# States CP-NWG 2024

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### Strategy

Greetings! This CP is a **States CP** and it is intended to solve by using the 50 State Governments instead of the Federal Government as the actor. This CP is intended to solve for Affirmatives without linking to any arguments that are based on Federal Action. A **Federalism DA** and/or a **Politics DA** (that has a link based on Federal action) could both be net benefits to this CP.

## 1NC

### 1NC- CP

#### Text: The 50 States and the District of Columbia Should <insert relevant part of Affirmative plan>

#### Increase investment plant-based protein to reduce livestock emissions, and

#### increase global reforestation investments.

#### Counterplan Solves. States and not the Federal Government Play The Key Role In Furthering US Climate Policy Leadership

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

While the Inflation Reduction Act and the IIJA represent historic progress and unprecedented federal action in addressing the climate crisis, further state, local, and federal policy action is required to meet the U.S. commitment to cut greenhouse gas pollution by 50 percent to 52 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 and reach net-zero emissions by midcentury.82 State and local governments, as they have done over the past two decades, must continue to lead a new generation of climate policy action in the coming decade. They must continue to show how climate policies should work for working people through robust labor and equity standards.

As Gov. Jay Inslee (D-WA) said recently, “The [Inflation Reduction Act] is not the culmination of climate action, but the inspiration for further climate action.”83 Indeed, a new wave of subnational action has begun and with it come additional opportunities for state and local governments to step up. This is important—perhaps most important—for states, regions, and various sectors of the economy that have not historically been on the leading edge of pollution reductions and energy transformation. This new generation of ambitious U.S. climate policy can be led with targeted sectoral strategies, performance standards, and economywide climate programs.

**States Will Play The Key Role in US Decarbonization Processes**

**Barth, ’24** (Adam, leads the electric transmission and distribution work in McKinsey’s Electric Power & Natural Gas Practice in North America. He helps utility and utility-service and -technology companies develop strategies to shape future growth, drive capital productivity, and perform operational transformations. McKinsey & Company, “How US states can advance a successful clean-energy transition,” [https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/how-us-states-can-advance-a-successful-clean-energy-transition January 29](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/how-us-states-can-advance-a-successful-clean-energy-transition%20January%2029)

As the United States moves toward decarbonization, states and their leaders will help determine whether net zero is achieved—and whether the energy transition elevates communities to deliver a more prosperous future for all. Last year, we outlined six critical action areas that could enable a more orderly transition, from designing a capital-efficient and affordable energy system to accelerating technological innovation to ensure timely deployment of new clean technologies.1 Across these areas, states have an opportunity to advance the transition, improve energy affordability, and support inclusive economic growth. Traditionally, states have influenced the creation of new sources of energy through formal policies, regulatory constructs, and planning and permitting authorities. But the national energy landscape is undergoing tectonic shifts.

McKinsey estimates that it will take more than $27 trillion of capital spending through 2050 ($900 billion per year on average) to deploy US climate solutions at scale.2 Several pieces of recent legislation include significant investments to make progress toward these aims. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) directs nearly $400 billion in federal funding to clean energy (see sidebar “How the Inflation Reduction Act could unlock new net-zero opportunities for state agencies”). And IRA funding promises to amplify the approximately $70 billion in clean-energy technology and demonstration projects funded under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL). Now is the time for states to consider how to access and use this financial support to achieve net-zero targets and advance an orderly energy transition—all while facilitating economic development (transitioning workforces, for example) and environmental equity (such as clean-energy benefits for disadvantaged communities). At the same time, while public funding can cover part of the transition, states may need to explore new financing mechanisms, as well as investments from public and private capital, to close investment gaps.

## 2NC

### 2NC- Overview

#### The CP solves 100% of case…. [insert explanation of how it solves each AFF advantage/terminal impact] by utilizing the state governments instead of the federal government.

#### The 1NC Rickets Evidence Discusses how it is the states and not the Federal government that historically play the key role in climate reduction and mitigation efforts.

#### The 1NC Bart evidence discusses how states in particular play a key role in the decarbonization process and are poised to play a bigger role than the federal government in future decarbonization efforts

**And…States Must Take The Lead on Domestic Climate Policy. This is Key to the U.S. Federalist System of Governance. State Leadership Paves the way for federal Action, not the other way around**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

A hallmark of the federalist U.S. system of government is experimentation, innovation, and flexibility by state and local governments—including in implementing federal policies and programs. At its best, this system can ensure that the diverse needs and circumstances of communities across the country are considered while maintaining progress toward the vision and goals set by the federal government. This is the path that climate action in the United States has followed: States and local communities are leading the way through innovative policy approaches that have built models for others to follow, paving the way for eventual federal action.

#### Two framing issues for the debate:

#### 1---This is a battle over the better actor, the federal government or state governments. If we can prove that states should be the focus of climate mitigation policy OR that state action MUST precede federal action, vote NEG.

#### 2---Only the plan and the permutations will link to <insert net-benefits here> and this is another reason to vote for the counterplan over the plan or the permutation of the plan and counterplan.

**States Are Already Investing In Building Capacity to Deal With Climate Efforts**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

Some state and local governments are already investing in the capacity building needed for implementation efforts. For example, in 2023, Minnesota created 30 new programs with dozens of new positions to help the state maximize its uptake of federal dollars.8 Some of these new positions include energy navigators tasked with assisting communities to go after federal funds. Oregon increased its state Department of Energy budget by $3 million in order to hire more staff—particularly to help Tribes, environmental justice communities, and individual homeowners access new federal resources.9 In addition, Washington state enacted the Clean Manufacturing Leadership Act, which creates a state industrial policy adviser role tasked with tracking “federal and other funding opportunities to transform and strengthen existing Washington manufacturers and promote the growth of new and emerging industries.”10

### 2NC- CP Solves Climate/State Action Superior

**State Led Sectorial Strategies are Crucial to deal with All of the Major Sectors Accounting For Climate Pollution**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

State and local governments have long used targeted sectoral strategies, often featuring performance standards alongside complementary policies, aimed at transforming various economic sectors to improve environmental outcomes and lower energy costs for their residents. For example, for more than 40 years, states have implemented renewable portfolio standards, clean electricity standards, and energy efficiency resource standards, requiring electric utilities to utilize greater amounts of renewable energy, carbon-free electricity, and energy efficiency, respectively. States were the first movers in adopting tailpipe pollution standards for automobiles, even before the first federal standards were put in place.84 And local and state governments have utilized building codes to achieve better energy efficiency in new building construction and are now using this tool and others to drive building electrification. Often, standards have been paired with complementary investments or been part of a broader multitool sectoral strategy. Now, with greater federal incentives and investments flowing into each economic sector, state and local governments can use performance standards and sectoral strategies to maximize federal and private sector investment and hold companies accountable for using new investments in ways that reduce pollution and energy costs in their communities.

The electricity sector accounts for one-quarter of U.S. climate pollution, and although it has featured some of the fastest progress in the transition to clean energy—especially driven by state and local leadership—it still has a long way to go to meet short- and long-term climate goals. More than 20 states, and more than 200 local governments, have committed to a goal of achieving 100 percent clean, carbon-free electricity.85 And at least 15 states have embraced a goal as a firm requirement upon their electric utilities, most often in the form of clean electricity standards. Some of those and other states are members of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a 12-state cooperative in the northeast United States that prices electricity-sector carbon pollution and reinvests those revenues in emissions reductions. More states and regions must embrace a faster transition to 100 percent clean electricity. Like in the case of Minnesota’s recent breakthrough, and in Michigan’s developing story, they can now use Inflation Reduction Act and IIJA investments—clean electricity investment and production tax credits, in particular—to do so faster and with even lower costs for their constituents.

The transportation sector is by far the largest contributor to climate pollution in the United States, and state and local governments have powerful jurisdiction over the nation’s transportation systems. States have long used vehicle emissions standards to reduce pollution. Recently, six states followed California’s next-generation leadership by adopting Advanced Clean Cars II standards that require 100 percent zero-emissions new light-duty vehicle sales by 2035.86 Several other states have joined California’s leadership with the Advanced Clean Trucks Rule that requires manufacturers to significantly increase sales of zero-emissions trucks—between 30 percent and 50 percent by 2030 and 40 percent and 75 percent by 2035.87 More states should join these lists. However, standards on new vehicle sales will also need to be complemented with other ambitious and creative transportation strategies, especially since without them, federal funding may flow to the same old carbon-intensive transportation projects. Indeed, many states—including some traditionally known as climate leaders—have already deployed IIJA transportation funding in ways that could increase, not decrease, climate pollution.88 Other states are plainly moving in the wrong direction. For example, Texas recently approved a plan to spend $100 billion on highways over the next 10 years.89 And North Carolina’s Legislature prohibited its transportation department from using federal funds for transit, biking, and pedestrian infrastructure.90 Still, some states are beginning to show what next-generation transportation policy looks like. Colorado, Connecticut, and Minnesota have advanced new policies that force state agencies to comprehensively incorporate climate change into infrastructure planning and investment decisions comprehensively.91 And local governments, through metropolitan planning organizations, will play an essential role in partnering with and pushing states to invest in transit and other low-carbon transportation infrastructure.

Regarding the buildings sector, local leadership has been at the forefront. Cities and states have long used building codes and appliance and construction standards to raise energy efficiency requirements. They are now deploying those same measures to confront the costly pollution and dependence on methane gas appliances. In addition, dozens of cities have banned new gas hookups, providing examples for others to follow.92 Likewise, more state and local governments should follow the lead of Denver, Colorado, New York state, California, and Washington state, which use appliance standards, building codes, building performance and clean heat standards, and other measures to aid decarbonization efforts.93 States and localities can do so with the tailwinds provided by new Inflation Reduction Act Home Energy Rebate Program, tax credits for residential and commercial energy upgrades, and greater investment through the IIJA in the Weatherization Assistance Program. However, several states have moved in the opposite direction by banning local jurisdictions from taking these necessary steps.94

**State Governments must capitalize on opportunities to move the nation toward effective climate action**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

However, the challenges facing subnational governments have solutions. Alongside this, additional coordination on a regional scale supports state and local governments to rapidly take advantage of new opportunities and may alleviate some of the burden-creating capacity concerns. Finally, through continued dedication to addressing gaps and committing to leadership on climate action, state and local leaders can chart the course for the future of equitable, enduring climate action that ensures all communities have clean air to breathe and share the benefits of a clean energy economy. As we enter the second year of the Inflation Reduction Act and continue to focus on the implementation of this historic legislation, in addition to ongoing implementation of the IIJA, state and local governments are a crucial factor in the success of the Biden-Harris administration’s bold climate action plan. Subnational governments must capitalize on these opportunities to move the nation toward just and effective climate action.

### 2NC- AT Obstacles to State Centered Climate Policy

**Obstacles to State-Centered Climate Policy Can Be Overcome**

**Basseches, ’22** (Joshua, David and Jane Flowerree Assistant Professorship in Environmental Studies and Public Policy, Tulane University. Climatic Change (2022) 170: 32 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03319-w>. “Climate policy conflict in the U.S. states: a critical review and way forward”

State-level climate policy has shown great promise in the context of federal obstruction or inaction. Nevertheless, significant obstacles to robust state-level climate policy remain and this review provides a novel synthesis of the literature detailing these barriers. As we note, scholars describe obstacles associated with governance and political institutions, public opinion and media coverage, industry and interest groups, and fragmentation within pro-climate coalitions. What remains less clear from this scholarship is how we can harness this knowledge to formulate *solutions* to policy obstacles; our primary contribution lies here.

Based on the broad, interdisciplinary literature discussed here, we suggest a series of strategies to move climate change policy forward. The politicization of climate change necessitates bringing other groups into the fold of climate policy support. In addition, there is a need for enhanced coordination among climate policy advocates and potential coalition partners and to support electoral gains for climate policy advocates. To achieve these goals, we suggest the following strategies.

First, climate policy advocates should become more skilled in the game of politics, by employing campaign finance strategies, electoral mobilization, and support for existing elected officials who are sympathetic to climate policy as they seek to gain institutional influence (i.e., ascending to leadership positions, etc.). Climate policy opponents have had a great deal more practice and experience doing this, but there is no reason that proponents cannot learn from them and deploy strategic political operations of their own. A related strategy includes “bottom-up” pressure from local governments and municipalities. Second, climate policy proponents should seek to improve the quality coverage, including by tailoring messages to particular audiences and constituencies and continuously linking climate action to co-benefits.

Third, the political power of IOUs can be leveraged in support of strong climate policy if the right conditions and incentives are put in place so that utilities see opportunities for financial growth as a result of these policies. However, in cases where this is not feasible, efforts should be made to reduce their political power, by empowering municipal utilities and CCAs, by building broad coalitions of non-utility business interests, and, when strategic, by shifting the venue of policymaking between the legislative and executive branches. Finally, divisions within the pro-climate coalition should be reduced. This can be achieved through more inclusive policy design that attends to environmental justice issues as well as by encouraging better coordination among “green business” actors, such as renewable energy firms, energy efficiency consultants, green capital, etc.

Although this review moves the research field toward integrated discussion of climate-policy obstacles and solutions, it also has several limitations that could be the basis for future research. One limitation is that both the problems and solutions have a U.S. focus. Although many countries have undertaken restructuring of their electricity systems, each system is unique, and many still have a larger role for public power than in the U.S. Moreo-ver, the polarized political culture characterized by a climate denial machine and heavy influence by wealthy donors and corporations on political outcomes does not necessarily translate well to other countries. Thus, there is a need for additional comparative research on climate policy obstacles and solutions, which will likely reveal topics that are much more salient in other countries.

Moreover, further work is needed in tailoring these solutions to particular states, considering their distinct partisan tendencies, energy economies, media landscapes and government contexts. Nevertheless, the strategies outlined above should be broadly valuable in reducing state-level climate policy obstacles and ensuring comprehensive progress at the state level despite continued uncertainty regarding federal climate policy. In addition, we have suggested ways of tailoring climate messaging by the media and others to make climate policy action more palatable to Republicans. In the context of energy and climate federalism, the states will likely remain key players in the years to come.

### AT: Perm do Both / let federal Government Take the Lead

**US States Have Always played an Important Role in Climate Policy. Federal inaction and Congressional Division on Climate Action make this more important today.**

**Higman, ’21** (Morgan, Former Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, Center For Strategic and International Studies, “Clean Resilient States: The Role of U.S. States in Addressing Climate Action,” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/clean-resilient-states-role-us-states-addressing-climate-action>, CSIS Report, February 9, 2021

U.S. states have always played an important role in setting the nation’s energy and climate policies, each charting their own course for energy production, consumption, and environmental impact within the bounds of often inconsistent federal regulation. The Biden administration has pledged to shepherd in a new era of federal-level climate action in the United States with commitments to expand renewable energy and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, a goal already adopted by a number of states. However, these plans will be subject to the limitations presented by a Congress that is deeply divided on climate change. For this reason, state-level policy will continue to play a critical role in shaping the country’s progress in addressing climate change.

While not all states support the Biden administration’s net zero emissions target, at some level all states do recognize value in addressing three energy-related climate imperatives: to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to create clean economic growth and opportunity, and to build resilient energy infrastructure. States demonstrate a wide range of approaches to prioritizing these imperatives.

**More Momentum Exists for State Action on Climate Change Than Federal Action**

**Higman, ’21** (Morgan, Former Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, Center For Strategic and International Studies, “Clean Resilient States: The Role of U.S. States in Addressing Climate Action,” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/clean-resilient-states-role-us-states-addressing-climate-action>, CSIS Report, February 9, 2021

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is a central requirement for slowing the harmful effects of climate change and is therefore the central target for state-level climate policy. Most states are making progress in reducing emissions in the production of electricity through policies that expand efficiency measures and renewables. Half of all states have now established emissions reduction targets, but these targets are not always linked to specific policies or plans to achieve them. Moreover, not all of the deepest emissions reductions in the last decade have come from the states with the most ambitious policy targets. These observations highlight a growing momentum among states around climate action, but also the need for greater clarity about where and how states are affecting emissions reductions.

**States Lead The Way in The Decarbonization Process**

**Higman, ’21** (Morgan, Former Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, Center For Strategic and International Studies, “Clean Resilient States: The Role of U.S. States in Addressing Climate Action,” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/clean-resilient-states-role-us-states-addressing-climate-action>, CSIS Report, February 9, 2021

In evaluating progress in state emissions reductions, it is helpful to bear in mind that all states need to follow the same relative path to reducing emissions. In general, this path begins with increasing end-use electricity efficiency and decarbonizing electricity production. On this front, most states have made some headway through policies that require efficiency and renewable energy production. Beyond this early part of the path, states must electrify transportation, machinery, and industrial technologies, then finally decarbonize hard-to-electrify sources of emissions.

**Powerful Interests have prevented effective federal climate policy, leading to a necessity of state action**

**Basseches, ’22** (Joshua, David and Jane Flowerree Assistant Professorship in Environmental Studies and Public Policy, Tulane University. Climatic Change (2022) 170: 32 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03319-w>. “Climate policy conflict in the U.S. states: a critical review and way forward”

Powerful interests have rebuffed climate policy efforts in the U.S., leading to decades of federal government inaction and heightened attention at the state level, where there has been comparative progress (Rabe 2007; Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2016). A great deal has been written about this shift to the states, and a robust literature on U.S. climate federalism has emerged (e.g., Karapin 2016; Rabe 2011; Thomson 2014; Woods 2021), including the significant climate policy action undertaken by states in the context of federal gridlock and policy rollbacks (Bromley-Trujillo and Holman 2020).

### AT: Perm do CP

#### Perm do CP severs- CP does not result in the AFF because the counterplan uses the states and the Aff uses the Federal Government- severance is a voting issue- causes the AFF to be a moving target and undermines stable neg links to key neg offensive arguments

### AT: States Don’t Have The Capacity To Solve

**States Are Already Investing In Building Capacity**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

Some state and local governments are already investing in the capacity building needed for implementation efforts. For example, in 2023, Minnesota created 30 new programs with dozens of new positions to help the state maximize its uptake of federal dollars.8 Some of these new positions include energy navigators tasked with assisting communities to go after federal funds. Oregon increased its state Department of Energy budget by $3 million in order to hire more staff—particularly to help Tribes, environmental justice communities, and individual homeowners access new federal resources.9 In addition, Washington state enacted the Clean Manufacturing Leadership Act, which creates a state industrial policy adviser role tasked with tracking “federal and other funding opportunities to transform and strengthen existing Washington manufacturers and promote the growth of new and emerging industries.”10

### CP Solvency Extensions

**State and Local Governments play a key role in US Climate Commitments over the next Decade**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

State and local leadership will play a critical role in whether the United States fulfills or falls short of its climate commitments in this decade.

State and local leaders have significant obligations, and significant opportunities, in Inflation Reduction Act and IIJA implementation, particularly because of their broad jurisdiction in transportation planning, economic development, environmental protection, and oversight of electric utilities and built infrastructure. Not only are state and local agencies eligible for a significant portion of new and expanded federal grant and financing programs, but they will also be key players in the uptake of federal clean energy tax credits. Moreover, for the first time, state and local agencies are eligible for direct payments commensurate with these tax incentives for which private entities have long qualified. Actions at the state and local levels will determine whether historic new federal investments are maximally benefiting their constituent communities, companies and consumers, and the climate.

**State Governments are key to meeting US Climate Commitments by 2030**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

Furthermore, if the United States is to avoid the worst effects of climate change and to seize the full opportunities available to it in a 21st-century clean energy economy, state and local governments will need to maximize the investments available through these bills and at the same time advance the next generation of American climate policy. According to one recent report from the Rhodium Group, roughly one-quarter to one-half of the greenhouse gas emissions reductions needed to meet U.S. climate commitments by 2030 must come from new state and local policies.4 As important as state and local climate leadership has been to date, more progress will be needed in more places and faster than ever before.

**Five Key Recommendations for State Centered Climate Policy**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

This report examines state and local implementation challenges and offers recommendations to assist states, local governments, federal agencies, and other interested parties in working together to advance climate leadership at the state and local levels. This report offers five key recommendations:

1. Build state and local climate capacity for the long haul: State and local governments need more staff and cross-agency coordination to help them implement most effectively.

2. Enhance technical assistance infrastructure: Federal agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and philanthropic organizations should help provide more and better technical assistance (TA) to state and local agencies.

3. Maximize federal investments with complementary policies and consumer awareness: State and local governments can maximize federal investments through complementary policymaking and by helping to raise consumer awareness of available opportunities.

4. Address equity gaps, workforce needs, and siting and permitting barriers: Effective and equitable implementation means state and local governments should prioritize investment in disadvantaged communities, support good jobs, and address challenges in siting and permitting.

5. Raise ambition with the next generation of U.S. climate policy leadership: State and local governments must maximize the effect of the Inflation Reduction Act and IIJA and use them to lead the next generation of ambitious climate policy.

**The US Must Build State and Local Climate Capacity for Long term Solvency**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

State and local governments often lack the capacity to effectively implement and manage new federal climate funding. This lack of capacity is especially challenging considering the vast array of new competitive and formula grant funding and tax incentive and financing opportunities under the Inflation Reduction Act and the IIJA. Many states lack the personnel resources to advance climate efforts across agencies. Likewise, local governments—sometimes representing small or disadvantaged communities—are stretched thin, often with limited or no bandwidth to identify, apply for, and manage new federal climate and environmental justice resources.

Inflation Reduction Act and IIJA programs also invite climate leadership from new and different state and local agencies than those that may be accustomed to incorporating such focus in their day-to-day work. These agencies may not lack capacity at all, but they instead lack a focus or a prioritization on climate change, seen in their decisions on energy resources or transportation infrastructure, for example. In addition, implementing many of these new federal opportunities requires crosscutting coordination across agencies that state and local governments, lacking effective infrastructure, can find challenging. Most state and local governments need to enhance their implementation capacity to take full advantage of this moment and to seize the new policy opportunities that this implementation window can unlock.

**The Inflation Reduction Act and the IIJA also provide state and local governments with unique investment opportunities**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

Furthermore, the Inflation Reduction Act and the IIJA also provide state and local governments with novel investment opportunities. For example, the elective pay provision in the Inflation Reduction Act’s clean energy tax credits opens these incentives to a new universe of public agencies and nonprofit entities.7 The Inflation Reduction Act and the IIJA also feature transformational investments developing new clean industries—from battery and solar manufacturing incentives to new regional green hydrogen hubs—which provide opportunities for state and local economic development organizations. This also includes funds for innovative climate-smart and equitable transportation infrastructure programs, community-led sustainability, and environmental justice strategies.

**Funding and Programs Already Exist for States to Build Climate Infrastructure Capacity**

**Rickets, ’23** (Sam, Senior Fellow, Center For American Progress, “Implementing America’s Clean Energy Future,” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementing-americas-clean-energy-future/> September, 2023

Within the Inflation Reduction Act and the IIJA, there are some programs that can support state and local government capacity building. These include the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Climate Pollution Reduction Grants (CPRG) program, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) State Energy Program, the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program, the Grid Resilience State and Tribal Formula Grants program, and more.

Some federal agencies also have placement programs to directly augment staff capacity in state and local agencies. For example, the DOE Clean Energy Innovator Fellowship allows institutions such as PUCs to host recent graduates for up to two years to work on energy policy.21 The DOE has also launched new initiatives to help build state and local capacity around particular policy challenges, such as the Renewable Energy Siting through Technical Engagement and Planning (R-STEP) program that will award grants to state-based collaboratives to expand their capacity around state and local renewable energy siting and planning.22

The CPRG program, administered by the EPA, is particularly important for building state and local government capacity.23 Through it, the EPA has offered all U.S. states, and Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico, a $3 million noncompetitive planning grant that can be used for personnel and administrative costs, including contractors and third-party support. The largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the country are also eligible for $1 million planning grants, and U.S. territories and Tribal nations are eligible for funding as well. The EPA recognized the need to quickly deploy planning grants to help state, local, Tribal, and territorial governments build the necessary capacity to apply for larger CPRG implementation grants and also to take greater advantage of other climate investments throughout the Inflation Reduction Act and the IIJA. In addition, the EPA used an innovative program design wherein if a state chooses to forgo its $3 million planning grant, those dollars become available to local governments within the state and elsewhere in the country.24 In spring 2023, 46 of 50 states applied for planning grants.25 All but two eligible MSAs nationwide have pursued planning grants.26

In late 2023, the EPA will open a $4.6 billion implementation grant competition to support implementing policies, programs, measures, and projects in some of the subnational climate action plans created in the planning stage of the program.27 The implementation grant funding competition allows the EPA to further support state and local government capacity and challenge subnational governments to develop the next generation of innovative climate and clean energy policy strategies.28 The EPA should use CPRG implementation grants to do both: first, by planning to make small implementation grants available to all planning grant recipients who complete necessary steps under the planning grant process and demonstrate how they will use such further funding to build additional capacity to carry out their climate plans, and second, by using the bulk of its general competition implementation grant funding to award larger grants for state and local governments with plans to produce the maximum additional, permanent, and verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas pollution and achieve equitable outcomes and support good union jobs. Local governments should also be eligible to apply for funding directly for strategies covered in their state’s plans.

Ultimately, throughout Inflation Reduction Act and IIJA implementation, federal agencies should look to provide state and local governments with the ability and flexibility to use federal dollars to expand their in-house capacity to help address this ubiquitous challenge.

**US States Have Led The Way On A Wide Range of Climate Policy Since the Early 2000’s**

**Basseches, ’22** (Joshua, David and Jane Flowerree Assistant Professorship in Environmental Studies and Public Policy, Tulane University. Climatic Change (2022) 170: 32 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03319-w>. “Climate policy conflict in the U.S. states: a critical review and way forward”

The focus of this paper is on climate mitigation policy, which can take many forms including broad-based climate policies, transportation policies, and electricity sector policies that have climate change implications (Grant et al. 2014; Bromley-Trujillo and Holman 2020). In the U.S., states have led in this area since the early 2000s as detailed in scholarly work (e.g., Rabe 2004; Matisoff and Edwards 2014; Bromley-Trujillo and Holman 2020).

These studies demonstrate a wide range of policy activity that centers on broad-based climate change efforts such as climate action plans, carbon cap-and-trade, and GHG reduction targets, transportation sector policies including low carbon and alternative fuel standards, and electricity sector policies such as renewable portfolio standards, net metering, and decoupling.

## ---Affirmative---

### 2AC Answers To States CP

**FOUR OBSTACLES EXIST TO STATE CENTERED CLIMATE POLICY:**

1. **Traditional Governance and Institutions Prevent States from Effectively Managing Climate Policy**

**Basseches, ’22** (Joshua, David and Jane Flowerree Assistant Professorship in Environmental Studies and Public Policy, Tulane University. Climatic Change (2022) 170: 32 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-022-03319-w>. “Climate policy conflict in the U.S. states: a critical review and way forward”

Political party governance and institutional arrangements in state government are important obstacles to climate policy action, particularly as environmental issues have become more politically polarized over time (Daniels et al. 2012). Democratic control of state governments facilitates climate policy adoption while Republican leadership acts as a veto point for climate legislation, often necessitating a Democrat trifecta to achieve bill passage (Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2016; Coley & Hess 2012; Trachtman 2020). There is also evidence to suggest a “counter-partisan response” at the state level (Miras and Rouse 2021); that is, when one party controls the federal government, the opposing party may become emboldened to act at the state-level (Bromley-Trujillo and Holman 2020).

1. **Media and Public Opinion Formation are more likely to hurt State Centered Climate Policy than Federal Climate Policy**

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Media coverage and public opinion around climate change also present obstacles to robust climate policy in the case where public concern is low (Bromley-Trujillo and Poe 2020; Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2019) and when media coverage frequency and content fail to raise the issues’ salience (Boykoff et al. 2021).

Media representations are powerful conduits of climate science and policy (mis)information. Moreover, media coverage of climate change, which is heavily driven by elite cues, is likely to shape public attitudes (Carmichael and Brulle 2016). Research on media portrayals of science-based issues shows that quantity and content of media coverage influences state-level agenda-setting (Bromley-Trujillo and Karch 2019). As such, when coverage presents climate science as uncertain, or fails to engage the views of different subgroups (Howarth and Black 2015), that coverage can shift climate change off of public and governmental agendas (Boykoff et al. 2021).

Public opinion also emerges as a barrier to climate action through influence on state legislative agendas (Bromley-Trujillo et al. 2019) and broader public discourse.

1. **Turn – Delegation of Climate Policy to the States Increases Lobbying and Corporate Activity Which Hinder State led Actions on Climate Policy**

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U.S. federalism delegates immense authority to states when it comes to climate and energy policy, and state efforts have expanded in the face of federal inaction (Karapin 2020; Thom-son 2014; Rabe 2011). This creates new opportunities for corporations and their lobbyists to influence climate policy. Initially, the increased authority of states prompted researchers to anticipate a “race to the top” with some states setting higher environmental standards (Fiorino 2006). However, subsequent research showed that the political economy of the environment often generates a “race to the bottom,” with some states competing for fossil fuel companies to develop their energy resources (Rabe 2007, 2013; Davis 2012; Cook 2017). Furthermore, after states become dependent on employment and tax revenues from the fossil fuel companies, they tend to make concessions to them. Wingfield and Marcus (2007) show that many of the states most dependent on fossil fuel industries have among the weakest environmental policies (e.g., Wyoming, Alabama, North Dakota, West Virginia, Louisiana).

The political alignment of subnational states and the fossil fuel sector is also motivated by economic co-dependence between state governments and the fossil fuel sector, resulting in states’ protecting business interests in order to advance the states’ economic growth and development agendas. However, this strategy can create conflict with neighboring states where air quality is adversely affected by high-polluting states. To mediate this conflict between states, the Obama Administration enacted the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule to limit the drift of airborne pollution across state borders. This policy quickly became a contested terrain between states and the federal government over jurisdiction, and it was resolved by the federal government making concessions to high-polluting states (Prechel 2012). Economic co-dependence also results in other actions by states that benefit the fossil fuel industry. To illustrate, several Republican lawmakers in Texas recently proposed legislation that threatened to divest the state’s more than $100 billion in retirement funds from banks and asset managers that boycott the fossil fuel sector (Douglas 2021).

Further, relaxed antitrust enforcement at the federal level has permitted the emergence of giant fossil fuel corporations (e.g., ExxonMobil, Koch Industries), which have virtually unlimited capital to spend on lobbying, political contributions, and media campaigns tooppose climate legislation. To illustrate, the Koch Brothers spent some of their $80 billion in wealth on an extensive media campaign to discredit scientific research on environmental pollution (Mayer 2017). Furthermore, during the 2019–2020 federal election cycle, the Koch Brothers’ Super PAC, Americans for Prosperity Action, spent more than $47.7 mil-lion on federal elections in disclosed contributions compared to less than $41.5 million for all contributions by the largest 20 environmental organizations (Open Secrets 2020a, 2020b). Moreover, historically, Americans for Prosperity Action has spent much more on undisclosed contributions (i.e., dark money), which reached $407 million during the 2012 federal election (Fang 2014).

1. **Divided Pro-Climate Policy Coalitions are more likely to negatively impact State led Climate policies**

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One obstacle to subnational climate policy that is perhaps less well recognized is the fragmentation of pro-climate policy coalitions. One source of fragmentation is divisions among the different alternative or renewable energy industries, which must operate in a political arena dominated by powerful fossil fuel incumbents (Kelsey and Meckling 2018). For example, a study of lobbying and testimony in Massachusetts found that more concentrated renewable energy industries were better able to engage in paid lobbying than dispersed ones (Culhane et al. 2021). Relatedly, Si and Stephens (2021) find disparate participation among solar developers and installers surrounding efforts to target solar installation among low-income households in Massachusetts. The solar industry is more fragmented in small installation firms, whereas the wind industry has higher capital barriers to entry and is consequently concentrated in a few, large firms. Solar firms are further divided between rooftop residential developers and those installing utility-scale projects, and between in-state and out-of-state firms (Stokes 2020).

In addition to divisions based on concentration, size, and capacity to influence politics/ policy, the renewable energy industries also tend to restrict their participation to issues that affect them most directly. For example, studies in Massachusetts and Rhode Island revealed that solar, wind, and other renewable firms did not show up to testify for legislation (e.g., carbon pricing) that did not target benefits to their economic sector. By contrast, environmentalists testified in large numbers in favor of the full range of climate bills. The picture that emerges is a fragmented renewables sector, with firms only lobbying and testifying for their own, narrow issues and sometimes battling each other over carve-outs for particular technologies in state-level RPS policies (Culhane et al. 2021).

Another source of division in pro-climate coalitions is between those who advocate for market-based, technocratic approaches to climate mitigation versus those who advocate for more holistic, climate justice approaches involving large public investments in jobs, infra-structure, equity, and health (Boyle et al. 2021). The more holistic approach acknowledges the power of the polluting elite, who have strategically invested for decades in undermining public trust in government and minimizing protections and support for marginalized com-munities, communities of color, and economically disadvantaged groups who are being disproportionately impacted by climate change and pollution (Stephens 2020). To further concentrate their wealth and power, big business has also reduced worker rights and protections, and it has shifted corporate culture to prioritize shareholders instead of workers (Stephens 2020). This approach tends to be aligned with progressive-left political coalitions, whereas the technocratic approach has a more moderate political position and tends not to emphasize issues of structural inequality. The structural vulnerabilities and under-investment that has been revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic have strengthened the political appeal of the holistic investment-based climate justice approaches (Boyle et al. 2021).

**Turn: Most State-Centric Cimate Policies Promote Climate Isolationism and Fail to Take Environmental Justice Into Consideration. This MUST Be rejected**

Most adopted and proposed state-level climate policies are based on a narrow, technocratic, carbon-centric model, which misses opportunities to invest in marginalized communities (Galvin and Healy 2020). To date, climate policy has been largely designed within the context of “climate isolationism,” which refers to the common framing of climate change as a narrow, isolated, discrete, scientific problem that requires a technological solution (Stephens 2020). Decision-makers working through a climate isolationism lens often focus in a technocratic way on achieving carbon reductions while inadvertently dismissing the social justice implications and human dimensions of these measures (Stephens Forth-coming 2021). Controversy surrounding California’s cap-and-trade program illustrates the conflict between climate justice and mainstream, technocratic policies (Basseches et al. 2021).

Until the Green New Deal framework gained traction on the national stage in 2018 (Galvin and Healy 2020), climate policies were often limited to market-based approaches. With more diverse leadership, including women, people of color and Indigenous people, a new approach is emerging that links climate/energy policy with jobs and economic justice, health, food, housing, and transportation. Several states and cities have proposed ambitious Green New Deal policies, such as New York’s Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (Boyle et al. 2021). This approach focuses on justice-oriented policies and direct investments in under-invested in households and communities. For example, climate justice proponents are now pushing for more equitable housing and community development, equitable access to clean and affordable energy, and more inclusive public engagement around climate policy development (Clifton and Kelly 2020). An expansion of the “just transition” concept includes worker protections and recognition of fossil-dependent communities and consumers (Healy and Barry 2017).