# Settler Colonialism K-NWG 2024

### Table of Contents

[Settler Colonialism K-NWG 2024 1](#_Toc174438970)

[Table of Contents 2](#_Toc174438971)

[SUMMARY & TIPS 3](#_Toc174438972)

[1NC 4](#_Toc174438973)

[Links 12](#_Toc174438974)

[Alt Solvency 23](#_Toc174438975)

[AT: Perms 26](#_Toc174438976)

[Impacts 30](#_Toc174438977)

[Affirmative Answers 34](#_Toc174438978)

[2AC Frontline 35](#_Toc174438979)

## SUMMARY & TIPS

#### Settler Colonialism (or Set Col) is an example of an off-case argument called a K which stands for KRITIK (or critique). While Disads link to the plan, a K may link to the plan, its impacts, the 1AC’s epistemology, or its systemic foundations. The premise is that it doesn’t matter how well-intentioned the 1AC is or how it claims to solve, if they ignored the systemic failures in its derivation.

#### Set Col states that when various groups of explorers (e.g the settlers) arrived, they viewed natives as savages and stole their lands through ongoing acts of violence. That process repeated itself nationwide leading to the eradication of enormous numbers of natives and the erasure of their cultural and social practices. The settler perspective led to the creation of government structures based upon denying indigenous peoples their place. Treaties were signed by the US with tribal nations only to be repeatedly violated. Indigenous farming and scientific knowledge was dismissed, or worse reattributed. The ramifications of those practices becoming American norms in the government’s infancy shaped its laws and presumptions are reinforced consciously and subconsciously in their application today. If courtroom judges and policymakers believe the US was founded by hard-working European settlers against dangerous savages that structures how they create, interpret and apply laws.

#### Set Col debaters will often argue this implicates the 1AC’s US legal actions as tools in ongoing indigenous eradication sustaining the system’s falsehoods (think of it as equivalent to learning your hero is an evil fraud, your parents are imperfect or Santa Clause isn’t real so the “naughty or nice” thing is just a behavioral ploy not a binding contract).

#### Kritiks should have LINKS, IMPACTS, an alternative (ALT) & a FRAMEWORK that tells the judge(s) how to pick a winner. The acknowledgement link in the shell also can function as a root cause arg. Links change based on the aff you’re facing.

#### Since this is a starter file, please review each part of the shell and blocks with your coaches. Then write block overviews for the Link, Impact and Alt and create responses to the Aff answers in the file & other predictable responses.

## 1NC

#### Settler fascism is intensifying. Settler colonialism requires the death of Native and Black life to secure its material and symbolic coordinates, necessitating fascist institutions that produce violence.

**Robinson 17** (ROWLAND “ENA͞EMAEHKIW” KESHENA ROBINSON, “Fascism and Anti-Fascism: A Decolonial Perspective”, February 11, <https://onkwehonwerising.wordpress.com/2017/02/11/fascism-anti-fascism-a-decolonial-perspective/>, shae)

In the wake of the election of Donald Trump to the south of the colonial border, there has been a blooming of discussion on fascism and the necessity for anti-fascist organizing amongst various left-wing streams of thought: anarchists, marxists, anti-racists, as well as others. This has only increased in the wake of his inauguration, the subsequent series of worrying (though unsurprising) executive orders that he has issued since taking the office, and the resistance that has flourished against them. Whether or not Trump himself is a fascist is a question that is up for debate. It is also arguable whether certain key political figures within his inner circle, such as Steve Bannon, also represent fascism, or at the very least, para-fascist. Undeniable though is that Trump and his closest advisers are right-wing national-populists, which in the context of the northern bloc of settler colonialism is, invariably, inseparable from white nationalism. What is undeniable is that a number of explicitly white nationalist organizations, theorists and influencers have been highly motivated and emboldened by Trump and his broad popular support amongst american settlers, across gender and class lines, who perceive america as having been betrayed and dirtied by immigrants, “minorities,” queer, trans and gender non-conforming people, feminists and a neoliberal capitalism that has sent industrial jobs overseas. Driven by these broad feelings of white ressentiment, and thirsting for a new frontier, these prophets of naked and proud white power, such as Richard Spencer, rallied to Trump’s campaign, and now presidency. Whether they will continue to stay in Trump’s corner though is yet to be seen. Additionally, as I write this from canada it would be foolhardy to believe that this country is hermetically sealed from what has been going on south of the border. Prominent figures in the race to replace Stephen Harper as the leader of the federal Conservative Party have sought to emulate Trump’s rhetoric, and have even openly called for bringing his message here. Do not forget that before Trump’s executive orders barring immigration from seven Muslim majority countries and authorizing the building of a wall on Mexican border, the late Harper administration passed the nakedly Islamophobic Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, as well as the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 (Bill C-51) and the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (Bill C-24), two laws which have respectively strengthened the already existing canadian surveillance state and allowed for the stripping of canadian citizenship from dual citizens and those with the ability to obtain dual citizenship. None of these are issues that been positively acted upon by the current Liberal Party government of Justin Trudeau. Most strikingly, and tragically, of course, is the recent shooting at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City. This event, which cost six lives, was carried out by a french-speaking settler who openly espoused support for the right-wing national-populism and Islamophobic politics of Trump, as well as Marine Le Pen in France. Many fear that acts such as this could be the tip of the iceberg, rather than some sort of isolated lone-wolf type incident. In general, while the emergence of the north american far-right goes back further than Trump, and was certainly emboldened by the election of Barack Obama as the first non-white person to the office of the president, Trump’s campaign and subsequent electoral victory has undeniably led to a marked acceleration of the movement. For the time being, naked white nationalists feel that they now have one of their own in the White(st) House, or, at the very least, someone who will lend them their ear when they come calling and who’s movement they can springboard off of in order to further build their own. I also know and want to recognize, that many people are scared as well of the current situation. As I noted in my commentary on the Trump election, my mother called me at nearly 3 in the morning to tell me that she felt like she was going to throw up. Similarly, my younger brother told me that he felt as though he may have to leave his job because of the smothering atmosphere of Trumpian white nationalism in his workplace. Since the election I have read what seems like daily updates of the fear, depression and rage felt by many of my fellow Indigenous scholars, and many, many non-scholars, as Trump has re-activated pipeline deals, ordered the construction of a border wall to keep out our relatives from south of the Rio Grande, and hung a painting of perhaps america’s most prolific Indian killing president, Andrew Jackson, in the Oval Office. The fears and worries being experienced and expressed by family, friends, colleagues and comrades across Turtle Island are palpable, and it would be cold, as well as disingenuous, for me to not give space and voice to those feelings. Bracketing off some of these issues though, what I want to do here is to ask a basic question: what is fascism? And, more particular to what I want to say here, what does fascism mean to Indigenous people in light of the particular conditions of settler colonialism? Is it even a useful analytic category for us in light of existent social conditions, technologies of governance and patterns of power? And, finally, what does anti-fascist struggle mean, or how should it be re-thought, in light of the struggle for decolonization? Defining Fascism So what is fascism then? Open any left-wing tome and you are bound to come across one of two definitions. The first, and perhaps more common these days, ~~views~~ [know] fascism as some form of particularly virulent authoritarian nationalism. Generally they attach fascism to manifestations of aggressive racism, reactionary and conservative traditionalism, anti-liberalism and anti-communism, as well as expansionist and revanchist approaches to foreign policy as part of a general movement towards the seizure of absolute political power, the elimination of opposition and the creation of a regulated economic structure to transform social relations within a modern, self-determined culture. Other essential features include a political aesthetic of romantic symbolism, mass mobilization, a positive view of violence, and promotion of masculinity, youth and charismatic leadership (Griffin and Feldman, 2004). The general historical examples of fascism, without paying much heed to unevenness between them, are the Italy of Mussolini and his Fascist Party and, of course, the National Socialist movement that seized political control of Germany in the early 1930s. Additionally they may look to Franco’s Spain, the clerical fascism of Romania under the Iron Guard and Ion Antonescu, or the various governments of Hungary in the 1930s and during the second world war. To the left of this essentially liberal-historical, though not entirely unhelpful, definition of fascism is that which is taken up by the majority of the revolutionary anti-capitalist movement, primarily by marxists, though also by some class-struggle anarchists as well. This particular definition traces itself back to the Bulgarian communist and General Secretary of the Communist International Georgi Dimitrov. Dimitrov’s famous description of fascism was of it as “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital” (1935). While there is more that can be said about this particular formulation of fascism, its pithy nature most certainly does have a certain political appeal to it. However it also clearly lacks the degree of specificity that one might consider necessary to make it actually helpful. Reflecting on this lack of specificity within Dimitrov’s formulation of fascism, others have worked to delved deeper into aspects of the fascist experience to flesh it out further and to attempt to deliver a genuinely helpful analytic. In particular, political economist Zak Cope (2015), in his book Divided World Divided Class: Global Political Economy and the Stratification of Labour Under Capitalism, sums up the attempts to give more depth to the Dimitrovian analysis of fascism, and here it is worth quoting him at length. He says: Fascism is the attempt by the imperialist bourgeoisie to solidify its rule on the basis of popular middle-class support for counter-revolutionary dictatorship. Ideologically fascism is the relative admixture of authoritarianism, racism, militarism and pseudo-socialism necessary to make this bid successful. In the first place, authoritarianism justifies right-wing dictatorship aimed at robbing and repressing any and all actual or potential opponents of imperialist rule. Secondly, racism or extreme national chauvinism provides fascist rule with a pseudo-democratic facade, promising to level all distinctions of rank and class via national aggrandisement. Thirdly, militarism allows the fascist movement both to recruit déclassé ex-military and paramilitary elements to its cause and to prepare the popular conscience for the inevitable aggressive war. Finally, social-fascism offers higher wages and living standards to the national workforce at the expense of foreign and colonised workers. As such, denunciations of “unproductive” and “usurers” capital, of “bourgeois” nations (that is, the dominant imperialist nations) and of the workers’ betrayal by reformist “socialism” are part and parcel of the fascist appeal (294). As Cope further notes, this summation is not out of line with the pre-Dimitrov (and, also, pre-Hitlerian) discussion of fascism in the Programme of the Communist International, which noted that “[T]he combination of Social Democracy, corruption and active white terror, in conjunction with extreme imperialist aggression in the sphere of foreign politics, are the characteristic features of Fascism” (1929). However, as with most of the contemporary left, Cope essentially remains within the general contours of Dimitrov’s work, holding fascism to be an “exceptional form of the bourgeois state” (2015: 294). This particular definition of fascism is in many ways still is the definitive, go-to, definition amongst marxists and many anarchists. However, even in the move to expand upon it, it is in many striking ways woefully insufficient. In particular the traditional COMINTERN definition of fascism, while placing it in a relationship with capitalism, understates, if not outright ignores, the manner in which fascist movements are often actually oppositional to capitalism, or at least certain manifestations or elements of it. Several more recent attempts to think through the question of fascism have attempted to more fully flesh this out, against the inherited dogma of the left that sees the deployment of revolutionary or left-wing imagery and language by fascists as a smoke-screen to deceive the masses of working class people. Of particular note a the theoretical stream of thought inaugurated by Don Hammerquist’s work of the question in his article Fascism & Anti-Fascism. Here Hammerquist, himself an autonomist marxist, rejects the traditional, primarily marxist-leninist, Dimitri-derived view of fascism as simply a tool for big business. Hammequist states that: Colonial Violence Turned Inwards Moving beyond the re-theorizations offered by Hammerquist, Sakai and Lyons, for many, both inside and outside of the northern bloc of settler colonialism, the traditionalist formulations and definitions of fascism are ultimately insufficient for a host of other, equally important reasons. In this regard however, in his own reading of fascism, Cope does open up a window onto what I propose is the true heart of fascism. He says: “Geographically speaking, on its own soil fascism is imperialist repression turned inward” (294). This is an aspect of fascism which I believe is essentially missing from all other attempts to give definition to the phenomenon, from the liberal-historical to Dimitrov, to Hammequist, Sakai and Lyons, from both the pithy and the detailed, and whose central importance cannot possibly be overstated. In essence, following this line of reasoning, we can say that fascism is when the violence that the colonialist-imperialist nations have visited upon the world over the course of the development of the modern/colonial/capitalist world-system comes back home to visit. This direct lineal connection from colonial violence to fascism was beautifully, if disturbingly, described by Aimé Césaire in his Discourse on Colonialism (1972), saying: [W]e must show that each time a head is cut off or an eye put out in Vietnam and in France they accept the fact…each time a Madagascan is tortured and in France and they accept the fact, civilization acquires another dead weight, a universal regression takes place, a gangrene sets in, a center of infection begins to spread; and that at the end of all these treaties that have been violated, all these lies that have been propagated, all these punitive expeditions that have been tolerated, all these prisoners who have been tied up and “interrogated, all these patriots who have been tortured, at the end of all the racial pride that has been encouraged, all the boastfulness that has been displayed, a poison has been instilled into the veins of Europe and, slowly but surely, the continent proceeds toward savagery (13). Regarding the shock of fascism’s recapitulation of colonial violence arriving on the shores of the homeland Césaire adds: People are surprised, they become indignant. They say: “How strange! But never mind-it’s Nazism, it will, pass!” And they wait, and they hope; and they hide the truth from themselves, that it is barbarism, but the supreme barbarism, the crowning barbarism that sums up all the daily barbarisms; that it is Nazism, yes, but that before they were its victims, they were its accomplices; that they tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples; that they have cultivated that Nazism, that they are responsible for it, and that before engulfing the whole of Western, Christian civilization in its reddened waters, it oozes, seeps, and trickles from every crack (14). So this brings me back to my secondary question, what does fascism mean to the Indigenous person? To the colonized? In particular, how can we read this as Cope adds that fascism “whilst on foreign soil” is “imperialist repression employed by comprador autocracies” (2014: 294) or when Hammerquist and Sakai discuss the globalization of fascism (2002; 2002)? To ask the question more precisely, what does it mean for an analysis of fascism when being on “foreign soil” is also being in its “own soil?” In other words, what, if anything, can fascism mean to those of us trapped within the belly of a violent settler colonial beast? For an anti-fascist theory and praxis then to carry any kind of meaningful weight it must contend with the fact of settler colonialism and its ongoing, central structuring of the entire symbolic, social and political orders of the northern bloc. Anything else threatens to become a repetitive loop, unable to break through to the actual core of fascism. The Terrain Below Fascism Building on this recognition of fascism as colonial violence turned inwards, we are immediately confronted with the truth that the terrain for even the possibility of the development of a domestic fascist movement within the spatial coordinates of the northern bloc is a terrain—in terms of both the literal material meaning of the land, as well as less direct meanings of the psychic, political, social, cultural, ideological and economic fields—is a terrain already soaked in blood. In particular it is a terrain that is already soaked in the blood of Native and Black Peoples. In the case of the northern bloc of settler colonialism, the sense of exteriority inherent in Césaire’s description of the perfection of what would become fascist oppression within the deployment of colonial violence overseas becomes interior. While for Césaire and Cope the violence of fascism is brought home from the distant colonies of the metropolitan powers, in the settler colonial context this violence is one that was perfected within the exceptional state of the expansion of the frontier, the clearing and civilizing of Indigenous People to make the land ripe for settlement, and the carceral continuum that has marked the Black experience on this land from chattel slavery to the modern hyperghetto. Thus, before one can even begin a discussion of fascism (or even capitalism for that matter[i]), and the possibility of its emergence on this land, it is important to recognize that fascism in the northern bloc can only occur in a context always-already defined by two fundamental axes: Native elimination and antiblack violence. These two axes, while being somewhat incommensurable with one another, also overlap, and of course also intersect with the general parasitism of the imperialist countries upon the Third World and other colonized peoples worldwide. Broadly we can say though that both the psychic and material life of white settler colonial society is sutured together by anti-Native and antiblack solidarity and violence. Settler Colonialism & Indigenous Genocide The united states and canada are a settler colonial estate. As noted above, this means that one of the principal features that distinguishes the settler colonialism of the northern bloc (as well as the australasian and israeli forms) from more traditionally theorized metropolitan, or franchise, colonialism is the fundamental drive towards the elimination of Native peoples (Veracini, 2010; Wolfe, 2006). This is what the late theorist of settler colonialism Patrick Wolfe referred to the logic of elimination when he described settler colonialism as an inclusive land-centred project that mobilizes a diverse assemblage of agencies with a programme of destroying Native nations in order that they may be replaced (2006). Indeed for there to even be a canada or a united states of america Native People must disappear in order for non-Native settlers to claim rightful ownership and title over the continent. Further the logic of elimination exists in a dialectic with an extensive project of settler self-indigenization. While this process is most stark in regions such as Appalachia and Quebec (Pearson, 2013) it is pervasive across the continent. Additionally, while much of these processes have taken place juridically, and are daily reinforced within the symbolic coding of the civil society of the white settler nation, these processes are, and always have been, drenched in literal Native blood. To define Native life under the existence of settler colonialism is to see it defined through the multiple, converging “vectors of death” arrayed against us, and our resistance to them (Churchill, 2001). All of these processes can be summed up in what Nicolas Juarez refers to as the grammars of suffering of Native life: clearing and civilization (2014). The former are those processes which not only destroy Native bodies and lives in the meat grinder of white invasion, but also evacuate Native sovereignty, not only from the spatial coordinates of the continent, but from also notions of linear, settler temporality as well. The Native is made into feral, savage flesh who is not only made non-sovereign at the moment of contact, but who, within the ontological ordering the settler world, was never sovereign, and who has no possibility of ever being sovereign. The latter is what Juarez describes as the processes designed to “the process of extracting the savageness from the Savage,” which, in tripartite fashion: [T]ransposes indigeneity from the Red body onto the Settler, commodifies the ontological resistance to whiteness found in indigenous lifeways to the point of no longer having any resistance to the ravishing of capitalist valuation and deracinates the Savage to the point of social death. A tri-operative process, the grammar of civilization hollows out the Indian, mines any cultural accouchements and values, and places them within the prerogative and definitions of value of the Settler (2014). Additionally, while the violences of settler colonialism are structural and ontological, it is also enacted in a quotidian fashion by the settler population itself. As Wolfe noted, there is, from the Indigenous perspective, a fundamental inability to separate the individual settler from the settler state, with the former being the latter’s principal agent of expansion (2016). Antiblack Violence and the Continued Inheritance of Enslaveability Along with the clearing of the continent of Indigenous Peoples, within the racial discourses of the northern bloc, as thinkers as diverse as Sora Han (2002), Jared Sexton (2008) and Angela Harris (2000) have noted, Blackness is equated with an inherent (and inheritable) status of enslaveability and criminality, and is marked for permanent exclusion from the social fold. While, as sociologist Loïc Wacquant has pointed out, the particular manifestations of this process have evolved over time—from chattel slavery, to Jim Crow, to the ghetto to the modern hyperghetto with its accompanying carceral continuum (the ghetto to prison to ghetto circuit)—the underlying logic has remained the same for the past several centuries (2010; 2002). Under this regime the Black body itself becomes a site of accumulation, nothing more than fungible property, which can then be subjected to gratuitous violence; that is, violence without the requirement of any previous transgression or reason within the social order. This is what Sexton, Frank B. Wilderson, III (2010) and other related theorists mean when they note that the grammars of suffering for Black life are accumulation and fungibility. The enduring legacy of the project to build an antiblack world (Gordon, 1995) is the direct line from enslaveability through lynching, extrajudicial executions of Black men, modern hyperincarceration and the criminalization of Blackness. All of this is enforced and made allowable by continuous, gratuitous antiblack violence. What is Fascism then to Native and Black People? So what then does fascism mean to us, the colonized, the Native and Black Peoples of this land, from whom it was stolen and who were stolen to work it? What does it mean for us if government are seized by a movement of fascists? What does it mean to us if Trump system-loyal right-wing national-populist, who, while not himself representing the kind of insurgent supremacist politics of a genuine fascist, still facilitates the rise and the existence of movements, theorists, organizers and influences who do espouse that commitment? To ask this question more specifically, what does the potential rise of fascism in the northern bloc of settler colonialism mean to Native and Black peoples who have suffered, and who continue to suffer, the hells of genocide, slavery, land theft, convict leasing, forced marches, Jim Crow, popular lynchings, public police murders, corralling and containment in reservations and ghettos, mass incarceration numbering in the millions, residential schools, economic quarantine and military occupation of our communities? What does fascist violence mean to us as peoples who already face structural processes that seek to drive us to alcoholism, drug abuse, suicide, mental illness and abject poverty, and which, in collusion with the more blatant aspects of our colonial oppression, seek to wipe out Native and Black Bodies? What does fascist violence mean to us when we already live under such states identified by Jodi Byrd as “unlivable, ungrievable conditions within the state-sponsored economies of slow death and letting die” (2011: 38). Thus it may seem that to equate our current status with fascism is erroneous, if not outright outrageous, given what our peoples have already experienced, and what we continue to experience on a daily basis. However, with that said, we should not ignore the potential for violence in excess of standard settler colonial operating techniques of governance that the modern fascist movement within the northern bloc holds. This is seen most starkly in the Quebec City mosque shootings. While the suspect, Alexandre Bissonnette, appears to have acted alone, we must not forget that this is a city where the local Soldiers of Odin chapter has stated that is wishes to launch patrols of Islamic neighbourhoods. In general we can say that, as noted by Stephen Pearson (2017), in excess of the right-wing national-populism of Trump and his canadian interlocutors, these forces, whether they explicitly engage in the kind of German nazi fetishism associated with such individuals and organizations Andrew Anglin of The Daily Stormer or the National Socialist Movement, something which many people continue to stereotype as the most publicly visible mark of fascism, they all thirst for a new frontier, for recolonization, for territories, for a white homeland. In other words, they thirst for the fulfilment of the settler dream—which is a project, it is important to note, they think has failed—to be dreamt anew. And in this we also return to distinction between a genuine fascist movement, which is a movement of insurgent rightists, and the system-loyal right-wing national-populism of the Trump presidency. While Trump drove home the slogan “make America great again,” it was not fundamentally premised on the idea that the american project had failed. The modern fascist movement of the northern bloc however embraces a politic that embodies a love for what america “might have been, if only.” In this sense it is a rhetoric and politic different from that of the Trump presidency (or, again, its canadian cognates) not only in form, but also in essence. Indeed, we must recognize that it exceeds the standard settler colonial project of settler self-Indigenization (though, of course, they engage in this as well) by way of a complete embrace of the settler self, including all its horrors. It is a proclamation of reassertion: white power naked and with no smiling lies. It is white power that is not only unashamed, but proud (Pearson, 2017). Ultimately, however, this issue does fold back in on itself, because of the fact of the foundational anti-Native and antiblack violence of the political project that created and sustains the northern bloc of settler colonialism. Such violence is ever omnipresent. The basal liberalism of settler colonial political life and civil society has always articulated a war over life and death with two fundamental aims: the elimination and dispossession of Native peoples and the subjugation and violent exclusion of Black peoples. In this regard, liberalism and fascism within the contours of the northern bloc can be properly placed on the same ethico-political continuum, one that is rooted in Native and Black death. In this, the fires of foundational Native and Black death, of the fact of ongoing invasion and settler colonialism, the final inadequcies of the Dimitrovian formulation of fascism are exposed and burdned away. And so here we return again to the question of colonial violence in the politic of fascism, because from the perspective of colonized life, whether the governing political logic of the colonial state is liberal or fascist, the fundamental warfare remains in place. The principal threat then of fascism to colonized peoples is not that we would move from a state of having not been subjected to violence from every possible angle to one where we would, but rather that the pacing of the eliminative and accumulative logics of settler colonialism would be accelerated to their fullest possible potential. This means that in the final analysis the question being posed to Native and Black peoples by our erstwhile white left allies, who right now are sounding the anti-fascist alarm, is an impossible choice between non-fascist, nominally “democratic” colonialism, and fascist colonialism. Not only is this an impossible choice, but it is also, as I have sought to show, a false one, because what is fascism in the face of gruelling colonial violence without end? At best the choice lies between a slow (“democratic”) and a fast (fascist) colonialism, in which the latter would most certainly accelerate the northern bloc’s underlying anti-Native and antiblack logics. Even the placing of anti-fascist theory and praxis within an explicitly communist perspective is unable to, in itself, offer us shelter or solution. This is because Native and Black ghosts, both living and dead, haunt the possibilities of socialism well. As I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere (2016), a socialism, whether marxist or anarchist, that does not, at the deepest possible level, engage with and seek to combat the fact of settler colonialism can only result in its own reconfiguration of the arrangements of settler power into a new form, nominally in the hands of the working class. The possibility of a newly socialized dispensation of settler colonialism could only be described as national socialism pure and simple. Our ghosts cry out for something different. Thus, we cannot choose between “democratic” colonialism, even a socialist one, and fascist colonialism because the ultimate problem is the same: colonialism.

#### The figure of extinction secures settler subjectivity. Their ecological collapse is ideological mystification that uses fear to protect settler colonial fluidity replicating imperialist concepts of whiteness.

**Dalley 16** {Assistant Professor of English, Daemen College, teaching World & Postcolonial Literatures Hamish - Ph.D, Australian National University. The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1238160}

Analyses of settler-colonial narrative have focused on how settlers imagine the past, identifying a problem of origins that makes history an object of anxiety. The meaning settlers attribute to the future has been, less thoroughly examined. This article addresses that gap by analysing literary texts from South Africa, Australia, and Canada that posit an ‘end’ to settler colonialism, imagining futures beyond the settler-colonial present. It argues that a key metaphor of the settler future is extinction. This concept allows the death of the settler subject to be constructed as comparable, to the elimination of indigenous peoples, superseded societies, maladapted species, or even – through the invocation of climate change – to the end of humanity itself. The article analyses the implications of settler extinction, arguing that the works in question rely on a slippage between the settler subject and ‘the human’ that replicates features of settler-colonial and patriarchal ideology. The article suggests that while extinction does offer a path for settlers to contemplate futures without them, it also operates as a mechanism of disavowal. Extinction is thus a metaphor of ending that enables survival, allowing settlers to avoid, a true reckoning with the disestablishment of settler- colonial power structures. Settlers love to contemplate the possibility of their own extinction; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending – the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out – is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive, for few modern social for- mations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few excep- tions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states – namely, the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of pol- itical agency and rights – and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance¶ that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article.¶ Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settler- colonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past – about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap – which is at once geographical, historical, and existential – has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superior- ity, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from ever moving on from the moment of colonization.2 As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression**.**3 Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4 As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because:¶ ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies.5¶ Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6 This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlersdo often try to imagine their demise – but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology**,** with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked.¶ I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools – the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial litera- ture, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between his- torio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change – an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settler- colonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature.¶ That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’ – by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms – and ‘fatal impact’ – which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak – all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’ that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinction also appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well.¶ The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonial- ism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883 Story of an African Farm:¶ It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. [...] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones. [...] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10¶ In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inha- bitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological super- iority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial geno- cide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenth- century novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds,¶ which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species.¶ Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of immi- nent loss’.11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who, by any objective measure, are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them. Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moses have traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability **–** an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change.¶ In the remainder of this paper I consider extinction’s function as a metaphor of decolonization. I use this phrase to invoke, without completely endorsing, Tuck and Yang’s argu- ment that to treat decolonization figuratively, as I argue extinction narratives do, is necessarily to preclude radical change, creating opportunities for settler ‘moves to innocence’ that re-legitimate racial inequality.13 The counterview to this pessimistic perspec- tive is offered by Veracini, who suggests that progressive change to settler-colonial relationships will only happen if narratives can be found that make decolonization think- able.14 This article enters the debate between these two perspectives by asking what it means for settler writers to imagine the future via the trope of extinction. Does extinction offer a meaningful way to think about ending settler colonialism, or does it re-activate settler-colonial patterns of thought that allow exclusionary social structures to persist?¶ I explore this question with reference to examples of contemporary literary treatments of extinction from select English-speaking settler-colonial contexts: South Africa, Australia, and Canada.15 The next section of this article traces key elements of extinction narrative in a range of settler-colonial texts, while the section that follows offers a detailed reading of one of the best examples of a sustained literary exploration of human finitude, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013). I advance four specific arguments. First, extinc- tion narratives take at least two forms depending on whether the ‘end’ of settler society is framed primarily in historical-civilizational terms or in a stronger, biological sense; the key question is whether the ‘thing’ that is going extinct is a society or a species. Second, biologically oriented extinction narratives rely on a more or less conscious slippage between ‘the settler’ and ‘the human’. Third, this slippage is ideologically ambivalent: on the one hand, it contains a radical charge that invokes environmentalist discourse and climate-change anxiety to imagine social forms that re-write settler-colonial dynamics; on the other, it replicates a core aspect of imperialist ideology by normalizing whiteness as equivalent to humanity. Fourth, these ideological effects are mediated by gender**, insofar** as extinction narratives invoke **issues of** biological reproduction, community protection, and violence that function to differentiate and reify masculine and feminine rolesin the putative de-colonial future. Overall, my central claim is that extinction is a core trope through which settler futurity emerges, one with crucial narrative and ideological effects that shape much of the contemporary literature emerging from white colonial settings.

#### The 1AC uncritically rests upon a legacy of carbon liberalism and colonial domination that acknowledges the risks of eco-collapse when it appears to threaten the liberal humanist subject without reflection on the settler’s historic culpability. Only interrupting those anthropocentric logics of settler colonialism can access the root of climate change and modalities that reproduce violence

Ahuja 15 (Neel - associate professor of postcolonial studies in the Department of English and Comparative Literature at UNC Chapel Hill. “INTIMATE ATMOSPHERES: Queer Theory in a Time of Extinctions” GLQ 21:2–3 Duke University Press)

Media representations of climate change struggle to grasp the enormity of killing. The planetary scale of carbon amplification, its association with expanding bodies and displaced destruction, coincides with a spectacular trauma of extinction: ecologically violent uses of land, chemicals, and carbon are accelerating the sixth major extinction event in earth’s history. This “event” (if we can stomach the cool rendering of mass death as a singularity) will commit 18–35 percent of extant animal and plant species to extinction by 2050.19 Perhaps one million species will disappear, and countless billions of living bodies will be denied the conditions of life or prematurely killed. Climate-related disasters are accelerating threats to already precarious lifeways: Inuit nations face melting Arctic ice; Maldivians and other islanders lose ground to rising seas; vulnerabilities to infectious disease grow with shrinking water supplies; the world’s agrarian poor face crop diseases, drought, desertification, and food price instability; and all countries face increased weather disasters. The large number of people who depend on subsistence agriculture are already living outside the ecological “boundary parameters” that enabled the rise of modern human societies.20 In this sense, we are already living the future of extinction. The planetary present—not some speculative future—exhibits a staggering scale of “reproductive failure,” human and nonhuman. Yet small bodies and intimate environments often get lost in big atmospheric narratives. Since its seventeenth-century origins in English, the term atmosphere has signaled the fluid medium of above-ground relations, its contradictory figuration as a space of geology and life, and a background that forges exchange between social and physical processes. Atmospheres can surround big and small bodies, and can shift as bodies entangle and disentangle spatially. With industrial pollution, lower atmospheric space abounds with plumes of toxic gases (methane, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide) as well as noncarbon by-products (e.g., nitrous oxide and ozone) that unpredictably concentrate in our bodies as we encounter a busy street, a power plant, or a factory farm. In addition to rising to heights where they can trap solar heat, these gases fix in soil and water, returning unpredictable flows of toxicity to the lithosphere where plants grow. These toxicities— often concentrated in poor and minority communities—contribute to childhood asthma, lung disease, and the spread of various cancers. In an account of living with toxic sensitivity to airborne heavy metals, Mel Chen describes navigating and transforming unpredictable atmospheres and their conjoined affective and spatial entanglements. The improvisational strategies for prophylaxis—such as donning a particulate mask to avoid exposure to vehicle emissions on a busy street—inevitably conjure public surveillance. “Suited up in both racial skin and chemical mask,” writes Chen, “I am perceived as a walking symbol of contagious disease like SARS, and am often met with some form of repulsion.”21 Chen’s account points to how the materiality of everyday air pollution subtly intertwines with the materiality of race. Race, according to Renisa Mawani, might itself be understood as an atmospherics rather than a “social construction.” Drawing on Fanon’s accounts of race and atmosphere, Mawani explores “race as an affective movement, a force rather than a thing, a current that reconstitutes and reassembles itself in response to its own internal rhythms and to changing social and political conditions.”22 If race is not simply a phenotypic characteristic but an ecology of affective movement and exchange, the effects of carbon pollution— disability, disease, forced migration, and sometimes death—can catalyze the emergence of xenophobic fears about economic and ecological interconnection. Racialized climate reporting draws affective power from senses of pervasive and inescapable environmental pollution. Michael Ziser and Julie Sze detail the persistent geopolitical and racial fears driving US responses to climate change. Contrasting the sentimental domestication of the (white) polar bear in US media with persistent fears of the cross-Pacific migration of Chinese air pollution, Ziser and Sze argue that climate discourses conjure earlier racial panics about “yellow peril” and obscure primary US responsibility for contemporary and historical emissions.23 While such reporting contributes to an atmosphere of fear and crisis, the everyday physicality of climate processes inscribes fear at the site of the skin. Atmosphere names a space of unpredictable touching, attractions, and subtle violences—a space at once geophysical and affective, informed by yet exploding representation, a space where the violences of late-carbon liberalism subtly reform racialized sensoria through shifting scales of interface. To explore this further I suggest that we think with mosquitoes, mosquitoes both figural and real, mosquitoes that bite, migrate, and feed on various bodies. These are parasites like those in Narayan’s vision of gay plague; they are also strange kin in a warming atmosphere. Mosquitoes excite colonial tropes in environmental discourse—from anthropophagic consumption (feeding on humans) to visions of tropical contagion.24 In the vampiric image of female mosquitoes’ blood feasts—required for their sexual reproduction—there is a counterpoint to the “carnivorous virility” that Carla Freccero attributes to liberal humanist visions of the subject. A small body becomes a predator of the human, forcing strange ecologies of attraction and feeling even as it poses risks of debility and death.25 But the parasite turns out to be feeding on a parasite. Alongside the mosquito, **a** universalized, waste-expelling human settler appears as the ultimate atmospheric parasite in neoliberal climate discourse. Michel Serres puts the point about scale this way: “The human parasite is of another order relative to that of the animal parasite: the latter is one, the former a set; the latter is time, the former, history; the latter is a garden, the former, a province; to destroy a garden or a world.”26 An organic imperialist, **the human colonizes ecologies, time, and thought itself**—an entire lifeworld. In the hands of late-carbon liberalism’s human settler, killing takes a form both massive and casual. This figuration is based on some daunting facts of extinction. The everyday activities of carbon-dependent industrial living connect one’s bodily consumption and waste to the “stranger intimacies” of a shared atmosphere, slowly threatening other far-flung bodies, human and nonhuman.27 The effects of waste may kill softly, enmeshed in the deep time and circuitous space of “slow violence,” a “largely unintentional ecocide.”28 From this vantage, beyond its invocation of xenophobic rhetorics of shape-shifting, virality, and contagion, the parasite suggests a problem of knowledge about agency and causality. For this is a human defined by waste rather than by romantic marks of sentience, feeling, or intentionality. To gloss Berlant, inhabiting late-carbon liberalism produces myths, icons, and feelings that may be “profoundly confirming” despite binding a person or world to situations of “profound threat.”29 Rather than settle comfortably into the assumption of species-derived power—of the destructive and universal human geological agency of “the Anthropocene”—we might say that to recognize that life is ambiently queer is to divest from spectacular temporalities of crisis and transcendence that infuse queer theory and environmentalism alike. Queering in this sense emerges by tracing an affective materiality that interrupts anthropocentric body logics and space-time continuums rather than a sovereign stance of negation in relation to Law, including the law of compulsory reproduction. Thus I interpret “queer inhumanism” as an account of interspecies entanglement and reproductive displacement, an inquiry into the unrealized lifeworlds that form the background of the everyday. This requires thinking askance the human and thinking death, animality, and vulnerability in an age of many extinctions—extinctions of taxonomized species, to be sure, but also more subtle orchestrations of racial precarity and quiet obliterations of histories that could have been. In a time of extinctions, lateral reproduction suggests not some transcendent space of queer negation—or worse, an acceptance of Narayan’s logic of plague—but a problem of rethinking our casual reproduction of forms of ecological violence that kill quietly, outside the spectacular time of crisis.

#### The affirmative’s generalized theorization of colonialism mystifies the operation of settler colonialism. The alternative is an ethic of incommensurability toward decolonization – you should relinquish any attachment to settler futurity and refuse the colonial reconciliation of the perm as premature and destructive

Tuck and Yang, 12 – PhD in Urban Education, Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations, and Coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York AND Assistant Professor of Ethnic Studies (Eve and K.W., “Decolonization is not a metaphor Eve Tuck,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40)

Generally speaking, postcolonial theories and theories of coloniality attend to two forms of colonialism. External colonialism (also called exogenous or exploitation colonization) denotes the expropriation of fragments of Indigenous worlds, animals, plants and human beings, extracting them in order to transport them to - and build the wealth, the privilege, or feed the appetites of - the colonizers, who get marked as the first world. This includes so-thought ‘historic’ examples such as opium, spices, tea, sugar, and tobacco, the extraction of which continues to fuel colonial efforts. This form of colonialism also includes the feeding of contemporary appetites for diamonds, fish, water, oil, humans turned workers, genetic material, cadmium and other essential minerals for high tech devices. External colonialism often requires a subset of activities properly called military colonialism - the creation of war fronts/frontiers against enemies to be conquered, and the enlistment of foreign land, resources, and people into military operations. In external colonialism, all things Native become recast as ‘natural resources’ - bodies and earth for war, bodies and earth for chattel. The other form of colonialism that is attended to by postcolonial theories and theories of coloniality is internal colonialism, the biopolitical and geopolitical management of people, land, flora and fauna within the “domestic” borders of the imperial nation. This involves the use of particularized modes of control - prisons, ghettos, minoritizing, schooling, policing - to ensure the ascendancy of a nation and its white elite. These modes of control, imprisonment, and involuntary transport of the human beings across borders - ghettos, their policing, their economic divestiture, and their dislocatability - are at work to authorize the metropole and conscribe her periphery. Strategies of internal colonialism, such as segregation, divestment, surveillance, and criminalization, are both structural and interpersonal. Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts **-** though they can overlap - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves5, whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. **Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve** the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, **seizing imperial wealth** is **inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion**. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). **Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.** Playing Indian and the erasure of Indigenous peoples Recently in a symposium on the significance of Liberal Arts education in the United States, Eve presented an argument that Liberal Arts education has historically excluded any attention to or analysis of settler colonialism. This, Eve posited, makes Liberal Arts education complicit in the project of settler colonialism and, more so, has rendered the truer project of Liberal Arts education something like trying to make the settler indigenous to the land he occupies. The attendees were titillated by this idea, nodding and murmuring in approval and it was then that Eve realized that she was trying to say something incommensurable with what they expected her to say. She was completely misunderstood. Many in the audience heard this observation: that the work of Liberal Arts education is in part to teach settlers to be indigenous, as something admirable, worthwhile, something wholesome, not as a problematic point of evidence about the reach of the settler colonial erasure. Philip Deloria (1998) explores how and why the settler wants to be made indigenous, even if only through disguise, or other forms of playing Indian. Playing Indian is a powerful U.S. pastime, from the Boston Tea Party, to fraternal organizations, to new age trends, to even those aforementioned Native print underwear. Deloria maintains that, “From the colonial period to the present, the Indian has skulked in and out of the most important stories various Americans have told about themselves” (p. 5). The indeterminacy of American identities stems, in part, from the nation’s inability to deal with Indian people. Americans wanted to feel a natural affinity with the continent, and it was Indians who could teach them such aboriginal closeness. Yet, in order to control the landscape they had to destroy the original inhabitants. (Deloria, 1998, p.5) L. Frank Baum (author of The Wizard of Oz) famously asserted in 1890 that the safety of white settlers was only guaranteed by the “total annihilation of the few remaining Indians” (as quoted in Hastings, 2007). D.H. Lawrence, reading James Fenimore Cooper (discussed at length later in this article), Nathaniel Hawthorne, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and others for his Studies in Classic American Literature (1924), describes Americans’ fascination with Indigeneity as one of simultaneous desire and repulsion (Deloria, 1998). “No place,” Lawrence observed, “exerts its full influence upon a newcomer until the old inhabitant is dead or absorbed.” Lawrence argued that in order to meet the “demon of the continent” head on and this finalize the “unexpressed spirit of America,” white Americans needed either to destroy Indians of assimilate them into a white American world...both aimed at making Indians vanish from the landscape. (Lawrence, as quoted in Deloria, 1998, p. 4). Everything within a settler colonial society strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear them from the land - this is how a society can have multiple simultaneous and conflicting messages about Indigenous peoples, such as all Indians are dead, located in faraway reservations, that contemporary Indigenous people are less indigenous than prior generations, and that all Americans are a “little bit Indian.” These desires to erase - to let time do its thing and wait for the older form of living to die out, or to even help speed things along (euthanize) because the death of pre-modern ways of life is thought to be inevitable - these are all desires for another kind of resolve to the colonial situation, resolved through the absolute and total destruction or assimilation of original inhabitants. Numerous scholars have observed that Indigeneity prompts multiple forms of settler anxiety, even if only because the presence of Indigenous peoples - who make a priori claims to land and ways of being - is a constant reminder that the settler colonial project is incomplete (Fanon, 1963; Vine Deloria, 1988; Grande, 2004; Bruyneel, 2007). The easy adoption of decolonization as a metaphor (and nothing else) is a form of this anxiety, because it is a premature attempt at reconciliation. The absorption of decolonization by settler social justice frameworks is one way the settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being one’s self. The desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore.

#### Frame this debate around the Aff’s ideological commitments and reject the 1AC’s colonial assumptions. Academic spaces must prioritize rejecting colonial scholarship, otherwise they will be used to justify destructive colonial policies.

Gani & **Marshall** 22 (Jasmine K. Gani: PhD of IR @ LSE. Senior Lecturer of IR @ St. Andrews. Jenna Marshall: PhD of Poli Sci @ Queen Mary Unive. Senior Researcher for Development and Postcolonial Studies @ U-Kassel The impact of colonialism on policy and knowledge production in International Relations, *International Affairs*, Vol. 98, Issue 1, January 2022, Pages 5–22, DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiab226)

Abu-Bakare's article offers an example of the limitations of academic–practitioner knowledge exchange. Exhorting scholars to make their research policy relevant does not address the unequal receptivity towards critical research that may challenge policy. Nor does it sufficiently take into account the implicit disciplining that can take place in that process of knowledge exchange. Those very spaces or channels that are created to facilitate sharing, listening and negotiation between knowledge producers and practitioners (through all the blurred boundaries between them) may reproduce and reify hierarchies through unequal interactions. Is real dialogue possible if power dynamics render the interlocutors unequal?56 Or, in their efforts to be heard, taken seriously, and make their presence worthwhile, academics and other knowledge producers may find themselves being subtly socialized into the very modes of speech and thought that they sought to criticize. This can also happen in reverse when grassroots practitioners share spaces with scholars and elite institutions. The path-breaking and radical ideas needed to initiate change on some of the most deep-seated problems in politics and society may be diluted in such spaces for the sake of pragmatism and communication, undermining the ability to imagine real alternatives to the status quo. This is not to say that knowledge producers, whether academic or community-based, should not engage with policy-makers, but rather that they should be clear in what they seek to achieve—if, for example, constructive dialogue or receptivity to expertise is unlikely, it is at times necessary and an ethical responsibility simply to register alternative ideas or contestation. Returning to the point made at the start of this piece, this cautions us in how we champion ‘impact’ and knowledge–policy engagement, especially if we only recognize engagements that supplement and are ‘useful’ to systems of powerrather than those that hold them to account. Conclusion

This special issue introduces the readers of International Affairs to the relatively undertheorized and underhistoricized relationship between race, knowledge production and policy-making. The articles demonstrate the ways in which practitioners have historically relied on research produced within the academy to inform policy, initiating the establishment of departments and disciplines for this purpose, but they also show the reverse to be equally true: that policy, both foreign and multilateral, influences the possibilities and parameters of research, funding and recruitment practices, and retention of jobs.57 A key goal of this special issue has been to foster reflection on the ways in which knowledge production (in its multifaceted forms) contributes to or challenges the practice of racism and coloniality; and the ways in which policy and practice shape, validate, limit or ignore knowledge production—in ways that either perpetuate or interrogate coloniality**.** As the three categories delineated above show, the academic–practitioner nexus is best captured as a series of foreclosures that actively work to uphold narrowly espoused evolutionary myths of the discipline and entrench a naturalization of white-racialized subject positions in academic discourse on the ‘international’, while sidelining scholars and activists, notably women and people of colour, who have made undeniable contributions to analysis of the contemporary world.58 All this brings into view, as one scholar puts it, ‘the fundamental ways in which IR already is, and always has been, complicit in ordering politics’.59 As we have argued in this introductory piece, the exposure in this special issue of the deep academic–practitioner nexus confronts and challenges the ‘gaps’ discourse advanced at the expense of making visible the existing reciprocity that disciplines the boundaries of acceptable enquiry. The outcome of this disciplining at the theoretical level can be seen in the construction of paradigms that normalize Eurocentric presuppositions on ‘how the world is’. But such outcomes are also made manifest through material implications generated by narrow policy responses and policy instruments.

The special issue is not just an exposure, though; it is also a call for repair. To embark on a project of repair, those involved in knowledge production, dissemination and application—within academia, think tanks, museums, schools, cultural production and policy—first and foremost need to recognize that their work is not detached from the real world, even if they seek to make it so. If the articles in this special issue have shown anything, it is that there can be no realistic and honest demarcation between political and apolitical knowledge: to assert neutrality is like offering a blank slate that will inevitably be written over. It is worth knowing that even with the best intentions, a scholar's work is likely to be co-opted for political ends**;** and that one's erasures and blind spots regarding injustice, even if innocently produced, will be taken as justification for inaction and marginalization of these injustices in the real world. Sincerity in seeking to prevent racist or imperialist co-optation necessitates more open interrogations of power and commitments to justice: and without doubt IR, whether ‘analytical’ or ‘critical’, and academia more broadly, are filled with sincere and honourable scholars who care about the world they live in and have the capacity to enact positive change. Questioning and challenging accepted and expected modes of academic enquiry requires courage and creativity, both of which are aided through collective effort. This special issue, then, is an invitation to adopt that courage and creativity in how we cultivate knowledge, in questioning the purpose and the ends of that knowledge, and to be discerning in how we try to put it into practice.

### Links

#### Once you have the plan text & impacts, add a specfic link to the shell & replace the general link with a better one if needed

#### (Carbon Tax) Do not trust their cost-benefit analyses of carbon tax policies or their low probability impacts. These assessments are based on the settler state’s incomplete economic models that always EXCLUDE our offense by design as unmeasurable and cannot predict numerous factors vital to determining outcomes. The result is serial policy failures when policymakers continually gravitate to incomplete analyses when formulating environmental policies

**Prasad 22** {Monica Prasad. Department of Sociology and Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University Hidden benefits and dangers of carbon tax. July 7, 2022 PLOS Climate 1(7): e0000052. https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052

**Carbon taxes**, like all taxes, **raise** two sets of **design questions**. The first set of questions is **on how to levy the tax:** what the rate should be, on whom it should be levied, **and** whether there should be any exceptions. The second set of questions is **how to spend the revenue**, such as whether it should become part of general revenue or should be reserved for dedicated purposes, and if dedicated, then whether it should be dedicated to environmental purposes or other purposes. There is disagreement on all these questions. On how to levy the tax, the World Bank’s Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition’s *Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices* concluded that achieving the Paris climate targets would require a price on carbon of US $50–100 per ton of CO2 emissions by 2030 [[1](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref001)]. In 2014 William Nordhaus calculated that a price of $7.40 per ton of CO2 would be optimal in terms of balancing costs and benefits of carbon tax [[2](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref002)]. A few years later, however, and in the face of several more years of inaction on carbon tax around the world, Nordhaus concluded that the social costs of carbon are over $30/ton of CO2 [[3](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref003)]. Many studies suggest starting with a lower rate in order to give households and firms time to adjust to the tax and make longer-term changes, and incrementally increasing the rate over time. The theoretical literature is clear that the optimal tax would be a flat tax on carbon that is levied equally on all sectors, but in practice, it is common for existing carbon taxes to exempt politically influential sectors and/or sectors vulnerable to international competition, even in the most environmentally ambitious countries. Finland and the Netherlands have had a carbon tax since 1990, Sweden and Norway since 1991, and Denmark since 1992. In all of these countries some sectors are hit by the tax and some are exempt, and the affected sectors have changed over time [[4](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref004)]. For example, in Sweden, much higher tax rates in transportation have led to emissions reductions in transportation, but lower rates are levied on oil and natural gas and have thus not led to lower emissions in those sectors [[5](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref005)]; in Norway only about 60% of emissions are taxed, with exemptions being given to the most energy-intensive industries [[6](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref006), [7](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref007)]. If there is disagreement on the specific rate and exemptions, there is much more disagreement on how to spend the revenue, and several different approaches have been proposed: merging the revenue with tax revenue from other sources, returning the revenue to households in a lump sum, using the revenue to cut other existing taxes, using the revenue to lessen the regressivity of the carbon tax, using the revenue to subsidize environmentally beneficial technologies or policies, or using the revenue to reduce debt [[8](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref008)].

**The problem is** that these different uses of the revenue respond to different—and potentially conflicting—concerns. Different design features have different consequences for three goals, all of which may be seen as relevant to carbon taxes: economic growth, distributional consequences, and the environment. If the goal is to *minimize economic costs*, many scholars argue the revenue from carbon tax should be used to lower other taxes. For example, [[9](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref009)] argue that because any tax introduces distortion and economic cost, adding a carbon tax on top of existing taxes magnifies the economic cost: “As firms pass CO2 taxes forward into higher energy prices, this drives up product prices in general, thereby depressing the real return to work effort and savings…Reducing the buying power (real returns) to capital and labor depresses labor supply and capital accumulation.” Therefore, as many scholars argue, the goal should be to minimize the economic damages of carbon tax by cutting other taxes. The most substantial recent study in this vein is [[10](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref010)], which examines several different revenue scenarios, including using the revenue to reduce the deficit or cut taxes on labor or capital, and finds that if the carbon tax is used to cut capital tax rates, it can actually increase GDP (see also [[11](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref011)–[14](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref014)]). Minimizing economic costs and using the revenue to cut capital taxes is also useful politically, to bring on board political actors who might not otherwise be convinced of the need for a carbon tax, because the broader public debate revolves around the perceived economic costs of these policies. British Columbia uses revenue from its carbon tax to fund a reduction in the corporate tax rate and taxes on small businesses, among other uses [[15](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref015)]. Although there are certainly criticisms of the argument that tax cuts for capital lead to significant benefits for the economy (e.g. [[16](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref016)]), a recent review found that “almost all studies agree that recycling the revenue through capital or corporate tax cuts is preferable, from an efficiency perspective, in the long term” [[17](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref017)]. On the other hand, a different goal may be *distributional*. A carbon tax is generally held to be regressive, because lower-income households spend much larger shares of their income on energy costs ([[18](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref018), [19](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref019)]. It is not fair for lower-income households to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of climate change mitigation, and therefore—some argue—the revenue from the carbon tax should be returned to low-income households ([[20](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref020), [18](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref018)]. The Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition report is clear that lessening the regressivity of the tax may be necessary to generate political coalitions in its favor. However, some scholars argue that this goal conflicts with the goal to minimize the economic damage from the tax. For example, [[18](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref018)] conclude that a lump sum rebate is the policy that most improves the fortunes of the bottom three quintiles, while “recycling revenue to reduce capital taxes is the most efficient policy, but we caution that it makes carbon pricing, which is already regressive, even more so.” They suggest as a middle option using carbon tax revenues to reduce labor taxes. They worry that “if the rebate policy is viewed as an attempt to reduce inequality, this might introduce a controversial policy sub-plot to an already polarized debate.” Moreover, recycling revenue to lower income households could be a selling point for carbon taxes in some circumstances but could be politically unpopular in other cases. The ultimate political consequences are unclear. The Australian carbon tax reserved a significant share of its revenue to be returned as dividends to lower and middle-income households, but this was not enough to overcome the political opposition that eventually saw the tax repealed [[15](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref015)]. Other authors dispute the equity-efficiency tradeoff of carbon tax entirely, finding that economic efficiency and distributional concerns need not always be in conflict [[21](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref021), [22](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref022)]. Cost-and-no-benefit analysis

If the goals of economic efficiency and distributional justice are potentially in conflict, at least the literature is aware of these two goals, examines the extent to which they are in conflict, and tries explicitly to reconcile them. **But on the question of *environmental benefits*, the literature is surprisingly silent**. Because environmental consequences are hard to measure, **the peer-reviewed econometric literature assessing the consequences of carbon taxes** generally **ignores environmental consequences.** A World Bank report examined 30 years of scholarship on carbon taxes in peer-reviewed journals and found only a handful that examine their effects on the environment. Even fewer studies attempt to include the environmental benefits in an overarching assessment of the costs and benefits of carbon tax [[23](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref023)]. This is **because of the** inherent **difficulty of modeling climate harms and benefits**. Marron and Toder note:Carbon dioxide emissions stay in the atmosphere for decades. Their environmental and economic impacts depend nonlinearly on the stock of greenhouse gases, which will depend on future economic developments, domestic climate policies, and policies elsewhere in the world**. Estimating the marginal social cost of carbon thus requires** complex modeling and **assumptions about the trajectory of carbon emissions,** climate sensitivity, **and the impacts of any climate changes**, all of which are uncertain. The cost may depend critically on controversial assumptions, **such as what value to place on low-probability, catastrophic outcomes** and what discount rate to apply in valuing damages far in the future [[19](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref019)] As a result, the estimates of environmental costs are wildly different, with a mean of $196 per metric ton of carbon but a standard deviation of $322. Examining the social costs of carbon has become more common in governmental cost-benefit analyses in the U.S. over the last decade, because a court case in 2008 concluded that governmental analysts could not assume that carbon emissions reductions have no value [[24](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref024), [25](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref025)]. Nevertheless, this literature generally ends with a wide range of measurements and an acknowledgment of uncertainty, since there are parameters that will forever remain outside the bounds of any attempt at calculation, such as the actions of future governments, and parameters that do not generate any consensus, such as the discount rate. Tol, in a metareview of these studies, concludes that “**estimates** of the social cost of carbon or the Pigouvian tax are highly uncertain and **are very sensitive to the researcher’s assumptions about people’s attitudes toward the distant future,** faraway lands, **and remote probabilities”** [[26](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref026)]. **Governmental calculations** have seen drastic revisions, ranging from $-10 to over $100, and changing from one year to the next the conclusion of the benefits of particular policies ([[24](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref024), [27](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref027)]. Pindyck argues that the conclusions of these models are almost entirely a function of an arbitrarily chosen discount rate, and that these exercises “**create a perception of** knowledge and **precision that is illusory, and can fool policy-makers into thinking that** the forecasts **the models** generate **have some kind of scientific legitimacy**” [[26](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref026)]. Because of this uncertainty, rather than attempt to model the environmental benefits of carbon tax, most cost-benefit analyses of carbon tax take the approach of beginning with a specific emissions reduction target and determining only what is the most cost-effective way of reaching it, a goal which demands less information and therefore affords more certainty [[19](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref019)]. While this approach is sensible given the uncertainties and political controversies surrounding the measurement of environmental harm, it leaves the literature disproportionately oriented to economic costs, and silent on the possible environmental benefits of carbon tax: “Since existing empirical studies on carbon tax do not account for the benefits of mitigating climate change, the common findings are carbon taxes cause the economy to shrink … **While the magnitude of carbon tax varies significantly** [depending on] how the carbon tax revenue is recycled to the economy, **the direction of impact is always negative, with few exceptions” [**[23](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref023)].

For example, one study argues “Substituting carbon taxes for other sources of revenue or using the proceeds to reduce deficits or finance expenditures are the keys to integration of carbon taxes with proposals for fiscal reform” [[11](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref011)]. But the authors do not assess whether using the revenue to facilitate the development of alternative energy would result in more or less abatement of carbon emissions, examining only how cuts in tax rates or returning the revenue in a lump sum would affect abatement. And they do not include the environmental benefits in their conclusion: “We focus on the market consequences of the carbon tax and recycling policies. We do not consider the avoided damages and climate benefits that would accompany such policies”. Similarly, another study argues for using carbon tax revenues to reduce capital taxation [[10](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref010)]. The authors find that the carbon tax reduces CO2 emissions, but they do not include the benefits of this reduction in assessing the costs and benefits of the tax, and they do not assess whether using the revenue for environmental purposes could lead to greater reductions in CO2 emissions. Because the environmental benefits are out of the equation, these authors ignore the question of whether using carbon tax revenue for environmental purposes would lead to even greater emissions abatement and thus to even greater overall benefit. As Nemet, Holloway, and Meier write, because these benefits are not considered in economic studies “the focus on cost minimization—rather than comparison of benefits and costs—diminishes the role of benefits in general”[[28](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref028)]. They note that targets for abatement levels are specified exogenously and treated as given in many carbon tax studies, and thus “the marginal damages of climate change do not influence choices among policy options” and “The resulting marginalization of climatic benefits has had the effect of excluding quantitative representation of benefits in general.” Perhaps most striking is that the focus on quantifiable costs leads these scholars to criticize the policies that may be precisely the ones to have the most environmental benefits. For example, the success of carbon tax in the Nordic countries has been attributed to their use of carbon tax revenue to subsidize research and development into clear energy technologies. One study cites “compelling technological contingences or breakthroughs…a continued phase out of nuclear power; a rapid ramping up of onshore and offshore wind energy; a spectacular diffusion of electric vehicles; a massive increase in bioenergy production; and the commercialization of industrial scale carbon capture and storage” as the relevant factors in explaining the energy transition in the Nordic countries [[29](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref029)]. Other authors emphasize the development of substitute fuels as a primary factor in the reduction of climate emissions [[4](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref004), [30](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref030)]. Using carbon tax revenue to subsidize research and development into clean energy technologies could thus be a means of accelerating technological innovation that gives firms the ability to reduce carbon emissions [[31](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref031)]. As Liscow and Karpilow argue, because innovations are non-linear and can build over time in a “snowballing” fashion, “To address social harms like climate change, government policy should encourage innovation in targeted areas” [[32](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref032)], giving clean energy technologies a “big push” that would fundamentally alter the trajectory of innovation. But Timilsina [[23](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref023)] notes that when carbon tax revenues are used to subsidize renewable electricity and efficiency improvements, the existing models, which are not equipped to consider the environmental benefits, show only economic costs, because the policy is only “recycling the revenue from one distortionary policy (i.e., carbon tax) to finance another distortionary policy (i.e., clean technology subsidy).” The policies most likely to lead to the development and adoption of substitute cleaner-burning fuels **are precisely the ones** that are deemed **too distortionary by the existing models,** because their **benefits**—particularly the nonlinear benefits of rapid technology improvement—**are not visible** in the models. The motivations behind decisions to leave out environmental benefits are understandable given the impossibility of calculating them, but the result is a scholarship that thoroughly explores the costs of carbon taxes to economic growth but is unable to consider the possible benefits to the environment. This leads to policy suggestions that may not be the most effective in reducing carbon emissions. The new starve the beast

If **the literature on carbon tax** misses hidden benefits of carbon tax, it also **misses a hidden danger: the** carbon **tax generates revenue only if i**ndividuals or **firms are paying the tax**, that is, if they are emitting carbon. **To the extent that they** are able to **bypass the tax by** substituting to **lower-carbon substitutes—or** to the extent that **lower-carbon emitting firms drive out higher carbon-emitting firms—revenues** from the tax **fall.** If those revenues have been used to substitute for other taxes, when revenues fall the programs funded with those revenues come under threat.

One study, for example, in analyzing the effect of carbon taxes in Canadian provinces, assumes fixed elasticities of response of fuel use to carbon taxes [[33](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref033)]. But **given the immense research and development infrastructure that has been generated around environmental technologies, this assumption of fixed elasticities is questionable,** and it may be necessary to model also the elasticity of the elasticity—that is, **it may become much easier to improve energy efficiency or substitute renewable fuels than it is now**. For example, the price per watt of solar photovoltaic cells has dropped from over $70 in 1977, to under 70 cents today. That kind of **non-linear development in technology is common** in the rapidly developing green technology sector, **but it is** **not incorporated in the current models**. Indeed, the most ambitious countries have aimed to become 100% free of fossil fuel, and in the Nordic countries 63% of electricity already comes from renewable energy [[34](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref034); see also [30](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref030)]. Consider McKibbin et al.’s argument for using carbon tax revenues to reduce capital taxation: “In that case, investment rises, employment and wages rise, and overall GDP is significantly above its baseline through year 25” [[10](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref010)]. But what happens when one introduces non-linear technological development, of the kind seen in the development of solar energy, into the model? The environmental benefits would of course be dramatic, but the revenues from the carbon tax would fall, because these newer technologies emit less carbon and thus generate less tax revenue. If capital taxes or other taxes have been cut, then the programs that were supported by the carbon tax revenue can only be financed through deficits, through new taxes, or through cuts in spending, none of which are included in the optimistic model about economic benefits. These developments may reduce some of those economic benefits. Stern and Stiglitz [[1](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref001)] argue that this would only happen over the very long run, but it is hard to be confident of this prediction given the rapid development of clean energy technologies. In a sense, using carbon tax revenue to replace other tax revenue pits the goal of reducing environmental emissions against the goal of preserving revenue for government programs, because efforts to reduce carbon emissions will starve the government of funds. Of course, taxes could always be raised in the future if and when this problem arises, and Gillis [[35](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref035)] suggests tax cuts are often reversed or undone in subtle ways. However, in the American context, cutting taxes has become an important electoral tool, and politicians therefore have an incentive to spotlight and campaign against tax increases, making maintenance of tax revenue more difficult than in other countries [[36](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref036)]. Carbon taxes could thus become a new means of reducing the size of government by changing the default situation to one of declining tax revenues. One strategy to mitigate this problem would be to incrementally raise the price of carbon emissions to keep government revenue fixed. For example, one study notes that the Swiss carbon tax “establishes a clear link between the rate and pre-defined quantitative reduction targets of CO2 emissions. In case reduction targets are not achieved an increase in the CO2 levy rate is triggered” [[30](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref030)]. Similar policies could be adopted to preserve government revenue, although these would make the carbon tax tougher to implement politically. Some scholars worry that policymakers will in fact privilege the preservation of revenue over the reduction of carbon emissions, keeping carbon emissions high in order to keep revenue high ([[37](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref037), [28](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref028)]). A strategy to avoid this would be to avoid using the revenue for general government purposes altogether.

**Policy implications** In *Cents and Sensibility*, Morton Schapiro tells the story of a World Bank report that evaluated a World Health Organization program to counteract river blindness in Africa. The WHO considered the program highly successful, as there was progress in stamping out the disease in 90% of the areas covered by the program, without going over budget. But **when** the World Bank triedto analyze the success of the program **using traditional** economic principles of **cost-benefit analysis, the result was inconclusive.** Schapiro writes: “**If you count value in economic terms**—changes in earnings discounted back to the present—the answer is, alas, not all that much [value generated] in areas with high unemployment and low educational achievement” [[38](https://journals.plos.org/climate/article?id=10.1371/journal.pclm.0000052#pclm.0000052.ref038)]. Because the beneficiaries could not be expected to be particularly productive in economic terms, the economic benefits were not as large as they would be for those in contexts where the beneficiaries could be expected to earn more. The authors of the report noted “there are **humanitarian benefits** associated with reducing the blindness and suffering” but “these benefits **are inherently unmeasurable,** **and we will not account for them** here.” The benefits of curing blindness for large numbers of people simply do not enter the cost-benefit analysis. In a way, this hesitation to tread where one’s methods do not go can be seen as admirable modesty. If the mandate is to measure the calculable benefits of a program, then clearly things that are not calculable are outside of one’s remit, and one should not try to force them into calculability. These calculations are best thought of as exercises, designed to shed light on some issues but not to provide a wholesale judgment on programs.

The problem arises when policymakers make decisions **based on** these **partial analyses as if they were complete** analyses. This behavior, too, is understandable: **policymakers** who care about evidence and analysis and rigor (which does not constitute the entirety of the population of policymakers) will **gravitate toward** studies that claim to provide itand maylet themselves be guided bysuch studies. But if **scholars** are **unwilling to consider incalculable benefits,** **policymakers** who pay attention to scholars **will be making decisions based on overestimations** ofcosts **and underestimations** of benefits.**This** phenomenon **seems to be occurring today with the** study of **carbon tax. Decision-makers should be wary** of relying on the economic scholarship for this reason. Simply pointing out the insufficiency of these approaches, however, does not give us alternative principles for policy analysis and selection. Thus, rather than completely ignoring cost-benefit calculations, a better principle is that **we should always examine cost-benefit calculations with an eye toward whether the unmeasurable factors are symmetrical or asymmetrical**. If both costs and benefits have equal degrees of difficulty of measurement, cost-benefit analysis cannot be a guide to action. However, where, as in this case, there is a strong tendency for unmeasurable factors to be in one direction—the calculation of benefits—cost-benefit analysis can be a guide to action if it is taken as providing a lower bound. Despite the difficulties of measurement, the implications for policy in this case are clear: carbon tax is a more promising policy than cost-benefit calculations would lead us to believe. More precise measurement is not necessary to reach that conclusion.

#### (Cap & Trade/Carbon Tax) The aff’s policy narrative sidelines any chance for indigenous, environmental justice as the desires of polluters are privileged over considerations of the impacts to marginalized communities who always suffer the costs of market-based solutions. Their embrace of addressing the threat of climate change using corporatized market-based solutions will continue to damage socially marginalized communities

Schlosberg & Collins 14 [David Schlosberg is a is an American political theorist who is currently a Professor of Environmental Politics in the Department of Government and International Relations the University of Sydney, Lisette B. Collins is Assistant Policy Officer at Office of Environment and Heritage at the University of Sydney From Environmental to Climate Justice: Climate Change and the Discourse of Environmental Justice February 22, 2014 <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.275>]

There are, however, some tensions in this shift to a focus on climate justice, especially in the engagement with more mainstream environmental groups and the legislative arena. There is concern that some climate policy-focused groups disparage the community-based work of the environmental justice movement. One activist notes: ‘We frame climate change in terms of impacted communities—what the facilities look like, health impacts, access to health or water or jobs. Reflected back to us, we are told that all we care about is local impacts and since carbon is global, our focus is misplaced, at best, or irrelevant, at worst.’64 However, the more mainstream groups, with media attention and significant funding, need the assistance and integration of the environmental justice movement in order to have an impact on many communities. And so the tension between the major environmental groups and the climate justice community continues. The tension is not simply in focus or organizational style, but discourse as well, especially in terms of different responses to using a market logic to frame policy. In an environmental justice approach, carbon markets are generally seen as giveaways to polluters at the expense of poor communities.65 A simple cap-and-trade system, where the original credits are given to polluters, is contrasted with preferred cap-and-dividend or fee-and-dividend policy, where permits would be auctioned to polluters and the revenue returned to poor and vulnerable communities.66,67 One activist explains the differing positions: ‘Traditional climate activists espouse ‘our economy works, except for the carbon thing. How do we simply make our economy less carbon-intensive?’ But EJ folks see climate as a symptom of a whole system, so we need to rethink our economics.’64 In any climate policy debate, environmental justice activists are suspicious of corporate or consumerist responses to climate change; they see such approaches as catering to those with wealth, rather than the already vulnerable. As we will explore below, the climate justice movement began with a critique of the carbon economy as a symptom of larger inequities created and exploited by global capital. More specifically, there has been tension around the key policy suggested by mainstream environmental organizations—to raise the price and/or limit the supply of carbon-based energy. The concern is that any policy to reduce carbon emissions—whether a cap-and-permit system, a carbon tax, or even just keeping fossil fuels in the ground—will inevitably raise the price of energy. That, of course, hurts the poor most. The environmental justice focus is not only on the emissions, but also on the impact of those emissions and the cost of energy; policies must address the inevitable inequitable impact with some type of compensation and relief. Environmental justice approaches widen the concerns to be addressed in constructing climate policy; this has the potential to put them at odds with the more mainstream and elite environmental NGOs. This discussion of the US environmental justice movement has attempted to lay out the internal evolution and expansion of its concerns. We now turn to the way that environmental justice as an idea has impacted other movement groups as they have developed conceptions of, and demands for, climate justice.

#### (Legalism) The topic’s appeal to legality contains a presumed neutrality over the jurisdictional capacity of the settler which naturalizes the process of settlement and generates affective attachments to liberal governance.

**Mackey 14** [Eva - Assoc. Prof, School of Indigenous and Canadian Studies, Carleton University. “Unsettling Expectations: (Un)certainty, Settler States of Feeling, Law, and Decolonization.” <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/canadian-journal-of-law-and-society-la-revue-canadienne-droit-et-societe/article/unsettling-expectations-uncertainty-settler-states-of-feeling-law-and-decolonization1/AC488FC12B5036F8FC0BCD3256AD0DB5>]

Certainty is often conceptualized as an unequivocally desirable and positive state of affairs. Many theorists assert, as if it is a self-evident universality, that all people require certainty, a sense that our lives and futures are secure and not at risk (Marris 1996 ; Giddens 1990 ). At the same time, as Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (1848, 16) pointed out, capitalism guarantees “everlasting insecurity.” Many theorists have explored the uncertainty that characterizes the post-modern, post-Fordist, and/or so-called “post-national” era of “globalization” (Baumann 1997 ; Beck 1992 ; Berman 1988 ; O’Malley 2004 ). One of the key reasons the Canadian government seeks to resolve Indigenous land rights is to provide “greater certainty over rights to land and resources therefore contributing to a positive investment climate and creating greater potential for economic development and growth” (Aboriginal Aff airs and Northern Development 2010 ). In this paper, I explore how concepts and processes that construct and produce certainty and uncertainty intersect with the challenges of decolonizing Indigenoussettler relations in Canada, both in law and in the everyday feelings of people opposed to Indigenous land rights. The relationship between certainty, development, and rights and title has been addressed by Carole Blackburn ( 2005 ), who argues that treaty negotiations in late twentieth-century British Columbia are a form of governmentality that help to regulate populations and mediate “between Aboriginal-rights claims and the demands of global capital,” and that they produce “effects of state sovereignty” (Blackburn 2005 , 586). Land rights, if not “legally captured” within a land rights agreement, are seen as making property uncertain and are therefore threatening to economic development and “capital and state sovereignty.” The goal of the land agreements, according to Blackburn, is the attainment of certainty through (1) extinguishing undefi ned Aboriginal rights, or (2) fixing, defining, and codifying such rights so they cannot threaten certainty (Blackburn 2005 ). Here, I build on Blackburn’s compelling paper, based on my own ethnographic research on conflict over land rights. Blackburn examines concerns over certainty in discussions of rights, title, and economic prosperity in neoliberal British Columbia in the years 1999–2000. She persuasively argues that the concern with ensuring certainty emerges in conjunction with how the “legal terrain has slowly expanded the recognition and protection of the rights of Aboriginal people since 1973” with Calder v Attorney General of British Columbia (2005, 589). Here, I engage a longer temporal genealogy of concepts of certainty and uncertainty, showing that certainty is not only a concern for present-day governance and neoliberal states. Indeed, securing settler certainty through law is a much deeper characteristic of the “logic of settler colonialism” (Smith 2012 ). The critical approach to certainty and uncertainty provided contributes to understanding the underpinnings of settler law and its relationship to contemporary “settler structures of feeling” (Rifkin 2011 ). It also gestures toward what might be required for decolonization. I argue that if settler jurisprudence and settler “structures of feeling” pivot on axiomatic assumptions about settler entitlement and certainty in land, property, and settler futures, and on materializing “settled expectations,” then decolonization, for settlers and for settler law, may entail embracing particular forms of (likely uncomfortable) uncertainty in order to imagine and practice relationships and power in new and creative ways. Settler Colonial Logics and Settler States of Feeling. This paper emerges from a larger project based on ethnographic studies of local confl ict over land rights in Ontario, Canada and Upper New York State, United States. Th e goal of that research is to understand the lived practices and discourses of people defending and countering Indigenous land rights—as a grounded point of departure to examine the limits and possibilities of decolonization. As someone raised as a member of settler society, working to understand how “settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone” (Tuck and Yang 2012 , 7), I decided that my research could best explore the “settler problem” (Epp 2003 ; Regan 2010 ) and thus critically examine what Andrea Smith ( 2012 ) calls the “the logics of settler colonialism.” These “logics” are the “social, ideological, and institutional processes through which the authority of the settler state . . . is enacted” (Rifkin 2011 , 343). I therefore conceptualized these sites of conflict over land rights as “contact zones” (Pratt 1992 , 6) of ongoing practices of settler colonialism, within which I could explore structures and practices that maintain colonialism, as well as the construction of settler subjectivities. My case studies include the confl ict over the land rights case of the Caldwell First Nation in southwestern Ontario, Canada, including members of the Chatham-Kent Community Network (CKCN), the group fi ghting the land agreement. At the time, the Caldwell agreement-in-principle proposed to resolve the specifi c land claim by buying land for sale on the open market. Th e Caldwell could, aft er purchasing enough land, then apply for reserve status. During fi eldwork, signs produced by the CKCN stating “NOT FOR SALE” were ubiquitous, posted on farms, homes, and businesses in the area. In New York State, I researched the land rights cases of the Cayuga Indian Nation and the Onondaga Nation, conducting interviews with members of the anti-land rights group Upstate Citizens for Equality, as well as with the solidarity groups SHARE (Strengthening Haudenosaunee-American Relations Th rough Education), and NOON (Neighbours of the Onondaga Nation). To understand the ethnographic materials, the project moved to develop a genealogy of colonial and national conceptual frameworks and practices, based on the themes that emerged in the ethnographic and interview material. During my research, farmers and other mostly small-town and rural nonAboriginal people who were fighting against land rights in their local areas constantly expressed powerful feelings of uncertainty, crisis, and anxiety about the future in the context of the land claims. Th ey felt angry about this uncertainty, treating it as unexpected and unfair. This paper traces how these settlers’ feelings of uncertainty and certainty about their entitlement to land in the present have emerged from historical and present-day practices and frameworks of colonialism and settler coloniality, and how they have been embedded in philosophy and settler legal regimes. One goal of this paper is to show that the deep feelings I encountered when interviewing people should not be conceptualized as extreme or abnormal responses. Instead, they should be seen as normal responses to land-rights actions, if they are conceptualized in the context of longstanding axiomatic frameworks of settler colonialism. I see them therefore as important characteristic “settler structures of feeling” that must be taken seriously in any efforts to decolonize, especially because they are also pivotal in jurisprudence and broader dominant culture. Th ey help us to see how coloniality and processesof settlement become naturalized and self-evident, how they move from what I call “fantasies of entitlement” to become embedded in law and in material worlds**.** I fi rst introduce key concepts and frameworks used in the paper, then proceed to explore the production of “settled expectations” of dominance and state sovereignty claims over Indigenous lands and the axiomatic assumptions that legitimize them. I then trace a genealogy of colonial and contemporary laws and land policies, exploring how they create settler certainty in land and a broader sense of entitlement to “settler futurity” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 1–3). Finally, I briefl y explore how the people interviewed expressed and defended common-sense “settler structures of feeling” that underpin settler jurisdictional imaginaries. I conclude with questions about decolonization and uncertainty. Uncertainty, Anger, and Settler States of Feeling Th e people I interviewed who opposed land claims were angry and resentful that they were forced to feel such uncertainty; they saw it as unexpected and unfair. Many made arguments that the economic uncertainty brought on by Indigenous land rights meant they could not carry out business and farming properly; they could not plan or develop their businesses and their communities. Th ey organized protests, arguing that their cultures and communities were “at risk” (Mackey 2005 ). Many also spoke longingly of “before,” when they had been certain and secure in their lives, land, and futures. The way they argued against land rights suggested a feeling that never before had their faith in their secure ownership of property, and their trust in the territorial integrity of nation, been betrayed in this way. Uncertainty as a result of Indigenous land rights, I suggest, understandably disrupts longstanding “settled expectations” of entitlement. States of anger about uncertainty implicitly construct an opposite normative state of aff airs in which settlers and the settler nation-state did, or believed it did, have certain and settled entitlement to the land taken from Indigenous peoples. Th e passionate anger about uncertainty expressed by the non-Native people I interviewed should not be surprising. It makes sense that if people feel their property and their expectations of a particular life and future might be suddenly and unexpectedly destroyed, they will feel endangered, uncertain, and angry. We can imagine that generations of settlers have grown up with ubiquitous narratives about how their families (and other families like theirs) have worked hard on the land to build the nation. Such narratives have never before seemed to be at odds with the national narrative or with the settled laws of the land. Th e people I spoke to seemed to have been thrown into a state of vertigo. Th eir settled worlds seemed upside down. To say that such feelings are not surprising is not to condone them. Nor is it to blame people, individually or collectively, for experiencing or acting on them. Th e point here is that, no matter how emotionally potent or understandable these emotions may be, they are not simply individual emotions that naturally occur. In settler nations, one “pernicious aspect of colonial power is that it shapes perceptions of reality,” and in doing so, creates an illusion of the deep “permanency and inevitability” of existing power **relations** (Waziyatawin 2012 , 72), an illusion or fantasy of certainty, of the predestined nature of “settler futurity” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 1). Such feelings undoubtedly reflect numerous intersecting anxieties and contexts—in part, ubiquitous popular interpretations of the danger and risks of land rights to “equality” and economic prosperity, promoted widely by mainstream media and other sources. It is signifi cant that these perceptions persist, even though many scholars and activists have demonstrated that engaging with the state through government-sponsored programs, including land claims, is not a route to autonomy or to decolonization (Alfred 2009 , 2001 ; Alfred and Corntassel 2005 ; Christie 2005 ). They argue that these programs are, instead, most often based on an assimilative logic ofincorporation into existing power structures that “promises to reproduce . . . confi gurations of colonial power” (Coulthard 2007 , 438). In this sense, although land-rights agreements and so-called “self-government” processes are designed precisely to avoid uncertainty and threats to settler futures, they are often, in the public imagination, perceived as embodying a myriad of catastrophic and unpredictable risks and dangers to existing relationships and political and economic arrangements. Some of the anger about uncertainty also likely reflects how late-modern subjects may experience precarity in this era of fl exible accumulation and neoliberal economics, and it should thus be understood within a proliferation of “a broader set of anxieties over economic security, citizenship entitlements, and national sovereignty” (Blackburn 2005 , 587). Blackburn suggests that although certainty is “what is sold to investors,” it is “not necessarily created for all residents . . . whether they are Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal” (Blackburn 2005 , 594). More broadly, although certainty is constantly being mobilized as a fantasy and a goal (Blackburn 2005 , 594), neoliberal economics at the same time produces day-to-day uncertainty and insecurity in labour, personhood, and futures. In this paper, I propose that such feelings should be taken seriously, not only for the above reasons, but also as entry points to understanding important characteristics of what Mark Rifk in ( 2011 ) calls “settler structures of feeling,” specifi cally how such feelings connect with broader historical and present-day settler social structures and laws. Drawing on Raymond Williams’s concept of “structures of feeling,” Rifkin suggests that longstanding institutionalized frameworks and material relations of settlement create certain “modes of feeling” among non-Native people in settler colonies. He argues that Processes and institutionalized frameworks of settlement– the exertion of control by non-Natives over Native peoples and lands - give rise to certain modes of feeling, and, reciprocally, particular affective formations among non-Natives normalize settler presence, privilege, and power. Understanding settlement as a structure of feeling entails asking how emotions, sensations, and psychic life take part in the (ongoing) process of exerting non-Native authority over Indigenous politics, governance, and territoriality (2011, 342). He asks, “[H]ow does that feeling of connection to this place as citizens of the state actively efface ongoing histories of imperial expropriation and contribute to the continuing justifi cation of the settler state’s authority to superintend Native peoples?” (2011, 342). Given that the transformation of Indigenous lands into settler homes is an “experienced materiality” (Harris 2004 ) of broader global processes of hierarchical identity making and material appropriation, tracking them involves examining how individual and collective emotions—as well as their broader social and legal common-sense frameworks—both refl ect and reproduce key assumptions of settler coloniality. They are therefore settler “structures of feeling” when they reflect and/or reproduce foundational conceptual frameworks that are essential to settler colonial and national projects. This is specifically the case when, fi rst, they naturalize the assumption that settlers are naturally entitled to the appropriation and ownership of Indigenous territories; and when, second, they normalize the assumption that non Native governments and people naturally have authority over “Indigenous politics, governance, and territoriality” (Rifk in 2011 , 342). Most importantly, they are settler “structures of feeling” when they draw on and reproduce what I see as the pivotal settler colonial and national assumption: that the Crown always already had and continues to have superior underlying title to Indigenous lands. In other words, when they assert and defend the certainty that Indigenous territory is always already domestic space within a superior jurisdiction and thereby enact the subordination of Native polities to the “jurisdictional imaginary” (Rifkin 2009 ) of the settler state. Th e Politics of Certainty: “Settled Expectations” Th e politics of settler certainty is powerfully evoked in the 2005 case City of Sherrill v Oneida Indian Nation of New York (544 US 197) of the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Th e Court rejected the Oneida Indian Nation’s proposal to turn the traditional lands they had purchased on the open market into trust lands. The stated reason, according to the Court’s opinion, was that to do so would disrupt what it called the “reasonable,” “justifi able expectations” (544 US 197, 202) and the “ settled expectations” (544 US 197, 200 and 218; italics added) of the “non-Indian” residents of the area. Th e Court argued that “[g]iven the longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of the area and its inhabitants” in which, for “generations . . . non- Indians have owned and developed the area that once composed the Tribes historic reservation” (544 US 197, 202), to allow the land into trust would “seriously disrupt the justifi able expectations of the people living in the area” (544 US 197, 215) Signifi cantly, “longstanding observances and settled expectations” were seen as “prime considerations” (544 US 197, 200, and 218). Th e City of Sherrill v Oneida Indian Nation of New York decision demonstrates that the defense of “settled expectations” of certainty has powerful legal authority. “Settled expectations” gestures powerfully toward the conceptual frameworks that inform the key settler-colonial assumption that enables the establishment, continuation, and certainty of the settler colony: this is, as previously mentioned, the founding assumption that the Crown always already has superior underlying title to Indigenous lands . According to the “doctrine of discovery” (Miller 2005 ) and the doctrine of terra nullius (Asch 2002 )—strikingly similar (and related) colonial theorizations of why non-Indigenous governments claimed entitlement to superior title to Indigenous land—Indigenous people were not (and are still not) recognized as having full ownership or title to their territories. Th e legal decision mentioned above cites the “doctrine of discovery” and explains it by saying that “fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign— fi rst the discovering European nation and later the original States and the United States” (544 US 197, footnote 1,203). This defining colonial assumption (with continued legal standing today)was based on a belief in the natural superiority of Western civilization, which gave the Crown a stronger and more legitimate sovereignty over the territory, simply through its arrival and assertion of its claim, and despite the vibrant collectives of Indigenous people living in the territory. 2 Th is longstanding pattern, in which colonizers assume entitlement to claim sovereignty over Indigenous lands, continues to be re-enacted post-facto in law as well as in the discourses of the people I interviewed. Colonization and settler nation-building has entailed the repetitive embedding and realizing of settler assertions of certainty and entitlement, and the repeated denial of Indigenous personhood and sovereignty, all embedded in the interpretation of early moments of colonial/settler assumptions of sovereignty over territory. Elsewhere (Mackey, in preparation) I undertake a detailed genealogy of how certainty and entitlement to land and superiority have been created and naturalized over centuries of colonization and nation-building, a complex process only briefl y alluded to here for lack of space. These so-called “logics” of colonial and settler national sovereignty over land are what I call elaborate and illogical “fantasies of possession” and “fantasies of entitlement,” which continue to provide a sense of the certainty and the settled nature of existing settler property relations: they infl uence a broader culture informed by what I call “settled expectations” of certainty. Th is certainty emerges from a set of stories that are grounded in delusions of entitlement, which are based on irrational and illogical arguments that should make sense to no one, not even those who created them and turned them into laws. They aresocially embedded, unconscious expectations of how the world willwork to reaffirm social locations**,** perceptions, and benefits of privilegethat have been legitimated through repeated experiences across lifetimes and generations. Even though they are “fantasies,” they have powerful effects in the world through their materialization in law. Indeed, according to Rifkin, the very existence ofIndigenous societies “has generated and continues to generate a fundamental tension within the jurisdictionalimaginary of the [nation] . . . troubling the eff ort to posit an obvious relation between the rightful authority of the state and the territory over which it seeks to extend that authority.” Th is fundamental tension results in what Rifkin calls an “endemic crisis in legitimizing settler sovereignty” (Rifkin 2011 , 343). Indigenous peoples making a priori claims to land, sovereignty, and ways of being indicates that the settler project is not complete, reveals settler certainties as fantasies of entitlement, and shows how the precarious and illogical claims to settler sovereignty must be constantly reinvented and defended. In this way, colonial and settlercolonial relations only became certain or “settled” by materializing the powerful underlying, legitimating fantasies of mastery over nature and others. In other words, the certainty of settler entitlement to Indigenous land has been made to seem certain, over time and in specific spaces, and has required a great deal of energy. Enlightenment philosophies articulated by John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, among others, bolstered colonial powers’assertions of sovereignty over Indigenous land with a false legitimacy based on ideologies of (1) the social contractand the state of nature, (2) productive labour and its link to civilization and recognizable government, and (3) Western theories of property and personhood that are also built on ensuring certainty in futures. Entitlement to land depended on colonists and settlers defining Indigenous people as inferior, based on such modern and so-called universalconceptual frameworks and including a myriad of embedded racial logics. Th is leads to the sense of entitlement that denies Indigenous peoples the recognition of their rights to their homelands. Both offi cial legal systems and local resistance to land rights depend on the longstanding and deeply commonsense modern concept that constantly casts Indigenous people as less civilized, as living in a “state of nature.” Th is rationale justifi es the supposed superiority of colonial and settler claims to sovereignty over land and the transformation of land into property. In fact, Western property regimes are designed to create and maintain certainty of expectation. Jeremy Bentham writes, “Property is nothing but the basis of expectation . . . consist[ing] in an established expectation, in the persuasion of being able to draw such and such advantage from the thing possessed” (quoted in Harris 1993 , 1729). Th e “functional importance of property,” Th omas Merrill and Henry Smith (2001, 363) argue, “is the security of expectation it created with respect to the future control of particular resources.” Inherent in the liberal notion of property, therefore, is the idea that it is secure and certain, not only now, but also in the future. It is tied to expectations of certainty. The property-based concepts of terra nullius , doctrine of discovery, state of nature, and the practices that emerged from them, were and are mobilized to legitimize and defend settler fantasies and expectations of certainty. Law and Certainty Such fantasies, however, require material backup to become more than just fantasies.Expectations andfantasies need law to be transformed into material certainties. The legal frameworks in Canada and the United States are extremely complex and decidedly different, yet one clear similarity between these systems is the legal rationale for the sense of entitlement that I encountered during my fi eldwork. Lawshave been developed to recognize certain Aboriginal rightsand occupation of their territories, yet such recognized rights are only partial. They are limited and secondary, because the ultimate highersovereignty has been constructed to remain perpetually vested in the Crown or the **state.** Th is ultimate, supposedly superior, sovereignty is, as John Borrows (2002, 94–96) puts it, “invented,” “conjured” like a “spell,” assumed, asserted, and rarely questioned. The patterns of settled expectations of certainty in property and privilege discussed above underpin jurisprudence about Native title and land rights, including landmark cases since Calder , cases that are often seen to have fundamentally “expanded the recognition and protection” (Blackburn 2005 , 589) of Aboriginal rights in Canada. These casescontinue to reproduce what Gordon Christie calls a “jurisprudential colonial narrative”(Christie 2005 , 1), a narrative that provides the conceptual underpinning animating the settler states of feeling discussed in the fi nal section of the paper. The (1763) Royal Proclamation has oft en been called the “Indian Bill of Rights,” because it appears to acknowledge the pre-existing rights of Aboriginal nations, implying Crown recognition of Indigenous nationhood. Yet, at the same time that it recognizes rights, it authoritatively undercuts the most “fundamental” of these rights when it “proclaims Crown sovereignty and ownership over vast reaches of Aboriginal territory (including lands into which at that time no European had ventured!).” (Christie (2005, 4) The Proclamation seems respectful because it recognizes Indian Nations as being in “possession of ” land. Yet immediately, speaking in the voice of the Crown, the Proclamation declares that those lands are “[p]arts of Our [Crown] Dominions and Territories.” Th erefore, at the precise moment when it apparently recognizes Indigenous nations, the Proclamation simultaneously transforms non-ceded Indigenous lands into Dominion territory. Th ese territories were seen as being occupied only temporarily by Indigenous peoples, as it was assumed that they would eventually be ceded to the Crown. Th is move, Christie (2005, 5) argues, “unilaterally undercuts Aboriginal sovereignty” by “enveloping Aboriginal nationhood within Crown sovereignty.” The sense of Crown entitlement lies in part in what the Proclamation assumes yet does not explicitly explain or justify : its powerful silences communicate the unspoken assumption that the Crown is naturally entitled to its superior sovereignty. Borrows points out that the Proclamation “illustrates the British government’s attempt to exercise sovereignty over First Nations while simultaneously trying to convince First Nations that they would remain separate from European settlers and have their jurisdiction preserved” (1997, 171). In this way, the Royal Proclamation created, structured, and protected Crown fantasies of certain entitlement to future title through establishment of a jurisdictional imaginary that may have recognized, but also encompassed , the sovereignties of Indigenous nations. At the same time, the full, rich, collective place-based sovereignty of Indigenous peoples became irrelevant simply through the colonizers’ unquestioned entitlement to defi ne entire nations on their own terms and as implicitly inferior. Indigenous nations exist, they are “recognized,” but at the same time they are carefully and “legally” (according to colonial and national law) put in their subordinate place. At fi rst, Indigenous peoples are contained within colonial jurisdiction, and later, further legally defi ned in the United States as “domestic dependent nations” in 1831 (case of Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia ). In Canada’s St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen , [1888] UKPC 70, [1888] 14 AC 46 (12 December 1888), the Crown encompasses Indigenous lands and title, bestowing on Aboriginal nations the right to use and enjoy the fruits of the land yet always through the Crown’s “good will.” (Christie 2005 , 9) Th e Court argued that Aboriginal title was only a restriction on underlying provincial Crown title and would be extinguished when surrendered by treaty. Th e Court ruled that the treaties transferred Crown lands to exclusively provincial control while eliminating Indian interest in those lands. Th is is because “post-treaty-making the land was not federal land, over which the federal Crown could issue licenses. Upon surrender by the treaty nations, this land became provincial land” (Christie 2005 , 5). One “vitally important subtext” of the dispute about jurisdiction in the St. Catherine’s Milling case, Christie argues, was that the Court interpreted the wording of the Royal Proclamation “not as signalling recognition of pre-existing claims,” but instead as a “ granting of rights to pre-treaty Indians” to use and occupy lands reserved for them by the Crown. Th e diff erence between recognizing pre-existing rights and “granting” temporary rights lies in transferring superior power to the Crown. Signifi cantly, reserving lands was understood to be “nothing more than a gracious extension of the good will of the Crown” (Christie 2005 , 5). This kind of reasoning is still common-sense today, especially when people speak of the government solving land “claims” by “giving” First Nations huge settlements or suggesting that Indigenous peoples “claim” settler land rather than “ re claim” their pre-existing land rights. Th e assumption of an ultimate, supposedly superior sovereignty continues to inform legal decisions today, despite a common perception that Canadian law is at the forefront of the recognition of Aboriginal rights, especially since Calder in 1973. Yet if we examine legal cases aft er Calder in terms of if and how they defend certainty for settler property, we find that they ultimately continue to play out the same fantasy of Crown entitlement, making the fantasy law and providing certainty to settler society through the careful limiting of Indigenous title and sovereignty. Calder was a landmark decision because it changed the defi nition of Indigenous land rights from what it had been previously—a personal and usufructory right—into a notion of Aboriginal title, a legal right. Yet the specifi cs of Aboriginal title were not defi ned. In 1982, the Canadian Constitution Act introduced section 35, which stated that the “existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affi rmed,” even though the meaning of Aboriginal title was still unclear. In 1995, the Government of Canada recognized the inherent right of self-government as an existing Aboriginal right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 . However, since then, pivotal court decisions have consistently interpreted these inherent rights so that they can only exist as long as they can be “ reconciled with ” Crown sovereignty (Borrows 2002 , 8). Once again, Aboriginal people must adapt, adjust, and reconcile themselves to the primacy of state sovereignty, which is unquestioned and certain in law. In the Supreme Court decision in R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, the Court decided that Aboriginal rights that were in existence in 1982 would be protected under section 35, and that they could not be infringed without justification, on account of the “fiduciary obligation” of the Crown to Aboriginal peoples in Canada. It therefore required that the Crown exercise restraint when applying their powers in interference with Aboriginal rights. Th us, on the one hand, Sparrow recognized Indigenous rights. On the other hand, the precise moment of recognition coincided with the limiting and encroachment of rights. One implication of Sparrow is that Aboriginal rights may be encroached on given suffi cient reason, and of course, these rights are therefore not absolute. Consequently, while Aboriginal rights were recognized within the law, they were also limited in specific ways. Although the Crown would now be required to justify its infringement of Aboriginal rights on the basis of the “honour of the Crown,” the measuring and assessing of that infringement is still within the power of the crown . In R v Sparrow , Justice Lamer stated that, even if the British policy was to respect the Native peoples’ occupation of traditional lands, “there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown . . . ” (italics added). Similarly, in the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Delgamuukw v British Columbia , [1997] 3 SCR 1010, a decision oft en proclaimed as a breakthrough for Indigenous rights, Chief Justice Lamer reminds readers that Indigenous rights “are aimed at the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America ... with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory” (italics added). Such “reconciliation,” as we have seen , has meant that Aboriginal peoples, lifeways, and relationships to territories must still always reconcile themselves to an inferior position in relation to Crown sovereignty, entitlement, and assumed superiority. As Christie suggests, these judicial rulings reveal that there is “never any question in the Court's mind that the Crown has complete authority” and sovereignty; the Crown decides “what land ‘means,’ to what uses lands may be put, and how people . . . will live in relation to lands and resources” (Christie 2005 , 15). Th e Crown’s superior sovereignty is enacted over lands, peoples, and the relationships between them. Borrows suggests that while the case “somewhat positively changed the law to protect Aboriginal title, it has also simultaneously sustained a legal framework that undermines Aboriginal land rights. In particular, the decision’s unrefl ective acceptance of Crown sovereignty places Aboriginal title in a subordinate position relative to other legal rights” (1999, 537). He says (1999, 585–86): In Sparrow , the Court held that prior to the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982 , the federal government could extinguish Aboriginal rights without the consent of a group claiming the right. The final section of Delgamuukw confi rmed this power . . . Th e Court arrived at its conclusion without ever questioning whether extinguishment was ‘a morally and politically defensible conception of Aboriginal rights.’ It simply assumed that ‘[i]n a federal system such as Canada’s, the need to determine whether Aboriginal rights have been extinguished raises the question of which level of government has jurisdiction to do so.’ In other words, in using precedent to define acceptable questions in the Court, the discussion focused only on debates within Canadian jurisprudence about what level of government (federal or provincial) has the right to extinguish Aboriginal rights. It did not allow a discussion of the legitimacy of the very right itself. Th e Crown and the nation-state’s legitimacy persistently draws on the legal assumption that its sovereignty is necessarily superior to, and stronger and deeper than, any claims of Indigenous people, because underlying title —the real “bedrock” title—belongs to the Crown . Th is is settler law, even if such claims have not been proven or if Indigenous people are not themselves “reconciled” to that interpretation. This is settler certainty—both assumed and defended through law. Jurisdictional Imaginaries in Practice: Narrating Entitlement I suggest here that the jurisdictional imaginary of settler entitlement discussed above also underpins the “structures of feeling” that emerged in public discourses and among the anti-land claim activists I interviewed. These become settler “structures of feeling” when they naturalize the assumption that settlers are entitled to Indigenous territories, that settlers have authority over “Indigenous politics, governance, and territoriality**”** (Rifk in 2011 , 342), and when they assume, as does the jurisprudence above, that the Crown always-already has superior underlying title to Indigenous lands, that Indigenous territory is (and/or should be) alwaysalready domestic space within the self-evident and naturally unifi ed nation-state. A letter to the editor of the Ridgetown Independent newspaper in Chatham-Kent Ontario, Canada, published March 11, 1999, demonstrates the complex fears and concerns I found during fi eldwork. Th e author introduces his letter as a “clarifi cation” of why readers should not be “troubled” by the “NOT FOR SALE” signs of the Chatham Kent Community Network that were ubiquitous in Chatham-Kent at the time. He explains what he calls “the true meaning” behind them: First, I would like to ask [a previous letter-writer who was troubled by the signs] if he/she is living beside a Canadian. Does this Canadian have to follow the same bylaws as you do regarding fire safety, building codes, firearms, access to property or any other bylaws that help ensure that you as his/her neighbour can continue living as you do now? Aft er all, that’s what bylaws are for—to ensure that everyone in a community, neighbour-toneighbour, has equal status and follows the same rules . . . Now, let’s talk about what those “NOT FOR SALE” signs really mean to those people who have put them out on their property. What’s “NOT FOR SALE”? i) Th eir land to another country; ii) Th eir right to have neighbours who follow the same laws they do; iii) Th eir right to purchase land at fair market rates; iv) Th eir family history, which is being totally disregarded because someone else can claim they were here even earlier; v) Th e future of their families to continue building on that land; and vi) Th eir memories, not only of good times, but also of hard work that made that land what it is today. Finally, the people who have those “NOT FOR SALE” signs up are certainly not racist—in fact they are very proud of this country and all the nationalities of people that have blended together to make it what it is today. The First Nations people are very welcome to buy land and live in south Chatham-Kent with the rest of the Canadians who reside there now (whether they are Irish-Canadian, Dutch-Canadian, African-Canadian or any other Canadians). But the fact is that we are all of one country—working together, living together, being part of this one country together. Th at kind of loyalty to your country should not be ridiculed. Aft er all, when the Americans came knocking on our borders during the War of 1812, the British, the natives and the United Empire Loyalists together said “NOT FOR SALE”—and that is why we are lucky enough to be here today—as one country. This letter is revealing because it endeavours to detail what were previously “settled expectations” within the national jurisdictional imaginary. It seems that the land rights action has challenged arrangements previously seen as settled. In response, the letter maps a normative world in which being, and acting as, a specifi c kind of loyal Canadian is the key to appropriate, acceptable, and expected behaviour. 3 Th e repeated stress on Canadian-ness as a singular set of the “same rules” and regulations that ensure that neighbours can “continue living as [they] do now” shows that expectations about the continuity (and certainty) of these arrangements are important. Th e repeated assertion of Canada as the primary framework of allegiance is pivotal. Th e assertion of Canada as “ one country” based on liberal frameworks of supposedly “equal status” and “the same rules” outlines the boundaries, jurisdiction, and expectations of national belonging. In this jurisdiction, “the First Nations people” are “very welcome” and off ered an invitation to join “the rest of Canadians,” but the price of admission is that they follow the rules of “one country” and assimilate into the jurisdictional, political, and cultural imaginary of the settler nation. Many of the CKCN supporters I interviewed also expressed the self-evident assumption that Indigenous peoples and lands are, and should continue to be, encapsulated and assimilated to national boundaries, jurisdiction, and laws in the name of equality, fairness, and economic efficiency. For example, when I interviewed Andrew, a local farmer, he argued: I think Canada is a huge success story. [But] I don’t think we need to be taking people based on their race and setting them aside . Th e ultimate goal has to be integration, not segregation . . . I think the whole situation of Canada; everybody should be Canadian and treated equally . If you’re born in Canada or if you become a Canadian citizen, everybody’s equal (italics added). Here, it is Canada that is seen to have the right to be “taking people” and categorizing them, or not, based on the needs of the nation, an implicit assertion of settler entitlement to defi ne and encompass Indigenous peoples in the service of the nation. Others I interviewed also tended to regard the nation and its needs as selfevident and primary. Paul, for example, begins with his discomfort with “special rights” and ends by arguing that Native people “don’t contribute” to our nation. Native people, in his view, are simply not separate nations: I don’t agree with groups of people, whether they’re raised based on race, colour, creed, religion, I don’t believe that anybody should have special privileges or rights or whatever based on any of that stuff . . . I just disagree with the whole thing that Natives should have separate nations . . . If you’re being funded by the federal government, you’re not a separate nation, and most Native people in this area, though they live in their separate nations, they work in our nation. And then they don’t contribute to our nation at all, they don’t pay taxes or none of that stuff . How do they consider themselves to be an independent or separate nation, or whatever it is? Another CKCN supporter, Mitch, agrees with Paul, saying that First Nations are not “real nation[s],” thus mirroring the underlying assumptions of the philosophies and jurisprudence discussed above in which settler sovereignty is deemed necessarily superior because Indigenous societies are not “real” nations. Ronald, a local schoolteacher, cannot understand the idea of Native people as a separate nation. He also affi rms the idea of a singular nation when he argues that a reserve is unacceptable because it means special privileges and rights for some people within Canada: I don’t want a reserve here . . . . Not because I don’t want Native people, I have no problems with them living here. I have problems with the reserve: it’s a special government, a special right or privilege . . . I think reservations are wrong right from the get go . . . I just can’t understand how they would want to live like that, being singled out within Canada . . . . Long term, that’s what I hope will come out of CKCN: political reform of the whole Indian relations act or whatever the hell it’s called. Ronald is not simply against a reserve in his area; rather, he has a broader goal of changing Indigenous-state relations to ensure there will be no competing Indigenous sovereignties within the nation. Many people I interviewed expressed, in this way, their sense of entitlement to control and superintend Indigenous people within the jurisdictional imaginary (Rifkin 2009 ) of the nation–state, defending their expectations and certainty through assumptions of the natural superiority, equality, and rationality of the singular nation. Framed in the language of modernity, progress, and equality, these are nevertheless “settler structures of feeling” because they are underpinned by the assumption that the Crown and the nation-state naturally have superior underlying title to Indigenous lands. They assume that Indigenous peoples,governments, and territoriesshould naturally be encompassed by, and assimilated into, a singular unified settler project**.** In this way,“settler structures of feeling” reflect and reproduce the settled expectations embedded in law, expectations that inspire settlers to feel entitled t**o** certainty inthe settler project.

#### (Markets) The commons are built by equal access to indigeneity and the land as fungible – the financial marketplace is premised on the dispossession of indigenous groups

**Baker 17** (W Oliver - PhD candidate and Mellon Fellow American Literary Studies at the University of New Mexico, intersecting histories of settler colonialism, racial capitalism, white supremacy, and class in American literature and culture, “Democracy, Class, and White Settler Colonialism”, 2017, https://www.academia.edu/34506752/Democracy\_Class\_and\_White\_Settler\_Colonialism)

In recent years. settler state policies have shifted away from a strategy Of direct violence and forced assimilation—mostly in response to the political threat posed by the anticolonial nation• alisms of the mid-twentieth century—and toward what Glen Coulthard describes as a politics of -colonial recognition.- in which settler societies promise greater accommodation and recognition of Indigenous groups but only to the extent that claims of sosvreignty or demands for decoloniza- tion go unheard and remain disavowed: A politics of colonial recognition also calls for reconciliation and healing between settlers and Indigenous peoples as a way to mend what is believed to be a racial or cultural conflict rather than a struggle over land and sovereignty. While settler societies might atnrtn the diversity Of Indigenous cultures or even lament past incidents Of colonial violence. Centuries-old structures and institutions of dispossession remain in place. These can be witnessed today in the underdevelopment of tribal economies that encourages the privati- zation of (or the attempt to dissolve) tribally-held land and resources; neoliberal policies that slash public services and deregulate predatory credit and loan industries while funding entrepreneurial self-help initiatives in Indian Country; the use of state and police violence to brutalize, incarcerate, and murder unsheltered and working poor Indigenous peoples whose presence -off the reservation- in border towns is seen as a threat and danger to the property and flows of capital of settler society, extraction industries that destructivelv seek to unearth and/or transport fossil fuels on or through tribal lands: and the ongoing refusal of federal governments to honour the treaties, land claims and rights to self determination of the Indigenous nations of North America. A second key analytic of settler colonial studies and Indigenous critical theory is the concept of Indigeneity. Although defined in various ways, for this essay3 purposes Indigeneity can be described as the social category of persons whose ways of life. forms of knowing. and modes Of being depend upon originary relationships to land bases that Euro-American settlers have enclosed and continue to occupy. Because Indigenous peoples claim originary ties to these land bases. their presence or attempt to live on and through them challenges the legitimacy of settler society. As a social category constituted through elimination and genocide, Indigeneity should be understood as distinct from, for example, the category of the wage labourer that is structured by proletarianization and hegemony. If wage labourers. whether employed or unemployed. are struc- turally included in the marketplace where their labour power is exploited. the marketplace itself and the liberal state form that upholds it are nonetheless premised on the elimination of Indigenous peoples altogether. The ideological framework that mediates, legitimates. and reproduces Indigenous dispossession and its category of Indigeneity is the colonial and racial grammar of what Jodi Byrd calls "Indianness.¯• The Indian came to be a social ontology in which Indigenous peoples were under- stood as savage. ancient. living fossils of early humanity. stuck outside of time and space in a state of nature. The Indian was and continues to be both abjected and romanticized in settler culture as a person who exists in a state of natural warfare. instability. and conflict. while also appearing liberated from the constraints and alienation of modern life. In this state of nature, the Indian is understood to lack the capacity to labour productivity. possess property. or enter into social con • tracts. Through such meanings. the Indian emerges as the outside or Other to Euro-American forms of liberal democracy. selfhood. and civil society.• As Byrd emphasizes. - European moder- nity hinges upon Indians as the necessary antinomy through which the New World—along with civilization. freedom. sovereignty. and humanity—comes to have meaning. structure. and pres- ence.-•• The Indian. in short, became the figure of the un-sovereign through which it was understood that the Indian might occupy but could never possess the ability or right to own lands or possess selfhood.' i The dispossession of Indigenous lands. resources. and bodies thus came to be seen less as a form of theft than the natural transition from -savage- communalism to civilized market society. Today. Indianness continues. as Byrd puts it. to "transit U.S. empire,- or put into motion, facil. itate, and cohere the United States' settler imperial project that reaches around the world." It is through Indianness that settlers come to view the lands. resources. and bodies of the earth as spaces and objects of a barren wilderness (terra nullius) freely available for expropriation. The current and future populations living in spaces of the lands and controlling the resources that US settler imperialism attempts to seize or control are, as Byrd explains. made "Indian- or abjected as mindless terrorist-savages whose confrontation with the agents of enclosure is under- stood not as an attempt to resist and survive colonization. occupation. and genocide. but an irrational attack against society. civilization. humanity. and the forces of modern progress. In short. Indianness is what legitimates the process of primitive accumulation or what David Harvey calls -accumulation by dispossession.- which is central to the formation. expansion. and domi- nance of global finance capitalism. What an understanding. then. of settler colonialism. Indigeneity. and Indianness demon• strates concerning the question of alliance-building among oppressed groups today is that political organizing through the spaces of the democratic commons or the identity of the settler wage labourer supports rather than disrupts the colonization of Indigenous peoples of North America In the case of the democratic commons. calls for preserving and expanding the public institutions and spaces of liberal democracy in order to cultivate more radical and progressive forms of democracy is a demand not to undo or transform but to uphold the settler colonial state As Byrd argues. "one reason why a racial' and just democratic society is a lost cause in the United States is that it is always already conceived through the prior disavowed and misremembered colonization of Indigenous lands that cannot be ended by further inclusion or more participation."" Coulthard echoes this point. showing that "in liberal settler states...the •com. not only belong to somebody.. .they also deeply inform and sustain Indigenous modes of thought and behavior"" While it should be acknowledged that the democratic Commons histori- eally has served an important role in cultivating and producing emancipatory modes Of analysis and forms Of social belonging. such gains have nonetheless always depended upon the tion of Indigenous peoples. Any defence, then, of the democratic commons today must at the same time defend Indigenous sovereignty. This means rethinking how groups relate in the spaces Of the commons in Ways that do not perpetuate liberal democracy's colonial project Oi building public institutions and democratic spaces through the seizure, theft, and colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and resources. Class .first models of a renewed workers' movement also risk reproducing colonial disposses. Sion When they fail to recognize that the Indian and the settler Wage labourer are structurally distinct categories Of oppression. former is constituted by dispossession through elimination. while the latter is structured by exploitation through hegemony. Even though exploited. settler wage labourers nonetheless come to experience their status in settler colonialism as a place Of refuge and protection tiom dispossession and abjection. The role of the settler state is to ensure and safeguard the settler wage labourers right not only to possess but not to be dispossessed of property, even if the only property the wage labourer possesses is labour power. In fact. possessing labour power as a commodity to sell on the market indexes the settler wage laboureös right and ability to enter the social Contract and find security from the forms structural exclusion natu• ralized in the position of the Indian. Such a status explains why. when neoliberal forms of precarious labour and exclusions from waged life increasingly target settler wage labourers, they are felt and represented as abnormal. undeserving, and. more importantly. grievable occurrences. The dispossession Of settlers challenges the symbolic and material consisten€y Of settler societies that are premised on dispossessing colonial peoples in order to reward and advantage settlers Of all classes. Settler society retains and reproduces its coherence as the promised site of settler sov. ereignty, possession. and rights by figuring the neoliberal dispossession of settlers as the exception to be if only because Indigenous dispossession remains the norm to be reproduced and repeated. grievability of neoliberal dispossession. heard today in the refrain that globalization has -abandoned the white working class.- depends upon the ungrievability and normalization of Indigenous dispossession that. in the narratives not only Of manifest destiny but also the demo- cratic commons and normative socialist futures. is depicted and accepted as a natural. inevitable. and necessary process. One of the limits. then. of calling for solidarity through the political identity of the wage labourer is that, in settler colonialism, what organized settler wage labourers demand is not necessarily an end to exploitation but the freedom, protection, and refuge from structural dispossession and exclusion that are normalized and naturalized in the social and racial ontologies of the Indian. Movements on behalf of settler labourers risk ending in reform rather than revolution precisely because they do not so much seek to confront capital as they seek refuge and protection within and through it.

### Alt Solvency

#### Imperial growth is terminally on a path of collapse – only decolonial movements can solve.

Helland and Lindgren 16 Leonardo E. Figueroa Helland, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Westminster College, M.A. Arizona State University, Ph.D. Arizona State University Westminster College, Tim Lindgren, Research Assistant at Westminster College, *What Goes Around Comes Around: From The Coloniality of Power to the Crisis of Civilization*, Journal of World-Systems Research, 2016, Vol 22 Issue 2, p. 431-438

Today we face a planetary crisis. Environmental, energy, food, financial, and social reproduction crises are disrupting the world-system (Ahmed 2010; McMichael 2011; Chase-Dunn 2013; Houtart 2010; Kallis, Martinez-Alier and Norgaard 2009; Foster, Clark, York 2010; Goodman and Salleh 2015; Peterson 2010; Rockstrom et.al. 2009, 2009b; Salleh 2012; Smith 2014; Steffen et.al. 2007). This planetary crisis, we argue, has been triggered by a globalizing mode of civilization that has become hegemonic.2 This mode of civilization is constituted and underpinned by anthropocentric, androcentric, hetero-patriarchal, Euro/Western-centric, modern/colonial and capitalist systems of power. Building on world-systems, decolonial, eco-feminist and posthuman theories, we contend that the “coloniality of power” (Quijano 1991; Grosfoguel 2009; Mignolo 2008; Lugones 2007; Maese-Cohen 2010; Dastile and Ndlovu-Gastheni 2013) has worked to globalize a civilization that exhausts the planet and exploits most of its people, thus unleashing a socioecological blowback that is turning this civilization into its own worst enemy. By “coloniality” we refer to the complex and multidimensional legacy of divisive, exploitative, stratifying and hierarchical forms of power (e.g., Eurocentric/Western-centric hegemony), forms of knowledge (e.g., technoscientific instrumental rationality), forms of (inter)subjectivity (e.g., possessive individualism), forms of human interrelations (e.g., racism, classism, heteropatriarchalism, etc.), and forms of human dominion over land and mastery of “nature” (e.g., anthropocentric property/dominion/sovereignty) that have become entrenched and continue to be reproduced throughout the world as an ongoing consequence of colonization. Coloniality thus entails that the hegemony of colonial forms persists to this day as a legacy that structurally constitutes modernity, even into supposedly “postcolonial” times. Coloniality is the underside of modernity: the historical and structural foundation that has enabled—e.g., through conquest**,** imperialism**,** slavery**,** resource extraction and Western dominance—the rise, hegemony, and globalization of a world-system dominated by modern civilization. This civilization has sought to globalize a political-economic model bent on endless accumulation, consumption and growth on a finite planet(Ahmed 2010; Foster, Clark, York 2010; Goodman and Salleh 2013; McMichael 2011; Steffen et.al. 2007; WPCCC 2010). Now in its “neoliberal” stage, this model reinforces a historically-ongoing coloniality of power premised on linear discourses of “progress,” “modernization,” “development,” and “evolution,” altogether constituting a hegemonic “standard of civilization.” Globalized through (neo)colonialism and (neo)imperialism, this “standard of civilization” has subjugated the global South under the North, and the rural under the urban, thereby stratifying the world into multiple overlapping hierarchies structured along core-periphery asymmetries. The globalization of this mode of civilization wouldn’t be possible without the coloniality of power which has assimilated semi-peripheral and peripheral elites into a Western-centric civilizational obsession with endless accumulation based on the “mastery of nature” (Plumwood 2002; Adelman 2015) and geared towards the aggressive pursuit of “high modernism”3 (Scott 1998)—and its “late modern(ist)” continuation. While settler-colonial elites have been instrumental to the expansion of hegemonic civilization, the colonial de-indigenization and cultural assimilation of Southern elites through centuries of Western domination has increasingly entrenched dominant worldviews and practices throughout the globe. Gonzalez notes; “[i]n the post-colonial period, Southern elites, deeply influenced by Eurocentric ideologies, subjugated their own indigenous and minority populations in order to “modernize” and “develop” them” (2015: 13). Most “postcolonial” elites haven’t broken with this coloniality of power (Dastile and Ndlovu-Gastheni 2013); instead, they often reproduce govern-mentalities aimed at “catching-up” with, emulating, imitating, “cloning” or conforming to hegemonic models enacted in the North’s metropolitan cores (Sheppard et.al. 2009; McMichael 2011; Grosfoguel 2009; Mignolo 2008). In seeking to emulate the North’s unsustainable “imperial mode of living” (Brand and Wissen 2012), many Southern elites have replicated the North’s “eco-destructive, consumerist-centric, over-financialized, [and] climate-frying maldevelopment model” (Bond 2012). This coloniality of power has often consumed the creativity, energy, and “resources” of (semi)peripheries in aspirational attempts to emulate and/or conform to hegemonic models by, for example, aggressively pursuing accelerated modernization, developmentalism, urbanization, industrialization, and massified commodity/consumerist cultures at almost any cost, human or ecological. Playing catch-up with the North inevitably requires the present-day rehearsal, in accelerated, compressed manner, of structurally violent practices that have underpinned the North’s “rise” to planetary dominance**—**like the transformation of nature (including humans) into exploitable “resources” (Apffel-Marglin 2011) and the systematic reliance on coercive statecraft, ecological imperialism, and (neo)colonialism. Comparable practices, now rehearsed in “updated” forms by elites/regimes of semi-peripheral “emerging economies,” seek to replicate expansive core-like metropolitan centers of accumulation, consumption, and growth, like the grossly unequal BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) megalopolises. To achieve this, emerging economies must resort to internal colonialism and “subimperialism” or “second degree imperialism” (Bond 2014) so as to compel into subservience their “own” peripheries as sources of exploitable natural and human “resources.” Yet in striving to emulate a patently unsustainable Northern “way of life” built on centuries of dispossession, emerging economies face two obstacles: First, the hegemonic barriers imposed by the dominant regime of accumulation controlled by the North which resists any challenges to its hegemony. Second, the planetary boundaries (Rockström et.al. 2009) imposed by the Earth’s finite carrying capacity which is already responding to breaches with destabilizing consequences (Foster, Clark, York 2010). Seduced by the coloniality of power, large “emerging economies”—like BRICS—are on a crash course against entrenched “old” Northern cores—as the latter try to preserve their unsustainable privileges at any cost. Brand and Wissen (2012) note: [G]eopolitical and geo-economic shifts will…increasingly be…ecological conflicts…[Facing] increasing competition for the earth’s resources and sinks, national and supranational state apparatuses seem…willing to support ‘their’ respective capitals…to strengthen their competitive position and…secure the resource base of their…economies…Thus, the hegemony of the imperial mode of living…, [spreading from]…the global North…to the South…explains…an imperialist rearticulation…in the context of multiple crises (555). Increasingly volatile tensions are resulting from the clash between the hegemonic system of accumulation and the planetary boundaries. Geopolitical/geoeconomic conflicts, and grabs and scrambles over “resources” strategic for “development(alism),” are proliferating globally. Such complications can often be traced to the hegemonization of an ecologically unsustainable, socially stratifying and politically volatile model of civilization bent on endless accumulation, consumption and growth on a finite planet. Ironically, the very success in globalizing this civilizational model through the coloniality of power may lead to its autophagous self-destruction through a planetary crisis. Overcoming this crisis requires not only a critique of modernity in its neoliberal capitalist guise, but a transformation beyond the systems of power underpinning the hegemonic civilization. In solidarity with movements for systemic change and drawing on decolonial dialogues we conclude with a blueprint for a just and sustainable transition inspired on indigenous, eco-feminist, and posthuman alternatives. Planetary Crisis: Five converging crises are triggering a planetary crisis of civilization: Ecological Rift. Modern civilization is causing an ecological rift with global biospheric lifecycles, breaching planetary boundaries and overshooting the Earth’s carrying capacity by exhausting and disrupting nature’s metabolic labor (Foster, Clark, York 2010; Ahmed 2010; Rockström, Steffen, Noone et.al. 2009; Salleh 2010). We are breaching four of nine planetary boundaries;4 further breaching seems inevitable as we continue to rely on this civilizational model. This anthropogenic eco-crisis is undermining the natural bases for human existence. The ecological rift derives from the anthropocentrism of the hegemonic civilization, aggravated by modernist drives for mastery of nature and capital accumulation, resulting in gross overconsumption of planetary biocapacity: “humanity…uses the equivalent of 1.5 planets to provide the resources we use and absorb our waste… [I]t now takes the Earth one year and six months to regenerate what we use in a year” (World Footprint 2014). Most ecological degradation comes from overconsumption and waste driven by the lifestyle of metropolitan centers globally, and of “(over)developed” rich countrie**s**. McMichael (2011) notes: the richest countries have generated 42% of global environmental degradation while paying only 3% of resulting costs. Urban areas occupy around 2% of global land yet produce more than two thirds of CO2 emissions. If everybody in the world lived like the average US or Canadian resident, we would need between three and five Earths—if not more—to regenerate humanity’s annual demand on nature; if everybody lived like the average EU resident, we would need 2.5 to 3.5 Earths. Emergent economies seeking to rapidly catch up and emulate Northern lifestyles—like the BRICS—dramatically aggravate this. This “imperial mode of living” propagated from cores and now also semi-cores is socio-ecologically unsustainable and dangerous (Brand and Wissen 2012). Energy/Resource Depletion. Overconsumption is causing a crisis of energy scarcity and natural resource depletion of oil, natural gas, coal, uranium, essential minerals, and water (Ahmed 2010; Zittel et.al. 2013; Sheppard 2009; Evans 2010; “Water Facts and Figures” 2014). Peak-oil may have already occurred in 2005-2008 (Ahmed 2010); the Energy Working Group estimated overall conventional energy peak for 2015 (Zittel et.al. 2013). Mineral depletion is predicted to exhaust 26 of the 37 most important minerals by 2100 (Sheppard 2009). By 2025 the number of people living in absolute water scarcity is projected to rise 50%, with “two thirds of the world’s population…in water-stressed conditions” (Evans 2010). Food System Crisis: Between 2001-2008 global demand exceeded supply and the global stockpile of grain shrank by half (Cribb 2010). “[A]verage productivity growth rates [2.0% 1970-1990]…fell to 1.1% between 1990 and 2007 and are projected to continue to decline” (Evans 2010:3). Modern industrial agriculture and the consumption/waste patterns of global North and metropolitan lifestyles are exhausting soils and sinks globally. Industrial agriculture through land-use change, synthetic fertilizers and pesticides is eroding soils, creating topsoil loss, and exhausting nature’s “metabolic labor” (Salleh 2010; McMichael 2011). Agro-industrial methods like monocropping and industrial economies of scale destroy biodiversity and carbon sinks, and degrade nutritional quality (Altieri 2009). Industrial aquaculture has fully exploited or overexploited most of the world’s fish stocks. The food system’s increasingly corporate consolidation multiplies social-environmental externalities through overexploitation of natural and human resources and gross maldistribution. The “globalized” methane-releasing “meatified” modern food system requires unnecessarily long transportation and is heavily dependent on dwindling fossil fuels, making it a major greenhouse gas emitter. All this is triggering a global food system crisis**,** profoundly impacting semi/peripheral regions (Ahmed 2010; McMichael 2011; Cribb 2010; Evans 2010.). However, further growth isn’t the answer. We already produce excess food—albeit of disappointing nutritional quality, yet much is wasted and distribution is so skewed that “providing the additional calories needed by the 13% of the world’s population facing hunger would require just 1% of the current global food supply” (Raworth 2012: 5). By shifting to agroecology, indigenous/small peasant methods, and permaculture, coupled with equitable, redistributive, communaland local economies we can produce more nutritious food, ensure fairer distribution, reduce waste, regenerate biodiversity, and fight climate change (Altieri 2009). Economic/Financial Crisis. The 2008 global economic/financial downturn resulted from contingent, recent-historical, and structural factors. While contingent factors like the housing market collapse and recent-historical factors like neoliberal deregulation of financial markets are crucial, we underline the long-term structural problems. Most importantly the growing disconnection between (a.) an increasingly financialized global economy, (b.) the “real” economy of human production, and (c.) the “real-real” economy of socio-ecological reproduction based on the Earth’s biocapacity to provide “ecological services” (Kallis, Martinez-Alier and Norgaard 2009). The increasingly financialized capitalist economy is grossly abstracted from the real economy of production based on human labor, and from the real-real economy of reproduction based on the socio-ecologically metabolic labor of communities and the planet. The second structural problem is the exploding global inequality coupled with persistent poverty; this notwithstanding the continuous (albeit slowing) growth of the global economy. Again, the issue isn’t that we need more growth, but that we have an increasing concentration of wealth tied to gross maldistribution and rampant waste **(**according to Credit Suisse, the top 8% of the world’s population concentrates almost 80% of global wealth). The global economic system is based on a faulty notion of endless accumulation propelled by increasingly financialized debt disconnected from its growing social and ecological debt **(**Ahmed 2010; Foster, Clark, York 2010; Peterson 2010; Kallis, Martinez-Alier and Norgaard 2009; Salleh 2010). Social Reproduction Crisis. This crisis results from the accelerated exploitation of productive and reproductive labor, leading to massive demographic displacements—so-called “migrations”—from rural to urban, and from peripheries to cores. Overconsumption in cores and now also semi-cores requires constantly increasing absorption of people—especially from semi-peripheries and peripheries—into a global system of production geared towards endless growth. For example, people displaced from their local land bases by the globalization and intensification of corporate and/or state mega-projects**,** industrial monocrops and resource extraction are often absorbed as cheap migrant labor moving towards the exploding slum-settlements of chaotically growing urbanized centers in emerging Southern economies or towards already established Northern centers of accumulation. There, they are incorporated as easily exploitable, often undocumented labor, crossing dangerous, sometimes lethal, and increasingly militarized Northern borders (e.g., the US-Mexico border, the EU’s Mediterranean) (Robinson and Santos 2014). Demographic displacements are aggravated by environmental/climate degradation, oppression and conflicts—many rooted in colonial/postcolonial/neocolonial histories and hegemonic/imperialist wars. Rural to urban and South to North displacements drain the human, cultural, and social-reproductive capabilities of traditional/rural/peasant/agricultural/fishing communities and Southern regions generally (Gasper and Truong 2014). The social reproduction crisis is gendered and racialized, primarily affecting women, peasants, indigenous communities, and people of color (Salleh 2010; Peterson 2010; McMichael 2011). The critical consequences are threefold: the brain drain, the proliferation of migrant/refugee labor, and the care drain. Racialized rural, peasant, indigenous and traditional communities are eroded by the massive transference or displacement of productive, reproductive, and intellectual labor to cities and to the North. Working-age people are being absorbed, often in violent, exploitative and oppressive conditions, into hyper-productive globalized economies of capital accumulation. Concomitantly, many children, elderly, and disabled are marginalized, left uncared for as socially-reproductive labor erodes. The care drain feeds the new genderization and feminization of labor in manufacturing, especially light assembly (e.g., maquiladoras, export-processing zones, sweatshops). Labor feminization draws from migrant female workers coming from rural communities. Communities of origin, deprived of working age females (and males), lose the reproductive labor needed to care for social needs like education, safety, health, child and elderly care, often becoming reliant on migrant remittances. The care drain also feeds the South to North export of female labor to cover for the scarcity of reproductive labor resulting from the absorption of Northern female labor into the “productive” labor force. Moreover, the growing global sex trade absorbs and exploits economically-marginalized women, especially from semi/peripheries. Add gendered—and racialized—labor exploitation in less visible realms like domestic work, care work, and agroindustry. The social reproduction crisis also embeds a health crisis stemming from acute inequality, environmental degradation, neoliberal erosion of public health infrastructures, and deteriorated access to food, water and resources. This health crisis, on the one hand creates the growth of noncommunicable “diseases of globalization” resulting from consumerist, commodity-based, sedentary and industrial lifestyles (e.g., diabetes, coronary heart disease, obesity, hypertension, depression, etc.), while on the other hand it perpetuates in the “Third World” communicable diseases such as malaria and cholera, among many others. This health crisis interacts with other abovementioned crises to further complicate social reproduction and to trigger displacement (Harris and Seid 2004; Schreker 2012; McMichael, Barnett and McMichael 2012; Ottersen, Dasgupta, Blouin et.al. 2014; The Global Health Watch 2014). These crises are partly triggered and aggravated by neoliberalism, including its dismantling of social support networks and ecological protections globally since the 1980s, which set the stage for the globalization of corporate and financial capital at the expense of people and planet. Yet the roots of the planetary crisis are deeper. The planetary crisis, we contend, has resulted from the generalization of a hegemonic mode of civilizationunderpinned by the layered intersection of anthropocentric, androcentric, heterosexist, rationalist, Euro/Western-centric, modern/colonial, racialized, industrialist/developmentalist, capitalist, and ableist systems of power. These ten systems of power constitute the infrastructures of hegemonic civilization**.** Upon them, complex discursive and institutional apparatuses have been built and reproduced, asymmetrically shaping relations, practices, and cultures, often in structurally hierarchical, violent, oppressive, and exploitative ways. Such infrastructures buttress vitiated relations among humans and with non-humans, thereby producing, reproducing and accelerating the crises. These infrastructures must be critically and materially deconstructed to enable alternative worldviews**,** lifeways, organizational forms and practices to flourish. Drawing on decolonial, ecofeminist, posthumanist-ecological, and world-systems analysis we describe these infrastructures and how they feedback on each other:5

### AT: Perms

#### (vs. K affs) They don’t get perms in method debates –

#### a) Fairness – their aff makes researching case-specific links impossible exploding neg prep burden.

#### b) Ground – No stable text plus perms allows aff condo and decks neg ground

#### c) Education – forced choices between methods incentivizes teams to be aware of and improve flaws in their strategies – iterative refinement is key to exporting methods out of the room.

#### (vs. policy affs) The perm severs out of our offense– it’s a voter since that lets them spike out of links and rearticulate the aff in each speech.

#### The intellectual project of the aff retreats into theory at the expense of material decolonization - the structure of settler colonialism is inherently tied to land, peoples, and relations that cannot be overcome by ethical analysis alone.

**Strakosch & Macoun 20** (Elizabeth, Lecturer at the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, and Alissa, lecturer in the School of Justice at Queensland University of Technology, Australia, “The violence of analogy: abstraction, neoliberalism and settler colonial possession,” *Postcolonial Studies,* Volume 23, Issue 4, pp. 505 - 506)

In their now classic essay, ‘Decolonization is not a metaphor’, Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang are clear that no intellectual moves – however sophisticated – will exempt us from the hard material work of decolonisation.2 Similarly, Linda Tuhiwai Smith notes that ‘[i]mperialism cannot be struggled over only at the level of text and literature. Imperialism still hurts, still destroys and is reforming itself constantly’.3 Colonial projects rely on many kinds of violence: military, economic, bureaucratic, psychological, carceral and racial. Importantly, their violence is also ideational and epistemological. Like many other scholars engaged in work on colonisation **in** the context of Indigenous sovereignty, we are concerned to help unravel the conceptual fabric holding these different forms of violence together. As colonisers and white members of a colonial political society structured in white racial dominance,4 we feel a particular responsibility to challenge this society’s silences, fictions and justifications. This means working to refuse the dehumanisation and erasure of Indigenous peoples, and – so far as we can – the alliances and excuses that complicity with this colonial society constantly offers us. For us, such a political project must involve interrogating any implicit claims that our political or intellectual commitments allow us to transcend our interests and locations, or free us from the structures in which we operate**.** Tuck challenges us to ask ourselves how we conceptualise mechanisms of change, and how we imagine that our research contributes to such transformation.5 It is in doing this that we come to question increasingly prominent theoretical moves to ‘renarrativise’ our colonial relationships, with the assumption that in doing so we substantively change their operation and provide a new basis for social struggle. Tuck and Yang’s formulation of decolonisation as not a metaphor is implicitly accompanied by the corollary, that colonialism is a deeply material set of political relationships to be struggled over in and from our concrete locations. As Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel note, ‘settler colonialism will not be undone by analysis alone, but through lived and contentious engagement with the literal and stolen ground on which people stand and come together’.6 A set of structures and relationships anchored in land, place and people cannot be transcended by political hot takes or sophisticated theoretical abstractions**.** Yet there are increasingly prominent threads in settler colonial and political theory that seem to attempt this. In this article we trace and challenge intellectual moves that work to distance theory from the material realities of colonisation and ‘solve’ colonial dilemmas through theoretical re-categorisations**.** The idea that finding the correct, hyper-critical take will transform us connects to the Enlightenment belief that individual rationality releases us from our material bondage**,** yet some Western critical theoretical traditions continue to operate within this framework of individualist intellectual liberation.7 This article is concerned with the violence we enact and fail to see, and the potential for transformative work we miss, when we follow this path of trying to think ourselves out of our predicaments. We suggest that the dangers of settlers ‘analysing’ our way out of complicity are amplified when we deploy analogy to build solidarity and reconceptualise ourselves as Indigenous. In the work we analyse here, the use of analogy is acknowledged but quickly lost as the new story of political relations**, and** of ourselves as outside neoliberal and colonial power structures, is naturalised and taken as a basis for action in the present**.**

#### (State) Their understanding of the state as unified, immutable, and inevitably dangerous to Indigenous actors creates a pessimism trap that stifles Indigenous agency and activism

**Lightfoot 20**, Assoc. Prof. in First Nations and Indigenous Studies, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Ojibwe (Sheryl Lightfoot, 2020, “The Pessimism Traps of Indigenous Resurgence,” *Pessimism in International Relations*, Chapter 9, pages 162-170, SpringerLink)

Through this dual structure, colonial power now works through the inclusion of Indigenous peoples, actively shaping their perspectives in line with state discourses, rather than merely excluding them, as in years past. Therefore, any attempt to seek ‘the reconciliation of Indigenous nationhood with state sovereignty is still colonial insofar as it remains structurally committed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority’.30 Concerning the state in relation to Indigenous peoples on the international level, Corntassel argues that states and global organisations, for years, have been consistently framing Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims in ways that ‘jeopardize the futures of indigenous communities’.31 He claims that states frst compartmentalise Indigenous self-determination by separating lands and resources from political and legal recognition of a limited autonomy. Second, he notes, states sometimes deny the existence of Indigenous peoples living within their borders. Thirdly, a political and legal entitlement framing by states deemphasises other responsibilities. Finally, he claims that states, through the rights discourse, limit the frameworks through which Indigenous peoples can seek self-determination. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel has concluded that states are deliberate and never changing in their behaviour. With this move, Corntassel limits and actually demeans Indigenous agency**,** overlooking the reality that Indigenous organisations themselves chose the human rights framework and rights discourse as a target sphere of action precisely because, aswas evidentin earlier struggles like slavery, civil rights or women’s rights, these were tools available to them that had a proven track record of opening up new possibilities and shifting previous state positions and behaviour. Indigenous advocates also cleverly realised, by the 1970s, that **the** anti-discrimination **and** decolonisation frames **could be** used together against states**. States did,** in no way**,** nefariously impose a rights framework **on Indigenous** peoples. Rather, Indigenous organisations and savvy Indigenous political actors deliberately chose to frame their self-determination struggles within the human rights framework in order to bring states into a double bind where they could not credibly claim to adhere to human rights and claim that they uphold equality while simultaneously denying Indigenous peoples’ human rights and leaving them with a diminished and unequal right of self-determination. But, because he is caught in the pessimism trap of seeing the state only as unified, deliberate and unchanging, Corntassel overlooks and diminishes the clear story of Indigenous agency and the potential for positive change in advancing self-determination in a multitude of ways.

Pessimism Trap 3: Engagement with the Settler State is Futile, if Not Counter-Productive

Since the state always intends to maintain, if not expand**,** colonial control, and is seeking to co-opt as many Indigenous peoples as possible in order to maintain or expand its dispossession and control, it is therefore futile, at best, and actually dangerous to Indigenous existence to engage with the state. Furthermore, all patterns of engagement will lead to co-optation as the state is cunning and unrelenting in its desire to co-opt Indigenous leaders, academics and professionals in order to gain or maintain control of Indigenous peoples. Alfred argues, in both his 2005 and 2009 books, that any Indigenous engagement with the state, including agreements and negotiations, is not only futile but fundamentally dangerous, as such pathways do not directly challenge the existing colonial structure and ‘to argue on behalf of indigenous nationhood within the dominant Western paradigm is self-defeating’.32 Alfred states that a ‘notion of nationhood or self-government rooted in state institutions and framed within the context of state sovereignty can never satisfy the imperatives of Native American political traditions’33 because the possibility for a true expression of Indigenous self-determination is ‘precluded by the state’s insistence on dominion and its exclusionary notion of sovereignty’.34 Worst of all, according to Alfred, when Indigenous communities frame their struggles in terms of asserting Aboriginal rights and title, but do so within a state framework, rather than resisting the state itself, it ‘represents the culmination of white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples’.35 Because it is impossible to advance Indigenous self-determination through any sort of engagement with the state, Coulthard also advocates for an Indigenous resurgence paradigm that follows both his mentor Taiaiake Alfred but also Anishinaabe feminist theorist Leanne Simpson.36 As Coulthard writes, ‘both Alfred and Simpson start from a position that calls on Indigenous peoples and communities to “turn away” from the assimilative reformism of the liberal recognition approach and to instead build our national liberation efforts on the revitalization of “traditional” political values and practices’.37 Drawing upon the prescriptive approach of these theorists, Coulthard proposes, in his concluding chapter, five theses from his analysis that are intended to build and solidify Indigenous resurgence into the future:1. On the necessity of direct action, meaning that physical forms of Indigenous resistance, like protest and blockades, are very important not only as a reaction to the state but also as a means of protecting the lands that are central to Indigenous peoples’ existence; 2. Capitalism, No More!, meaning the rejection of capitalist forms of economic development in Indigenous communities in favour of land-based Indigenous political-economic alternative approaches; 3. Dispossession and Indigenous Sovereignty in the City, meaning the need for Indigenous resurgence movements ‘to address the interrelated systems of dispossession that shape Indigenous peoples’ experiences in both urban and land-based settings’38; 4. Gender Justice and Decolonisation, meaning that decolonisation must also include a shift away from patriarchy and an embrace of gender relations that are non-violent and refective of the centrality of women in traditional forms of Indigenous governance and society; and 5. Beyond the Nation-State. While Coulthard denies that he advocates complete rejection of engagement with the state’s political and legal system, he does assert that ‘our efforts to engage these discursive and institutional spaces to secure recognition of our rights have not only failed, but have instead served to subtly reproduce the forms of racist, sexist, economic, and political confgurations of power that we initially sought…to challenge’.39 He therefore advocates expressly for ‘critical self-refection, skepticism, and caution’ in a ‘resurgent politics of recognition that seeks to practice decolonial, gender-emancipatory, and economically nonexploitative alternative structures of law and sovereign authority grounded on a critical refashioning of the best of Indigenous legal and political traditions’.40 Corntassel also demonstrates the third pessimism trap, that all engagement with the state is ultimately futile. For the most part, however, Corntassel’s observation is that the UN system operates like a reverse Keck and Sikkink ‘boomerang model’ and ‘channels the energies of transnational Indigenous networks into the institutional fiefdoms of member countries’, by which an ‘illusion of inclusion’ is created.41 He argues that, in order to be included or their views listened to, Indigenous delegates at the UN must mimic the strategies, language, norms and modes of behaviour of member states and international institutions. Corntassel fnds that ‘what results is a cadre of professionalized Indigenous delegates who demonstrate more allegiance to the UN system than to their own communities’.42 In his final analysis, he charges that the co-optation of international Indigenous political actors is highly ‘effective in challenging the unity of the global Indigenous rights movement and hindering genuine dialogue regarding Indigenous self-determination and justice’.43 Finding that states deliberately co-opt and provide ‘illusions of inclusion’ to Indigenous political actors in UN settings, Corntassel comes to the same conclusion as Alfred concerning the futility of engagement, arguing that because transnational Indigenous networks are ‘channeled’ and ‘blunted’ by colonial state actors, ‘it is a critical time for Indigenous peoples to rethink their approaches to bringing Indigenous rights concerns to global forums’.44Imagining a Post-Colonial Future: Pessimistic ‘Resurgence’ Versus the Optimism and Tenacity of Indigenous Movements on the Ground

All of these writers advocate Indigenous resurgence, through a combination of rejecting **the** current reconciliation politics of settler colonial states**,** coupled with a return to land-based Indigenous expressions of governance as the only viable**,** ‘authentic**’** and legitimate pathto a better future for Indigenous peoples, which they refer to as decolonisation. While inherently critical in their orientation, these three approaches do make some positive and productive contributions to Indigenous movements. They help shed light on the various and subtle ways that Indigenous leaders and communities can become co-opted into a colonial system. They help us to hold leadership accountable. They also help us keep a strong focus on our traditional, cultural and spiritual values as well as our traditional forms of governance which then also helps us imagine future possibilities. As I have pointed out here, however, all three theorists are also caught in the same three pessimism traps: authenticity versus co-option; a vision of the state as unified, deliberate and never changing in its desire to colonise and control; a**nd a view of engagement with the state as** futile**, if not** dangerous, to Indigenous sovereignty and existence. When combined, these three pessimism traps aim to inhibit Indigenous peoples’ engagement with the state in any process that could potentially re-imagine and re-formulate their current relationship into one that could be transformative and post-colonial, as envisioned by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples**.** The pessimism traps together work to foreclose any possibility that there could be credible openings of opportunity to negotiate a fairer and just relationship of co-existence **with** even the most progressive state government. This pessimistic approach is not innocuous**.** By overemphasising structure and granting the state an enormous degree of agency as a unitary actor**,** this pessimistic approach does a remarkable disservice to Indigenous resistance movements by proscribing, from academia, an extremely narrow view of what Indigenous self-determination canand should mean in practice. Byoverlooking **and**/or discounting Indigenous agency and not even considering the possibility that Indigenous peoples could themselves be calculating**,** strategic political actors in their own right, and vis-à-vis states, the pessimistic lens of the resurgence school unnecessarily**,** unproductively and unjustly limits the field of possibility for Indigenous peoples’ decision-making, thus actually countering and inhibiting expressions of Indigenous self-determination. By condemning**—**writ large**—**all Indigenous peoplesand organisationsthat wish to seek peaceful co-existence with the state, negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with the state, and/or who have advocated on the international level for a set of standards that can provide a positive guiding framework for Indigenous-state relations, the pessimistic lens of resurgence forecloses much potential for new and improved relations, in any form, and is very likely to lead to deeper conflicts between states and Indigenous peoples, and potentially, even violent action, which Fanon indicated was the necessary outcome. The pessimism traps of the resurgence school are therefore, likely self-defeating for all but the most remote and isolated Indigenous communities. Further, this approach is quite out of step with the actions and vision of many Indigenous resistance movements on the ground who have been working for decades to advance Indigenous self-determination, both domestically and globally, in ways that transform the colonial state into something more just and may eventually present creative alternatives to the Westphalian state form in ways that could respect and accommodate Indigenous nations. Rather, it aims to shame and blame those who wish to explore creativeandinnovative post-colonial resolutions to the colonial condition. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration or UN Declaration) was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 after 25 years of development. The Declaration is ground-breaking, given the key leadership roles Indigenous peoples played in negotiatingand achieving this agreement.45 Additionally, for the first time in UN history, the rights holders, Indigenous peoples, worked with states to develop an instrument that would serve to promote**,** protect and affirm Indigenous rights, both globally and in individual domestic contexts.46 Many Indigenous organisations and movements, from dozens of countries around the world, were involved in drafting and negotiating the UN Declaration and are now advocating for its full implementation, both internationally and in domestic and regional contexts. In Canada, some of the key organisational players—the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee), the Assembly of First Nations, and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, or their predecessor organisations—were involved in the drafting and lengthy negotiations of the UN Declaration during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the United States, organisations like the American Indian Law Alliance and the Native American Rights Fund have been involved as well as the Navajo Nation and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, who represent themselves as Indigenous peoples’ governing institutions. From Scandinavia, the Saami Council and the Sami Parliaments all play a key role in advancing Indigenous rights. In Latin America, organisations like the Confederación de Nationalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA) advocate for implementation of the UN Declaration. The three, major transnational Indigenous organisations**—** the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the International Indian Treaty Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council—were all key members of the drafting and negotiating team for the UN Declaration, and the latter two, which are still in existence, continue their strong advocacy for its full implementation. Implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires fundamental and significant change, on both the international and domestic levels. Because implementation of Indigenous rights essentially calls for a complete and fundamental restructuring of Indigenous-state relationships, it expects states to enact and implement a signifcant body of legal, constitutional, legislative and policy changes that can accommodate such things as Indigenous land rights, free, prior and informed consent, redress and a variety of self-government, autonomy and other such arrangements. States are not going to implement this multifaceted and complex set of changes on their own, however. They will require significant political and moral pressure to hold them accountable to the rhetorical commitments they have made to support this level of change. They will also require ongoing conversationand negotiation with Indigenous peoples along the way, lest the process becomes problematically one-sided. Such processes ultimately require sustained political will**,** commitment and engagement over the long term, to reach the end result of radical systemic change and Indigenous state relationships grounded in mutual respect**,** co-existence and reciprocity**.** This type of fundamental change requires creative thinking**,** careful diplomacy, tenacity, and above all, optimistic vision, on the part of Indigenous peoples. The pessimistic approaches of the resurgence school are ultimately of little use in these efforts, other than as a cautionary tale against state power, of which the organisational players are already keenly aware. Further, by dismissing and discouraging all efforts at engagement with states, and especially with the blanket accusations that all who engage in such efforts are ‘co-opted’ and not ‘authentically’ Indigenous, the resurgence school actually creates unnecessary negative feelings and divisions amongst Indigenous movements who should be pooling limited resourcesand working together towards better futures.

### Impacts

#### The expansion of settler colonial sovereignty is based in an ontological securing of life as infinite futurist progression of desire against the shifting signifier of backwards deathly savages to be eliminated. The result is endless violence.

Schotten 16 (C. Heike, – associate professor of political science @ UMass “Queering Sovereignty, Decolonizing Desire.” Mills College. Carnegie Hall, Oakland, California. 4 March 2016. Spatializing Sovereignty organized by The Society for Radical Geography, Spatial Theory, and Everyday Life. Conference Presentation. http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/84081898. 8:07 - 19:56 Transcribed by Tabatha R. at rev.com)

Okay so in the state of nature, which Hobbes defines as a place where there's no security, there is, in Edelman's terms, no future. This is true not only because we are responsible solely for our own survival, an endeavor we cannot possibly succeed at on our own, but it is also because given this radical insecurity, we are incapable of imagining any other moment or time than now. Hobbes himself acknowledges there is no "accounting of time" in the state of nature, which of course makes sense; in a condition of perpetual war, the future is unimaginable because it is so tenuous. As well, the past becomes effectively irrelevant, hence the institution of sovereignty in Hobbes' version secures our physical preservation and I’m arguing that it does so by bringing temporality itself into existence and producing a future. Okay, so that's the first point. The second point is that, in this act, the sovereign establishes the very meaning and content of life itself**.** For understood temporally, there is a way in which there is no distinction between life and death in the state of nature, in so far as there is no way to tell present from future. The state of nature's enduring present entails that life there is a kind of limbo-like existence, a suspension of living or perpetual near-death experience wherein we can never be certain of anything. This may be why it is so important to Hobbes to establish the commonwealth in the first place: Not simply to preserve life, as he explicitly suggests, but actually more primarily to definitively demarcate life as life and differentiate it from death. I mean, there's a normative enterprise going on here, right? Indeed, although the sovereign is the beacon of peace, war and death are just as must a byproduct of the institution of sovereignty as life and peace are. So what I take from this is that sovereignty, in short, is the definitive bio-political regime, in so far as it constitutes and determines life as such, distinguishing it from what only becomes subsequently recognizable as death. The third point is that sovereignty institutes this life-death distinction via a moralized logic that relegates life to the domain of civilization and value, and death to the domain of savagery and nihilism. This becomes clear in the conflicted and confusing ways Hobbes characterizes the state of nature as simultaneously a time, a place, and a condition. Now as I just argued that the state of nature is a time — like if it is an era or an epoch — it's a time with no time, a moment that is completely timeless, an era lacking any dynamism or principle of change. If the state of nature is instead a condition, which he also claims, he is clear that it is one of savagery, writing "It may peradventure be thought there never was such a time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so over all the world, but there are many places where they live so now," and he cites as an example, "the savage people in many places of America." Bolstering the view that the state of nature is a story about humanity's pre-history, Hobbes here rehearses the enlightenment trope of indigenous peoples as European humanity's ancestors and/or pre-modern childhood. Savagery is, therefore, associated with solid temporality, timelessness, and the failure of forward movement or progress. Conclusively, when referencing a geographical location, the state of nature is America, and the 17th-century European notion of the new world, an empty land ripe for exploration and conquest. These specifications of the state of nature in Hobbes make clear that establishment of sovereignty imposes a clear distinction not simply between peace and war, life and death, but also between modernity and backwardness, civilization and savagery. Each of these categorical pairs functions as a surrogate for the others. Taken together, they suggest the deep implications of the categories of life and death with colonization and conquest for European politics and political theory. The fourth point is that the commonwealth, or sovereign or sovereignty, can't actually solve the problem Hobbes says it does. So if there's no state and we're all going to murder each other, the solution is obviously a really big bad, coercive state, right? And that's going to solve the problem? It can't solve the problem, and that's because it can't solve the problem of desire, which has futurism built into its very structure. Hobbes actually gets short shrift as a psychologist. He actually talks quite a bit about desire and affect. So desire, according to Hobbes, is a voluntary motion of the body, whose aim, regardless of object, is attainment — possession, consumption, enjoyment. Yet this attainment poses a dilemma, for as he says, the aim of desire is "not to enjoy once only and for one instant of time, but to assure forever the way of one's future desire." According to Hobbes, in other words, desire seeks perpetuity of enjoyment. It aims at a consumption that can never fully completed. The fifth point — we're almost done — is that Hobbes asserts, therefore, that human beings are perpetual power-seekers, not because we want more and more, but because we want to preserve what we have now forever. His claim is that mere maintenance of the present requires accumulation**,** undertaking a perpetual reference to an unknown future**.** Thus, even despite the security from physical violence the sovereign provides, he cannot alleviate the anxiety that runs apace with desire. Everything we do today is undertaken for the sake of a future, which, if we're successful, will be no different from the present. But the sovereign can't guarantee that, right? Sixth then, and finally, this means that Hobbes' colonial story of the emergence of life and death from the state of nature is based on an underlying logic of desire that explains why settler colonial societies transform into expansionist security states. Hobbes' understanding of desire and its dilemmas elaborates George W. Bush's doctrine of preemptive warfare**,** the logic of Israeli self-defense in the face of so-called "existential threats," and the rationale behind stand-your-ground laws that exonerated the murderer of Trayvon Martin. The fact of this logic's hegemony in economics and political science as rational-choice theory or in international relations as Big R Realism make clear that futurist temporality is the unquestioned philosophical foundation of the U.S. economic and political order, as well as the obviously imperial investments of these economic disciplines. In short, it is the temporalization of desire itself that explains both the settler colonial foundations of survival, life and the value of life, as well as its transformation into an expansionist imperial project. Okay, that was part one. Part two: settlement and the global war on terror. So how does this reading of Hobbes through Edelman help us understand the emergence of empire? Lorenzo Veracini has argued that settler colonialism is distinct from other types of colonialism in so far as it seeks to erase itself as settler colonialism. Following Patrick Wolf's argument that settler colonialism pursues a logic of elimination, whereby settlers seek to replace the native and indigenize themselves post-facto, Veracini argues that because it aims at the elimination of the native, settler colonization necessarily aims at its own elimination. The truly successful settler colonial project, then, would therefore efface the native entirely, whether through genocide or assimilation or some other form of disappearance, the politics of recognition as Glen Coulthard has recently argued. Unless and until elimination is accomplished, settler states will engage in all sort of contortions, both political and ideological, to obscure the native in order to naturalize the conquest. Veracini represents this future of settler colonialism as either conceptually embedded its definition or else as a kind of bad faith on settlers' part, potentially implying that a guilty conscience somehow seeks to ward off complicity with conquest. I think that Edelman's understanding of futurism, however, helps explicate just how and why thisanxious, reiterative, and reactionary veiling impulseis definitive of bio-political sovereignty. Hobbes' narratization of the drive of the state of nature is, like any other narratization of the drive, an imposition and thus an explicitly ideological move that serves a particular political agenda. It is the specifically futurist character of this imposition that destines it for failure and thus explains its anxious and recursive structure. Edelman regards this narrative movement toward a viable political future as fundamentally fantasmatic, not to mention conservative and ideological. Futurism, in other words – and these are his words — "perpetuates the fantasy of meaning's eventual realization," a realization that is by definition impossible, in so far as it is always only ever to come. Right? That's what the future is: It's beyond our grasp, it's always just out of reach. Built into Hobbes' understanding of desire, in other words, is the failed tautology of futurism, which as Edelman instructs, is fundamentally and futilely political. My contention is that this constitutive failure of futurism can be understood as the dynamic content of conquest in settler societies, as the original civilizationist imposition of temporality, an act that explains their subsequent transmogrification into expansionist security states. So, rather than face the violence that brought peace and life itself into being, Hobbes instead naturalizes this founding act by declaring it to be a "general inclination of all mankind" to engage in what he calls a "perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death." In other words, he both institutes life and pushes it forward via a futurist narrativization of the drive into an insatiable, cumulative desire. Yet while desire may push us ever forward, **ever** beyond the initial moment of settlement**,** it cannot erase that settlement or relieve settlers' sovereignty of conquest. This is neither because of settler colonialist theoretical definition nor because settlers secretly feel guilty, but rather because the impossibility of fulfilling futurism's fantastical promises requires some other way of meeting the needs it manufactures if settler sovereignty is to maintain itself and it polity in tact. Settler societies resort to any number of destructive forms of managing futurism's failing, from transfer and removal to outright extermination through war, massacre, starvation, and disease. Yet this anxious reiterative activity is wholly predicable from an Edelmanian perspective and ineliminable from the structure of settler sovereignty because the futurist narrativization of the drive has rendered settlers beholden to an unsustainable temporality that must produce queerness or death in order to continue to produce meaning, survival, and civilization for itself**.** Settler sovereignty, thus, cannot do without the death native it brings into being. The native as death must exist in order to purchase life and survival for the settler. And yet, as Veracini and Wolf argue, the native cannot exist if the settler is to indigenize herself as native to the land she has expropriated, hence the production of new enemies, new queers, new deathly threats to settlement and its civilization and its way of life. The settler colonial foundation of bio-political sovereignty gives way to an expansionist imperial security state that finds new enemies abroad and new obstacles to its endless expansion, thereby solving, albeit only ever partially and temporarily, the problem of futurist failure that constituted settlement to begin with.

#### Attempts to reform liberalism towards solving ecological problems through governmental action retrench Western conceptions of man---that sanctions mass colonial violence, anti-Black environmental dualism, and makes solving warming impossible.

Frazier 16 [Chelsea M. - Ph.D candidate, department of African-American Studies @ Northwestern, Spring 2016, “Troubling Ecology: Wangechi Mutu, Octavia Butler and Black Feminist Interventions in Environmentalism,” Critical Ethnic Studies, Vol 2:1, pg. 42-46, modified for ableist language]

Delinking geography and power is a significant step toward reconfiguring our earth ethics, particularly as environmental studies frameworks have traditionally been informed by colonial European notionsof“the political.”8 More specifically, I mean that environmental studies and activism has traditionally been aligned with mainstream political discourse in its emphasis on liberal reform as an ideal strategy for addressing its concerns. Sylvia Wynter reveals a key flaw in this line of reasoning. In her essay “Unsettling Coloniality,” Wynter opens by asserting [My] argument proposes that the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e., Western bourgeois) conceptions of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy, of the human species itself/ourselves.9 Wynter argues that Western philosophy has constructed and continually reinforced the idea of Western Man as the measure of humanity. She also emphasizes that the securing of Western Man as an ethnoclass is fundamentally at odds with the securing of “the human species itself/ourselves.” Elsewhere, Wynter has argued that our present master discipline of economics discursively functions as a secular priesthood of the U.S. nation-state’s economic system. As well as, therefore, of the overall globally incorporated world-systemic capitalist economic order in its now neoliberal and neo-imperial, homo-oeconomicus bourgeois ruling-class configuration at a world-systemic level—of which the United States is still its superpower hegemon.10 Here, Wynter explains that the United States and its role as global superpower facilitates the existence of a “world systemic capitalist economic order” based on neoliberal and neoimperial ethics. These ethics are rooted in and inextricably linked to the notion of Western Man as human. The kind of environmental studies or activism that tethers itself to a neoliberal, neoimperial ethics that sustains our present “world systemic capitalist economic order” can never ~~retard~~ or alleviate our struggles rooted in environmental degradation. If anything, by uncritically relying on traditional approaches to environmental rehabilitation and conservation via legislative reform, for example, many environmentalist activists and scholars reinforce the very system they claim to be fighting. Wynter outlines this conflict quite clearly as she argues: The correlated hypothesis here is that all our present struggles with respect to race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, struggles over the environment, global warming, severe climate change, the sharply unequal distribution of the earth’s resources (20 percent of the world’s peoples own 80 percent of its resources, consume two-thirds of its food, and are responsible for 75 percent of its ongoing pollution, with this leading to two billion of earth’s peoples living relatively affluent lives while four billion still on the edge of hunger and immiseration, to the dynamic of overconsumption on the part of the rich techno-industrial North paralleled by that overpopulation on the part of the dispossessed poor, still partly agrarian worlds of the South)—these are all differing facets of the central ethnoclass Man vs. Human struggle.11 Following Wynter, I insist that “the West” itself—its divisions of space and its rigid notions of the human subject—are insufficient frameworks through which “global warming, severe climate change, and the sharply unequal distribution of the earth’s resources” can be effectively addressed. We must consider these issues while concurrently addressing a central conflict from which these issues emerge: a fraught and delimited understanding of human subjectivity. In her effort to connect environmental struggles with a delimited understanding of human subjectivity, Jane Bennett questions the very necessity of an “environmentalist” stance entirely. In her book Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Bennett ponders “whether environmentalism remains the best way to frame the problems, whether it is the most persuasive rubric for challenging the American equation of prosperity with wanton consumption, or for inducing more generally, the political will to create more sustainable political economies in or adjacent to global capitalism.”12 Bennett’s questions about the persuasiveness of environmentalism, coupled with Wynter’s critiques, implore me to consider Bennett’s alternative for framing these problems: vital materialism. According to Bennett, traditional environmental ethics are reliant on an abstraction of human bodies from their “passive environments” and leave little room for “animals, vegetables, or minerals” to be considered fully acknowledged political subjects. Furthermore, according to Bennett, a vital materialist stance is more useful than an environmental one because it (1) makes human and nonhuman relationality horizontal as opposed to vertical/hierarchical, and (2) insists on the vitality or aliveness of all matter—drawing out the ways in which humanity in its bacterial and mineral makeup is not as distinct from “everything else” as we would like to believe. Bennett’s vital materialism not only includes a far more nuanced understanding of our relationships to other forms of materiality but also aims at drawing out horizontalized connections to others—human and nonhuman. Given the history of racialized exclusion in mainstream environmental discourse**,** a horizontalized vital materialism seems to speak back to those inherent hierarchies that not only abstract human bodies from their “passive environments” but also agitate political structures and hierarchies “that have served repeatedly to relegate black subjects to the status of western modernity’s nonhuman other.**”**13 While Bennett’s interventions are incredibly useful, at second glance, her proposition does have problems that she herself anticipates. There are dangers in an approach that seeks to lessen the distinctness between “humanity” and “the rest of matter.” Despite her attempt to democratize all forms of materiality, Bennett’s vital materialist stance retains the potential of opening the floodgates for even more ruthless forms of instrumentalizing human beings. Bennett tries to address these dangers, emphasizing the idea that “if matter itself is lively, then not only is the difference between subjects and objects minimized, but the status of the shared materiality of all things is elevated.”14 Additionally, Bennett aims to demonstrate that vital materialism relies on an understanding that “all bodies become more than mere object, as the thing-powers of resistance and protean agency are brought into sharper relief.”15 Given the extensive colonial and Middle Passage histories of the violent instrumentalization of black subjects who have struggled for centuries to be recognized as “human,” a restructuring of ecological ethics that retains the readied potential for further objectification is worrying at best and preposterous at worst. At the same time, given the messy (non) distinctions between so many different forms of materiality that Bennett highlights, it becomes difficult to completely dismiss her logic. Both Wynter and Bennett signal that a “new” environmental politics can not come as a result of liberal reform or black inclusivity within extant mainstream political discourse but only after understandings **of** relational human subjectivity are deeply scrutinized and restructured. Moreover, because of the roots of all the “isms” that Wynter coherently reports for us, a truly “new” environmental politics would render our present world unrecognizable. This article is concerned with the work of imagining this other world and other relationalities between material forms. In the pages that follow, I examine the ways Octavia Butler and Wangechi Mutu effectively trouble ecology as they lead us away from the limitations of traditional environmental studies while offering transgressive visions that center black female subjectivity, challenge the (dis)connections between human and nonhuman entities, and initiate alternative notions of environmental/ecological ethics.

# Affirmative Answers

### 2AC Frontline

#### To prepare answers to a Kritik, remember the acronym, POSTAL which stands for perms, offense, solvency, theory, alternative and links. Often the best answers will be based on garnering offense from your specific 1AC. Below are a few starter answers to compliment those.

**(Framework) The role of the ballot is to** weigh the effects of government implementation of the plan versus the impacts of the K. We outweigh on magnitude and timeframe since indigenous erasure is happening now

#### a) Competitive equity – any other interp moots our offense and makes it structurally impossible for the aff to win

#### b) Clash – real world problems require a combination of political and critical solutions – weighing the aff allows for the most in-depth education about both – key to self-reflexivity and decision making

#### c) infinite philosophical frameworks tank predictability and exclusive discursive focus moots 9 minutes of 1ac offense

#### **(Perm) Perm do both- solves climate change**

Nelson 20

(Melissa K., 12-22-2020, Melissa K. Nelson is a Native ecologist, a professor of Indigenous sustainability at Arizona State University, and the president of the Cultural Conservancy. She is Anishinaabe/Métis and a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians) "Time to Indigenize Lands and Water Conservation," Sierra Club, https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2021-1-january-february/feature/time-indigenize-lands-and-water-conservation)/EE

Even though much work still needs to happen to decolonize the conservation movement, traditional ecological knowledge and place-based Indigenous sciences are finally receiving some of the recognition they deserve. **Many Indigenous peoples are willing to share their knowledge with Western ecologists** and land managers, andtentative **collaborations have shown how traditional ecological knowledge can work alongside scientific ecological knowledge to better address** pressing environmental issues like **climate change and watershed conservation**. Land managers can incorporate lessons learned from Indigenous ecocultural restoration projects and seek comanagement partnerships with Indigenous fire managers, water protectors, basket weavers, seed gatherers, and hunters. Some national forest districts and other public lands, for example, have recently begun experimenting with Native American fire-management practices. **As the U**nited **S**tates **reckons with its colonial past and** the damages of **Native American dispossession, we must reimagine our methods of land stewardship—for the good of the planet** and its many living beings.The conservation movement and **government agencies can transform themselves by listening to** and learning from **Indigenous peoples and**, in turn, **offering support. That is how, together, we can decolonize our relationships** with the land and water. **We must honor and respect Indigenous peoples' environmental knowledge and lifeways and, in doing so, help restore** totem keystone species and **cultural keystone processes, from elderberry medicine to salmon migration**. Such honor and respect can serve as a kind of cultural medicine and allow us to fulfill our sacred responsibility as humble members of this magnificent Earth.

#### **(Offense) Climate change destroys aboriginal groups and indigenous culture – turns their impact and only the case will solve.**

Korff 21 (Jens Korff – Postgraduate degree in IT and interested in self-development, supporting marginalised groups and exploring creativity, “10 major threats to Aboriginal land”, Creative Spirits, 29 June 2021, <https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land>)

**Climate change affects Aboriginal land already.**[Torres Strait Islanders](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/people/torres-strait-islander-culture) are noticing visible changes to their land, including **erosion, rough seas and higher storm frequency,** according to former Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Tom Calma. [[4]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn4) Other risks include **flooded sacred sites, king tides, and ocean acidification and its effects on coral reefs and fish**.

Extreme weather conditions have the potential to **reduce water availability and erode infrastructure like sewerage systems** and housing on the islands.

Many villages are only about 2 metres above sea level. Constructing sea walls and coastal erosion control measures can help some of the worst affected islands, [[5]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn5) especially if they have airstrips, but it is not a long-term solution.

The 2008 Garnaut Report identified the Torres Strait as especially vulnerable. Over the next century the sea-level is expected to rise by up to 59 centimetres [[6]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn6).

"There is a real possibility that some communities will need to move to higher ground or relocate altogether to the mainland," Calma said. Shaun Edwards from far North Queensland agrees, predicting that "Torres Strait Islanders will end up coming to the mainland" [[7]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn7), an option not considered by others such as Climate Change Minister Penny Wong [[8]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn8).

Fred Gela, Mayor of the Torres Strait Island Regional Council, says that "the land and sea in the Torres Strait is a critical part of our spiritual and physical identity." [[5]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn5) Inaction would put at risk the survival of their way of life which is unique in Australia.

But Aboriginal people are well-placed "to help mitigate the impacts of climate change because of where they live and their unique knowledge of the land," says Joe Ross, Chair of the Northern Australia Land and Water Taskforce [[9]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn9).

We already have water rising in Kowanyama… At high tide water runs right through some islands.

— Shaun Edwards, Cape York Aboriginal leader [[7]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn7)

On **mainland Australia**, some Aboriginal communities feel that **global heating threatens their survival**. Houses are not built to deal with prolonged periods of extreme heat and several [outstations](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/aboriginal-homelands-outstations) are running out of water or have poor drinking water quality.

Houses in town camps are often built from cheap, hollow concrete blocks which trap the heat. Without sufficient tree cover houses and overwhelmed air conditioning units, people sleep outside, in shifts or overcrowd the coolest room of the house – with [**often devastating consequences**](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/overcrowded-houses)**.**

In Central Australia more than nine remote communities and outstations are
already experiencing water shortages as well as frequent and intense heatwaves. [[10]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn10)

In some communities, such as Yuendumu, about 300 kms north-west of Alice Springs, the government is no longer building new houses because there isn’t enough water in the aquifer to accommodate more people. Most communities in the NT have either poor water quality, are water stressed, or experience both. [[11]](https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/threats-to-aboriginal-land#fn11)

Regional centres such as Alice Springs might need to brace for an influx of climate refugees from Australia's tropical north.

**People will be forced to leave their country and leave behind much of what makes them Aboriginal. Climate change is a clear and present threat to the survival of our people and their culture.**

#### (Solvency) Decolonization creates a “narrative deficit” where we cannot imagine a paradigm shift

**Busbridge, PhD, ‘17**

(Rachel, lecturer at Australian Catholic University, 1-23-2017, “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization”, SAGE Journals, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0263276416688544>, NK)

The prescription for decolonization – that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonized and the overturning of colonial relationships of power ([Kohn and McBride, 2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0263276416688544?utm_source=summon&utm_medium=discovery-provider): 3) – is indeed one of the most counter-hegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to Israel-Palestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ ([Benford and Snow, 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0263276416688544?utm_source=summon&utm_medium=discovery-provider): 616). What, however, **does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonization?** As [Veracini (2007)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0263276416688544?utm_source=summon&utm_medium=discovery-provider) notes, **while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address** the lack of attention paid to the experiences of indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonization (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), **there is** nevertheless **a** ‘narrative deficit’ **when it comes to imagining settler decolonization.** While [Veracini (2007)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/0263276416688544?utm_source=summon&utm_medium=discovery-provider) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualization, it is apparent that the **structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways** closes down possibilities **of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonization aspires.** In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonization – which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible.

#### (Theory) Vague alternatives are bad. Zero explanation of how the US would move from its current constitution to complete decolonization means their alt is vague. - Vague alts are illegitimate and a voter for fairness, and education – a) It allows them to spike out of offense from speech to speech through reclarification rendering them unpredictable. b) Lack of stable advocacy kills perm ground and makes K solvency non-falsifiable.

#### (Alternative) The subject-formation of debate should emphasize actualizable alternatives---anything else is an ivory tower position that would facilitate mass violence if materialized.

**Condit 15** (Celeste, PhD, Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia---sex edited “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 101.1)

Thus, **when** Žižek and **others urge us to “Act”** with violence **to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call** his **[the] appeal** both **a failure of imagination** and a failure of reality. As for reality, **we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation** (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) **but instead to the production of totalitarian states** **and**/or **violent factional strife.** A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. **All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions**—**the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest** primate. Indeed, **this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil.** **The failure of imagination** in such rhetorics thereby **reveals itself to be critical**, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). **The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal**, **intellectually difficult**, **requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and** perhaps **requires more creativity** **than the typical academic theorist can muster**. **In the absence of a viable alternative**, the **appeals to** Radical **Revolution seem to have been** **sustained by the emotional zing of the kill**, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But **if one does not provide a viable vision** that **offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering** (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). **A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history**, **other than as constant local scale violent actions**, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that **the focal project** **for progressive Left Academics should** now **include the hard labor** **to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.**

#### (Link Turn) Their demand upholds native sovereignty over the grammar of anti-blackness. Slavery is ante- and anti- society – it is a prerequisite to colonialism. We should, rather, affirm a movement within slavery of settler decolonization

**Sexton 14** Jared Sexton, University of California Irvine, USA “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign” http://planetarities.web.unc.edu/files/2015/01/sexton-unsovereign.pdf

We might understand something else about the historical relations between black and native peoples if we bear in mind that **the dynamics of Negrophobia are animated**, in part, **by a preoccupation with sovereignty**. We have learned already that settler colonialism is governed by a genocidal commandment and that, as a direct result, survival becomes central to indigenous movements for settler decolonization. We have also learned that sovereignty, even disarticulated from the stateform, is the heading for thinking about this survival as a matter of politics.19 Yet, **in its struggle against settler colonialism, the claim of native sovereignty** – emerging in contradiction to the imposition of the imperial sovereignty of Euro-American polities20 – ‘**fortifies and extends the interlocutory life of America [or Canada or …] as a coherent (albeit genocidal) idea**, because treaties are forms of articulation, discussions brokered between two groups presumed to possess the same kind of historical currency: **sovereignty’** (Wilderson, 2003: 236).

This point is not mitigated by the fact that native sovereignty is qualitatively different from, not simply rival to, the sovereignty of nation-states. What links these statements discursively **is an ‘ethico-onto-epistemological’** (Barad, 2007) point of contact: ‘At every scale – the soul, the body, the group, the land, and the universe – they can both practice cartography, and although at every scale their maps are radically incompatible, **their respective “mapness” is never in question’** (Wilderson, 2010: 181).21 Capacity for coherence makes more than likely a **commitment ‘to preserve the constituent elements of sovereignty’** (2010: 182) **and a pursuit of the concept of ‘freedom as self-determination’**.22 The political de-escalation of antagonism to the level of conflict is mirrored by a conceptual domestication at work in the field of Native Studies, namely, that settler colonialism is something already known and understood by its practitioners. The political-intellectual challenge on this count is to refine this knowledge and to impart it. The intervention of Native Studies involves bringing into general awareness a critical knowledge of settler colonialism.

We might contrast the unsuspecting theoretical status of the concept of settler colonialism in Native Studies with its counterpart in Black Studies: racial slavery. I remarked above that **any politics of resurgence or recovery is bound to regard the slave as the position of the unthought**. This does not suggest, however, that Black Studies is the field in which slavery is, finally, thought in an adequate way. The field of Black Studies is as **susceptible to a politics of resurgence or recovery** as any other mode of critical inquiry. Which is to say that the figure of the slave and the history of the emergence of the relational field called racial slavery remains the unthought ground of thought within Black Studies as well. The difference, provisionally, between these enterprises is that **whereas Native Studies sets out to be the alternative to a history of settler colonialism** and to pronounce the decolonial intervention, **Black Studies dwells within an un-inheritable, in-escapable history and muses upon how that history intervenes upon its own field**, providing a sort of untranscendable horizon for its discourse and imagination. The latter is an endeavor that teaches less through pedagogical instruction than through exemplary transmission: rather than initiation into a form of living, emulation of a process of learning through the posing of a question, a procedure for study, for black study, or black studies, wherever they may lead.

Native Studies scholars are right to insist upon a synthetic gesture that attempts to shift the terms of engagement. **The problem lies at the level of thought** at which the gesture is presented. **The** settler colonial studies **critique** of colonial studies **must** be repeated, this time with respect to settler colonialism itself, **in a move that returns us to the body** in relation to land, labor, language, lineage – and the capture and commodification of each – **in order to ask the most pertinent questions about capacity, commitment, and concept**. This might help not only to break down false dichotomies, and perhaps pose a truer one, but also to reveal the ways that the study of **slavery is already and of necessity the study of capitalism, colonialism and settler colonialism, among other things**; and that the struggle for abolition **is already and of necessity the struggle for the promise of communism, decolonization, and settler decolonization, among other things**. Slavery is the threshold of the political world, abolition the interminable radicalization of every radical movement. Slavery, as it were, **precedes and prepares the way for colonialism**, its forebear or fundament or support. Colonialism, as it were, the issue or heir of slavery, its outgrowth or edifice or monument. This is as true of the historic colonization of the Third World as it is the prior and ongoing settler colonization of the Fourth.23

‘**The** modern **world owes its very existence to slavery’** (Grandin, 2014a).24 What could this impossible debt possibly entail? Not only the infrastructure of its global economy but also the **architecture of** its **theological and philosophical discourses, its legal and political institutions, its scientific and technological practices, indeed, the whole of its semantic field** (Wilderson, 2010: 58). A politics of **abolition could never** finally **be a politics of resurgence, recovery, or recuperation**. It could only ever begin with degeneration, decline, or dissolution. Abolition is the interminable radicalization of every radical movement, but **a radicalization through the perverse affirmation of deracination**, an uprooting of the natal, the nation, and the notion, preventing any order of determination from taking root, a politics without claim, without demand even, or a politics **whose demand is ‘too radical to be formulated in advance of its deeds’** (Trouillot, 2012: 88).25

The field of Black Studies consists in ‘tracking the figure of the unsovereign’ (Chandler, 2013: 163) in order to meditate upon the paramount question: **‘What if the problem is sovereignty as such’** (Moten, 2013)? Abolition, the political dream of Black Studies, its unconscious thinking, consists in the **affirmation of the unsovereign slave** – the affectable, the derelict, the monstrous, the wretched26 – figures of an order altogether different from (even when they coincide or cohabit with) the colonized native – the occupied, the undocumented, the unprotected, the oppressed. **Abolition is beyond (the restoration of) sovereignty. Beyond the restoration of a lost commons through radical redistribution** (everything for everyone), there is the unimaginable loss of that all too imaginable loss itself (nothing for no one).27 If the indigenous relation to land precedes and exceeds any regime of property, then **the slave’s inhabitation of the earth precedes and exceeds any prior relation to land – landlessness**. And selflessness is the correlate. **No ground for identity, no ground to stand (on).** Everyone has a claim to everything until no one has a claim to anything. No claim. This is not a politics of despair brought about by a failure to lament a loss, because it is not rooted in hope of winning. **The flesh of the earth demands it: the landless inhabitation of selfless existence**.

#### (Link Turn) Rather than a naïve affirmation of science’s neutrality, our strategy is necessary to combat climate skepticism – *“strategic positivism”* is not a retreat to the academy, but instead a strategy for political efficacy

Latour, 13 - Professor of Sociology Science at Science Po Paris (Bruno, “Telling friends from foes in the time of the Anthropocene”, <http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/131-ANTHROPOCENE-PARIS-11-13.pdf>) \*we don’t endorse ableist language

You will never find a library in France that would put a book by Claude Lanzmann on the Shoah side-by-side on a table with a book by an arch negationnist like Faurisson. A few days ago, however, my friend Clive Hamilton was horrified to see his book, Requiem for a Species, together with one of the newest pamphlets by a climate denier “L’innocence du carbone” (amazing title, I will come back to that). And the worst is that Clive would have appeared unfair and dogmatic if he had taken the librarian to task for keeping such an absurd and scandalous balance. If he had protested, no doubt the librarian would have answered that this is a rational debate and that both sides have to be heard. There is a law (in France) against Faurisson; not against climate negationnism. And that is one of the problems that paralyze politics in the Anthropocene. This is not a rational debate. Or rather, it is a debate for which the climatologists of the IPCC who would have been considered rational in another climate are being rendered powerless. They are portrayed as irrational by those who use the power of reason and appeal to the freedom of scientific inquiry to pollute not on only the atmosphere but also the public sphere (to use James Hoggan’s expression). Why? Because both sides — and this is what produces the idea that there are two sides — use the same science-versus-politics repertoire. This repertoire is made of two parts. First, both sides imply that Science is about distant, dispassionate facts of nature while politics is about ideology, passions and interests whose intrusion into Science cannot do anything but distort the plain facts. Second, both sides agree that policy 131- Thinking the anthropocene 4 should follow scientific expertise and that we cannot make decisions based on uncertain science. The difficulty is that this repertoire (disproved by fifty years of historical case studies) is shared by most of the public as well. It means that if any lobbyist paid by the mining or oil industry or any physicist with his own pet version of what the laws of nature tell him, manages to introduce the smallest grain of doubt into the expertise, the whole policy train stops. Part one: science is about incontrovertible and indisputable facts; part two: policy follows science. Since this is what all politicians, as well as every onlooker believe, and since it is also the way TV shows organize debates as if they were judges in a courtroom, it is incredibly easy to make two sides emerge even when there is only one. To give credit where credit is due, this should be called the Luntz strategy to honor Frank Luntz’s infamous memo to the Republican party: “Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, their views about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a primary issue.” His success speaks volumes about the mass of money spent to foster climate deniers but it also speaks to the fragility of the immunological system of those who use the science-vs-politics repertoire. It appears that the slightest virus is enough to make them doubt and stop policy in its tracks. Because of this weird – though common-sensical – vision of science versus politics, there is no way to immunize the public against such an infectious form of “skepticism” — a grand adjective that has been most maliciously appropriated. Of course, it would be great if we could imagine that at some point, because of the many public debates about the issue, the two sides would become one. Case settled, let’s now move on to the policy. The apparently innocuous term “skepticism”, used so intently by deniers, might seem to lead in such a direction. Let us have a “fair and balanced” debate, as they say on Fox News. But there is not the slightest chance that this closure will ever occur, since the deniers’ success is not to win any argument, but simply to make sure that the rest of the public is convinced that there is an argument. How could the poor helpless climatologists ever win in such a kangaroo court where the point is not to reach a verdict (the verdict has been reached in the IPCC report already anyway). The new discipline of “agnotology”, to use James Proctor’s expression, is the willful production of ignorance that has functioned marvelously for cigarettes as well as for asbestos and with more resistance for extermination camps. It will work much better, and for much longer, for climate science, and for one additional reason: it is about 131- Thinking the anthropocene 5 the daily life of billions of people. The chance to ever reach closure is nil. And yet waiting for closure before drafting policy is not an option either.To shift from a science-vs-politics to a science-with-politics is of course not without danger. At first glance, climate deniers will have a field day clamoring that their adversaries have finally confessed what they, the deniers, have always said: climate science is politics. To which the only reasonable answer is: “Yes, of course, where have you been? And what are you doing yourself?” After a minute of hesitation because of the loss of the old settlement — it is not easy to lose confidence in the Maginot line of factversus- value! — it quickly appears possible to redraw the lines of conflicts. Not between two sides of an epistemological debate (on one side the climate science and, on the other, the climate skeptics), but between two sides — and they will be soon more than two — with a completely different view of what you may expect from science as well as from politics. There is no conflict between science and politics. But there is a conflict between two radically opposite political epistemologies, each with its own definition of what science and politics are, and how they could collaborate. Of course, there exist plenty of reasons for imitating what feminists call “strategic essentialism” and to employ, whenever necessary, a form of “strategic positivism” as if we could confide to a settled science of the climate the task of serving as an incontrovertible premise for policy. But even if this strategy could succeed (and the response to the last IPCC report indicates that it has failed this just the same as all previous attempts to “convince” the public), it would not solve the question because it would remain a pedagogical gain — not a political one. More people would know for sure, which is always good, but they will not be moved an inch out of the situation of just knowing. We are not dealing here with undisputable “matters of fact,” but with “matters of concern” to be disputed. It is a question of knowing “uncomfortable facts” about pressing issues that concern the very soil on which every body resides. It should have become clear that expressions like: “The innocence of carbon” as well as that of “uncomfortable facts” straddle the distinction between facts and values. How could it be otherwise since we are talking here about conflicts that pit against one another different definitions of the land to which the various polities are attached? How could any one, I beg you, defends one’s territory quietly and dispassionately when it is under attack? The only result of the older settlement of fact-vs-politics is that, in such a conflict, one side fights with all the forces at its power while the other side, the rational and reasonable climatologists, must fight with their hands tied behind their backs by the injunction that they, and they alone, should protect the sanctity of Science (capital S) against any encroachment of ideology and interest. In the old days, such an alternative political epistemology could have smacked of “relativism”. But today it is much clearer that when opponents reach for their guns and mention the “science wars”, it is much fairer, and, once again, more rational to say: “Not a science war, but for sure, a war of the worlds”. Or rather, a war for the occupation and definition and composition of what the world, at least this sublunary planet, Gaia, is like. How could we agree on this composition since, depending on the answer, each of us has to move literally to another place? How could we settle the issue when, depending on the response given, we ally with other people and break sides with others? Paradoxically, capitalists seem to know what it is to grab, to possess and to defend a land more than their space-less adversaries who have to defend Science and its View-from-Nowhere for inhabitants of no place. At least they know to which soil they pertain better than those who keep defending themselves by an appeal to the extraterritorial authority of Science. Remember the Bushists war cry: “Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus”. Well, it seems that those traditionally-defined nations are neither from Mars nor from Venus, but some are from an Earth which has a specific shape and some are from another Earth, or, maybe, from a land of no land called “utopia”, the utopia that the Moderns have imagined as their only future. A future that now looks just like the destroyed space stations from which Ryan Stone tries to escape in Gravity.