is an imposition of Global North sovereignty that fuels the endless replication of coloniality which dispossesses indigenous folks and traps them within a false illusion of inclusion that serves to reinforce its ontological underpinnings

Itxaso Domínguez de Olazábal, PhD in Arab and Islamic Studies from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1-27-23, “On Indigenous Refusal against Externally-Imposed Frameworks in Historic Palestine”, Millenium Journal of International Studies, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359>, -PGR, 3-25-23

Anticolonial Resistance Projects and Liberal Politics of Recognition. Recognition Imposed from the Global North

‘Refusal comes with the requirement of having one’s political sovereignty acknowledged and upheld, and raises the question of legitimacy for those who are usually in the position of recognising: What is their authority to do so? Where does it come from? Who are they to do so?’[21](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn21-03058298221131359)

To further understand the inevitability of Indigenous frameworks to comprehend dynamics in and beyond historic Palestine, this section elaborates on one of their central notions, that of refusal. Critical Indigenous Studies invite us to centre the relational approach to settler-colonial power. The colonial relationship is based on – and perpetuated thanks to – material elements of domination and dispossession by force or coercion, but also operates through mechanisms of more implicit violence such as misrecognition and alienation based on hierarchies of race and gender.[22](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn22-03058298221131359) The perspective leads us to explore the link between anticolonial resistance and the study of recognition politics drawing on several Indigenous scholars, among which Glen Coulthard, a member of Yellowknives Dene First Nation, and Audra Simpson, who belongs to the Mohawks of Kahnawake, stand out, in turn inspiring – and inspired by – other authors.[23](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn23-03058298221131359)

Coulthard bases much of his criticism of liberal politics of recognition on the work of Franz Fanon.[24](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn24-03058298221131359) He questions the applicability of the recognition theory to the contexts in which the colonial relationship – or other structural asymmetries of power –still constitute a poignant reality. The hegemonic theory of recognition considers mutual recognition as something positive and desirable when it comes to ending a conflict and achieving reconciliation and even forgetfulness.[25](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn25-03058298221131359) Some of its critics believe that recognition can, however, produce adverse effects and contribute to perpetuating, and in a certain way justify and reproducing, the interconnected and mutually reinforcing modes of colonialism.[26](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn26-03058298221131359) Liberal politics of recognition do not consider the colonial relationship’s incommensurability – and foundational injustice.

An essential danger derives from the colonial binarism: accepting these politics of recognition may mean internalising the colonial narrative, since the Indigenous is recognised by a colonial subject whose existence is illegitimate. Presenting it as a painful concession, the coloniser ‘recognises’ the Indigenous as a subordinate deserving of some carefully selected (not threatening) rights by virtue of his [their] identity and culture, not of his [their] implicit sovereignty and unique bond with the land. When the Indigenous ‘consents’, he [they] accepts the recognition and, simultaneously, the dispossession accompanying it. He [They] becomes a victim of the distraction from the Indigenous struggle co-option consists of.[27](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn27-03058298221131359) Liberal politics of recognition function as a distraction mechanism that forces the colonised to remain on the defensive and reproduce a reactive strategy.[28](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn28-03058298221131359)

Anticolonial resistance that aspires to change but does not denounce the liberal politics of recognition accept, and even demand, recognition by the colonial project. They bet on framing their claims in the structures delimited by the colonial authorities, who agreed to negotiate some fringes of the system, albeit not its legitimacy altogether. The terms of the accommodation might be (re)arranged, but the colonial power will have the last word.[29](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn29-03058298221131359) This type of resistance, as well as the passive attitude towards the colonial project, is considered an internalisation of the colonising language (‘white freedom and justice’, in Fanon’s words) as one of the most treacherous psychological effects of the colonial relationship.[30](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn30-03058298221131359)

This article focuses specifically on the recognition proposed – rather, imposed – by other actors than the colonisers. Critical Indigenous Studies ‘asks the settler, native, and the arrivant each acknowledge their own positions within empire and then reconceptualise space and history to make visible what imperialism and its resultant settler colonialisms and diasporas have sought to obscure’.[31](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn31-03058298221131359) Its scholars help us to understand the way Indigenous realities are ordered not just by the respective settler-colonial authority but also by other interconnected systems of power that structure the global hegemonic structure that the international society is, particularly when it comes to the idea of empire and to normative structures of whiteness that continuously replicate themselves.[32](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn32-03058298221131359)

In a global system shaped by circuits of capital accumulation and imperial asymmetrical flows, recognition can be granted by a colonial entity but also by other states, the international society, or other forces, such as the market. All of them represent the Global North in one way or another.[33](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn33-03058298221131359) Empire and racial capitalism slyly operate to expand uninterruptedly at different levels. Each of those actions becomes entangled with violence to re-centre the foundational requirements of the Global North throughout different geographies. Simultaneously, the international normative framework holds hands with settler colonialism while boasting its liberal values. Most analyses refer to the US as a clear instance of an unsettler state that has the reins of a system built – and still relying – on the colonial legacies of the Global South, but the case of Israel is not an exception. The state is a European colony. Since its establishment, it has resorted to mechanisms developed for centuries by imperial powers to dispossess, subjugate and de-humanise the colonised Palestinians. It has implemented these processes of racialisation and hierarchisation directly when upholding British colonial regulations and, most of the time, indirectly through corporeal and non-corporeal means.

The Global North contributes to the constant replication and perpetuation of whiteness and racialising structures through ‘homogenizing pressures’,[34](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn34-03058298221131359) processes of objectification/subjection’[35](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn35-03058298221131359) and ‘intellectual and political projects that assume the continuation rather than the end of settler colonialism’.[36](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn36-03058298221131359) Western arrangements are imposed mainly through several avenues, building on epistemological presumptions and discursive tactics, creating a network of various sites and processes. It sets a political ontology, biopolitics and racialising assemblages that mirror an overdetermined nature of international advancement and go from the ideological to the material through bodies, institutions and affects.

In the case of historic Palestine and mirroring others, the Global North imposes the terms in which the context must be explained and narrated accordingly: it sets the paradigm regardless of the realities on the ground. Indigenous peoples need to learn to speak the language of the international society and adopt a ‘colonial intelligibility’,[37](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn37-03058298221131359) even if that leaves them with mere ‘illusions of inclusion’.[38](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn38-03058298221131359) This imposition of liberal politics goes hand in hand with the red lines within which contestation is possible, and the resulting expectations imposed on the colonised regarding their behaviour and rights.[39](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn39-03058298221131359) The Global North has also accommodated Indigenous Palestinian rights within existing (post)colonial legal and political frameworks, mainly when it comes to the adoption of Western models in institutional or cultural terms (especially, the creation of a capitalist nation-state), the consequence of full involvement with the neoliberal model[40](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn40-03058298221131359) or the illusion of an ever-bounded sovereignty.[41](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03058298221131359#fn41-03058298221131359)

## Area Neg---Israel

### DA---Iranian Prolif

#### The creation of security guarantees through a mutual defense treaty triggers Iranian prolif and harms Israeli diplomacy with Russia

Inbar and Lerman, 19

(Efraim Inbar is president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and a fellow at the Middle East Forum, Eran Lerman is vice-president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, 6/25, “Why a U.S.-Israel Alliance is a Terrible Idea”, <https://www.meforum.org/58838/us-israeli-defense-treaty-neither-desirable-nor-practical>)

South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham recently suggested that the United States should conclude a defense treaty with Israel. His objective was to signal to the world how important the American relationship with Israel is. In his opinion the pact would show the international community that "an attack against Israel would be considered an attack against the United States." This is not the first time that the idea of a US-Israel defense pact has been broached. House Resolution 700 in 2006 called for ever-closer relations between Israel and NATO, ultimately leading to full membership in the Alliance. Such gestures should be appreciated for the noble sentiment they express. But from an Israeli perspective a defense treaty with the US is not desirable; it might create more problems than it would solve. A defense treaty entails a commitment to take military action in the case of aggression against one of the parties. Yet Israel has declared for decades that it does not want American soldiers to endanger their lives for Israel's security. Jerusalem has adopted the famous Churchillian dictum "Give us the tools and we shall finish the job." (Churchill did not necessary mean this; he did not hide his delight when the US came into WWII. But Israel does mean it). This principle, which is enshrined in Israel's national security thinking, has been an important component in Israel's popularity in the US. It is also an element of the unwritten but powerful understanding between Israel and American Jewry, alongside American Jewry's commitment to help Israel secure American material and diplomatic support. Israel has been a staunch supporter of the US in the international arena since David Ben-Gurion lent his support to the US-backed UN action in Korea in June 1950. The deep and broad security relations between the two nations are extremely useful to both sides. Israel is a security asset for the US in many ways. It serves as America's best ally in the region, occasionally ready to act militarily in conjunction with American interests. (The point was emphatically made during the Jordan crisis in 1970). Today, close cooperation is also reflected in joint exercises – some of them bilateral, others multilateral in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, Israel supplies the US with critical intelligence, and it develops advanced technologies that are integrated into the American military. The Defense Department and the American military establishment, once hostile to Israel, have learned to appreciate the special relations. Yet, Israel has never demanded a US security guarantee. Israel wants to be independent. Any defense treaty would curtail its freedom of action. Noteworthy, the European members of the NATO alliance, which is headed by the US, need permission to deploy their forces from the headquarters of the alliance in Brussels. During the Cold War no German plane could fly without approval from Brussels. Israel could not tolerate such restraints. It must use force almost without respite in accordance with its own calculations. Israel's rationale might not be always acceptable in the US. Moreover, such frequent use of force could become a burden for the US, if Israel is its formal ally. A defense treaty also entails obligations to act together with the US. That is why NATO forces are currently deployed in Afghanistan. Israel refrained from sending a military contingent to Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan where US forces were engaged in fighting wars. Israel is busy enough with its own wars. Sending Israeli troops to distant fronts is unlikely to receive domestic support. Once the Senate is asked to ratify a binding treaty, complex questions may arise; and given current tendencies in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, ugly undertones may come to the surface. Thus, the point is likely to be made that the territorial scope of the defense treaty must be defined. And note: Israel's borders are disputed even by America. It is not wise for Israel to try force this issue. In fact, a treaty that commits the US to protect Israel in the pre-1967 lines (only) would generate the opposite result than that intended by its originators. Moreover, the specific case where the treaty might be activated (the casus foederis) would need definition. Obviously, the US will hardly agree to act together with Israel in response to every terrorist attack. If the trigger is left undefined, the treaty will not be useful and instead become a source for friction. Might the treaty be activated automatically? Even then, the US will reserve the right to act in accordance with its constitutional processes, which might extend the length of time until which security assistance is delivered. Certain contingencies demand immediate action, and such legal niceties might make turn defense treaty into a useless mechanism. To this may be added the familiar tendency of the US government, and specifically the military, to take such commitments very seriously. Even if it is unlikely that the treaty will be activated, it would still require American military planners to point out what resources and forces would be needed at ready in order to respond to Israeli needs in an emergency. Given the current constraints on US forces, such an allocation for Israeli contingencies is likely to cause resentment; specifically, among military echelons that Israel had been careful to cultivate over recent decades. Another problem arises from Washington's firm preference that all its allies must ratify international treaties that deal with arms control. Yet Israel is reluctant to sign such treaties because their verification mechanisms are far from perfect. The way the international community, including the US, has dealt with the quest for nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, is totally unsatisfactory from an Israeli point of view. For this, and a multiplicity of other reasons, Israel has been reluctant to join the NPT, and has reached discreet understandings with consecutive US administrations on this question. There is a real danger that an open debate on a defense treaty would bring into focus tensions on this issue that have been dormant for generations. Moreover, a defense treaty that could be read as extending American nuclear deterrence to the Israeli theater may also be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as an alternative to preventive action when it comes to Iran's bid for the bomb. Past administrations, including President Obama's, repeatedly asserted that they would not make do with "containment" of Iran (i.e., the deterring of Iran) on the military nuclear question; even if the JCPOA ultimately was meant to prepare the ground for such a policy down the road. Should the US commit to offer Israel a nuclear "umbrella", this would in practice open the question of whether either country is still truly committed to the principle of preventing Iran, at all costs, from achieving a nuclear arsenal. Beyond the political imperatives on both sides, the decisive question regarding a US-Israel defense treaty can be cast in terms of cost-benefit analysis. The various costs have been outlined above. As to the benefits, a formal alliance would not necessarily add to the key components vital to Israel's national security. US military assistance, which indeed provides the IDF with key components of its build-up and maintenance, clearly constitutes an element in Israel's deterrence equation. But this rests upon the existing long-term (ten year) commitments of the Administration and upon annual congressional allocations – not upon any treaty. The weight and size of the assistance package is a function of US determination to help an ally, and not predicated upon the existence of a formal treaty document. Nor would such a document change hostile perceptions of Israel's immense base of support in the US as it is today. A US-Israel defense treaty would also pose some diplomatic difficulties. A degree of formal distance between Jerusalem and Washington is useful in Israel's diplomatic interactions with many of the Third World countries that are suspicious of a superpower. In addition, under a defense treaty, Israel will be even less free to compete with the US military industries than it is today. As a formal ally, Jerusalem would be less likely to conduct effective diplomacy with Moscow, let alone host a tripartite US-Russia-Israel summit of national security advisors. Thus, a defense treaty between Israel and the US would reflect noble sentiment; but beyond the statement of friendship, it is neither desirable nor practical. The treaty may be a lofty idea, but one that works well only if it remains theoretical.

### DA---Dip Cap

#### An affirmative that engages Israel/Palestine would have a significant dip cap and PC link

Kurtzer-Ellenbogen et al., 2-3-23

(Lucy, Director of the US Institute of Peace Israel and Palestine Region Program, Robert Barron, Program Officer for the US Institute of Peace on Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Caroline Dibble, Program Assistant, MENA Regional Initiatives, Garrett Nada, Program Officer, and Ambassador Hesham Youssef, Senior Fellow for the US Institute of Peace, “Takeaways from Blinken’s Trip to the Middle East”, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/takeaways-blinkens-trip-middle-east>)

Secretary Blinken visited Jerusalem and Ramallah amid deteriorating violence. How did this impact the agenda, and will we see the United States once again drawn into the role of mediator? Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: Secretary Blinken’s trip was planned before the most immediate escalation in Israeli-Palestinian violence, yet the negative trendlines have been clear. The Biden administration is no stranger to this arena, and so the context that greeted Blinken and his team was undoubtedly unwelcome, but not a surprise. Questions now turn to the administration’s calculus of whether its firefighting approach of the past is enough to meet the challenges of the present, as well as the goal it has set for the future: “Equal measures of freedom, security, opportunity, justice, and dignity” for Palestinians and Israelis, ideally achieved through “two states for two peoples.” From the outset of the trip, this vision seemed far removed from the dire reality unfolding on the ground. 2022 was the deadliest year for Palestinians and Israelis at each other’s hands in decades. The occupation is entrenching with extremist annexationist ministers wielding significant power in the Israeli government, while Palestinians remain divided and under two sets of authoritarian rule. The West Bank leadership under President Abbas has lost legitimacy, and with it any semblance of control it once had over significant parts of the West Bank, where militancy is strengthening. Major death tolls from last week’s deadly Israeli army raid targeting Palestinian militants in a Jenin refugee camp, and from a subsequent terror attack by a Palestinian man on Israelis in East Jerusalem, suggest that 2022’s violence could be merely a sign of things to come. The administration is under no illusions. It knows that shifting this reality to get back on the road to a diplomatic solution is a Herculean task, and one requiring significant expenditure of political and diplomatic capital.

### DA---Lashout

#### Placing conditions on military aid cause Israeli lash out and harms deterrence

Bender, 20

(William J. Bender, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant general, is a former Air Force chief information officer and a participant of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) 2019 Generals and Admirals program to Israel, 12/30, “Conditioning U.S. Aid to Israel Would Make Everyone Less Safe”, <https://jinsa.org/conditioning-u-s-aid-to-israel-would-make-everyone-less-safe/>)

Calls for conditioning aid to Israel have gained momentum since Israel proposed—but postponed—extending sovereignty to parts of the West Bank this summer. However, placing additional restrictions on those funds would strain America’s most critical security relationship in the Middle East and be harmful to Palestinians and Israelis alike. The security assistance that the United States provides to Israel directly benefits America’s strategic interest for regional stability and deterring major war. As the United States retrenches from the Middle East, its aid to a capable partner like Israel will only become more important to regional security. In this way, the assistance goes beyond supporting Israel and is also a means for promoting regional security and stability without deploying more American troops. Since the Clinton administration, the United States has planned its foreign military financing (FMF) and missile defense cooperation with Israel through ten-year Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). The Clinton, Bush, and Obama White Houses all maintained a firewall between their policy disagreements with the Israelis and security assistance. Indeed, the Obama administration negotiated both a nuclear agreement with Iran that created tensions with the Israeli government as well as the current U.S.-Israel MoU. This MoU, which covers fiscal years 2019-2028, bolstered the vital bilateral relationship by outlining an unprecedented $33 billion of FMF and $5 billion in missile defense. While MoUs are nonbinding, strong bipartisan majorities in Congress have generally appropriated funds per their terms. This precedent has held regardless of which political party controlled the White House or Congress. However, conditioning aid is a growing idea among those who see U.S-Israel relations primarily through the lens of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Their theory is that Washington could leverage its support to change how Israel spends the funds or push Israel’s leadership to make concessions to the Palestinians. Yet, existing U.S. laws already specify that Israel must use U.S. military supplies for self-defense and sets rules for American weapons transferred to foreign countries. In the few instances where U.S. officials have investigated Israel’s operational use of American-made weaponry, they have done so with Israel’s full cooperation. American defense assistance enables Israel to develop and purchase crucial missile defenses and tunnel detection technology. These technologies afford it the strategic patience to interrupt most attacks without initiating ground operations against their source in Gaza or Lebanon. In fact, rather than being used against Palestinians, Israeli equipment purchased through American aid is more likely to help defend them. Missile defense funding has helped Israel develop and acquire Iron Dome, David’s Sling and Arrow batteries and interceptors that effectively protect the skies over the West Bank and Israel proper. Since 2016, the American and Israeli governments have cooperated on tunnel detection technology that the IDF has deployed on the border with Gaza and Lebanon. As a result of this innovation, Israel has destroyed roughly twenty tunnels, including one extending into Israel in October 2020. If withholding these funds means that Israel has less access to valuable technologies and munitions, Jerusalem may launch preemptive but necessary actions to stop attacks on Israeli civilians. Without the defensive systems the MoU allows Israel to purchase, the IDF could have to divert weaponry to Gaza and away from the much-bigger threat from Hezbollah and Iran to its north. In fact, U.S. security guarantees have encouraged Israel to take risks for peace. As President Bill Clinton aptly explained during a 1993 press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, he “has told me that he is prepared to take risks for peace. He has told his own people the same thing. I have told him that our role is to help to minimize those risks. We will do that by further reinforcing our commitment to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge.” FMF has also enabled Israel to purchase the F-35 fighter aircraft, which it has used in Syria to stop Iran from proliferating advanced weaponry. More than any other ally, Israeli operations against Iran have rolled back Iranian military expansion and prevented it from building up weapons to Israel’s north that could provoke a regional war that harms both Israeli and U.S. interests. In response to the growing frequency and volume of calls for conditioning these funds, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) recently released a report underscoring the importance of aid to Israel and ways to counter the arguments in favor of placing additional conditions on it. Congressional hearings, clearer language within authorizing legislation, and public statements from Defense and State department officials can clarify how aid to Israel contributes to Middle East stability. Placing more conditions on aid to Israel would undermine America’s credibility and put Israelis and Palestinians at risk. The route to stability in the Middle East—and eventual peace between Israelis and Palestinians—lies with more U.S.-Israel cooperation, not less.

### K---Homonationalism

#### Any engagement within Israel that does not first breakdown the power structures of homonationalism will allow for pinkwashing to run rampant. U.S engagement further entwines the ties between Israel and the U.S which continues complicity within the homonationalist structure.

**Puar 2013** [Jasbir K. Puar, Puar is Professor and Graduate Director of Women’s and Gender Studies at Rutgers University, “*Rethinking homonationalism*” . International Journal of Middle East Studies, 45(2), 336-339, GMU JAF]

At times the “viral” travels of the concept of homonationalism, as it has been taken up in North America, various European states, Palestine/Israel, and India, have found reductive applications in activist organizing platforms. Instead of thinking of homonationalism as an accusation, an identity, a bad politics, I have been thinking about it as an analytic to apprehend state formation and a structure of modernity: as an assemblage of geopolitical and historical forces, neoliberal interests in capitalist accumulation both cultural and material, biopolitical state practices of population control, and affective investments in discourses of freedom, liberation, and rights. Homonationalism, thus, is not simply a synonym for gay racism, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries; it is not another identity politics, not another way of distinguishing good queers from bad queers, not an accusation, and not a position. It is rather a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and sexuality. To say that this historical moment is homonational, where homonationalism is understood as an analytics of power, then, means that one must engage it in the first place as the condition of possibility for national and transnational politics. Part of the increased recourse to domestication and privatization of neoliberal economies and within queer communities, homonationalism is fundamentally a deep critique of lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses and how those rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to citizenship—cultural and legal—at the expense of the delimitation and expulsion of other populations. The narrative of progress for gay rights is thus built on the back of racialized others, for whom such progress was once achieved, but is now backsliding or has yet to arrive. I have thus theorized homonationalism as an assemblage of de- and reterritorializing forces, affects, energies, and movements. While the project arose within the post 9/11 political era of the United States, homonationalism is also an ongoing process, one that in some sense progresses from the civil rights era and does not cohere only through 9/11 as a solitary temporal moment. The following brief discussion of homonationalism in relation to pinkwashing and Palestine may help demonstrate the complex ways I see homonationalism as neither identity nor political position. Homonationalism and pinkwashing should not be seen as parallel phenomena. Rather, pinkwashing is one manifestation and practice made possible within and because of homonationalism. Unlike pinkwashing, homonationalism is not a state practice per se. It is instead the historical convergence of state practices, transnational circuits of queer commodity culture and human rights paradigms, and broader global phenomena such as the increasing entrenchment of Islamophobia. These are just some of the circumstances through which nation-states are now vested with the status of “gay-friendly” versus “homophobic.” The conflation of homonationalism and pinkwashing can result in well-intentioned critiques or political stances that end up reproducing the queer exceptionalism of homonationalism in various ways.4 It is thus important to map out the relations between pinkwashing and homonationalism, or, more precisely, the global conditions of homonationalism that make a practicesuch as Israeli pinkwashing possible and legible in the first place. In connecting Israeli pinkwashing to a broader global system of power networks, I am demonstrating the myriad of actors that converge to enable such a practice. Pinkwashing has become a commonly used tag for the cynical promotion of LGBT bodies as representative of Israeli democracy. As its use as a shorthand proliferates, it must be situated within its wider geopolitical context. That is to say, pinkwashing works because both history and global international relations matter. So while it is crucial to challenge the Israeli state, it must be done in a manner that acknowledges the range of complicit actors. Historically speaking, settler colonialism has a long history of articulating its violence through the protection of serviceable figures such as women and children, and now the homosexual. Pinkwashing is only one more justification for imperial/racial/national violence within this long tradition of intimate rhetorics around “victim” populations. Further, Islamophobia has proliferated since the beginning of the “war on terror,” but it also predates 9/11 in various forms (see, for example, Edward Said’s periodization of Islamophobia as heralded during the end of the cold war). Pinkwashing works in part by tapping into the discursive and structural circuits produced by U.S. and European crusades against the spectral threat of “radical Islam” or “Islamo-fascism.” Then there is the function of capitalism. The neoliberal accommodationist economic structure engenders niche marketing of various ethnic and minoritized groups, normalizing the production of, for example, a gay and lesbian tourism industry built on the discursive distinction between gay-friendly and not-gay-friendly destinations. Not unlinked to this is what I call the “human rights industrial complex.” The gay and lesbian human rights industry continues to proliferate Euro-American constructs of identity (not to mention the notion of a sexual identity itself) that privilege identity politics, “coming out,” public visibility, and legislative measures as the dominant barometers of social progress. Within this nexus of history and economy, Israel appears as a pioneer of homonationalism, being perfectly situated to encourage the normalization of some homosexual bodies in relation to an increasingly violent occupation of Palestine. This homonationalist history of Israel, or the rise of LGBT rights in Israel, parallels the concomitant increasing segregation of Palestinian populations, especially post-Oslo. Moreover, the United States is in no small part culpable for the effectiveness of Israeli pinkwashing, as it is to a large extent directed toward citizens of the United States, Israel’s greatest financial supporter, and more generally to Euro-American gays who have the political capital and financial resources to invest in Israel. U.S. settler colonialism is inextricably intertwined with Israeli settler colonialism. Through their financial, military, affective, and ideological entwinement, it seems to me that the United States and Israel are the largest benefactors of homonationalism in the current geopolitical configuration, as it operates on three scalar registers: internal, territorial, and global.

#### The securitized narrative of Israeli existential threats is a product of US empire and the aff’s rhetoric of human rights is rooted in the logic of American exceptionalism.

Puar 07 (Jasbir K., PhD ethnic studies, *Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times*. Duke University Press. 2007)

With the United States currently positioning itself as the technologically exceptional global counterterrorism expert, American exceptionalism feeds off of other exceptionalisms, particularly that of **Israel**, its close ally in the Middle East. The exceptional national security issues of Israel, and the long term ‘‘**existential’’ threat** it faces because of its sense of being ‘‘entangled in a conflict of unparalleled dimensions,’’ for example, proceeds thus: ‘‘**exceptional vulnerability**’’ results in ‘‘exceptional security needs,’’ the risks of which are then alleviated and purportedly conquered by ‘‘exceptional counterterrorism technologies.’’∞π In this **collusion** of American and Israeli state interests, defined through a joint oppositional posture toward Muslims, narratives of **victimhood** ironically **suture** rather than deflate, contradict, or nullify claims to exceptionalism. In other words, the Israeli nation-state finds itself continuously embroiled in a cycle of perceived exceptional 8 introduction threats of violence that demand exceptional uses of force against the Palestinian population, which is currently mirrored by U.S. government o≈cials’ public declarations of possible terror risks that are used to compel U.S. citizens to support the war on terror. Reflecting upon contemporary debates about the United States as empire, Amy Kaplan notes, ‘‘The idea of empire has always paradoxically entailed a sense of spatial and temporal limits, a narrative of rising and falling, which U.S. exceptionalism has long kept at bay.’’ Later, she states, ‘‘The **denial** and **disavowal** of empire has long served as the ideological cornerstone of U.S. imperialism and a key component of American exceptionalism.’’∞∫ Thus, for Kaplan the distancing of exceptionalism from empire achieves somewhat contradictory twofold results: the superior United States is not subject to empire’s shortcomings, as the apparatus of empire is unstable and ultimately empires fall; and the United States creates the impression that empire is beyond the pale of its own morally upright behavior, such that all violences of the state are seen, in some moral, cultural, or political fashion as anything but the violence of empire. U.S. exceptionalism hangs on a narrative of transcendence, which places the United States above empire in these two respects, a project that is aided by what Domenico Losurdo names as ‘‘the fundamental tendency to transform the Judeo-Christian tradition into a sort of national religion that consecrates the exceptionalism of American people and the sacred mission with which they are entrusted (‘Manifest Destiny’).’’∞Ω Kaplan, claiming that current narratives of empire ‘‘take American exceptionalism to new heights,’’ argues that a concurrent ‘‘paradoxical claim to uniqueness and universality’’ are coterminous in that ‘‘they share a teleological narrative of inevitability’’ that posits America as the arbiter of appropriate ethics, human rights, and democratic behavior while exempting itself without hesitation from such universalizing mandates.≤≠

1. Extracting American Power on Global Terrains

Darren Dochuk

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