Everyone cites this Narang card

Narang says that nuclear posture includes capabilities, employment doctrine, command-and-control procedures, and is operational.

Makes a distinction between operational and declaratory nuclear doctrine.

Operational: is what generates deterrent power. What an adversary can credibly do with nuclear weapons.

Declaratory: what a country outwardly claims are its nuclear doctrine.

Not many people say the term also includes declaratory. Narang says there is some overlap but doesn’t specify further. Only person who disagrees is Miranda, who says that declaratory posture is equally important. Miranda never says ‘nuclear posture’ includes declaratory posture, but writes using the phrase ‘declaratory nuclear posture.’

### Most widely-cited definition

#### ‘Nuclear posture’ refers to capabilities, employment doctrine, and command-and-control procedures.

Vipin Narang 14. Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D in Government from Harvard University, previous fellow at Harvard University’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, a predoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a Stanton junior faculty fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict*. 2014. Stanford University Press.

I fill this vacuum in the first part of the book by analyzing the experiences of the regional nuclear powers, or the non-superpower states that have developed independent nuclear forces: China, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, and France.3 I discuss these states’ choices about nuclear strategy in terms of nuclear posture. Nuclear posture is the incorporation of some number and type of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles into a state’s overall military structure, the rules and procedures governing how those weapons are deployed, when and under what conditions they might be used, against what targets, and who has the authority to make those decisions.4

**---[FOOTNOTE FOUR BEGINS]---**

As a definitional aside, the focus is intended to be on a state’s observable nuclear posture as defined above, as opposed to a state’s declared nuclear doctrine. A state’s nuclear posture is essentially its peacetime nuclear orientation and procedures for deployment and signaling during crises. Because of the challenges of studying doctrines in general, and nuclear doctrines in particular—which are highly classified, often unarticulated, untested, and of questionable credibility—I have chosen to focus on a critical component of doctrine, a state’s nuclear posture, in order to gain some leverage on the questions of interest.

**---[FOOTNOTE FOUR ENDS]---**

Nuclear posture is best thought of as the operational, rather than the declaratory, nuclear doctrine of a country; while the two can overlap, it is the operational doctrine that generates deterrent power against an opponent. To put it bluntly, states care more about what an adversary can credibly do with its nuclear weapons than what it says about them. I thus use the term “nuclear posture” to refer to the capabilities (actual nuclear forces), employment doctrine (under what conditions they might be used), and command-and-control procedures (how they are managed, deployed, and potentially released) a state establishes to operationalize its nuclear weapons capability. This can also be thought of as “nuclear strategy,” and I use these terms interchangeably with both referring to the preceding definition. As Tara Kartha colorfully put it, without a nuclear posture or strategy, “a much vaunted [nuclear] test remains simply a loud bang in the ground.”5

#### Excludes declaratory nuclear doctrine, includes operational doctrine.

Vipin Narang 10. Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University, Research fellow at Harvard’s Befler Center for Science and International Affairs. “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability.” Winter 2009/10. *International security* 34.3, 38-78. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40389233.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A1ce820c92cf66857df85f067d7561e72&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1>

Most of the proliferation literature focuses on the acquisition of nuclear weapons, viewing the ability to assemble a single functional nuclear weapon as the critical threshold in a state’s ability to deter conflict.5 The mere acquisition of nuclear devices, however, neither constitutes an operational nuclear arsenal nor produces a uniform deterrent effect.6 It is the incorporation of some number and type of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles into a state’s overall military structure and the rules and procedures governing how those weapons are deployed, when and under what conditions they might be used, against what targets, and who has the authority to make those decisions that broadly constitute a state’s nuclear posture and that generate a speciªc deterrent effect. Thus, a key missing variable in the proliferation literature is a state’s nuclear posture. In this article I use the term “nuclear posture” to refer to the capabilities, deployment patterns, and command and control procedures a state uses to manage and operationalize its nuclear weapons capability.

Nuclear posture is best thought of as a state's operational, rather than declaratory, nuclear doctrine; it is a state's operational doctrine, or nuclear posture, that generates deterrent power against an opponent - states care more about what an adversary does with nuclear weapons than what it says about them. As such, differences in nuclear posture can generate variation in a state's ability to deter different types and levels of conflict, as well as induce trade- offs with respect to securely managing its nuclear arsenal.7 In the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union evolved nuclear postures to eventually establish some degree of dynamic stability between them, and various postures had differential deterrent effects.8 Similarly, regional nuclear powers9 - which face systemic and domestic constraints different from those of the superpowers - have adopted varied, but identifiable, nuclear postures across a spectrum of capabilities, management procedures, and levels of transparency, with each having different deterrent effects. I identify three distinct types of regional power nuclear postures: a catalytic posture, an assured retaliation posture, and an asymmetric escalation posture.

### --Supporting evidence

#### Capabilities, deployment patterns, and command and control.

Shashank Joshi 12. “IV. The Implications of a Nuclear Iran.” 12/13/12. Whitehall Papers 79.1, 75-129. DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2012.746032

If Iran does decide to make one or, as would be more likely, more nuclear weapons, and successfully does so, it would then face a choice over its nuclear posture and doctrine. Nuclear posture refers to the ‘capabilities, deployment patterns, and command and control procedures a state uses to manage and operationalize its nuclear weapons capabilities’.6 Nuclear doctrine refers to the declaratory side of those operational arrangements, such as a state's articulated conditions for using nuclear weapons. In practice, posture and doctrine are interdependent, and may be considered together.

#### Deployment patterns, potential targets, and circumstances when a state uses nuclear weapons.

Cristobal M. Miranda 16. In fulfillment of M.A. in International Security, University of Arizona School of Government and Public Policy. “Towards a Balanced U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” 2016. https://repository.arizona.edu/bitstream/handle/10150/620870/azu\_etd\_14832\_sip1\_m.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

While in one sense maintaining a nuclear deterrent force in perpetuity is in inherent conflict with the notion of a distant future involving complete nuclear disarmament, in another sense one can view contemporary deterrence, nonproliferation, and disarmament efforts as potentially complementary and linked since each of these objectives share the overarching goal of preventing the future use of nuclear weapons (Ferguson, Perry & Scowcroft, 2009, p. 93). Efforts by nuclear states to pursue nuclear disarmament, even though such efforts do not yet produce complete disarmament and deterrent forces continue to exist, can engender some international support to nonproliferation policies (Knopf, 2012/2013, p. 94). A middle approach may be possible where nuclear states seek to balance the goals and benefits of nuclear deterrence with nuclear nonproliferation efforts and the long-term vision of nuclear disarmament. Such a balanced approach could also reduce, but not eliminate, some of the inherent dangers of nuclear weapons (Goldstein, 2000, p. 278, 296-298; Hagerty, 1998, p. 37). Timing is a key variable that allows for this middle or balanced approach; nuclear deterrence relationships exist today and can be maintained for the foreseeable future given that the timeline for global nuclear disarmament is decidedly long-term and uncertain. The challenge in the coming years and decades is to shape nuclear deterrence relationships in ways that are conducive to allowing for the future possibility of nuclear disarmament. The following sections of this chapter will develop a “nuclear balance” theoretical model, focusing on how a state can develop a nuclear weapons policy involving nuclear posture and force structure that ensures strategic deterrence and stability while also supporting nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policies. For the purposes of this theoretical model, the term “nuclear posture” refers primarily to the circumstances in which a state might choose to use nuclear weapons, as well as the deployment patterns of nuclear forces and potential targets; the term “force structure” refers to the size and characteristics of a state’s nuclear deterrent. The terms “nuclear strategy” and “nuclear doctrine” are used interchangeably with nuclear posture. This theory recognizes that the current international nuclear environment is more complex than the bilateral nature of the Cold War nuclear rivalry. Contemporary nuclear states face a dynamic and interconnected set of deterrence relationships that feeds a “security trilemma where actions taken by a state to defend against another state have the effect of making a third state feel insecure. Due to the trilemma, changes in one state’s nuclear posture or policy can have a cascading effect on the other nuclear-armed states” (Koblentz, 2014, p. 3). While the “security trilemma” is a challenge to international security, it also provides a potential opportunity for a given nuclear state to positively influence the evolving nuclear landscape (Koblentz, 2014, p. 31). The nuclear balance theoretical model is realist at its core in that it assumes that the international system will remain an anarchic environment where independent states are primarily responsible for their own security. This model draws upon both defensive and offensive realism. From defensive realism, it adopts the notion of the deterrent utility of small nuclear forces (Waltz, 2013; Glaser, 1998). From the offensive realist school of thought, it emphasizes the notion that nuclear forces, regardless of size, must be modern, flexible, and survivable in order to maintain an effective deterrent (Lieber & Press, 2013; Lieber & Press, 2013, January; Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 227-232). The nuclear balance model also takes into account the dangers of nuclear weapons as derived from organization theory and other dangers such as nuclear terrorism, as well as recognizes the existence of international nuclear norms that support the nonproliferation regime (Sagan, 2013). In a general sense, this theoretical model is consistent with the concept of “analytic eclecticism,” described by Sil and Katzenstein as “an intellectual stance that supports efforts to complement, engage, and selectively utilize theoretical constructs embedded in contending research traditions to build complex arguments that bear on substantive problems of interest to both scholars and practitioners” (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010, p. 411; Paul, 2009, p. 2). While the nuclear balance model is most relevant for NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states given their Article VI legal commitment to eventually disarm, it is possible that any nuclear-armed state could follow such a balanced nuclear weapons policy.

#### Includes technological capabilities, force structure, official statements, and security priorities that affect when and how nuclear weapons are used.

Hyun-Binn Cho and Ariel Petrovics 22. \*\*Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at The College of New Jersey. \*\*Assistant Research Professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy and Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “North Korea’s Strategically Ambiguous Nuclear Posture.” 2022. *The Washington Quarterly* 45.2, 39-58. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2091874

North Korea’s growing capabilities have reinvigorated policy debate about the regime’s strategic nuclear thinking. While denuclearization remains a top priority, until North Korea dismantles its nuclear program, the question of how Pyongyang might use its newfound capabilities continues to bedevil outside observers.2 The reclusive regime has yet to declare an official nuclear doctrine, and experts are divided over how to best characterize its nuclear posture. Posture, sometimes also called nuclear strategy, goes beyond official doctrine to comprehensively evaluate when and how a state would use its nuclear weapons by assessing its technological capabilities, force structure, official statements, and broader security priorities. To be sure, discerning North Korea’s nuclear posture is fraught with the dual challenges of limited and evolving information about the “Hermit Kingdom,” but understanding the strategies of the newest nuclear-armed state is too important a task to ignore. Pyongyang’s nuclear posture will have far-reaching consequences for deterrence, crisis escalation, and the risks of nuclear proliferation in the Asia Pacific and beyond.3

How can we best characterize North Korea’s nuclear posture, and what indicators allow us to make such an assessment? This article addresses these questions by making two contributions: presenting an updated assessment of North Korea’s nuclear posture and offering a conceptual map to better manage the uncertainty surrounding Pyongyang’s strategic nuclear thinking. First, we argue that North Korea’s nuclear posture is best described as one of strategic ambiguity—mixing features from traditionally distinct postures to generate uncertainty in its adversaries. Existing evaluations typically pigeonhole North Korea into individual boxes within traditional typologies of regional-power nuclear postures, even when there is considerable disagreement over which box fits best.4 Indeed, North Korea watchers have over time assigned the regime to every one of the available boxes within such typologies. Forcing North Korea into one box, however, belies the uncertainty surrounding the Hermit Kingdom and potentially misleads US and South Korean force planning, which must consider the risks involved in choosing the wrong box. We thus propose an alternative interpretation: Pyongyang has a de facto nuclear posture of strategic ambiguity, which relies on a mix of features from traditionally discrete postures to leverage uncertainty and optimize deterrence.

The first step to understanding this posture of strategic ambiguity is to recognize that nuclear postures traditionally serve as a signaling device. Unlike the range of possible military operations and contingencies that nuclear war-fighting strategies can cover, nuclear postures describe the state’s primary envisioned usage of nuclear weapons.5

**---[FOOTNOTE FIVE BEGINS]---**

Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). While some analysts use the term nuclear posture synonymously with nuclear strategy, we distinguish nuclear posture both from the range of nuclear war-fighting strategies that a state might contemplate and from declared nuclear doctrine.

**---[FOOTNOTE FIVE ENDS]---**

Thus, the nuclear postures of regional nuclear powers such as China, India or Pakistan signal a high probability that these states will use nuclear weapons in a manner that is consistent with available indicators. In this regard, the credibility of nuclear postures can be a factor in managing crisis stability.

#### Includes numbers, types, locations of weapons, delivery systems, and operational status.

NATO 07. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “NATO/Russia Unclassified.” 2007.

https://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng-nuclear/nuc\_glos-e.pdf

Nuclear posture

A term commonly used in NATO to refer to nuclear forces and related subjects such as numbers, types, locations of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems, as well as their operational status, including delivery-system readiness levels and weapon-storage locations. See also deterrent force (CP&MT).

### Includes declaratory policy

#### “Nuclear posture” includes nine elements, and excludes things like missile defense and non-nuclear capabilities

Perry & Schlesinger 9 --- Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States

William J, James R, 2009, “America’s Strategic Posture,” The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/strat\_posture\_report\_adv\_copy.pdf

It is important to begin here with a definition. The nuclear posture consists of the following elements:

1. The arsenal of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.

2. The arsenal of forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons.

3. The triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems (land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers).

4. The delivery systems for forward-deployed systems (including both submarine-launched cruise missiles and aircraft equipped to carry both conventional and nuclear payloads, called dual-capable aircraft).

5. The stockpile of warheads held in operational reserve.

6. A stockpile of fissile material appropriate for use in warheads.

7. The associated command, control, and intelligence systems.

8. The infrastructure associated with the production of all of these capabilities, without which the force will not remain viable, both physical and human.

9. Declaratory policy specifying the role of nuclear forces in U.S. military and national security strategies.

### Includes nuclear doctrine

The Miranda card also says that nuclear posture is used interchangeably with nuclear doctrine.

#### Nuclear doctrine, command and control systems, and targeting plans.

Abdul Latif Tunio 07. “New Directions of China’s Nuclear Posture: Capabilities and Limitations.” 2007. *Asia Pacific* 25, 179-187.

The role of nuclear posture is important in the projection of national power. It entails the ambitions of power in determining the national goals. It also plays a crucial role in maintaining a nuclear deterrence. Nuclear postures are mainly expressed by nuclear doctrine, command and control system and the targeting plans of a country. The nuclear doctrine of China stands for credible minimum nuclear deterrence. China developed nuclear weapons as a limited force to prevent nuclear blackmail and to obtain greater international status and prestige. It’s relatively small nuclear forces are intended for retaliation rather than first strike purpose. China has always shown principled stand on nuclear problems and has exercised nuclear restrain against other nuclear powers.

### Includes declaratory---AT: Narrang

This most clearly includes AFFs that change the roles of nuclear weapons.

#### ‘Declaratory nuclear posture’

Cristobal M. Miranda 16. In fulfillment of M.A. in International Security, University of Arizona School of Government and Public Policy. “Towards a Balanced U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” 2016. https://repository.arizona.edu/bitstream/handle/10150/620870/azu\_etd\_14832\_sip1\_m.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

In his study of regional states’ nuclear postures, Narang (2014) focuses on the operational aspects of nuclear doctrine instead of a state’s public statements on nuclear doctrine, arguing that the operational aspects are most relevant for deterrence; this focus on operational capabilities also has the advantage of increasing confidence in the coding of each state’s nuclear posture (p. 4, 21). Given the worst case planning that most state militaries typically conduct, it is logical to focus on the operational capabilities of a potential adversary when examining deterrence relationships; “states care more about what an adversary can credibly do with its nuclear weapons than what it says about them” (Narang, 2014, p. 4). However, declaratory doctrine for a nuclear state, especially one that is democratic, is important and should not be discounted since declaratory nuclear pronouncements are essentially public commitments; a democratic government that disregarded such public commitments could pay a significant political price in relation to domestic opponents and other states (Sagan & Vaynman, 2011, p. 28). Declaratory posture does offer insight on a state’s strategic thinking, serves as a tool to communicate deterrence threats, and can also directly influence a state’s military planning for nuclear weapons employment (Sagan & Vaynman, 2011, p. 29; Sagan, 2009, p. 165). In addition, as Sagan (2009) notes, declaratory nuclear doctrine is important in terms of supporting a state’s nonproliferation and disarmament policies, as well as potentially influencing the nuclear policies of other states (p. 165-166). A state’s declaratory nuclear posture can influence other states by affecting international nuclear norms or standards of responsible behavior regarding the possession and possible use of nuclear weapons (Sagan, 2009, p. 166). A declaratory nuclear posture that involves a broad role or mission for nuclear weapons will generally not support nonproliferation and disarmament policies, which seek to reduce the utility of nuclear weapons. In contrast, a declaratory nuclear posture that restricts the role of nuclear weapons in a state’s security strategy can be seen as potentially supportive of nonproliferation and disarmament objectives. For the purposes of the nuclear balance model, both the declaratory and operational aspects of nuclear posture will be considered. Ideally, the operational and declaratory components of a state’s nuclear posture would be congruent.

### Includes NFU

#### Includes No First Use.

Bruce G. Blair 20. Research scholar in the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, co-founder of the Global Zero movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons. “Loose Cannons: The President and US Nuclear Posture.” 2020. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 76.1, 14-26. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701279?casa\_token=XxmfEHvhsF8AAAAA:1gAev\_tHm0e5jQkqafrjqd\_zsDBspT6LRlS7DWFM3D4d3EyVthUCWCdoqAk9shAedgOIyZBoduo2cQ

First use of nuclear weapons, the third contingency, is even less stable than the other two, but planners cling to it because of its relative feasibility and its putative advantages in the arena of warfighting.9 The US nuclear posture has always programmed first-use options, including large-scale preemptive strikes against Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. (Preemptive strike designations historically would have appeared in a launch order.) Smaller-scale first-use (and second-use) options first appeared in the mid-1970s under the rubric of “limited attack options.” The latest variant is noted in the Trump administration’s nuclear posture review; it calls for “low”-yield weapons deployed on US strategic submarines for use – first or second – in small numbers in the early phase of a conflict.

#### Nuclear posture includes NFU.

The Hindu Editorial Board 22, “India’s nuclear policy reflects past ideology,” The Hindu, 7/2/22, https://chahalacademy.com/current-affairs/02-Jul-2022/893

The Nuclear Doctrine of India:

The Nuclear Doctrine of India is based on the premise that it will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation for another country's attempt to use nuclear weapons against India, its states, or its army. Without joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty, India became the first country to develop nuclear power. The Doctrine Treaty of India is built on the following pillars:

Establishing and sustaining a credible minimum deterrent.

A "No First Use" nuclear posture means that nuclear weapons will only be deployed in response for a nuclear strike on Indian territory or Indian forces elsewhere;

Nuclear response for a first strike will be huge and aimed to do irreparable harm.

Only the civilian political leadership, through the Nuclear Command Authority, may sanction nuclear retaliation attacks.

Non-use of nuclear weapons against governments that do not possess nuclear weapons;

However, in the case of a massive biological or chemical assault on India or Indian forces anywhere, India will maintain the option of retaliating using nuclear weapons.

The continuation of rigorous limits on the export of nuclear and missile-related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty discussions, and adherence to the nuclear test moratorium.

Persistence in the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world through comprehensive, verifiable, and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)- On January 4, 2003, India formed a three-tier Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) to manage its nuclear weapons.

### Excludes conditions for use

#### Excludes conditions for use.

Jun Bong-geun 16. Professor in the Department of National Security and Unification Studies at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. “An Analysis of North Korean Nuclear Doctrines and Its Implications.” 7/27/16. <https://preview.kstudy.com/W_files/kiss9/5n000183_pv.pdf>

This paper aims to analyze and evaluate North Korea’s nuclear strategies, especially the principles and conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, or ‘nuclear doctrine,’ that have appeared in a variety of its laws and statements, and to predict the direction of its nuclear weapons development program and draw implications for our North Korea policies.

‘Nuclear strategy’ widely refers to a state’s deployment and use of nuclear weapons for political and military purposes, and it constitutes part of the state’s broader military and security strategy. Nuclear strategy consists of nuclear capability, nuclear force configuration, and the like on the hardware side, as represented by the term ‘nuclear posture,’ and governing principles for the use of nuclear weapons on the software side, namely, nuclear doctrine. This paper focuses on the analysis of the latter.

### Excludes info-gathering

#### It excludes the information processing architecture surrounding nuclear weapons in favor of a focus on weapons alone.

Paul Bracken 16, Professor of Management and Political Science at Yale University, “The Cyber Threat to Nuclear Stability,” Orbis, vol. 60, no. 2, 2016, pp. 188–203

Strategic Postures

A strategic framework rather than a predictive academic theory is the first requirement for any coherent discussion about nuclear weapons. Without it a debate about strategy and modernization, biases and politics lacking the rational context that serious policy research demands will dominate. Any real problem—modernizing the U.S. nuclear posture, countering China, dealing with North Korea—will be so complex that predictive academic theories are unlikely to be of much use. While a good strategy requires such a framework, it must be tempered by details that are specific to context, country, and time frame.

One such framework was developed in the Cold War and offers insights into the dynamics of a second nuclear age. This nearly forgotten framework was called “max-min,” and it defined a strategic posture in terms of two factors: accuracy and search.1 Accuracy describes how close to its target a system can deliver a warhead. Accuracy is measured in terms of “circular probable error” (CEP), defined as the radius of a circle, centered on the target, within which 50 percent of the warheads are expected to land. A smaller CEP indicates greater accuracy. While the Cold War framework focused on nuclear warheads, the concept applies to conventional precision weapons as well, since they are also capable of destroying non-hardened nuclear targets.

Search is defined as the time it takes to fix a target’s location, measured in hours or days. A surrogate measure of search is the amount of money put into programs and technology. For example, the dollars invested in the U-2 reconnaissance program, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets and spy satellites were also measures of search.

Analysts have understood the significance of breakthroughs in accuracy for some time.2 These are the backbone of the precision strike revolution. What is not appreciated yet is that a revolution in search technology in recent years promises to have an equally large impact.

The term “max-min” arises from the idea that in a first strike nuclear attack, the attacker attempts to minimize retaliation while the second striker attempts to maximize the retaliatory blow. When the theory was first developed in the mid-1960s, U.S. policymakers assumed that the Soviet Union would strike first and that the United States would retaliate.

It is important to understand that the two strikes occur sequentially. The order of moves matters. If it changes (e.g., the United States strikes first), so do the results. Therefore, max-min 􀂏 min-max, as in the mini-max theorem of game theory. Thus, this is not game theory. There is no definition of game theory’s mixed strategies, so bluffing analogies with poker—central to game theory analyses of nuclear strategy—do not exist here.3 Max-min deals with long-term competition rather than short-run moves. The time frame of the max-min analysis is thus closer to net assessment.4 The focus is on multi-year efforts to build a strategic posture after analyzing what one’s opponent has chosen. The “moves” are investments in intelligence systems such as ASW, satellites, and other search technologies; and weapons, such as fixed and mobile missiles, bombers, and submarines. Because all of this includes the information processing architecture, as well as nuclear weapons, a better name is “strategic posture.” The term “nuclear posture” is reserved for the weapons alone.

### Contextual evidence

#### The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy

DoD 95, “Nuclear Posture Review,” Department of Defense, 1995, accessed via WebArchive, https://web.archive.org/web/20090806232307/http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr95/npr\_.html

The Nuclear Posture Review was chartered in October 1993 to determine what the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy should be. A 10-month DoD collaborative effort, the NPR was co-chaired by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. Working groups were comprised of representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the unified commands. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed and directed the progress of the NPR through issue briefs and the development of a final report, which was presented to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some decisions relating to the NPR were raised through the interagency process, including all relevant agencies of the U.S. government, which had the opportunity to review a wide range of options. The President approved the recommendations of the NPR on September 18, 1994.

#### It is the role of nuclear weapons in the US arsenal.

Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark 19, political scientist and assistant professor of international affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, “Should Presidential Command over Nuclear Launch Have Limitations? In a Word, No.,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, May 2019, 2576-1153

It is also worth mentioning that there are some relevant policies already in place, including specifications of the circumstances under which the United States will use nuclear weapons. According to the Defense Department’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, 22 [FOOTNOTE 22 BEGINS] 22 The nuclear posture review is the Department of Defense’s process to determine what role nuclear weapons should have in the U.S. arsenal. Reviews generally happen with each new presidential administration or quadrennially. The 2018 document is accessible here: Nuclear Posture Review, Department of Defense, February 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEWFINAL-REPORT.PDF. [FOOTNOTE 22 ENDS] nuclear use is circumscribed for all but the most extreme circumstances to defend U.S. vital interests. It articulates that deterrence is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, and pledges to augment the conventional capabilities the United States will use in combat. Moreover, the document articulates negative security assurances, commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states in good standing with their Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty obligations. President Barack Obama pledged this commitment and Trump has reaffirmed it.

#### Role of nuclear weapons in national security.

Allison B. Bawden 20, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, GAO, “NUCLEAR WEAPONS: NNSA Needs to Incorporate Additional Management Controls Over Its Microelectronics Activities,” GAO, June 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1156500.pdf

According to the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States will pursue initiatives to ensure a continued capability to develop and produce microelectronics beyond 2025.7 [FOOTNOTE 7 BEGINS] 7Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2018). The Nuclear Posture Review is produced periodically and describes presidential policy on the role of nuclear weapons in national security. [FOOTNOTE 7 ENDS] Currently, NNSA plans to begin production after 2025 for three nuclear weapon modernization programs, and microelectronics will be needed for those programs.8 Historically, NNSA’s weapon modernization programs have been life extension programs (LEPs), which refurbish or replace nuclear weapons components to, among other things, extend the lives of these weapons and enhance the safety and security of the stockpile. However, NNSA is moving into an era in which its weapon modernization programs will also include weapon modification programs and potentially new acquisitions.

#### It's comprehensive.

Maj. Jon M. Fontenot 95, Major, United States Air Force, “A New Era: From SAC to STRATCOM,” 5/23/95, https://spp.fas.org/eprint/fontenot.htm

Background: The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was created on March 21, 1946 and assigned the mission of deterring aggression through "long range offensive operations in any part of the world" and "maximum range reconnaissance over land or sea". During the first year, SAC's personnel loss was 63 percent and aircraft loss was 78 percent; the losses were due to the demobilization after World War II. But during the next two years, SAC's personnel and aircraft gains helped establish the command. When General Curtis E. LeMay became SAC's third commander, the morale in the command was low. But General LeMay would change the attitude in the command and make the command one of the elite places to work. During his tenure (almost nine years), General LeMay instituted a strenuous training program to make all units combat ready. SAC was very good at its job, but unexpectedly the threat was over--the Warsaw Pact was gone, the Berlin Wall fell, and the Soviet Union dissolved into independent states. General Butler was the chief architect with dissolving SAC and the start-up of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM). He worked very closely with General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the roles and missions and structure of STRATCOM. The only question was when would the change take place. STRATCOM took over the same mission of SAC, but with one twist. STRATCOM has authority over all nuclear weapons. The future for STRATCOM depends on two items: the Nuclear Posture Review and the restructure of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). The Nuclear Posture Review is a comprehensive look at the nations nuclear weapons and how the nation employs them. While SIOP is the means to employ the weapons, the planning takes 18 months. STRATCOM knew this was too long and developed a plan to reduce the time from 18 to 6 months (adaptive force planning).